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Media Coverage of The Syrian Crisis From 2011 to 2013: 




The Syrian crisis is characterized by the intertwining of variables at the local, regional and global levels. 
The geopolitical importance of Syria and the positions of the Syrian government on many issues, most 
notably the Arab-Israeli conflict and the support of the “Resistance” in Palestine and Lebanon, radically 
divided the Syrian society and the Arab media into supporters and opponents of the Syrian government and 
created contrasting mental images of the Syrian crisis. Media not only transmit events but contribute to 
their creation as well. Media contents are formulated according to the desires and tendencies of the sender 
so that the recipients get mental images of the facts that make them adopt ideas and behaviors consistent 
with the propagandists’ objectives. For many, the media are the basic source of information and 
consequently they are the creator of thoughts and attitudes.  
 
This study tackles the coverage of the internal pivot of the Syrian crisis by Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar 
channels from 2011 to 2013; that is before the expansion of the crisis on the Arab and international levels 
and before the role of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) got larger. In addition to its relation to the 
geopolitical importance of Syria, the importance of this research is related to the influential role of Al-
Jazeera and Al-Manar channels on the public opinion of the Arab peoples. Moreover, the engagement of 
Qatar and Hezbollah in events in Syria increases the importance of the two channels which hold the agendas 
of their financers and convey the propagandas of the conflicting parties on the Syrian ground. This study 
aims at knowing the characteristics of the news discourse that is influenced by many political, economic, 
religious and military variables and at detecting the tools of propaganda. The quantitative analysis in this 
research shows the general features of the two channels’ coverage mechanism of the Syrian crisis. The 
semiotic analysis studies the denotative and connotative levels of the verbal and non-verbal signifiers. This 
eventually helps to know the mental images which the two channels desire to insert into the recipient’s 
mind. 
This research is based mainly on Agenda-setting Theory, News Framing Theory and Gatekeeping 
Theory, and based on a multidisciplinary approach. The evoked disciplines are: information and 
communication sciences, media sociology, politics, linguistics, history, propaganda and misleading, 
military sciences, sociology, and religion.   
 
The results proved that the tendency of Al-Jazeera is anti- Assad and pro-opposition by a rate of 100%, 
whereas Al-Manar’s is contrary by 100%. Each signifier mentioned in the research samples contributes to 
propaganda promotion and psychological war.  The two channels adopted several techniques which are 
known in the field of propaganda some of which are: Assertion, Repetition, Exaggeration, Name-calling, 
Glittering generalities, Reincarnation and plain folk, Recipient-credible testimonials, Bandwagon, 
Simplification, Emotional enticement, Euphemism, Diverting attention,  Lesser than two evils, Pinpointing 
the enemy, Inflicting terror and chaos, Lying and misleading.  
The study detected other means that were employed in the context of propaganda war on the screens of 
the two  channels: denying and trivializing the existence of the other, the people say the truth, more 





of the State to that of the people, alleviation of events´ severity through employing non-verbal signifiers, 
one signifier is stronger than many combined signifiers, direct and indirect adoption, direct and indirect 
bias, repeating the opponent’s propaganda, exploiting the characteristics of Arabic language, Islamizing 
events and accusing the enemy of sectarianism, animalizing the opponent and undermining them through 
exploiting the socially prevailing meanings of words, exploiting the indications of the mentioned numbers, 
mentioning the names and types of weapons, giving free rein to the recipient’s imagination through verbal 
and non-verbal signifiers, linking the feelings of hope or victory to religious phrases, showing the attitudes 
of children, disproving the other’s propaganda, the channel gives the interviewed people political trends, 
balancing between the discourses of strength and weakness, images free from a clear meaning and leading 
the recipient’s perception to the images content through the news story, exploiting the position of another 
enemy in the region, exploiting the interference of allies, stressing that the enemy is not strong and that it 
is rather brutal, indirect mentioning of the weakness of the opponent in order to justify the military actions, 
affirming the maintaining attitudes and continuation,  the significances of the camera’s angles and 
movement, exploiting non-traditional spoils, metaphors, linking all the catastrophic results to the opponent, 
a signifier on behalf of another, exploiting the characteristics of the female, integrating the statistical 
presentation with the emotional enticement, addressing the topic of ethnicities and sects indirectly, the 
journalists’ involvement in the events, human icons, and the propagandists spread their propaganda through 
mentioning or adopting that of another party.  
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The Arab world is not countries that form a homogeneous block; the administration, economy, 
political stances, social structures, as well as other factors that determine the identity of countries 
differ from one country to another in such world. This geographical region witnesses a tremendous 
spread of modern communication means in a way that cancelled almost completely the role of the 
traditional cultural means, such as the book. The modern media became the most important source 
for information and knowledge. This media is subject to the wishes and goals of its owners, which 
leads to shaping the public awareness in a way that suits such goals (Greg, 2016; Salahuddeen, 
2015)  
    In this context, public movements broke out and shook a group of countries in the Arab 
world. First in Tunisia; December 2010, then in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain. Toppling 
down the ruling regimes was the most prominent goal for these movements. For protesters, 
toppling down presidents meant eradicating corruption and dictatorship (Al-Baiyoomi, 2017; 
Janabi, 2016; Mokannawi, 2015).  
   The opposition movements are characterized by dichotomies in many ways the most 
outstanding of which are: public vs. dictator, religious vs. secular, old vs. young, man vs. woman, 
national vs. international, poor vs. rich and online vs. offline (Straaten, 2013). 
The discrepancy of the political visions created huge difference in the ways these events were 
covered. In order to describe the anti-regimes´ movements, the media set different names: the Arab 
spring, the Arab awakening, the Islamic awakening, the revolution for liberating from dictatorship, 
the conspiracy against the unity of the Arab world etc.  
The different sources, the different news frames and the selectivity of vocabulary and pictures 
gave different images of the same event. The media transfer but also create the events (Mahmood 
et al, 2014; Harahsha, 2013; Shalash, 2013; Leila Vignal, 2012).  
 
The media stances towards the Arab peoples’ movements were evidently subject to the stances 
of the owners and managers of such media. For example, Al-Jazeera Channel considered 
demonstrations in Tunis, Egypt, Libya, and Syria as legitimate public right, while it didn’t care 
similarly about the public movement in Bahrain. These demonstrations were seen as movements 
run by Shiite parties aiming at toppling down the ruling regime and at realizing the Shiite extension 
in the region. Al-Manar, the pro-Hezbollah Channel, saw that peoples’ revolutions against regimes 
in Tunis, Egypt, Libya and Yemen represent “Islamic awakening”, while its vision was completely 
different regarding what’s going on in Syria (Janabi, 2016; Mokannawi, 2015; Harahsha, 2013; 





The sensitivity of the Syrian event is fundamentally related to the stances of the Syrian 
government towards many Arab, regional, and international issues. For example, the stance against 
Israel; the viewpoints are different regarding the credibility of challenging and confronting the 
“Israeli occupier” by the Syrian government. The same applies to the question of Syria not yielding 
to the Western dictations; the Euro-American ones.  
Some see the Syrian government as a defender, resistant and preserving the Arab nation dignity, 
and defending its unity. On the other hand, some see that this government is secretly an ally to 
Israel, and works on protecting the Israeli interests in the region, but dressing the cloak of 
resistance to hide its real inclinations, so that it’s not confronted by the people who want to liberate 
“the holy land”, Jerusalem, and also the Golan Height, from Israel. The supporters of the Syrian 
government see that the goal of the opposition movements is disturbing security and stability; 
asking for reforms is a facade to cover the real intentions sought to be achieved by many anti-Syria 
countries. While the anti-government opponents see that its downfall will lead to liberating all 
Arab occupied lands (Deeb, 2015; Mokannawi, 2015; duMont, 2012; Vignal, 2012).  
 
  Critics of the Syrian government believe that the dictatorship of the Syrian regime depended 
on cultural control and imposed the ideas which glorify the personality of the leading president 
making his rank reach sacredness. The propaganda of this dictator regime nurtured sectarianism, 
divided Syrians, depoliticized and neutralized them against participating in any activity or 
expressing their views or feelings towards the situation in Syria (Magout, 2012).  Some people see 
that the most significant reasons of the Syrian crisis are: the desire of the opposition to change the 
ruling regime and to demolish corruption, unjust distribution of natural resources and wealth, 
geopolitical and economic variables that dominate the relations between Syria and the Arab and 
non-Arab countries, oil and gas, cultural violence, inequality, poverty, the hegemony of religion 
that controls the people’s behaviors, sectarianism which decides the relation of the people’s 
groups, and the armed retort of the security forces against the demonstrators. They also think that 
the opposing movement is a result of the people’s desire rather than foreign orders (Musarurwa & 
Kaye, 2016; Heydemann, 2018).    
However, the different opinion considers that western countries are the actual cause and 
conductor of these opposing movements.  In the viewpoint of this opinion, the Arab people seem 
unable to take this step on their own (Shihade et al, 2012; Eskjær, 2012). The American media 
spotlighted the views of some thinkers and researchers of the Issues of the Arab homeland who 
believe that the culture of the Arab nation and the control of the Islamic bases on thought and 
conduct disable the Arab peoples to achieve democracy (Salaita, 2012). 
 
 Sectarianism seems to be one of the most important factors of the war in Syria.  The Sunni sect 
constitutes the majority of the Syrian opposition whereas the attitude of minorities ranges between 
supporters of the government and moderate opposers (Balanche, 2018; Badran1& Smets, 2018). 
Balanche (2018) believes that Assad cannot realize stabilization and security unless he 




especially the Alawite sect. This demographic change means expelling millions of the Arab Sunnis 
and preventing them from coming back when security is back in Syria. Therefore, millions of 
Syrians were obliged to migrate and the regime controlled important areas which are considered 
gathering centers of the Sunni sect such as Idlib and Daraa. If some Sunni refugees thought of 
coming back to Syria, they would be under the regime’s mercy, which means that they would be 
humiliated. Balanche also sees that minorities like Christians, Alawites, Druze and Ismailis do not 
trust the promises of the opposition concerning protecting them in case it won and their vows of 
building a democratic Syria. Moreover, these minorities do not believe in the western promises 
concerning the international protection of them. 
  On the international level, as from its beginning, the Syrian crisis created a division in the 
attitudes of the countries. While the European countries were calling for overthrowing Assad and 
his government and for an international military intervention, China and Russia stood against these 
decisions and used the veto to prevent any military intervention in Syria. China justified its attitude 
saying that the duty of countries is respecting the national sovereignty and not using force in 
solving the international conflicts (Swaine, 2012). 
 
Such background information influenced the ways of media coverage of the events in Syria. A 
media war broke out. The Syrian channels tried their best to prove the presence of a “conspiracy 
and a world war” against Syria where media misleading is used through fabricating events and 
broadcasting them as truths. Some Arab channels that support the Syrian government policy 
followed the same course and adopted the Syrian channels as an important source for their news. 
Some media like Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Al-Manar, Syrian Space channel and Al-Akhbariya, 
exchanged accusations and insults using terms such as: instigating channel, lying channel, 
tendentious channels, a servant to the enemy, a servant to the devil. It was possible to sort the 
stance identities of the viewers and know their belongings through the channels they believe. Some 
journalists resigned because the attitudes of the channels opposed their personal stances. Some 
channel offices were shut down, the broadcast of some channels was stopped because of the way 
they covered news in Syria; Addounia Channel1 for example. This indicates the power and danger 
of the media influence by creating and directing the public opinion (Al-Baiyoomi, 2017; Janabi, 
2016; Mokannawi, 2015; Harahsha, 2013; Shalash, 2013; Leila Vignal, 2012).   
 
This study quantitatively and qualitatively analyzes the news coverage of the Qatari Al-Jazeera 
Channel and that of the Lebanese Al Manar’s of the Syrian crisis as from 2011 to 2013. It is based 
on Agenda-setting Theory, News Framing Theory and Gatekeeping Theory. The research sample 
includes news reports which deal with the internal axis of the Syrian crisis; that is what is going 
on inside Syria. The news report requires the journalist to be objective and to present facts with 
the highest degree of credibility (Al-Dalou, 1995; Al-Jandoubi, 2010). In this context, I study the 
                                                             
1 A private Syrian channel known for being pro-Syrian government. It dedicated a large part of its coverage to exposing what it called “media misleading” exercised by some 





interrelation between the verbal and non-verbal tools employed by the journalist and the channel 
to explicitly or implicitly express their attitudes towards the events and to convey the propagandas 
of the conflicting parties. In order to facilitate understanding the content of media messages about 
the war in Syria and to understand the reasons of the attitudes of the studied channels, explanatory 
chapters have been added. These include information about the history of Syria and the contexts 
of the crisis, the history of the channels and their editorial policies, in addition to the rules and 
methods of propaganda and psychological war.  
The research is based on the multidisciplinary approach. The disciplines that were made use of 
are: information and communication sciences, media sociology, politics, linguistics, history, 




- Media and Public Opinion 
Mass media plays an important, if not the most important, role in creating knowledge and 
forming public opinion and awareness of the key issues as it is considered the first source that tells 
people what is locally and internationally going on. Not only do media personnel report news, but 
they also formulate it in ways that produce social and political understanding regardless of its 
validity. Media reshapes our reality through giving mental images that influence our understanding 
and behavior towards events (Greg, 2016; Yaylaci, 2015; Willem, 2015; Van Schaik, 2015; 
BoMeiza, 2007). 
Several factors control the process of media reporting of conflicts; therefore, media coverages 
are constructed in different ways which convey contents of different, and sometimes contrasting, 
significances of the same event (Kinali, 2013). In order to analyze the process of making news by 
the media, the political directions and the economic basis of this media have to be taken into 
consideration (Yaylaci, 2015). People follow media as a means of presenting the truth yet many 
of them miss the importance of selectivity the journalist practices when framing the news, 
especially during reporting the events of conflicts. These frames produce the public opinion and, 
eventually, determine the conduct of societies towards events (Nijenhuis, 2014).  
The influence of media on politicians and decision making continually increases so much that 
it has become impossible to separate the changes in the media scene from those in the political 
field (Werman, 2015; Abdelmoula, 2012). 
Visual knowledge shapes affective and cognitive emotions (Sacco & Gorin, 2017). The visual 
content has always been the main part of the communication process in many areas. The 
appearance of digital communication technology has even doubled the role of the visual content 
and facilitated the process of receiving and grasping information. Therefore, news organizations, 
government agencies, and businesses are working hard to improve the visual content in order to 




Twitter, has been adopted as means which fulfill the desires of propagandists during conflicts (Seo 
& Ebrahim, 2016). 
 
The study of (Powell et al, 2015) has shown that images have more effect on the opinions and 
behaviors of recipients than texts when they are presented aside. However, when texts and images 
are presented together, the text has more effect on the recipient’s views regardless of the content 
of the image, while the visual content influences the behavioral intention regardless of the content 
of the text. The communication content creates behaviors emerging from emotion. For example, 
the furious retort towards the beheading of the western journalists may evoke an international 
intervention against the Islamic State (ISIS). 
 
- The Effect of the Recipients´ Connection to the Event on their Evaluation of the Work 
of Media 
A survey study was done about the opinion of the Swiss public of the news coverage of the 
French language Swiss press on the war in Syria, especially on emotions provoked by news images 
of war. The study showed that people look forward to a more profound and comprehensive 
coverage characterized by objectivity in a way that frames and sources vary especially in the case 
when the media portrays perpetrators versus victim. The Swiss public experienced three emotional 
stages during being exposed to news:  1-suffering and pity, 2- identification with the images 
content, 3- the public constructed their own views of the presented images and of the way they 
were formed through wondering about the reasons of selecting these frames; the rationality of the 
image was questioned. The public criticized bias or manipulation by the media (Sacco & Gorin, 
2017). I argue that the Swiss public’s attitude, reasoning, and criticism of media are related to their 
physical and psychological remoteness from the events in Syria; they are not deeply interested 
even if they sympathized with the Syrians. Sympathy here arises from man’s ability to project the 
situations they see or hear of on themselves. The audience’s direct connection to the event may 
prevent them from rational thinking towards what they see and hear through media. This audience 
is more emotionally than mentally motivated. Therefore, the Syrian recipient who watches the 
scenes of murder and devastation will be affected by the media messages about the war in Syria   
in a different way from the Swiss audience. The Syrians may not have the opportunity to practice 
any logical mental reasoning which investigates the nature of the news sources and frames. 
Moreover, in the case of the audience who is directly connected to the events, even if they criticized 
the media mechanism, still they would go on watching, liking and biasing to those which express 
their tendencies. 
 
The outcomes of Linda Shalash’s questionnaire (2013) on the views of the Arab audience about 
Al-Jazeera’s coverage show that the majority of the sample individuals believe that when Al-
Jazeera stopped all its programs and exclusively covered footages uploaded on YouTube, Twitter, 
and opposition sites, it increased the number of its audience. Whereas 12 % of the sample 




- The Role of Internet in the “Arab Spring” 
The facilities presented by the social media made victims, volunteers and relief organizations 
consider them as shelters where they can post the contents which they want to convey to people. 
The NeoMedia has become platforms for presenting the outcomes of wars and catastrophes like 
Tsunamis (J.Rogstadius et al, 2013). 
 
Many studies have dealt with the role social media and cell phones in the “Arab Spring” and 
conflicts, some of these are: (Doucet, 2018; Karyotakis et al, 2017; Zeitzoff, 2017; Seo& Ebrahim, 
2016; Mast & Hanegreefs, 2015; Pantti & Boklage, 2014; Howard & Hussain, 2013; J.Rogstadius 
et al  2013 ; Benkirane, 2012; Youmans & York, 2012; Trombetta, 2012; Cottle, 2011). The social 
media has been the portal where the government opposing activists can post their videos and 
transmit the live prevailing manifestations of violence, the images of demonstrations, the 
casualties, the wounded, the military and security operations, and the scenes of devastation. All 
that would not have been known without the NeoMedia.  
People, opposing activists and even some researchers and journalists employed terms such as 
the Twitter or the Facebook Revolution to signify the importance of the role of NeoMedia in the 
uprising and success of revolutions in the Arab World (Mahmood et al, 2014). Some people believe 
that the Syrian war is the most socially mediated in history and this is because of social media 
(O’Callaghan1 et al, 2014).  
The opposing Syrian activists see that the revolution would not have happened or continued 
without the internet although less than fifth the population had access to the internet in 2011 
(Trombetta, 2012). 
The appearance of a large number of the Arab bloggers and cyber activists was not sudden, 
spontaneous or emergent. It was rather an outcome of the accumulation of striving efforts to 
achieve political and human rights; the traditional media like the radio, the television and the press 
played a role in preparing the climate for the appearance of the activists in the virtual world – the 
internet (Benkirane, 2012) . 
 
The “Arab revolutions” changed the form and structure of media (Salaita, 2012). Digital media 
changed the infrastructures of visual production and circulation (Pantti, 2013). This media proved 
its ability to influence the tastes, desires and choices of followers who use these communication 
means (Isani, 2006). The role of social media was not only restricted to reporting and accelerating 
the events of the opposing movements in the countries of the “Arab Spring” but they also led to 
creating and accelerating the reactions of several countries on the local and international levels 
(Benkirane, 2012). 
 
The social communication sites are crucial for mobilization. The revolutions of Tunisia and 
Egypt inspired the Syrians after they succeeded with the aid of NeoMedia which facilitated the 
organization of protests and was a main cause of increasing the number of protesters and conveying 




but they also adopted a lot of their slogans the most prominent of which were: “The people want 
to overthrow the regime” (Kase et al, 2014; Straaten, 2013). The interactive media imposed itself 
on the Arab public. For instance, the Sudanese spend a quarter of their days following and 
participating in issues and subjects which they are interested in. 90% of them believe that 
interactive media is a means of enhancing democracy, strengthening the idea of accepting the 
other’s views, and constructing effective discussions (F.Hasan, 2017). 
 
- The Effect of Social Media on Policies 
During political crises, the companies of communication technology innovate new applications 
which are able to attract people, meet their desires and consequently make profits (Howard & 
Hussain, 2013). 
 
Social media has proved that it is more capable of influencing the public opinion than the 
traditional political discourse. It is capable of mobilizing the public and directing them to take 
quick and momentary steps in the context of their political participation (Blounis, 2015). Social 
media is characterized by its cheapness and the fast spread of information on it. Therefore, it 
succeeded in realizing political change in the Arab World (Zeitzoff, 2017; Mahmood et al 2014). 
Its role is clear in democratization. The unity of the forces of internet, the cell phone and the 
interactive media, has created new methods for telling the political accounts, especially those of 
change (Howard & Hussain, 2013). The inevitability of the role of social media in the process of 
democratization should be reconsidered. The historical, social, political, religious and economic 
characteristics of the societies which use this media have to be studied. 
 
The scholars ought to concentrate on the consequences of the changes brought about by this 
media, especially in the contexts of wars and conflicts. Analysts, decision makers and even those 
who work in the security sector have to get engaged in social media in order to grasp the 
mechanism of propagandists which leads to changing the people to extremism (Zeitzoff, 2017; 
Thompson, 2012). 
 
Peoples are not the only ones who use the NeoMedia. A lot of countries and politicians do use 
it as propaganda platforms. The Syrian presidency used Instagram as sociopolitical communication 
during the years of the Syrian crisis (Holiday & LaBaugh, 2015; Gohdes, 2014). Seo (2016)  sees 
that also dictators have strongly benefited from the means of digital communication after they 
realized the importance and seriousness of the role they play in influencing the public opinion. 
More than 75% of the world leaders have active accounts on Twitter and Facebook (Zeitzoff, 
2017).   
 
Journalists, scholars, and militants communicate and follow each other on social media 
(Klausen, 2015). U.S. policy-making during Syria’s crisis was very much influenced by the 




president Barack Obama to announce an air strike against the Syrian government but he rolled 
back and Trump performed it later. Obama’s senior advisors assured the importance of the role 
which media plays in American political decision making as it exerts pressure on the officials to 
direct their policies and urge them to make decisions in the favor of the opposition (Doucet, 2018). 
 
The leaders and governments do not use this media to make decisions or attitudes. They rather 
use it to manipulate the public such as presidents Assad and Vladimir Putin’s use of fake accounts 
through which they try to play with the public opinion (Zeitzoff, 2017). 
 
According to Ahmad Shehabat, the opposition is fighting an unbalanced and unequal war 
against the regime on both the military and communication levels. Yet, the spread of the 
opposition’s propaganda on the means of social communication had a strong influence on the 
Syrian government, the citizens, and the international attitudes which showed their support of the 
opposition.  Even the administration of the social media supported the opposition and turned a 
blind eye to a group of videos and texts which are inconsistent with the rules of these means in 
order to support the opposition in the face of the Syrian government and its propaganda concerning 
a global conspiracy. These means also omitted a lot of the comments of the government supporters 
and closed many pages of theirs (Shehabat, 2013). 
 
The Syrian war changed the components of the media scene in the country and led to the 
appearance of a substitute media that changed the direction of messages from the top (the 
authority) to the bottom (the people). The process of producing information has become 
horizontally oriented as it contained different points of view produced by the communities rather 
than the authorities. The conflict also led to the rise of media organizations trying to secure 
international acknowledgement for the journalists and to ensure their freedom in a democratic and 
pluralistic context. This led the Syrian government to have to change the media scene (Badran1& 
Smets, 2018; Issa, 2016). 
 
There is a new generation of social and political activists, educated youth who got engaged in 
the complicated political processes who formed an important axis in the democratic discourse 
against the oppressing regimes and demanded social and political changes (Shirazi, 2013). 
 
- Government Censorship in the Time of Social Media 
As a result of the Syrian government’s block and censorship on the foreign coverage of the 
events in Syria, several professional photo journalist clandestinely covered the events in Syria 
(Pantti, 2013). However, the most important thing was the social media’s granting the activists and 
citizens virtual platforms so that they could face the oppression of the political leaders. This media 
helped create a collective identity, a resistant one against the dictatorship (Seo & Ebrahim 2016). 
The numerous numbers of the technologies of communication led to narrowing the chances of the 




Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, the activists resort to other means some of which are SMS 
networks. In addition, hacker communities like Anonymous and Telecomix help the activists to 
create new software so that they can overcome the blocks set by the state (Howard & Hussain, 
2013). 
By contrast, what might happen if the governments blocked all forms of communication? The 
fighters of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the activists and refugees assured their suffering from 
cutting off communications which causes inability to communicate or post videos continuously as 
the Syrian government used to block communication in the areas controlled by the opposition 
combatants (Rohde et al, 2016). The worries of the governments about the power of social 
communication pushed them to confront the civil activists and arrest a group of bloggers who can 
be considered as substitutes for the traditional opposition leaders and the charismatic speechmaker 
because the political uprising in the Arab countries did not have the characteristics of traditional 
uprising (Pantti & Boklage, 2014; Howard & Hussain, 2013). Despite its blockage of 
communications several times, the Syrian government was aware of the importance of keeping the 
virtual existence through the social media; therefore, it employed the Electronic Syrian Army and 
was careful to the availability of the internet in the areas which were under its control (Gohdes, 
2014). 
 
Anita Gohdes (2014) believes that the social media actually worked in the interest of the 
opposing movements but the blockage of the internet by the regimes, especially in conjunction 
with military operations against the opposing people, weakens coordination among the opposition 
forces and does not allow the success of their plans. She also thinks that the murder operations 
against the civilians took place in conjunction with the internet blockage in order to conceal 
atrocities. Moreover, she expects that the decrease of military coordination among the opposition 
forces will certainly lead to the victory of the regime’s forces. That the researcher did not take into 
consideration the Arab and western support of the opposition. The armed opposition obtained very 
developed communication systems as from the first months of the Syrian crisis. These devices 
work via satellites. This assures the importance of communication as a weapon in the military 
battle (Rohde et al, 2016).  
 
Lorenzo Trombetta (2012) sees that the regime’s propaganda was prevalent on the traditional 
media using the same repeated discourse whereas the opposition’s thoughts prevailed in the 
internet and the social media trying to confront the regime’s propaganda which utilized censorship 
for support.   
I argue that the way journalists and sometimes researchers portrayed the war in Syria, especially 
in its first year, as the war of those requesting freedom against the dictator regime is more 
dangerous than censorship itself. Western news media tried hard to picture Arab uprisings as legal 
people’s movements struggling for freedom and democracy against the oppressing tyrannical 
regimes (Pantti, 2013). The journalists would make a serious mistake because of their dependence 




the Arab governments as dictator ones and positively cover the attitudes of all those who oppose 
them. This is misleading whose catastrophic results may be larger than the hegemony of the ruling 
regimes. For instance, the outcomes of the religious dictatorship may be much more serious than 
the political one. The crisis in Syria is not that of two different poles, not only a crisis of freedoms; 
many factors manipulate its events. 
Journalist work is not easy when it has to report events of whose issue the public does not know 
a lot. It is even more difficult when the journalist is not familiar enough with the language and 
traditions of the country where the events are taking place. All this affects the strength of the news 
story and, eventually, the quality of the mental images inserted into the recipient’s mind (Storck, 
2014). Taking the event’s variables into consideration influences the content of the news coverage. 
For example, in the first three months of the Syrian crisis, the Jordanian journal, Al-Majd, 
considered all what was happening as a reformist wave which included many Arab countries. 
However, the same journal later considered what was taking place in Libya and Syria a Zio-
American wave and a big conspiracy. It also stated that the events in Syria were different from the 
revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia which targeted freedom and reform (Mokannawi, 2015). 
Regardless of the validity of the fact that there was a conspiracy or not, the journal tried to cover 
the crisis in a different way when the influence of plenty of factors, especially the geopolitical 
ones, on the events was clear.  
 
- The Social Media and the Diaspora 
The NeoMedia increased the potency of the role of diaspora groups in the remote political 
activity. It is a bridge for linking the opposing people inside and outside their countries. It also 
unifies their forces in the face of the ruling regimes. The social media helped the immigrant and 
refugee Syrians and facilitated their participation in the political process. It helped their voices and 
those of the local activists reach the whole world (Pantti & Boklage, 2014; Pantti, 2013). Through 
merging the lenses of their cell phones with the social media, amateur journalists and citizen 
journalists inside and outside Syria could practice self-mediation and confront the aggression of 
the regime (Pantti & Boklage, 2014). 
 
The Syrian activists in Russia tried to mobilize the Syrians living there and to gain the support 
of the Russian people. They also attempted to exercise media pressure on the Russian officials so 
that they might control their decisions and activities (Pantti & Boklage, 2014) .  
There must be a unification of the capacities of the social and traditional media in order that 
they can realize the optimal targets. The success of the activists on the social media is bound by 
the support of the traditional media as the latter is able to promote their thoughts rapidly and 
professionally. Pantti and Boklage (2014) who assure that the government-opposing people 
availed themselves of the virtual platforms on the internet to a great extent but their success was 
strongly connected to unifying their efforts with television channels and anti-Syrian government 




process but the traditional Russian media blocked their activity and did not spotlight it which 
diminished the volume of their influence (Pantti & Boklage, 2014). 
 
The emotions and feelings of the opposing activists inside and outside the country differ. This 
is reflected in the content of their discourse on the social media. Despite the virtual participation 
in the political process, the Syrian diaspora do not suffer the circumstances and difficulties of the 
war. In contrast to the situation of the Syrians in Syria, who face difficulties and chaos of all forms, 
the Syrians abroad take part in the political activity yet without direct physical suffering or risk 
(Pantti & Boklage, 2014). 
 
- The Most Prominent Applications, the Difference of Content in relation to the 
Difference of Means 
Studies on the ratio of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube’s contribution to the events of uprisings 
differ. However, they agree on the inevitability of their contribution to reporting events and to the 
search for the international support of the opposition. The study of Deen Freelon et al (2013) shows 
that Twitter represented an important arena and an effective area during and after “the Arab 
Spring”. The opposers and supporters of Assad relied on Twitter for their political activities. 
However, the study of the content of the interviews with the combatants of FSA, activists and 
refugees assured that Twitter was not the mostly used means that helped them convey their voices 
to the world. Its influence was too limited (Rohde et al, 2016). YouTube, Facebook and Twitter 
were of the most promoting means (Kase et al, 2014). Yet, YouTube and the cell phone lens outdid 
these means in reporting the events in Syria to the audience all over the world (Howard & Hussain, 
2013). 
 
Studies that were interested in the numerical significance of hashtags on Twitter searched the 
number of mentioning a group of words or phrases which were used to express the opposing 
movements in the Arab World. It also searched the numbers of those who shared these hashtags 
and those who reacted to them. This assures the importance of social media in constructing the 
public opinion on issues of public interest (Bruns et al, 2013).  
 
The messages on social media differ according to the nature of the events themselves and the 
type of the means. For example, after the revolution in Libya, Facebook highlighted the ideas that 
deal with the role of the attitudes and demands of the active local politicians. Libyan Youth 
Movement page on Twitter gave priority to issues different from those of its page on Facebook. 
Not only did it cover issues concerning the reconstruction of Libya and performing political and 
economic reforms, but it also highlighted the feelings and aspirations of the public especially 







- Merging Social Media with Traditional Media 
Jalal Ziada (2015) thinks that traditional media could successfully cope with digital technology 
and merge it in the process of making the media content. Social media led to changing the media 
scene in the world (Mahmood et al, 2014). In the context of covering the events of the “Arab 
Spring”, several local, international and transnational channels of which are Al-Jazeera, the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), and China Daily based their news on the database spread on the 
pages of social media (Karyotakis et al, 2017). NeoMedia is an important element in forming the 
news, especially when traditional field reports from correspondents are unavailable (Eskjær, 
2012). New York Times sought help from the videos of the activist Syrian citizens which led to 
the appearance of a new media pattern, the Collaborative News Clip, where the ordinary citizen 
produces media contents that basically depend on the sentimental enticement of the recipient (Wall 
& Zahed, 2014). 
 
The long period and the complications of the war in Syria influenced the way the west media 
covered the events; it used to avoid sending journalists for the coverage. This led to the change of 
social media into the arena of production of eyewitness videos and photos and user-generated 
content by citizen journalists (Sacco & Gorin, 2017). The visual coverage of the Syrian crisis has 
been characterized by the merging of NeoMedia with the traditional one. The merging of non-
professional eyewitness footage with the professional sources has created a new type in the process 
of visual production. Mass media resorted to the help of the citizen journalist and primarily relied 
on the video footages, the texts and the tweets of the opposing activists. This applies to a large 
group of countries some of which are Belgium, Finland, Italy, Spain, Romania and the United 
Kingdom (Sacco & Gorin, 2017; Van Leuven et al, 2015; Pantti, 2013; Klausen, 2015; Pantti, 
2015). The optimistic opinion of this merging sees that the use of NeoMedia in articulating news 
may lead to the emergence of international coverage and balanced one in terms of the diversity of 
sources and views towards the same event (Van Leuven et al, 2013).  
 
The phenomenon of the citizen videographer enabled traditional media to perform live coverage 
and enabled some decision makers to react momentarily and simultaneously to all what happens 
of murder and violence. However, traditional journalists had to rely on the experienced activists 
for what was going on inside Syria in order to achieve a good selectivity process of the contents 
uploaded by the citizen journalist. Traditional media helped the voice of the Syrian activists reach 
the world (Wall & Zahed, 2014). 
The Syrian opponents see that even the regime’s traditional media was in need of modernizing 
and developing the means and methods of propaganda; that’s why the regime was obliged to resort 
to the help of social media, photographers and amateur activists. On the other hand, the amateur 
opponent activists had to turn into professional in traditional channels through selecting 





The traditional media was extremely dependent on interactive media which weakened 
reliability and verification that should be established in the process of drafting the content. The 
media process became inaccurate and void of verifiable journalistic reports (Sacco & Gorin, 2017; 
Varghese, 2013). The study of Mast and Hanegreefs (2015), of the war in Syria from 2011 to 2012, 
shows that the images produced by Syrian citizens formed a very valuable source for the Flemish 
media. This led to merging different visual framings of the war in Syria. However, it 
simultaneously caused the coverage lose its transparency and credibility to some extent due to the 
presence of unverifiable sources and undocumented excerpts as well. Dutch and Flemish 
journalists covering the Syrian conflict did not rely on trustworthy sources nor did they achieve a 
sufficient degree of an emotional-moral distance (Johansson, 2017). 
In addition to dependence on social media, there is another important factor which controls the 
process of formulating the content. The media economics controls the process of adopting the 
sources as each media allocates a limited budget to foreign news reporting. In order to know what 
is happening in Syria and due to the difficulty of access there, some media organizations adopted 
a very few numbers of specialized people who would visit the region a few times during different 
periods of time. While other media relied on generalists or sometimes on one or even two 
permanent correspondents (Vandevoordt, 2015). 
 
The quantitative content analysis of Sarah Van Leuven et al (2015) studies the diversity of 
sources in Belgian newspaper and TV news coverage of the events in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria in 
2011. The results show that journalists held onto traditional sourcing practices in the coverage of 
the events of Tunisia and Egypt while in the case of Syria, they resorted to network journalism 
practices. In many cases the Belgian journalists did not seek the user-generated content on social 
media. They rather used to copy the activists’ video footages from international news agencies or 
TV stations such as CNN and BBC.  In other words, these journalists left the task of investigating 
and cross-checking the news to other agencies and news stations.  
  
Our perception of reality no longer depends on mono-spectral imaging. Social media and blogs 
have put an end to the selectivity of the journalists who choose what they want and throw the rest 
(Welbers, 2016). However, there is another point of view. The research of Madeline Storck (2014) 
which studies the relation between professional and citizen journalists found that witness 
testimonies are also subject to Gatekeeping where those who are responsible for the 
communication process select definite sounds to be re-mediated. Moreover, the process of 
selecting the frames remained subject to the decision of professional journalists, and eventually, 
the citizen journalists´ work was limited to pumping the information into the channels´ filters. 
Depending on social media does not necessarily mean achieving freedom and giving way to the 
voices of the activists who represent different trends. The journalists are still gatekeepers as they 
select, accept, refuse and exclude the materials produced by these activists. The Syrian crisis 




visualization of the war a necessary thing to know how media constructs mental images about 
crises and wars (Pantti, 2015). 
 
According to Steve Paulussen and Raymond Harder (2014), several researches tackled the role 
of social media as sources of traditional media in certain events such as catastrophes, elections or 
crises. However, there are no researches that deal with journalists´ daily follow-up and dependence 
on social media beyond the scope of remarkable events. 
 
- Criticizing Exaggerating the Positive Role of Social Media  
The role of communication technology is intrinsically conflicting. It could lead to successes 
and progress on many levels while it may be a cause of the spread of chaos and violence on others. 
It might cause successful revolutions which achieve freedom, justice and dignity or bring about 
the superiority and control of extremists (Benkirane, 2012). 
There is a skeptic opinion about the role of social media and internet in the opponent Arab 
movements. In order to make sure of this, one has to prove the fact that revolutions could not have 
happened without this media. A tremendous accumulated amount of information and discussions 
may contribute to discouraging individuals to move rather than inciting them to do that. In contrast, 
some criticize these suspicious thoughts about the role of media. These skeptic people did not 
appreciate the role of media in making the voices of the oppressed people reach out as they were 
able to access each other and unite their word and behavior against the ruling regimes. NeoMedia 
opened the way for a different intellectual production based on unfiltered communication for 
people who have different and diverse political, cultural, economic and social horizons and visions 
which leads to attaining a change that can be radical on all local and international levels (Joseph, 
2012). 
 
The positive role of the social media in the “emancipation” movements and their development 
as saviors of peoples would be exaggerated. Some emphasize the contribution of Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube, Blogs and Instagram to creating organized civil resistance (Shirazi, 2013). This 
could be true, but it cannot be generalized to cover all communities. In the Syrian case, social 
media was not an arena of organized civil resistance for a long time. It soon changed into platforms 
calling for armament and transmitting video footages about the activities of the military opposition. 
This accelerated and reinforced the split of the Syrian society into supporters and opponents. It 
also led to dividing opposition itself into a large number of factions and platoons. Social media 
turned into real war arenas whose tools are words and images and the most prominent of whose 
ways is hacking the opponents´ pages. It is important to study the level of awareness and 
intellectual freedom of the public demanding political freedom. It is, moreover, important to know 
the level of the influence of religion – especially Islam – on the process of understanding and 
perceiving the social and political reality. Some studies highlight the danger of social media 




regimes and the western countries through showing footages that contain the scenes of beheading 
Arabs and western people (Seo & Ebrahim, 2016; Blounis, 2015). 
 
- News Frames and War 
Robin Vandevoordt (2015) sees that it is necessary to study the structural status and editorial 
identity of the media organizations. These control the mechanism and attitudes of journalists 
towards the events which are being covered. It is also necessary to take into consideration the 
social background and the affiliations of the journalists as these determine and influence their 
selection of frames. 
 
Media is blamed because of calling for and promoting the frames of war more than those of 
peace. Journalists overlook the fact that the public may be interested in the news of peace more 
than those of war. Basma Atassi  (2015) sees that press oscillates between being profession and 
business; it simultaneously seeks to earn money and convey news to people. In order not to be 
exposed to misleading and manipulation, we should recognize the purpose of each media. Johan 
Galtung, one of the founders of peace studies, sees that ‘war journalism’ pivots and concentrates 
on differences, conflicts and violence among societies and groups, while it neglects the frames of 
the reasons and results of these wars (Nijenhuis, 2014). Social media could be a substitute to 
traditional one in presenting the disastrous outcomes of wars. In the context of the events of the 
“Arab Spring”, the NeoMedia was full of images portraying the results of war and the suffering of 
people, especially after the mass massacres like the chemical aggression on the civilians (Seo & 
Ebrahim, 2016). Concerning the war in Syria, mass media played a big role in shifting and moving 
the events from peacefulness to violence owing to its selectivity of the negatively provocative 
frames of the recipients´ feelings regardless of their political affiliation. The sensitivity of the 
Syrian crisis emerges from the interlacing and complications of variants. This influenced the 
media’s portrayal of events. The coverage of this crisis requires accurate research of the manner 
in which the media frames events, selects and employs the images which influence the recipient 
public who build their understanding of events on basis of the messages of this media (Sacco & 
Gorin, 2017). 
 
In the context of war coverage, the images of victims are considered the strongest influential 
thing on the recipient due to their ability to create a feeling of sympathy and pain-sharing (Powell 
et al, 2015). This especially happens when tortured children are shown because these images can 
often be the primary stimulus of the humanistic campaigns and activities. However, the visual 
frames which media and humanistic organizations adopt narrowly showed human suffering during 
wars.  For example, they created stereotypical images such as the scene of the mother and the child 
or that of the only child. It is true that these visual contents influence the humanistic feelings but 
they diminish the true reality of the human suffering during wars (Fehrenbach & Rodogno, 2015).  
Portraying refugees as groups has been repeated and sometimes, iconic images like a homeless 




may make the recipient feel that the sender is manipulating him through stimulating a sentimental 
response in the interest of the refugees (Van Schaik, 2015). 
The limitedness or similarity of frames apply to other themes as well. The study of Jan Boesman 
et al (2015) about the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium press in covering the news of the Belgian 
combatants in Syria, shows that the selected frames were not modern yet similar to the frames 
which cover the same area, that is there is a basic point which these journals depended on. 
 
- The Effect of the Type of the Means on the Content 
The content analysis study by Tara Lackey (2015) concerning the coverage of the Syrian crisis 
in the American media assures that newspapers had better media quality than TV, especially in 
selecting the themes frames and the way of processing them in addition to larger quantity of 
sources. This made the coverage of the press, especially that of the elite, seem more thoughtful 
and fact-based in reporting than TV when it comes to foreign news events. This result supports 
that of Sacco and Gorin (2017) who considers TV less trustworthy than print media which led to 
deteriorating the confidence of the public. 
The news magazines and the public affairs ones highlighted the frames of conflict and victims 
in their coverage of the Syrian crisis between 2011 and 2012. However, the public affairs 
magazines shed more light on photographs depicting peace framing (Greenwood & Jenkins, 2015). 
 
- The Frames Are Influenced by the Policies of the Countries 
There is a strong relation between the public relations of Obama’s Administration and the trend 
of the western media coverage of the American foreign policy about the situation in Syria. The 
American attitude through the adopted agenda by the public relations of Obama’s Administration 
influenced the UN’s decisions and the media’s mechanism, way of coverage and attitudes towards 
the Syrian crisis. This assures the importance and role of the policy of prior establishing of agendas 
by using the force of the discourse characteristics (Lehimdjian, 2016). 
Mass media controls what and how we think. Not only does it control the thoughts which are 
immersed into our minds but also the mechanism of their immersing. The differences in the ways 
of covering the mass media of the Syrian crisis certainly emerge from the geopolitical involvement 
of the governments. Each media reflects the viewpoint of its national government (Godefroidt et 
al, 2016). 
The process of news formatting is affected by the media’s relationship with the event and its 
closeness to it. This is what the analysis of Judith Nijenhuis (2014) assures concluding that the 
media of intervening countries adopted more war frames than that of the non-intervening ones. 
Social variants, the closeness to the event and the relationship with it, and the media establishment 
ideological agenda which is connected to the agendas of the political actors form the most 
important factors which control the news selection practices of the following channels: The Iranian 
Al-Alam TV, (foreign Arabic language TV stations), Russia Today, Deutsche Welle, and BBC 




Al-Jazeera and FOX News channels did not cover the government opposing events in many 
Arab countries objectively. The secret stimuli and submission to the policy of the ruling 
administrations which govern the media process in these establishments led to portraying events 
in a way different from reality. Al-Jazeera covered the events provoked by the attitudes of the 
ruling family. Fox News covered these movements in a way that copes with the opinions and trends 
of the conservative and religious public who oppose Obama’s approach (Alalawi, 2015).  
The American media’s positive coverage of the Arab Spring drew attention to the process of 
demonizing Arabs which was taking place for a long time. This does not mean that the coverage 
of the Arab uprisings changed the American way of presenting the Arabs in media. Steven Salaita 
(2012) sees that the social and political circumstances in the Arab countries are the reason which 
imposed review on the American media. This media’s coverage of events was linked to the 
interests of the USA and to its vision of the situation in the Arab countries. It also showed the 
desire of the American administration to keep its control over the Arab world. 
Driven by their interests and general concerns, western and Israeli media adopted the frame of 
intimidation of the unknown future, the possibility of the spread of chaos, and the arrival of the 
extremist radicals to power (Shihade et al, 2012). Media bias arising from political affiliations and 
visions towards what is happening in the Arab world was predominant (Matthew et al, 2013) . 
 
Some studies analyzed the form of the coverage such as the number of materials, the mean 
length and so on. The study of Rawan and Imran (2013) analyzed materials that were published 
from 15 March 2011 to 14 March 2012 in Khaleej Times and The New York Time. The results 
showed differences in terms of the number of published stories whereas the mean length of 
editorials was similar. Both newspapers were against president Al Assad but they were based in 
this attitude on the predominant political and cultural affiliations. This means that the attitude 
towards Assad was the same but the reasons were different. Khaleej Times presented the conflict 
as a confrontation against the oppressing regime while the demonstrators were presented as 
victims. The New York Time presented the conflict as a struggle between the victims and 
dictatorship.  
 
From 2013 to 2014, Al-Quds Palestinian newspaper paid quantitative attention to the Syrian 
crisis while the Israeli Yediot Aharonot paid qualitative attention to it. Al-Quds concentrated on 
the Palestinian-Syrian relations and on the humanitarian dimension while Yediot Aharonot 
concentrated on the security dimension, the diligence of Israel on the security of its northern 
borders, and the probable outcomes of the Syrian crisis on Israel. The Israeli press sided with the 
groups of the Syrian opposition and expressed its fear of the interference of Hezbollah and its 
support of the Syrian government. It also repeatedly reminded the recipient of the long enmity 
between Israel and the Syrian regime. The attitude of this newspaper changed by time. In the 
beginning, it demanded the fall of the regime, but later it called for keeping it for fear of the coming 






The study of Michael Bruce (2014) showed that the coverage of Al-Jazeera, Al-Jazeera English, 
Al-Arabiya, Alhurra, and BBC Arabic of the events of many countries of the Arab Spring were 
similar in terms of the application of the human-interest frame while they were strongly different 
about political frame. Alhurra channel resorted to this frame more than Al-Jazeera and BBC 
Arabic. The interest of Alhurra in the political frame reflects the interest of the USA in the region 
and its strong bonds with many governments which are targeted by the uprising peoples. The 
content also coped with the American policy and its trends. However, the most prominent frame 
even in the coverage of Alhurra was the humanitarian one by a ratio of 57.7 %. I argue that we 
cannot always separate frames and analyze them in this way. They may not give accurate 
indications. A channel may not highlight the political frame but it implies it in all the other frames. 
For instance, in order to prove the barbarity of communism, the media may adopt a lot of frames 
like the humanitarian, the economic and that of responsibility yet the target of all these frames 
could be political. I refer to the implied frame which contains the clear external frames which can 
only be uncovered through accurate analysis processes that study the relationship among all the 
significances of the messages and contexts of media. 
 
Concerning the framing of the Russian intervention in Syria by RT and Radio Liberty, the 
Russian media was different from the English in several issues the most prominent of which are: 
civil war, Counter-terror operation, Responsibility and Humanitarian frame, Diagnostic and 
Prognostic frames. However, the main difference was about responsibility. RT strongly conveyed 
the Russian government’s propaganda through depending on the Russian officials as main 
resources of coverage (Imamgaiazova, 2016). The existence of NeoMedia obliged traditional 
media to change its ways of tackling event during crises. Absolute obscuring of events is no longer 
possible. However, this media innovated ways through which it can trick the recipient in order to 
meet the objectives of the propagandist. One of these ways is reducing the importance and 
seriousness of the event in comparison with what the opposing channels present. This is what the 
study of James Brown (2015) assures. This study shows that the Russian media’s coverage of the 
events of Ghouta in Damascus talked about the importance of this news but avoided mentioning 
the great number of casualties. In order to study any news coverage of war, it is not enough to 
search how often the mentioning or the numbers of casualties have been repeated but the contexts 
where this takes place. The mentioning of casualties is only a propagandist weapon the target of 
which is political rather than humanitarian, but it exploits the humanitarian dimension to cause a 
great effect in the interest of a political aim. This verification gives us the chance to recognize the 
side who benefits from these frames. 
The nationalization frame followed by responsibility and conflict frames dominated the 
coverage of le Figaro, the Daily Telegraph, the New York Times, and the Moscow Times before 
and after the chemical aggression on 21 August 2013. Despite the danger of using this weapon and 
its grievous results, the moral frames, human interest and the economic consequences were rare in 




situation. These solutions were rather presented in a way that copes with the suggestions of 
governments (Godefroidt et al, 2016). 
The American press allotted a larger area for covering the Syrian crisis than the one allotted by 
le Figaro and the Daily Telegraph. This reflects the political role of president Obama who manages 
negotiations and the process of searching possible solutions with the French and the British 
(Godefroidt, 2016). 
 
- The Most Prominent Frames and Trends in Covering the Syrian Crisis 
Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya took a supporting position of the regime’s opponents and presented 
the events as a movement to achieve freedom and democracy confronted by the dictator power of 
the regime through murder and violence (Al-Baiyoomi, 2017, Janabi, 2016; Kinali, 2013). 
Al-Jazeera and BBC framed the conflict in Syria similarly with some differences about framing 
Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS. Both channels assured that the dictatorship of the regime and the laws 
pressing the people were the reason why the events erupted in Syria. They also assured that the 
violent security reaction of the Syrian government led to spreading the conflict and widening it to 
include other regions, that the opposition is protecting the people, and that it is victorious. In the 
frame of responsibility, the two channels blamed the government forces and considered them 
murderers of the people (Salih, 2014)  
 
Mikkel Fugl Eskjær (2012) studied the coverage of the Danish press in the first months of the 
crisis employing quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the themes and sources namely of 
the journalist existence in the region. The results point out that the newspapers kept in mind the 
pre-crisis prevailing vision about a group of themes such as the relation between Islam and 
democracy, the Arab Israeli conflict, and the ability of the Arab communities to achieve actual 
reforms. 
 
The study of Minos-Athanasios Karyotakis (2017) shows that China Daily and Al-Jazeera 
concentrated on public affairs, the Civil unrest, while BBC highlighted public affairs, civil unrest 
and human interest. It also allotted a wide area to express the political agendas of the actors. 
Some researches paid attention to analyzing the content of the propaganda of the conflicting 
parties which spread on the pages of social media. Seo and Ebrahim (2016) studied the content of 
images on the main pages of president Assad and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and 
Opposition Forces from April 2013 to September 2014. The pages of president Assad presented 
him as a fearless strong man who depends for his attitudes on the people’s support and the strength 
of the relationship with the foreign allies. The pages of president Assad avoided the images of war 
and held those whom they called terrorists wholly responsible. They assured the role of Assad in 
protecting the country from them. On the other hand, the images on the pages of the opponent 
coalition were mainly about the threats of the enemy, the losses of civilians, unity and victory. 




perform some actions against the government’s violence. They also shed light on the economic 
problems like homelessness and hunger. 
 
The study of Michael and Conlin (2016) showed that these transnational media: Al-Jazeera, Al-
Jazeera English, Al-Arabiya, Alhurra, and BBC Arabic did not concentrate on the frame of conflict 
during covering the crisis. The researcher justifies this by the existence of possible fear of a violent 
people’s reaction. I suppose that the contrary is true. This media provoked people, stimulated them 
and created violent reactions. To verify this, there must be a study of the verbal and non-verbal 
significances and the contexts of each significance regardless of the traditional classifications of 
frames. The Rhetorical Discourse Analysis of “the Opposite Direction” program, which is 
transmitted on Al-Jazeera channel, from 2011 to 2012 shows that the channel concentrated on the 
following themes: militarizing the revolution and accepting the military interference, overthrowing 
the regime and dismantling the army, convergence between the Syrian regime and the Israeli 
enemy, purposelessness of nationalist thought and resistance, and remanufacturing the enemy. 
Israel was substituted by Iran. Al-Jazeera’s rhetoric discourse facilitates the process of the 
recipient’s acceptance of the idea of overthrowing the regime with all its establishments not only 
its persons. The channel assured that it was impossible for the Syrian people to solve their issues 
through peaceful ways and pointed out militarizing the revolution with misty and vague concepts 
(Harahsha, 2013). 
 
In many cases, the media never reflects the vision of communities towards issues. For instance, 
there is a very big difference between what media promotes as a solution to the Syrian crisis and 
what the Syrian people think. According to a questionnaire in 2015, the Syrians thought that the 
diplomatic solution of the crisis was the optimal one, whereas the media strongly promoted and 
called for the military one and presented it as a people’s choice (Kamal, 2017). The media 
presented the crisis as a conflict between the good and the bad people. It was and still is promoting 
the necessity of humanitarian interference but in the form of military war. This media absented the 
actual danger which the countries taking part in the war will suffer from (Greg, 2016).   
 
The study of Basma Atassi (2015) showed that the media which supported the Syrian 
government and that which opposed it neglected the attitudes of the antagonist and did not give it 
the chance to appear. The coverage was one sided. This media as a whole did not highlight the 
suffering of the residents of Damascus before and after the peace initiative in Barza.  
Neither did Western media tackle the situations in the areas controlled by the Syrian 
government nor did it allocate space for the views of the Syrians who support the president. On 
the contrary, the Russian and Syrian media covered the events in the areas controlled by the Syrian 
government and presented the opposition as terrorists but they did not concentrate on the human 
casualties resulting from the Russian and Syrian bombardment (Doucet, 2018). It is necessary to 
study the contexts where the pro-Syrian government channels withheld the news of the human 




means putting it in the contexts which serve the government’s propaganda. For example, instead 
of its being about murdered people because of the government bombardment, the news would 
mention the victory of the Syrian army on the terrorists and killing large numbers of them. Here 
the media mentions the casualties due to bombardment, but it legalizes this military action.    
 
The Syrian crisis is characterized by the participation of kids on the field and media levels. S. 
Layla (2013) believes that the kids in Syria took a significant part in the democratic social 
movements. The uprising erupted in Daraa by children who wrote statements on the walls 
threatening Assad. Then they were faced violently. They were present in most of the 
demonstrations all over Syria side by side with the adults. I have not found research studying the 
media coverage of kids except for highlighting them as victims of war. Therefore, this point is 
going to be one of the pivots of this study. 
 
- Visual and Rhetoric Frames 
There is a strong relationship between selecting words and ideology in the context of the media 
coverage of the events in Syria. The terminology employed to describe the Syrian crisis was 
strongly different in the Iranian, Saudi and Turkish press. The ideology of each country controlled 
the mechanism of media. Manipulation of the recipient’s mind is performed through inserting 
ideologies into the language of media. The readers may get deformed unreal images about the 
events and this certainly influences their understanding and visions. The ideologized media 
discourse is able to change, reverse, reinforce, produce and reproduce facts. For example, 
overstating positive side of realities and under-stating negative side of realities presents facts in a 
way different from what they really are (Amin & Jalilifar, 2013) . 
 
The Syrian presidency realized the necessity of targeting audience through media so it adopted 
Instagram in 2013 in order to address two different audiences: Arabic speaking and English 
speaking. The qualitative analytic approach by Steven Holiday et al (2015) shows that the Syrian 
presidency had addressed the two types of audience equally when it discussed the themes of youth, 
social support and religion. However, clear differences were noticed in the visual rhetoric of 
patriotism and nationalism where the English-speaking audience was more targeted. As if the 
Syrian presidency was attempting to introduce Syria as a strong and unified country. However, the 
discourse of arousing sympathy prevailed in the messages addressing the Arab audience.  
 
The official Syrian newspapers attached importance to slogans. The slogan of “The People 
Want Bashar Al Assad” was the full-page headline of Al-Baath newspaper on 30 March 2011. 
This means that this newspaper which had represented Al-Baath Party for long decades changed 
its stiff language and used one of the most prominent slogans of the Arab Spring, namely “The 
People Want to Overthrow the Regime” (Trombetta, 2012). One of the targets of this research is 
analyzing the significances of the slogans which the channels highlight and the contexts in which 





Critical discourse analysis by Kais Kadhim (2018) studies the ways of presenting the image of 
the Syrian government and the opponents in the pro-government Syrian online news; Cham press. 
The outcomes reveal that the media ruling ideology controls the process of selecting the words. 
Therefore, the opposition was described with negative words such as: terrorism, the universal 
conspiracy and groups against the law, while the government was described with positive words 
like: victorious, the protector, the savior . The study also disclosed that Cham press adopted the 
terms used by Assad in his interviews or speeches. 
Analyzing the discourse of president Bashar Al-Assad with TV news networks and international 
press reveals that president Assad disapproved the Syrian identity of the opposition as he 
considered all the opponents external mercenaries who belong to Al Qaida and spread its ideology 
which form danger on the region and international security. According to him, opposition works 
for an external conspiracy the aim of which is achieving the interests of foreign countries in Syria 
and the Arab Home (Merz, 2014).    
 
- Coverage of the Chemical Aggression  
Some studies tackled the media coverage of certain themes and “prominent events” like the 
chemical attack on Ghouta in Damascus (Greg, 2016). The study of Dinerstein Anton (2015) 
depended on the framing analysis to study the coverage of the privately owned newspapers (the 
Financial Times and the Kommersant) of the chemical aggression on Ghouta on 21 August 2013. 
The study of James Brown (2015) compares the Russian media coverage with the coverage of the 
USA, UK, and France of the chemical attack on Ghouta in Damascus. The results showed big 
differences between the Russian media and the others in terms of selecting the frames and the 
sources. The essential reason of these differences is the political culture of each country and the 
difference of criteria and visions. The differences mainly pivoted on style of reporting, determining 
responsibility and estimating the stimuli, and portraying the role of Russia and the western forces. 
Russia concentrated on justifying its attitudes and its interference in the Syrian affairs. In spite 
of its different party affiliations, Russian media is characterized by common points which unite it 
about the coverage of the Syrian crisis. This may be attributed to the lack of media freedom. 
Through its interference in the Syrian affairs, Russia presents itself as the primary defender of 
countries’ independence and sovereignty in the face of America. While the western media was 
stating the inevitable readiness of the dictator regime to launch a chemical aggression, the Russian 
media was slow and wondered about the necessity of taking such a step and about the timing of 
this event and its contexts (Brown, 2015). ETV’s position was neutral and it did not charge the 
regime of murdering people with the chemical weapon (Salih, 2014). 
 
In their coverage of the chemical aggression, The Washington Post, The New York Times and 
the Lebanese newspapers depended on the officials as sources. They chiefly concentrated on the 
conflict frame and the diplomatic efforts of many countries to solve the crisis. Quantitatively, the 




the parties which own them but their coverage was more thematic than that of those of the USA. 
The American newspapers were based on the frame of moralities and described the chemical 
aggression as a war crime whereas the Lebanese newspapers did not adopt this frame on the same 
level. The Lebanese newspapers seemed as if they had been desensitized, maybe due to the 
frequency of crises and wars for several years. The Lebanese newspapers depended on the views 
of the foreign officials while those of USA restricted themselves to the opinions of the American 
officials. This indicates that the coverage of the Lebanese newspapers is a reflection of an 
“international” view while those of the USA reflect the perspective of the USA only (Cozma & 
Kozman, 2018). 
 
The study of Dianne Akkerhuis (2013) displayed that BBC, in its coverage of using the 
chemical weapon, adopted perspective of the Syrian civilians and victims while CNN highlighted 
the viewpoints of the Syrian and American peoples together. Al-Arabiya strongly embraced the 
perspective of the Free Syrian Army. However, Al-Jazeera covered the positions of the 
international community, the Syrian community and relatively the attitudes of the Syrian regime. 
The channels ways of covering the theme of using the chemical weapon by the pro-Assad soldiers 
differed. BBC concentrated on the idea of the Syrian regime’s use of the chemical weapon against 
the people while CNN highlighted Obama’s political attitudes towards the Syrian regime. Al-
Arabiya channel held Hezbollah responsible for bombarding the civilians with the chemical 
weapon. Al-Jazeera concentrated on the possibility of using the chemical weapon in the Syrian 
war and on the possible international reactions to this matter. 
 
Concerning the selection of sources, BBC employed many sources except the sources of the 
Syrian government. Moreover, the footages may be considered unreliable as they are produced by 
local residents. The coverage of BBC was classified as subjective. The coverage of CNN on the 
face of it seemed objective but the results disclosed that it was subjective. Al-Arabiya channel was 
subjective to a great extent especially when it depended on vague and unknown sources and 
adopted words and metaphors that had several explanations. Al-Jazeera was classified as objective 
because it depended on diverse sources and quotes that include the views of the conflicting parties 
(Akkerhuis, 2013). The dependence of the channels on sources of diverse tendencies and quotes 
which include the views of all the conflicting parties is not enough to make them objective. It is 
quite important to study many verbal and non-verbal significances embraced in the contexts which 
deal with the different views. The implicit aim of mentioning a declaration of a military leader in 
the Syrian army could be mocking the government’s propaganda. So, this is one of the targets of 
our research: studying the contexts of mentioning the perspectives of the conflicting parties. 
The concentration of research on “prominent events” such as the chemical aggression makes 
the value of casualties connected with that of the weapons used against them. It also links the 
importance of the international movements and positions to the “non-daily events”. I do not deny 




principle, I see that our research should focus on the daily details of the Syrian crisis and consider 
each event of it a “prominent event”. 
 
- Covering Asylum and Refugees     
The study of Rebecca Wallace (2018) searches the coverage of eight Canadian English-
speaking newspapers of the crisis of Syrian refugees from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2016. 
The research proves that the news frames greatly changed throughout the conflict and before and 
after the federal elections in Canada. Before the elections the conflict frame predominated the 
news. However, it changed into humanitarian frame and sentimental enticements in the interest of 
the refugees after the spread of the image of three-year-old Kurdish kid Alan, who became an icon 
and a tool to attract people’s emotions in the interest of the refugees. During and after the elections, 
the theme of repatriating and integrating the Syrian refugees became the dominant frame. 
 
The western media suffers from double standards. When it described the situation in Syria, the 
Mainstream Western media focused on the frame of human tragedy especially for the part 
concerning children’s news (Doucet, 2018).  However, this soon changed when it was about the 
refugees coming to the European countries.  These refugees were often described as a danger on 
security, economy and the stability of the host countries (Zeher Abid et al, 2017). Although the 
non-government organizations and newspapers discussed the issue of refugees in 2015, there is 
considerable shortage in tackling and framing this theme. In addition, editors select dimensions 
and details that lead to influencing policies towards the theme of refugees. People only know about 
the refugees through the images they see in the media (Hoyer, 2016; Van Schaik, 2015) . 
 
The coverage of Fox News and CNN of the situations of the refugees needs adopting more 
diverse and more accurate sources. The frames were selected to meet the agendas and desires of 
media to attract the audience and persuade them (Campanella, 2017).   
The coverage of the Austrian newspapers of the issues of refugees from 2015 to 2016 was 
characterized by stressing the frame of security and economic threats more than focusing on the 
humanitarian frame and the basic information about the situation of the refugees. This coverage 
contributed to deterring the integration of refugees into the Austrian community (Greussing & 
Boomgaarden, 2017). The position of Sweden towards the theme of refugees and receiving them 
is considered the most positive one (Berry et al, 2015).  The victimization frame portrays the need 
of refugees to help as they suffer from circumstances beyond their will and ability to solve the 
crisis (Greussing & Boomgaarden, 2017). 
 
The frames of covering the Syrian refugees by the British newspapers are not similar. The 
Guardian and The Telegraph covered the events in different ways that cope with their political 
trends. The left-leaning, The Guardian, strongly adopted a welcoming attitude towards the Syrian 
refugees and sustained this position even after chaos spread and many aggressions happened. On 




the refugees, and this attitude became even stronger from 2015 to 2016 (Tavassoli & Jalilifar, 
2019).    
 
The neutrality of the non-host countries of refugees and the big geographical distances that 
separate them from Syria must lead to neutral and objective media coverage concerning the theme 
of the refugees in comparison with that of the host ones. Studies indicate that the refugees host 
countries use more metaphors than the non-host ones (Zeher Abid et al, 2017). 
The Jordanian newspapers were not interested in the issues of the Syrian refugees despite their 
being part of the region. Most of the contexts which dealt with the theme of the Syrian refugees 
were about the help they get from Jordan and the other countries (Al-Mazahra, 2016). In general, 
the content of the Turkish audience messages about the refugees on Twitter was positive which 
reflects the image of the host people (Öztürka & Ayvazb, 2018) . During the interviews, the 
feelings and attitudes of the Americans towards the refugees varied and contradicted. Some 
welcomed them and considered helping them something necessary out of humanitarian stimuli. 
However, the others expressed their worries about the economic outcomes because receiving a 
large number of refugees may influence the jobs occupied by the Americans in addition to the big 
danger resulting from receiving individuals who belong to extremist terrorist organizations (Yigit, 
2017). The different ways in which media covered the war in Syria created a crisis in determining 
“the identity of the Syrian crisis”. On one hand, the interlacing variants were simplified and the 
problem was presented as a conflict between activists demanding freedom and a dictator regime. 
On the other hand, the activists were presented as terrorists whose coming and shaking security 
and stability frighten countries.  
 
- Media and Terrorism 
As from its beginning, the Syrian crisis attracted foreign combatants who came from several 
regions all over the world. As from 2012, a lot of volunteers from North Caucasian origins formed 
an international nucleus of Mujahedeen to which “believers” in the Islamic issue and in defending 
Muslims can join. The Arab and international reactions about the intervention of “Mujahedeen” in 
the Syrian crisis varied. Some welcomed the participation and others considered the practices of 
combatants extreme violence and terrorism. The appearance of other fighting groups which came 
to the region to take part in the war in Syria led to creating conflicts and bloody dissensions among 
the “Jihadi” groups (Souleimanov, 2014). 
 
The study of Talal Alshathry (2015) about the coverage of Al-Jazeera and CNN of ISIS from 
June to October 2014 discloses that the coverage of both channels was episodic. CNN shed light 
on the conflict frame while Al-Jazeera adopted the responsibility and economic-consequences 
framing. As for the sources, CNN depended on American officials, while Al-Jazeera depended on 
other media. It focused on the danger of ISIS and its control on Syrian areas, whereas CNN 




Hellmueller, 2016). According to different results, Al-Jazeera took a positive position of the Free 
Syrian Army, ISIS and Al-Nusra altogether (Salih, 2014) . 
 
The image of the Syrian opposition suddenly and shockingly changed from moderate to Al 
Qaeda-linked groups in the content of a lot of Mainstream Western media. The reasons of this 
change were not clear and not well reported (Doucet, 2018). 
The study of Viktor Johansson (2017) analyzes the coverage of the Swedish newspapers of the 
frame of the Syrian combatants from 2016 to 2017. The term “combatants” here refers to the 
individuals who travel to Syria in order to join the armed conflict. The results show that the image 
of these combatants was negative in the newspapers and their actions were considered as problems 
and dangerous social phenomena. 
 
The coverage of the newspapers of the Syrian combatants in Flanders and the Netherlands 
between 2012 and 2013 highlighted the ‘terrorist’ frame and stressed that the stimulus which 
guides the movements of the fighters was religious (Islamic) more than secular. The journalists 
selected their vocabulary such as “the victim and the terrorist” as a result of their abidance to the 
societal construction of the issue. The term “victim” was often used with the purpose of signifying 
the danger of extremists on the moderate Muslims (Berbers, 2015). Powell (2018) sees that this 
sort of coverage links Islam to terrorism. Viktor Johansson (2017) believes that linking between 
Islam and terrorism requires investigating the religious trends of the journalists and the 
newspapers.  
However, at the same time, the fighters themselves Islamize their movements. The Flemish 
extremist organizations used the term “Martyr” in order to legalize their activities and present them 
as solutions to problems arising from the dominance of the western and secular culture on the 
Islamic nation (Berbers, 2015)  . 
 
Maura Conway (2008) sees that the fact that information is power has become known by 
everybody, governments and peoples, but also by terrorists and their audience. The true victory, 
especially these days, is strongly related to the supremacy of the propaganda stories. One cannot 
undermine the ability of the propaganda of ISIS as it developed its communication mechanism in 
form and content through employing the most modern technology in order to influence the 
recipient (Gates & Podder, 2015).  
Terrorism employs social media to serve the jihadists’ operational strategy in Syria and Iraq. 
ISIS is there on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and the other interactive media. Its propaganda tools 
enabled it of polarizing a lot of people to take part in the war (Veilleux-Lepage, 2014; Klausen, 
2015). Social media is being used to prepare and perform crimes and operations of aggression 
against the civilians. Therefore, governments, especially the forces of intelligence and security, 
should be prepared to face this danger. The problem is that social media is renewable and its 




stop in order to keep up with these changes and understand them to eventually face the danger of 
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The research aims at studying the news coverage of the two channels, Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar 
of the Syrian crisis from 2011-2013. This crisis has two aspects; internal and external. The external 
aspect is excluded; for example: the Arab conferences, international conferences, the opposition 
activities abroad, meetings and workshops. This study focuses on the internal aspect of the Syrian 
crisis: anti and pro-government movements, the security and military situation, and finally the 
results and repercussions of the war between the conflicting parties; that is, how did the channels 
cover what is happening on the Syrian soil, not outside? There is one exception which is the 
coverage of the refugees outside Syria. The research seeks to know how the situation of the Syrian 
refugees and displaced people inside and outside Syria was covered.  
The aim of the research focus on the internal aspect of the crisis is the desire to analyze deeply 
some details which reveal the mechanism of the media while covering an event characterized by 
sophistication and complexity, an event where variables overlap so that the news coverage 
becomes a complicated and sensitive issue. Applying the minimum requirements of objectivity or 
career ethics might be very difficult, if not impossible. The other aim of only focusing on the 
internal aspect of the Syrian crisis is the desire to study the Syrian event within its local and 
national boundaries. That is studying the Syrian-Syrian conflict, the conflict between the people 
of the same country. How did the contradiction of the Syrian visions manifest? How has the fight 




-  What are the resources the channels relied on? Were these channels able to send their reporters 
to cover the events on the ground? Was the presence of the reporter in the news reports full or 
partial3? What was the orientation of the sources towards the Syrian government and its actions? 
Is it pro, neutral, or anti? What are the main contexts in which the sources of conflicting parties 
are called?  
-  What are the news frames on which the two channels have focused? How can the word and 
picture, selected in a way that suits the editorial policies of the channels, create different and 
conflicting mental images; how were the events given two radically different faces? 
-  How were the pro and anti-government public movements portrayed? What are the 
requirements and aspirations of the Syrian people? What is the significance of being selective of 
the Syrian mottos by the channels and repeating them in the news reports? 
                                                             




-  How was the security and military situation covered? Where was the main focus: on the 
military activities of the government or on the military activities of the opposition? What are the 
military activities of the government? What are the military activities of the armed opposition?  
- What are the outcomes of the conflict? On what war consequences have the two channels, Al-
Jazeera and Al-Manar, focused?  
- Did the two channels report the propaganda of the government and the opposition? Why and 
within what context? What are the bases of such propaganda?  
- How has the personality of the Syrian president Bashar Al-Assad been portrayed by the two 
channels? Within what contexts?  
- Who are the effective personalities inside Syria? Have the two channels iconified particular 
personalities and presented them as effective public symbols on the ground? Who are these 
characters? 
- What are the ethnicities and religious sects that have been highlighted in the media? In what 
contexts? 
- What are the solutions to the crisis and what is the future of Syria according to the orientation 
and coverage of the two channels?  
- Have the two channels relied in the news coverage on live videos, info-graphics, photos? What 
is the visual content of the reports; what are the visual frames adopted by the two channels? 
- What are the characteristics of the news rhetoric of the two channels? Have the channels 
adopted the direct (declarative) or indirect method? Has the news discourse contained implicit 
messages? Has the exaggeration or simplification method been adopted? 
- What are the significations of the icons and nonverbal signs? 
- How could the channels create contradictory mental impressions amongst recipients through 
directing the film material and through selecting vocabulary and terminology? 
- What is the general orientation of the two channels regarding the conflicting parties? What 




- Revealing the mechanism of the news coverage by Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar of the Syrian 
crisis from 2011 till 2013.  
- Identifying the characteristics of the media rhetoric by the channels being studied under the 
influence of many political, religious and ideological variables; also under the influence of 
methods and goals of financing these media outlets. What happens to news when the channels turn 
into ideological conflict fronts? What are the tools of media attack and defense in the state of war? 
- Revealing the tools of the media war, misleading and propaganda, the tools that are provided 
to create news rhetoric and to create mental images that suit the editorial policies of the channels; 






Research Time Limit 
 
The time limit of the research is specified from mid-March 2011- the beginning of the Syrian 
crisis- till December 2013.  The reason why the research covers only three years is that events in 
Syria reached a different stage at the end of 2013. This was the time when the role of Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) started growing gradually and affecting strongly the course and outcomes 
of the crisis (AbuRomman et al, 2016). Thus, a new stage started regarding tackling the Syrian 
events; at the Arab and international levels. The Syrian issue was no longer a local issue; rather, it 
came to be internationally and media-wise a regional conflict whose parties are some Arab 
countries like Saudi-Arabia and Qatar, and some other countries like Turkey, Iran and Israel. This 
conflict also turned into a direct and obvious war of interests between Russia and the USA. The 
Syrian soil became a platform receiving militant fighters who came from different countries; each 
one of them carries his own sender's message. Many media, analysts and specialists have adopted 
the term "civil war" to describe what is going on in Syria during the first three years of the crisis. 
However, the unconcealed intervention of the regional and international forces changed the 
characteristics of the Syrian event and the characteristics of the media discourse on this event 
(Tokmajyan, 2014).  
 
The Importance of the Study 
 
The Syrian crisis is locally, regionally and internationally interlacing and complex. The 
geopolitical importance of Syria and the positions of the Syrian government towards a lot of issues, 
the most prominent of which are the Arab-Israeli conflict and supporting the “Resistance” in 
Palestine and Lebanon, divided the Syrian society and the Arab media into extreme supporters and 
opponents of Assad and created contrasting mental images of the Syrian crisis (Deeb, 2015; 
duMont, 2012; Vignal,  2012).The value of this research is connected to the geopolitical 
importance of Syria, especially in the frame of the Arab-Israeli war. The Syrian regime introduces 
itself as the resistant and anti-Zionist occupation regime and that is why it is exposed to a universal 
conspiracy in the context of what is called “the Arab Spring” (Deeb, 2015; Merz, 2014). I argue 
that the Arab-Arab, Arab-Israeli, Arab-Iranian and Arab-international relations are different, 
contradicting and conflicting. These relations feed the Arab societies with discord based on 
sectarian, political, economic, social and doctrinal grounds. They also influence the mechanism of 
media and the content of its messages. The media coverage of the Syrian crisis is performed in the 
context of these differences and disagreements. The study of the news coverage of the war in Syria 
requires profound understanding of these facts in order that the explicit and implicit news 
discourses can be grasped. The complexity of the Syrian crisis data and the division of the views 
of analyzers and researchers on the role of the Syrian government and Assad in the Arab issues 
created difficulty concerning describing and classifying events. Everybody sees things from the 
corner of their convictions and the media was influenced by this division which caused a crisis of 




The importance of this research is also connected to that of Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar, especially 
in terms of their ability to influence the public opinion. As from its beginning; 1996, the Qatari 
channel, Al-Jazeera, drew the attention of the Arab and international public opinion concerning 
the way of its coverage of wars and sensitive issues; locally and internationally (Harahsha, 2013; 
Miladi, 2005). Qatar is considered an important regional and international player whose role 
cannot be undermined. Al-Jazeera began financed and supervised by the Qatari royal family 
(Abdul-Nabi, 2015). The Syrians were influenced by the messages of the channel as from its start. 
That time the Syrian media was owned and controlled by the government sector or by the 
supporters of Al-Baath ruling party. Many issues which were considered taboo topics could not be 
tackled, especially those related to Al-Assad family in addition to sectarian ones and political 
thoughts different from those of Al-Baath party. However, as from the beginning, Al-Jazeera 
discussed all these topics and criticized the ruling regimes, which made it seem as the channel that 
expresses the concerns and interests of the Arab citizen. In this way, Al-Jazeera strongly dominated 
the Arab media arena (Kinali, 2013; Abdelmoula, 2012; el Oifi 2004). There is another viewpoint 
which supposes that Al-Jazeera is only a developed form of the Arab official media that aims at 
promoting the regimes’ policies and legalizing all their decisions and actions (Harahsha, 2013). 
 
Al-Jazeera’s coverage of events in the countries of the “Arab Spring” drew the attention and 
interest of both ordinary people and researchers (Abdul-Nabi, 2015). According to Shalash, Al-
Jazeera took the lead in covering the opposing movements of the Arab regimes so much that some 
believed that the channel was the cause of launching the “Arab Spring”. Al-Jazeera cancelled its 
traditional programs and only covered the revolutions, one after the other. It employed all the 
programs, interviews and reportages to talk about the latest events in the Arab world. Its success 
in covering the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt inspired the other Arab peoples (Shalash, 2013). 
Abdullah M. (2012) assumes that Al-Jazeera played an important part in supporting the Egyptian 
revolution and caused its success through intensified and deep coverage. This led to bring about 
an important political change in the Arab arena (Abdullah, 2012). Nevertheless, some Al-Jazeera 
officials see that the channel was late in reporting the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt and that it 
did not participate in fueling the situation. On the contrary, it was very slow as these topics are 
considered very sensitive. This slowness made the staff of the channel receive calls from the Arab 
audience accusing them of complicity against peoples (Shalash, 2013).  
 
A lot of viewers think that Al-Jazeera’s credibility led to the success of the Egyptian revolution. 
Contrary to that, another viewpoint believes that Al-Jazeera went out of professional limits and 
was an influential actor which triggered events. The channel did not restrict itself to coverage; it 
rather participated in creating the movements. The third viewpoint, however, sees that there is 
great exaggeration when talking about the role of Al-Jazeera in the success of the revolution as its 
true role does not exceed normal reporting (Abdullah, 2012). 
Al-Jazeera was exposed to severe criticism due to divergence in its coverage of the opponent 




Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria while it did not pay the same attention to the uprisings in Yemen, 
KSA and Bahrain (the allies of Qatar and the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council). It 
supported the uprising in Libya and introduced it as a legal rebellion while it adopted a very weak 
position towards the Bahrain Uprising (Abdul-Nabi, 2015).  
Al-Jazeera was also criticized because, in the context of its coverage of the Syrian uprising, it 
depended on unreliable and uncertified video footages and information which led to a negative 
change in the views of many people about the Qatari diplomacy. The coverage of the channel of 
the chemical attack on Ghouta in August 2013 was a propaganda in the interest of the foreign 
policy of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Abdul-Nabi, 2015). Nevertheless, at the same time – as 
we saw in the Previous Studies –the coverage of Al-Jazeera was considered as an objective one 
with a diversity of sources (Akkerhuis, 2013).  
 
The criticism directed to Al-Jazeera did not lessen its importance as a source of information 
and a prime mover of events. Many analyzers, politicians, opinion leaders and presidents such as 
Obama followed Al-Jazeera channel to know the events in the Arab countries as from the end of 
2010. The success of Al-Jazeera in drawing the attention of opinion leaders and presidents made 
it an influential tool in the regional and international policy (Abdul-Nabi, 2015). The most 
prominent reasons which made me choose Al-Jazeera are: the difference of the attitudes of Al-
Jazeera between a revolution and another; the divergence of the results of scientific research  about 
the coverage of the channel of the “Arab Spring”, especially concerning the Syrian issue; 
considering Al-Jazeera an objective channel only because it covered the views of the conflicting 
parties with neglecting the contexts in which these views were presented; the resignation of some 
Al-Jazeera media personnel due to the coverage of the events of the Arab Spring , especially in 
Syria (Shalash, 2013); closing the offices of Al-Jazeera by many Arab regimes during the “Arab 
Spring” (Abdullah, 2012); and finally because of the deep – negative or positive – effect on the 
audience, opinion leaders and  political leaders by this channel. 
 
Al-Manar channel represents Shiites in Lebanon and it is considered the main carrier of the 
ideology of Hezbollah (Matar, 2006). Through this channel Hezbollah introduces itself as a 
resistant against the Israeli aggression and a defender of Lebanon, especially in the south. Al- 
Manar’s popularity increased after its continual coverage of the Palestinian Intifada and the war of 
Hezbollah with Israel which forced the latter to withdraw from the Lebanese south (Conway, 
2008). Hezbollah’s media tools are able to contribute to forming the so-called “New Middle East” 
even in a way different from that which the USA administration envisages (Conway, 2008).   
 
Al Manar’s discourse is different from other Arab channels. It is known for its seriousness and 
commitment to issues of special interest for society.  The channel’s programs continually change 
in order to keep up with the aspirations of Muslims and non-Muslims. Its committed treatment of 




introduced it to the Arab society as a respected channel which is suitable for the family (Baylouny, 
2009). 
 
Al-Manar always links the speeches of Hezbollah   directed outward to the party’s policies and 
its aspirations concerning the Lebanese society. It also paves the way of Hezbollah to establish its 
projects away from military issues. Al-Manar gives way to discussions among all the Lebanese, 
not only those who belong to the Ideology of Hezbollah. Moreover, it pays noticeable attention to 
the youth group and considers it the nucleus of the future. Therefore, the channel sees that its duty 
is to resist the western media and policies which influence these young people, especially the 
females (Baylouny, 2009).  
 
Hezbollah is considered an influential force politically and militarily not only in Lebanon, but 
also in the Middle East. Its popularity grew gradually and reached the zenith after its victory on 
Israel in Lebanon in 2006. However, its military interference in the Syrian events made it lose a 
considerable part of this popularity (Harb, 2016; Eric Lob, 2014; Tokmajyan, 2014). The public 
opinion viewed the interference in Syria as a step emerging from several motivations. Some see 
that the reason is religious in interest of protecting those who belong to the Shiite sect and 
spreading this sect. Others consider the reason political and ideological as Hezbollah   seeks to 
politicize some aspects and religious disagreements in order to attract the supporters and push them 
to adopt actions that please the party and achieve its political and geostrategic targets and interests 
(Shalabi, 2015; Tokmajyan, 2014).  
 
Some welcomed the military intervention of Hezbollah in Syria, while others severely 
condemned it and considered that Hezbollah neglected the true enemy, Israel, and contributed to 
murdering the Sunni sect on a sectarian basis so that it could support the regime in which those 
who belong to the Alawite sect occupy high leading posts. Yet, the General Secretary of Hezbollah 
negated these charges considering its interference a duty to protect Syria, the skeleton of the axis 
of resistance which is formed of Syria, Iran and Hezbollah. Moreover, he considered the 
intervention a necessity to protect Lebanon through a preventive war against the Islamic extremist 
(Harb, 2016; Tokmajyan, 2014). 
 
Those who criticize Hezbollah believe that it supports a tyrannical oppressing regime whose 
principles contradict those of the members of Hezbollah who have introduced themselves as 
supporters of the oppressed for a long time (Harb, 2016; Shalabi, 2015). Many Arab societies do 
not believe the propaganda of the Syrian government and Hezbollah   concerning their resistance 
against Israel and refuse using Hezbollah of such a ground to justify its military interference in 
Syria. The Palestinian factions which were previously supported by the Syrian government did not 
support the regime against the people, which assures the illegality of Hezbollah’s position (Shalabi, 




as many Lebanese Shiites oppose this intervention and consider it the cause of their children’s 
death (Lob, 2014). 
 
The reaction of Hezbollah towards the “Arab spring” varied in accordance with its ideological 
attitudes towards the governments. It supported the people’s movements which opposed the ruling 
dictatorships that are supported by the United States and that avoid confronting Israel. It intensified 
the right of the demonstrators in the democratic change. It also recalled religious concepts such as 
jihad and martyrdom in the context of its describing the “Arab spring”. However, the uprising in 
Syria confounded Hezbollah which could not persist with its supporting position of the Arab 
peoples against the regimes; it had to support the Syrian government, its ally and supporter of its 
project of resisting Israel (Shalabi, 2015). 
 
Despite the importance of Hezbollah’s relationship with the Syrian government and the 
importance of Al-Manar as a superior channel in Psychological war (Calabrese, 2013; Daher, 
2011), there is a shortage of research which tackles Al-Manar’s coverage of the Syrian crisis. 
Hezbollah’s relationship with the Syrian state; the contradiction of its position towards the 
uprisings of the “Arab Spring”; the split of the Lebanese and Arab public opinion about the concept 
of resistance and the contradiction of the principles which Hezbollah advocates; Hezbollah’s 
military intervention in Syria; and the subordination of Al-Manar´s editorial policy to all these 
variables makes the research on the mechanism of this channel of covering the Syrian crisis an 
important task. 
 
This study could contribute to enriching the researches which deal with propaganda, media 
misleading and media war which is subordinated to military and political war through studying the 
relation between the verbal and non-verbal significances; studying the signs in their multiple 
contexts; and analyzing the relation between traditional and modern media through studying the 
quantity and contexts of adopting sources. Several studies searched the significances of source 
repetition (Van Leuven et al, 2015), but I think that number significances are not enough to 
understand the mechanism of media at the time of war; contexts must be studied. Researches 
concentrated on “prominent events” in the Syrian crisis, but this study deals with the coverage of 
the daily events throughout three years. I suppose that this accurately uncovers the policy of the 
channels towards the Syrian crisis as the prominent events may require special coverage methods 




Regarding the news sources: 
Because of imposed censorship by the Syrian government on Al-Jazeera Channel, the 
opposition sources became the first news source which the channel adopted, and the base upon 




of the sources of Al-Jazeera opposed the stances and activities of the Syrian government. Al-
Jazeera has tried to prove its objectivity by calling pro-regime sources, but the contexts in which 
they were put serve the propaganda of the armed and unarmed opposition.  
The Syrian government did not impose censorship on Al-Manar Channel. Still, the channel 
reporter was not the first Source of the information. Al-Manar adopted the media rhetoric of the 
pro-government Syrian channels. Al-Manar took these channels as a very important news source. 
The channel exercised self-censorship because its news frames where formed according to what 
supports the propaganda of the Syrian government. Al-Manar relied on opposition sources to prove 
the Syrian government's propaganda. That is to say fighting the opponents through using their 
weapon. 
 
Regarding the news topic: 
1.  The public movement: 
The opposition public movement according to Al-Jazeera is a revolution of freedom, dignity, 
and liberation from the tyranny of the dictatorship and corruption. Al-Jazeera did not cover the 
pro-government public movement; rather it touched upon it incidentally and very quickly. The 
contexts in which pro-Assad processions were mentioned were offensive against the Syrian 
government. I argue that contexts are means of warfare with defensive and offensive 
characteristics. 
However, for Al-Manar there is no genuine opposition public movement. Rather, it is a military 
movement by outlawed people supported and financed by Arab and international parties who have 
interest in the downfall of the Syrian government. Some terms may indicate a movement against 
Assad but they have been placed in “defensive” contexts in support of government propaganda. 
Al-Manar was committed to covering public movement supporting the Syrian government and 
president.  
 
2.  The militant activities of the conflicting parties: 
Al-Jazeera focused on the military activities by the government and portrayed the government 
army forces and the Syrian security forces as a wild beast swallowing everything that comes in its 
way, or as a fire burning everything hysterically. Al-Jazeera covered the militant activities of the 
opposition, but in the less percentage compared to that of the military activities of the government. 
The picture of the armed opposition varies on Al-Jazeera Channel. Sometimes it is portrayed as a 
strong arm facing a very criminal regular army and defeating it, and sometimes the military armed 
opposition looks like an army only able to defend, a kind of powerless army that needs military 
support. Al-Manar coverage of the military activities by the government and by armed opposition 
varied according to necessities and requirements of the stage. The channel sometimes portrayed 







3. Outcomes and repercussions of the conflict: 
Priorities of the two channels were different in terms of showing the outcomes and 
repercussions of the war. Al-Jazeera focused on mentioning the civilian deaths and presented them 
as victims of the criminality of the government. Al-Manar focused on mentioning civilian deaths, 
the regular army soldiers, and the people who died because of the armed opposition in a way that 
serves the propaganda of the Syrian government. 
There is a radical difference in the way the two channels tackled the subject of refuge, 
displacement, economy and services situations. The news coverage was not in favour of all the 
components of the Syrian people; rather, there was media alignment.  
 
Regarding Al-Assad personality and other official and none official personalities: 
The two channels did not continuously tackle the personality and activities of the Syrian 
president Bashar Al-Assad. Al-Jazeera made use of this news item for the purpose of criticizing 
and instigating against the political and military course by Assad, whereas, Al-Manar promoted 
the positivity and good behavior of the president. The channels iconified some personalities who 
became in the media symbols for freedom fighting, steadfastness and challenge. 
 
Regarding ethnicities and religious sects: 
The frank tackling of the stances and situations of the Syrian ethnicities was incidental and 
superficial. The contexts within which the situations of the ethnicities and circumstances of the 
people belonging to religious sects - considered as minorities in Syria - carry significance which 
was employed by Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar to confirm the mental image drawn by these channels 
about the reality of the Syrian crisis. Sectarian-wise, the channels used vocabulary and pictures 
that could indirectly instigate sectarian schism and violence. 
 
Regarding the solutions to the crisis:  
In its reports Al-Jazeera did not present a clear solution to the crisis; rather it used to broadcast 
provocative expressions encouraging Syrians to continue with their public movement, whether 
peacefully and militarily till the downfall of the government. Al-Manar did not clearly and 
precisely tackle the possible solutions to the Syrian crisis. For Al-Manar the Syrian army should 
win over the conspiracy, which indicates implicitly that the solution to the crisis is by regaining 
control over all regions by the Syrian government. 
 
Regarding the techniques of discourse and images:  
The two channels relied on videos more than on info-graphic and photographs.  
Regarding the psychological war applied through media being studied, the direction of the news 
material was an important weapon in influencing the emotions of the recipient, hence on the public 
opinion. Al-Jazeera followed the exaggeration method while Al-Manar followed the method of 
simplification or euphemism many times. Adopting the method of exaggeration by Al-Manar was 




The two methods of exaggeration and simplification where followed through selectivity of the 
news topics, selectivity of vocabulary, selectivity of pictures, showing or hiding voices contained 
in the videos, the tone of the voice of the journalists, and through the body language of the Syrians 
who expressed their stances. 
Al-Jazeera discourse varied between being direct and indirect. This discourse included explicit 
signifiers and other sentences that have implicit and allusive significations. Such implication tells 
the desire of Al-Jazeera for being reserved sometimes in order to present itself as an objective 
channel. It also tells the desire of this media to influence the recipient in different ways like the 
literary style; styles that are able to plant and feed thoughts and feelings amongst the target 
audience. 
Al-Manar adopted the direct and frank rhetoric. However, this rhetoric always included 
propaganda purposes serving the stances of the Syrian government. That is to say, we can consider 
that the goals of the massages are the implicit significances the channel sought to be received by 
the recipient. 
Sometimes Al-Manar used the method of implication or intimation. That was in particular 
context where such method serves the influencing power of the news message over the viewer. 
 
Regarding the orientation of the channels concerning the conflicting parties: 
The bias of both Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar is definite. Al-Jazeera supports the opposition; it is 
the TV platform that adopted and highlighted strongly the rhetoric and propaganda of the 
opposition. Al-Manar supports the government; its news coverage is an extension to the coverage 




The research population is all the individuals, objects or elements that share the same 
characteristics which can be observed (Bin Morsli, 2003; Misbah, 2007). It is the sum of similar 
messages whose characteristics the researcher wants to know (Tamar, 2007). The population is the 
total sources where the content to be studied was published or broadcast (Abdul Hamid, 2009).  
There are two types of the research population: the target population and the accessible 
population (Abdul Hamid, 2009).   
 
The target population is all the units the researcher wants to study. Hence, it is sometimes 
characterized by the large number and widespread to the extent that it is very difficult and maybe 
impossible to study it completely. On the other hand, the accessible population is the population 
that can be accessed out of the target population. The researcher chooses it through the process of 
sampling. This population is considered representative, in terms of characteristics, of the target 





The target population for this study is all the news and news reports by Al-Manar and Al-
Jazeera which tackled the internal aspect of the Syrian crisis (events on the Syrian ground not 
outside) from the year 2011 till 2013. Exceptionally, the topic of refugees outside Syria was added 
to the internal aspect of the crisis. 
News is a media material whose job is to transfer information – objectively - about incidents 
and new events that are current and important for the recipient. News is information about a topic 
which we didn't know about before. A piece of news answers the following questions who? What? 
When? Where? How? Why? (Al-Dalou, 1995; Al-Yaseri, 1987; Khaddour, 1982).  
A news report is a media material in between the short fast news and the journalistic 
investigation whose job is to show realities, their backgrounds and their details (Al-Dalou, 1995; 
Al-Hamamsi, 1993). A news report includes all the elements that are included by the news but in 
a deeper and more elaborated way. A report is an expanded piece of news (Al-Jandoubi, 2010; 
Adham, 1984).  
News and news report are the first stage of information. The reason why the study focuses on 
news and report is because they are the keystone upon which the second stage of information is 
based, which is the stage of explaining and analysing by the specialists (Al-Jandoubi, 2010; Jawad, 
2002; Adham, 1984; Khaddour, 1982).  
 
The accessible population for this study 
The electronic website for Al-Jazeera includes news texts and video news reports about the 
Syrian crisis. Searching for texts is done by using keywords. Therefore, it is difficult to confine 
the number of all texts (the number of pieces of news) which tackled the Syrian case being studied. 
Regarding the video reports, the channel dedicated a special archive for such reports. This part of 
the archive does not include texts. It only includes video news reports4. 
 
The search service in Al-Jazeera archive related to news reports enables the researcher find the 
required reports quickly and accurately. This is because the archive is classified according to the 
names of countries, dates and news reports headlines. It’s enough to choose the name of a country, 
for example Syria, and specify the dates of the required reports, from March 2011 till December 
2013, so the total number of reports will be shown on the screen. Accordingly, 3891 is the total 
number of the reports which tackled the Syrian event from March 2011 till December 2013. On 
average this is 1297 reports for each year, which means four reports on average for each day. 
 
Regarding Al-Manar Channel, when the researcher defined the research population –in 2014 – 
the channel consecrated a link on its main page of the website specifically dedicated for the Syrian 
issue. It included texts and video reports starting from the year 20105. It wasn't easy to confine the 
                                                             
4   Al-Jazeera Channel, Reports’ library,    http://www.aljazeera.net/multimedia/reportslibrary  available on 30 May 2017.  
5  In the year 2016 the formatting of the electronic website of Al-Manar Channel was changed. The special section about the Syrian crisis was deleted on the main page of the 
website, but the archive includes special section about news related to Syria. 




number of news items which tackled the Syrian crisis from the year 2011 tell the year 2013. The 
search services and the channel archive do not allow performing this operation easily. 
In the year 2011 the electronic website of the channel included news texts more than video news 
reports. In the year 2012 the website included video reports, but not continuously. Sometimes there 




The research goals and questions lead the researcher during the process of selecting the content 
to be analyzed (ELO S. & KYNGA, 2008; Mohsen, 1973). A sample must be chosen when the 
number of the research population is very big and there's no possibility to analyze it all (GAO, 
1996; Toaima, 1989). The sample is a partial group of this population (a limited number of items) 
that can be made use of to help the researcher do without studying all the items of the population 
(Abdul Hamid, 2004; M. Hussein, 1983; Mubarak, 1992). 
 
There are some conditions that must be met in the sample (Humam, 1983). This sample must 
be representative of the population out of which it is drawn (Duncan, 1989). It must represent a 
reflection of the basic traits and characteristics of the research population (M. Hussein, 1983). The 
issue of representativity is considered a controversy. Sheldon Gawiser (1997) asks the question 
explaining the concept of the sample: how can you meet 1,000 people only and probe their opinions 
and then claim that you know what 250 million Americans think of? Therefore, the process of 
selecting the sample must be accurate in a way it takes into consideration the capability of the 
selected sample to represent the characteristics of the whole research population (Mubarak, 1992).   
 
Having equal opportunities is considered another condition for selecting the sample. Every 
individual in the research population must have the opportunity to be selected within the sample 
(M. Al-Hassan, 2009; Atwi, 2007). The researcher should avoid being biased too (Al-Assaf, 1989) 
because the goal of any scientific research is to explain a particular phenomenon with objectivity 
as much as possible (Neuendorf, 2002). Selecting accurately representative sample to the research 
population is considered a proof of the objectivity of the researcher (Alabd & Azmi, 2009). Such 
representation leads to meeting one of the most important conditions for content analysis, which 
is generalizability, which is the ability to apply the results of the sample analysis to all items of the 
research population (M. Hussein, 1983; Atwi, 2007). 
 
- Types of samples 
There are two types: probabilistic samples and non-probabilistic samples (Tamar, 2007). In this 
study the two types were adopted in order to achieve the goals of the research. 
Because the research problematic has been confined to studying the news coverage of the 
internal (local) aspect of the Syrian crisis, and because the external aspect has been excluded, 




stances of countries regarding the crisis in Syria, the purposive sample had to be adopted. It is a 
kind of non-probabilistic sample that does not rely on coincidence and where the analysis units are 
not chosen randomly, rather according to characteristics and standards set by the researcher so that 
the sample can serve the goals and problem of the research (Tamar, 2007; Alabd & Azmi, 2009; 
Abdul Hamid, 2004;  Ayyad, 2007). A purposive sample was drawn which included a collection 
of texts and video news reports which tackled the following subjects: public movements which are 
pro and anti-government, military and security situation and the results of the conflict from 2011 
- 2013. 
 
One fault of the purposive sample is the likelihood that the researcher could be biased when 
selecting (Atwi, 2007, Tamar, 2007). Moreover, such sample requires initial exploring or reading 
of the files that will be studied so that the materials that suit the problem are selected. The desire 
of the researcher to obtain genuine knowledge is the most important factor that enables him avoid 
being biased. I seek such knowledge and I seek achieving the goals of the research very honestly. 
Therefore, the sample was drawn on the basis that the media material includes the subjects to be 
studied regardless of the orientation of these subjects (Pro, anti or neutral). 
Then a simple random sample was drawn out of this purposive sample. Random sample is one 
kind of probabilistic sample. The units are selected by coincidence and randomly. This provides 
the opportunity to all files, as it also helps the researcher avoid being biased. The simple random 
sample is used when the research population is homogeneous (Atwi, 2007; Zugheib, 2009; Tamar, 
2007). 
 
- Sample size 
The sample size plays an important role and it affects the credibility and the accuracy of the 
results of the analysis (Mubarak, 1992).  As a general rule, the big size of the sample is suitable 
for the quantitative analysis because the larger the number of the studied units the higher the 
representativity is. On the other hand, the qualitative analysis can make use of a small sample 
where the discourse analysis requires elaboration and being deep (Mubarak, 1992; Abdul Hamid, 
2004).  
 
There is no fixed and absolute size of the sample. It varies according to the goals and techniques 
of the research (M. Hussein, 1983). But some researchers think that it's better to achieve balance 
between the number of research population units and the number of the sample units drawn out of 
it. If the number of the research population units is 3000 it would be better to have a sample per 
cent of 10% out of the per cent of this population (Tamar, 2007).   
 
Upon deciding the sample size, I took into consideration the following variables: 
- The representative ability of the sample, thus enabling the researcher generalize results to the 




- Achieving balance between the number of the research population units and the number of the 
sample units.  
- And finally suiting the sample size of the analysis techniques that are adopted and this was 
the most important variable that controlled the sample size. 
The total number of Al-Jazeera reports which tackled the Syrian crisis from 2011 till 2013 was 
3891. It wasn't possible to classify all files according to the subjects being tackled; have they 
tackled the internal or external aspect of the crisis? That is why I assumed that half of the number 
of the reports tackled the internal aspect of the Syrian event and the other half tackled the external 
aspect. Accordingly, the sample size was decided so that it does not go beyond 150 reports. 
In relation to Al-Manar, it wasn't possible to calculate the number of files that dealt with the 
Syrian crisis from 2011 two 2013 accurately. Therefore, I assumed that the total number is 3000 
and I divided this number into two halves assuming that the first half tackled the internal aspect of 
the Syrian crisis and the second half tackled the external aspect. Accordingly, the sample size was 
decided so that it does not go beyond 150 reports. 
 
It was taken into consideration that the higher the percentage of homogeneity among the 
population units the less we need to increase the sample size (Abdul Hamid, 2009; Tamar, 2007). 
Because the two channels have different methods for formatting and archiving media materials, 
the samples were drawn in slightly different ways. 
 
- Al-Jazeera channel sample 
The Al-Jazeera archive enabled choosing a purposive sample for each month separately starting 
from March 2011 until December 2013. The number of the purposive sample units for the three 
years is 674 units6. A random sample was drawn out of this purposive sample of 136 video news 
reports. Four reports were selected from each month, so the number of the 2011 files was 40 
reports. The number of the 2012 files was 48 reports. The number of the 2013 files was 48 reports. 
The total number is 136 news reports. 
 
- Al-Manar channel sample 
Because a report is an expanded piece of news, I wanted to focus on studying the video news 
report. But this was not always possible for Al-Manar Channel. Its archive did not always include 
video reports about events in Syria between 2011 and 2012. This shortage carries significance that 
will be studied later on. So, it was necessary to use news texts instead of video reports. The news 
texts had to be available on the electronic website of Al-Manar Channel. These texts also reflect 
the characteristics of the news rhetoric by Al-Manar TV. So, Al-Manar sample includes (written) 
news texts and video news reports7. 
 
                                                             
6 Details are in the index.  




The formatting of Al-Manar archive did not enable following the same method that was 
followed for drawing Al-Jazeera sample. That is, it was not possible to draw a purposive sample 
for each month separately starting from March 2011 until December 2013. Thus, it was not 
possible to draw four files for each month separately. So, a total purposive sample for the three 
years was drawn from 2011 until 2013. The number of units for this sample is 363. Then a random 
sample was drawn.  
 
The sample size for each year was different: Al-Manar sample for the year 2011 includes 26 
files, 10 video news reports and 16 written news texts. Al-Manar sample for the year 2012 include 
43 files, 31 video news reports and 12 written news texts. Al-Manar sample for the year 2013 
includes 71 video news reports. The total number of the studied files is 140 files. 
 
The difference in the sample size related to each year is due to the method of drawing the 
purposive sample on the one hand but more important than that to the density of the media 
coverage. Al-Manar Channel intensified its news coverage of the events in Syria gradually; the 
Year 2013 witnessed an intensive coverage of the events8. 
 
- Summary of sample drawing 
A purposive sample including files that tackled the details of the crisis and the events taking 
place inside Syria, not outside, was drawn. Then out of this purposive sample, a random sample 
was drawn. The sample of each channel was divided into 3 sections: the sample of year 2011, the 
sample of year 2012, and the sample of year 2013. The portion between the number of the available 
research population units and the number of drawn sample units was taken into consideration. The 
number of Al-Jazeera units is 136 video news reports. The number of Al-Manar sample units is 
140 news texts and video reports. 
 
- Additional procedures related to sampling 
The videos and texts of the random sample were saved on an external hard drive because they 
are the content to be studied. As for the purposive sample, it was enough to mention headlines, 
dates, and the internet links related to the units of this sample9. 
 
Research Techniques  
 
There are two techniques for analyzing given information: the quantitative statistical analysis 
and the qualitative analysis. At the start of the research the researcher should decide whether the 
manifest content is going to be studied or the latent content as well (ELO & KYNGA, 2008).  
                                                             
8 The researcher observation.  





According to many researchers including (Hansen et al, 1998; Shoemaker and Reese 1996): 
combining quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis is very necessary to achieve a 
comprehensive understanding of the meaning. This combination also enables knowing the possible 
effects of the communication message over the recipient. Content analysis is considered ideal 
when the communication content is the basis for inference (Paula M, 1999). Harold Lasswell 
(1927) entered the content analysis as a systematic method for studying mass media, especially 
when related to studying propaganda. 
 
The adopted method in this study is a common method in the field of media content analysis. 
The methods of content analysis, the quantitative and qualitative, were combined. Many 
researchers agreed on the importance of this type of methods (Charaudeau et al, 2001; Cheveigné, 
2000; Cheveigné, Boy, Galloux, 2002). Because it allows analyzing explicit and implicit messages 
of the content through classifying and evaluating main concepts, symbols and subjects (Reitz, 
2004). This type of analysis represents deductive processes (related to quantitative analysis) and 
inductive processes (related to qualitative analysis) of the content (Charaudeau et al, 2001; 
Cheveigné, 2000; Cheveigné, Boy, Galloux, 2002). Differences between these two types have 
diminished and the number studies that do not try to match between them in relation to media 




- Its definition and conditions 
It is a research technique (Weber, 1990; Holsti, 1969; Berelson, 1952;  Lasswell, Lerner and 
Pool, 1952) “that uses a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text” (Weber, 1990). It is 
used for objective, systematic and quantitative description and identification of specified 
characteristics of messages. It is used for making replicable and valid inferences from what is said 
on a given subject in a given place at a given time (Holsti, 1969; Berelson, 1952; Krippendorff, 
1980; Lasswell, Lerner and Pool, 1952). A researcher can apply it to any communication material 
(Al-Assaf, 1989).  
Written, verbal or visual communication messages can be analyzed by this analysis technique 
(Cole, 1988). It is not limited to type of variable measured or context of messages (Neuendrof, 
2002). 
 
Many researchers including (Stemple, 1982; Jean de bonville, 2000; Berelson, 1952) agreed on 
the necessity that the quantitative analysis of the content should be exclusive to the manifest 
content. In other words, it should be exclusive to describing what man said or wrote frankly. The 
quantitative analysis is only interested in describing what was said, not what wasn't said. 
According to Dey (1993), when reading the data the questions are: Who is telling? Where is 




There is another approach that is different from this descriptive approach of the content.  Some 
researchers represent the inductive approach where they consider that analysis goes beyond merely 
describing the content towards reaching indications about the components of the media process 
and about the implicit and latent meanings in the content (Al-Assaf, 1989; Abdul Hamid, 2009). 
 
So, the quantitative content analysis should be done according to scientific controls that can be 
summarized as follows (Neuendorf, 2002): 
Objectivity, which means avoiding the least form of bias. Validity This is achieved when the 
obtained results served the research goals. Generalizability where the research results can be 
generalized to the research population. Replicability This requires setting a coding list, so that it 
works as coding guidelines. Neuman (2014) refers to the necessity to plan coding processes very 
accurately so that replication can be possible.  
 
- Analysis units 
 
They are the content to be analysed (Abdul Hamid, 2009; M. Hussein, 1983). Analysis units 
should be accurately defined in terms of number and size (Al-Assaf, 1989; Alabd & Azmi, 2009).  
There are several main units for analysis: the word unit, phrase unit, sentence unit, thought unit, 
topic unit, and the context unit (Tamar, 2007). Analysis units could be challenging for the 
researcher. The thought unit could be made up of a sentence or several sentences and it could 
include several thoughts. Therefore, choosing it as an analysis unit could make the analysis 
processes sometimes difficult (Catanzaro, 1988; Graneheim&Lundman, 2004). On the other hand, 
when the analysis unit is very small, like a word, this may lead to a fault in analysis where the 
word would be decontextualized, which affects the meaning (Graneheim & Lundman, 2004).  
 
According to the research questions, the analysis unit could be a complete message, extracts 
from pages, conversation or interview (Robson, 1993; Polit& Beck, 2003). According to 
Graneheim and Lundman (2004) the best analysis unit should be big enough to represent the 
research population, and small enough to be kept in mind. 
 
The current study adopted the complete media material as an analysis unit, whether this material 
is a video news report, or a written news text. 
 
- Analysis categories 
 
Content analysis encompasses a number of distinct stages: pre-analysis, coding, categorization 
and inference (Bardin, 2001). This analysis aims at quantitative categorization through grouping 
vocabulary and thoughts under categories according to well-defined coding guidelines. This 
process should lead to answering research questions and research hypotheses (Stemler, 2001; 




The process of classification and categorization are related to fragmentation. More precisely, 
as a technique, the content analysis seeks to explain the contents of communications by breaking 
down the message and reconstructing it into categories (Blanchet, Gotman, 1992; Abdul Hamid, 
2009). 
Categorization seeks to organize and group under the same category things and people who 
share the same nature (Block henriette et al, 1984; Cavanagh, 1997). It also aims at dividing the 
content into a system of thoughts directly related to the research goals and problems, thus it allows 
avoiding the other thoughts and contents which do not serve these orientations (Block henriette et 
al, 1984; M. Hussein, 1983). 
 
The conditions of the categorical system or grid of analysis. 
Categories should meet some conditions, the most important of which: comprehensiveness; 
categories should allow classifying all the content to be analyzed. Exclusivity; that is lacking the 
possibility for classify the same content under more than one category at the same time. 
Objectivity; categories should be codable in a similar way by all coders. Relevance; categories 
should answer the research questions. Homogeneity; categories should be subject to a unified 
principle that controls their organization. Finally, productivity; categories should achieve 
important and rich results and should lead to indications that serve the research hypotheses (Bardin, 
2001; M. Hussein, 1983). 
Categorization includes specifying a coding list, which is considered a guiding process about 
the steps of coding. According to Neuman (2014), the accurate planning of the coding processes 
can make replication possible. All basic and subcategories should be procedurally accurately 
defined (Maurice Angers, 1997). 
 
- Types of categories 
 
There are no typical categories that work for all kinds of research (Block henriette et al, 1984). 
But there are two kinds under which all categories can be classified (M. Hussein, 1983; Tamar, 
2007). The first category is the form category. It represents all categories which describe the 
procedure or method of presenting or displaying the content. That is, it is interested in answering 
the question: How was it said? The second category represents the content categories. They are 
the categories that describe meaning and thoughts that are included by the content, and they are 
the categories that are interested in answering: What was said?  (Khosh & Sarai, 2011).  
 
In this study, form categories were excluded, including a category that defines the form of the 
media material; whether it is a report, investigation, news story etc. This is because the research 
sample studies only the news report which is a video material that is broadcast by a channel within 
news bulletins. This material includes details related to the piece of news for the purpose of 
clarifying it. That is to say, it is an expanded piece of news which includes interviews with 




The study also relied on how the channels classified these materials; Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar 
classify them under the news report category. This is also the case for news texts which have been 
included in the research sample because video reports were not always available.  
 
The duration for each report is also considered a form category (Tamar, 2007), but it was 
excluded. The duration of each report in the report sample ranges between 1 to 5 minutes. On Al-
Jazeera, these reports were repeated throughout the day. Al-Jazeera broadcast news every hour. 
Al-Manar also repeated reports in news bulletins throughout the day. Excluding this category was 
on the basis that they are unable to provide information necessary for the research; on the one hand 
they are not relevant to the research questions and problems and on the other hand, the time of the 
reports being studied, from the viewpoint of the researcher, may not be very significant for several 
reasons: a report is part of a complete news context; news introduction read by the presenter, then 
the video report is to be broadcast. Experts might then be contacted for the job of explaining the 
news. Secondly, repeating these reports throughout the day; the report might be three minutes, but 
it might just be repeated more than 10 times throughout the day. Thus, the time allocated for the 
same report might be half an hour on a daily basis. It’s worth reminding as well that the channels 
did not allocate one report dealing with the Syrian crisis for each day, rather the number of reports 
sometimes was more than three or four reports on the same day. Third, if the report duration was 
short, no more than two minutes, but the report might however be loaded with expressions which 
affect the recipient and influence him strongly. In this case the importance of time duration 
diminishes. 
 
The quantitative study was exclusive to some content categories. In fact, the main goal for 
adopting quantitative analysis of the content in this study is to support the qualitative analysis 
results; achieving a higher level of objectivity in evaluating the orientation of the channels towards 
the Syrian crisis. The analysis categories where set so that it is possible to describe the general 
characteristics of the news coverage by Al-Manar and Al-Jazeera. Most of the details will be 
studied within the space of qualitative analysis. In other words, the study was not interested in the 
frequency of all the details to be studied, rather it was interested on studying these details 
qualitatively. 
 
- Pre-study or pre-knowledge 
There are two viewpoints related to the pre-knowledge (pre-reading) of the content to be 
analysed. The first one considers that DATA could not lead to theories or visions unless the 
researcher is fully aware of all the details of these DATA (Polit& Beck, 2003). The second one 
considers that all categories must be selected as well as variables and coding lists without 
conducting any pre-study, in order to avoid bias (Neuendorf, 2002).  
 
In this study the pre-knowledge took two forms: non purposive and purposive knowledge. The 




event. Getting to know the content of news (the research population) was momentary for the 
researcher. Observing the coverage of Al-Jazeera, Al-Manar, Syrian channels as well as other 
channels of the Syrian crisis was a priority for the researcher regardless of choosing this topic as a 
research problem. For example, there was a deep curiosity to know the identity of the sources 
adopted by the channels. The big difference in selecting the news frames by channels was the most 
prominent motive for watching and observing many channels with different orientations in order 
to view the Syrian event from different perspectives and from different angles. Such knowledge 
of the research population can be described as the general automatic knowledge. Such knowledge 
is characterised by the general consciousness of the general mechanisms for how channels work.  
 
Automatic knowledge also grew when the researcher experienced the responses of Syrian 
people to the messages of the TV channels. The researcher experienced division and schism among 
the different sections of the society; each component has its own channel or channels that speak 
for them. Anti-government opposition people took Al-Jazeera as a means that represent the 
viewpoint of the people who are rebelling against the ruling dictatorship. On the other hand, people 
supporting this government regarded Al-Manar and the Syrian channels as the channels of truth, 
which broadcast reality with complete honesty and credibility and defy the “misleading” and 
“deceiving” by the channels that represent the opposition viewpoints. 
 
Curiosity was the most prominent motive for inquiring: How did the channels shape their 
stances? How could these stances affect the awareness and vision of the Syrian people towards 
events in Syria? Syrian people watched non-Syrian channels which they trusted and believed, 
possibly because the nature of how they covered the events in Syria suited the wishes and 
orientations of such people. All these variables encouraged the researcher to observe the role of 
the media in enhancing or distorting the awareness of the recipient. Accordingly, a group of 
research categories were set as an initial list. Some of them represent generic categories like the 
source category, the source orientation category, the topic category and the content orientation 
category. And some others represent main and subcategories for these generic categories. 
 
The other form of pre-knowledge came according to a purposive study of the research sample. 
This procedure was necessary for the final selection of the main and subcategories so that these 
categories become comprehensive to all points to be analysed quantitatively. For example, the 
source category: main and subcategories were put initially before conducting the initial study of 
the research sample, and after doing this study some categories were added or deleted so that they 
become comprehensive to all form of the sources form. The same happened for the other 
categories. In short, categories were put before and after the initial purposive study of the research 
sample. 
 
In fact, the pre-study enabled the researcher achieve a better understanding of the content to be 




define the points that should be analysed quantitatively so that they answer part of the research 
questions which need statistical results. Whereas the qualitative analysis answers the other part of 
the research questions which require non-numerical results. 
 
The pre-knowledge of the content of analysis did not affect the objectivity of the research. Such 
knowledge did not create any bias, bearing in mind that bias is: "Inclination or prejudice for or 
against one person or group, especially in a way considered to be unfair”10 or “A concentration on 
or interest in one particular area or subject”11. 
The researcher aims at achieving an accurate knowledge of the mechanism of the news coverage 
by these channels of the Syrian crisis. The selected categories include the points that should be 
analysed quantitatively without neglecting or focusing on points more than others. 
 
- The categories for this study 
 
The quantitative analysis categories were divided as follows: Generic categories, main 
categories, and subcategories. There are six generic categories which are: the source category, the 
source orientation category, the topic category, the visual content category, the category of 
displaying the voices included in the videos, and the content orientation category. 
 
Some generic categories include main and subcategories and some others are exclusive to main 
categories only because they are enough to achieve the desired outcome. 
 
Hence, the content analysis grid was composed of six generic categories, 24 main categories, 
and 49 subcategories. The total number is 79 categories. 
 
1- The source category 
 
The source is tool or tools through which the channel obtains information (Khokha, 2007). Most 
often media relies on several sources for shaping the content of messages. Accordingly, the source 
category searches the different sources that feed the content to be analyzed. Sources vary; they 
may be people, papers, radio and TV stations, news agencies, books or films, documents etc. 
(Tamar, 2007).  
 
The main and subcategories for the source category 
 
1-1    Channel correspondents 
1-1-1  Full presence in the report 
1-1-2   Partial presence in the report 
                                                             
10 Oxford Living dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/bias, available on 14 August 2017.  





A correspondent is a person who works for news agencies, radio and TV stations, newspapers 
and magazines, periodicals, etc. whose job is to collect information and send reports about 
particular topics. He sends such information from the countries where he was sent to cover 
events12.  
 
By full presence by the correspondent in the report is meant that the reporter covers all the facts 
that are tackled by the report and that the reporter is found on the ground in the regions where the 
relevant events in the report are happening. For example, some reports deal with events going on 
in three or four counties and the reporter covers them all. 
Partial presence by the correspondent in the report means that the reporter covers part of the 
events tackled by the report and makes use of other sources for obtain information about the events 
going on in different regions. 
 
There are several indicators for knowing whether the presence is full or partial: the presence of 
the reporter in front of the camera, hearing the sound of the reporter while the camera is moving 
from one place to another, the interaction of people with him even when he is not in front of the 
camera, like when a Syrian man talks and explains what is going on the ground and speaking 
directly to a person standing next to the cameraman. This can be clear from the direction where 
that man is looking. And finally, the context of the news report is considered an indicator for the 
presence or absence of the reporter. 
 
As for the indicators to the nature of the reporter presence in the studied news texts, the 
electronic website mentions whether the reporter was the news source or not. In the news context 
the reporter mentions the other sources he made use of in case he could not be present in the 








By media is meant: “The main means of mass communication (broadcasting, publishing, and 
the Internet) regarded collectively”13. 
 
                                                             
12 Dictionary.com, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/correspondent available on 14 August 2017. 
Cambridge Dictionary, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/correspondent available on 14 August 2017. 





By Syrian media is meant any newspaper, magazine radio or TV located inside Syria and 
financed by Syrian institutions or people, regardless of whether these Syrian people are the real 
financier or they are a façade to hide the names of the real financiers; hidden and undeclared 
financiers.  
Also, under this category are the Syrian internet web sites. However, because the managers of 
these websites do not always mention their locations and their financing sources, a secondary 
category was allocated in case such type of sources is identified. The purpose of this category is 
to specify the percentage of how often the channels rely on the Syrian internet websites in 
comparison to how often they rely on Syrian traditional media sources, radio, TV… (This 
secondary category won’t be classified as a subcategory; rather, its results would be classified 
under the category: Syrian media). 
 
The Syrian media which represent the views of the Syrian opposition are not classified under 
this category even when they meet the conditions of the Syrian media. An independent category 
was allocated for the opposition sources for research purposes. 
By Arab media is meant any Arabic speaking media which is located in one of the Arab 
countries. It’s not enough that the media is an Arabic speaking media. 
By international media is meant any media located outside the Arab world, whether regionally 
like Turkey and Iran, or in a wider region like Europe and America. 
 





A news agency is defined as: “An organization that supplies news to subscribing newspapers, 
periodicals, and newscasters14”.  
Syrian news agencies are every agency located inside Syria and managed by a Syrian capital 
whether governmental and non-governmental. 
Arab news agencies are every institution that speaks in Arabic and governed by an Arab capital 
in addition to being located in one of the Arab countries. 
International news agencies are every agency located outside the Arab world. 
 





                                                             




By reports and information is meant all information coming from official institutions and 
organizations. The organizations related to opposition are not classified under this category, rather 
it is classified in the opposition related source category. 
The same terms and standards, applied on media and news agencies, also apply to these 
institutions and organizations. That is to say, in order for an organization to be Syrian, it should be 
located inside Syria and governed by Syrian authorities. In order for these organizations to be 
considered Arab, they should be located in one of the Arab countries and managed by Arab official 
authorities. As for the international organizations, they are every organization outside the borders 
of the Arab world.  
 





By official figures or responsible personalities is meant: “A person who holds a position in an 
organization, government department, etc.15”. 
 
1-6 Opposition sources 
1-6-1 Civilian activists 
1-6-2 Organizations and coordination committees  
1-6-3 Political and military figures 
 
Civilian activists are those who present themselves as peaceful opposition or those who take 
part in and film demonstrations, or those who film the different events like the security activities 
by the government forces, without having any military role. 
Organisations and coordination committees: this refers to all institutions that represent the 
Syrian opposition, whether the institution is inside Syria or outside. This category includes the 
opposition media and the political and military coordinates out of which statements and 
declarations related to the course of events in Syria are issued. 
Political and military figures: this category includes all opposition political and military figures 
present inside or outside Syria regardless of the rank of this figure; a soldier, a general.  
 
1-7 Eyewitness 
1-7-1 Identified eyewitness 
1-7-2 Unidentified eyewitness 
 
                                                             




An eyewitness is: “A person who actually sees some act, occurrence, or thing and can give a 
first-hand account of it16”.  
 
While classifying data, information may be mixed. A civilian activist might be an eyewitness 
and vice versa. However, I controlled this category by several indicators: A channel should give 
the label (eyewitness) to the source, or when it uses indirect expressions like “the people in the 
region saw”, or when reporter runs conversation with civilians who tell what happened without 
presenting them as activists. Even when they are affected by events and even when their thoughts 
are against the government, this doesn’t mean that they are activists. Finally, reporters for other 
channels might interview eyewitnesses and then the studied channels call these sources to shape 
their contents. 
The identified eyewitness is the person the channel mentions his name or presents other 
information about him. 
The unidentified eyewitness is the person the channel doesn’t mention any information about 
him, and it only presents his opinion or statements. 
 
1.8 The archive 
1-8-1 Video 
1-8-2 Static images (photographs) 
 
An archive is: “A collection of historical documents or records providing information about a 
place, institution, or group of people17”. “Any extensive record or collection of data18” 
The video and photograph categories were selected for the purpose of knowing the form of 
archive resources being used and adopted by the channel either to enrich the content of reports or 
to compensate for the missing elements. 
 
1-9 Unidentified sources 
1-9-1 Media and agencies 
1-9-2 Official reports and statements 
1-9-3 Official personalities 
 
By unidentified sources is meant the sources which were not accurately identified, like when a 
channel says: reported by news agencies, according to official reports, or a responsible source 
issued a statement, (without giving any other information about these reports, in which country, in 
which sector…). The indicator that identifies the unknown sources is the shortage of basic 
information about the source. 
 
                                                             
16  Dictionary.com, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/eyewitness available on 14 August 2017.  
17  Oxford Living Dictionaries, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/archive available on 14 August 2017. 




2 – The source orientation category 
2-1 Pro government 
2-2 Anti government 
2-3 Neutral  
 
I will mention later on more details about the content orientation category. However, it’s enough 
here to talk about the source orientation. This category was divided into three sections, pro, anti-
Syrian government, and neutral, regardless of whether the opposition is strong or medium.  
The indicator for the source orientation is the direct and manifest content. For example, when 
the source condemns the activities of the government forces and appeals for international 
intervention, or when the source defends the activities of these forces and considers them heroic. 
The neutral source is the source that stands in the middle between the government and the 
opposition, either by not having an opinion that favors any party or by criticizing both parties, or 
by seeking through his statements invitation for restoring calm and giving up violence. 
 
3- Topic category 
 
 It is considered one of the most common categories in media and communication research that 
are made use of to answer the question: What is the content about and what are the most prominent 
topics? They rely on classifying topics to be studied then dividing each topic into subtopics, from 
which control and deeper understanding of the main topics can be achieved (Tamar, 2007; Atwi, 
2007; Mohsen, 1973).  
There are no templates prepared in advance and ready for the topic categories; they differ when 
the research goals differ (Richard Budd et al, 1992).   
 
Bearing in mind that the research problem is exclusive to studying the internal aspect of the 
Syrian crisis, public movements, security and military situation, and the conflict results, three main 
categories were specified for the general category of the topics: public movements, military 
activities by the conflicting parties, and the results of the conflict.   
 
Each category will be studied separately for several reasons the most important of which: it is 
not necessary (in this study) to know whether the channel talked more about the public movements 
or about the security situation, or whether it tackled the results of the conflict more than tackling 
the military situation. The opposition public movement started in 2011 and continued nearly until 
the first half of 2012, then the armed movement started being more prominent than peaceful 
demonstrations. The security and military situation is a continuous state throughout the years being 
studied by the research. Therefore, comparing the frequency of the mentioning by channels of the 
peaceful public movement and the frequency of mentioning the security situation would not give 




etc. The other reason stems from the necessity that the topic category should answer the research 
questions, therefore it was necessary to divide them as follows: 
 
3-1 Public movement  
3-1-1 Pro-government 
3-1-2 Anti-government 
3-1-3 Civilian opposition against armed opposition 
 
Public movement means every unarmed peaceful activity, demonstrations, protests, or strikes. 
This category was divided into three subcategories:  
The pro-government movement which is any activity aiming at supporting President Assad, the 
government or the Syrian security and military forces. 
 
Anti-government movement means every activity aiming at expressing rejection of Assad as 
president, rejecting his stances and actions. Also, it means every activity aiming at opposing the 
policies of the government and the actions of the armed forces. 
Civilian opposition against armed opposition means every activity by unarmed anti-government 
opposition against armed anti-government opposition. The aim of such activity is to reject the 
course and mistakes by the armed opposition.  
 
The process of calculating frequency for this category: whether the channel has allocated a 
complete report or part of this report to talk about the public movement, this is considered 
mentioning for one time, or whether the channel covered in the one report the demonstrations in 
five counties or in one county, this is also considered mentioning for one time. That is, if the 
research result that the channel mentioned the pro-government movement five times, this means 
that five reports have tackled this event. 
 
3-2 Activities by the conflicting armed sides 
3-2-1    Government activities 
3-2-1-1 Against civilians 
3-2-1-2 Against militants 
 
Government activities mean all activities by the Syrian security and military government forces. 
Against civilians means against citizens who do not carry weapons, regardless of whether they 
are pro, or anti-Syrian government. 
Against militants means activities aiming at confronting armed opposition. 
 
3-2-2 Activities by the armed opposition 
3-2-2-1 Against civilians 





By the activities of the armed opposition is meant every activity where weapons are used in 
order to achieve a certain goal. 
Against civilians means against citizens who do not carry weapon, regardless of their political 
orientations.  
Against the government means every activity against the authorities (whether against people or 
against infrastructure), same for every activity against the Syrian army and the government 
security forces. 
 
The process of calculating frequency for this category: the method for calculating frequency for 
this category is different from the method for calculating category for the public movement. This 
category requires calculating the number of phrases, sentences and sometimes thoughts - in the 
same report - which tackled the activities by the government or by the armed opposition. 
Sometimes activities are summarised by one phrase, and sometimes by a sentence or several 
sentences, and some other times by a whole paragraph or thought. 
 
Note: If a channel talks about clashes between the government forces and the opposition forces, 
this piece of news is classified under two categories simultaneously: the government activities 
against the militants, and the opposition activities against the government. This might breach one 
of the conditions that have been agreed to analyse the content, but the study requirements 
necessitate classifying this news under two categories simultaneously. The significations of using 
a certain utterance (clashes, battles) will be studied in details in the qualitative analysis chapter. 
 
3-3 Consequences of the conflict between the government and the opposition 
3-3-1     Deaths 
3-3-1-1 Government’s deaths, civilian and military 
3-3-1-2 Opposition’s deaths, civilians and military 
3-3-1-3 Other party’s deaths 
 
The government’s deaths, civilian and military, mean all those who support the Syrian 
government, whether in reality or according to the news context which gives the dead a political 
identity even when they don’t have it in reality. For example, when a channel says the civilians 
died because they have rejected subjugation and humiliation. This is an indication to that they are 
opposition. On the other hand, if the channel says those civilians died because they said yes to 
national unity, in this case this would be an indication that they are pro-government because the 
phrase (national unity or maintaining national unity) represents the Syrian government rhetoric. In 
this regard, in order to get accurate results, the classification related to deaths requires analysis of 
the manifest content but sometimes analysis of latent one. This is because the news context 





The opposition deaths, civilian and military, mean all those who support the opposition whether 
in reality or according to the news context. Under this category are the deaths of militants from 
other nationalities which are not Syrian. For example, militants who came from Jordan to join the 
Syrian armed opposition. 
 
Other parties’ deaths, for example deaths of pro-government forces like Hezbollah, Iraqi 
factions. This category also includes the neutral Syrian deaths; all those who have no clear and 
definite stance towards the conflicting parties. Exactly who the other parties’ deaths are will be 
mentioned while stating the results.  
 
The process of calculating the frequency for this category: This process requires studying 
phrases, sentences or thoughts that dealt with the topic of deaths in the one report. That is, the 
deaths might be mentioned seven times in two or three reports. 
 
3-3-2    Wounded people  
3-3-2-1 Government´s wounded, civilian and military 
3-3-2-2 Opposition´s wounded, civilian and military 
3-3-2-3 Other wounded people 
 
Everything said about the deaths´ category applies to the wounded’ category. 
 
3-3-3 Displacement and refuge 
3-3-3-1 Internal 
3-3-3-2 Abroad 
3-3-3-3 Unspecified  
 
Internal displacement is moving from one place to another inside Syria. 
Refuge abroad is moving from Syria to other countries, whether border countries like Lebanon, 
Jordan, and Turkey or other countries like European countries. 
By unspecified is meant when the channel does not mention the place where the displaced or 
refugees are, whose situations and life circumstances are being covered.  
The process of calculating the frequency for this category: Whether a whole or partial report is 
allocated to talk about this topic, it is considered mentioning for one time. If the final result is five 
times for the refugee topic, this means that five reports tackled this topic. 
 








Under these categories are living circumstances, the situation of the government and non-
government services sectors; water, electricity, communication and so on. They also include 
working and education circumstances.  
Good means when the channel presents the situation in Syria as stable and quiet; everything is 
nearly available and people do not suffer any difficulties in their lives. 
Medium means that the situations are in a middle stage, not absolutely good and not absolutely 
bad. There are difficulties, but services and life necessities are still available even though partially.  
Bad means when there is shortage in many services, life necessities are not available, and people 
suffering is clear and prominent in the news report.  
 
The process of calculating the frequency for this category: Whether a whole or part of the report 
is allocated to talk about this topic, it’s considered to be mentioning for one time. If the final 
calculation is five times for the topic of economy and services situation, this means that five reports 
have tackled this topic.  
 
Note: The different ways for calculating the frequency of the subcategories of the category of 
the conflict results does not affect the accuracy of calculating the percentage for these categories. 
For example, the deaths category requires calculating the number of sentences or thoughts that 
tackled this topic. The one report may include tackling the government’s deaths, the opposition’s 
deaths, and the neutral deaths. In this case it is supposed to put three ticks (√) in the deaths´ 
category (it’s not possible to consider that the report tackled the deaths topic only once). On the 
other hand, the refuge category does not require calculating sentences, rather the general idea. 
Therefore, whether a whole or part of the report is allocated for tackling refuge this is considered 
mentioning for one time. That is to say, one report can tackle the topic of deaths several times 
(because of the different belonging of the deaths), whereas the refuge topic is considered tackling 
for one time regardless of the space allocated for the topic. 
 
4- Visual content category 
4-1 Video 
4-2 Infographic 
4-3 Static image, (photograph) 
 
In quantitative analysis it was enough to search for whether the channel used videos, info 
graphic, or photographs in the studied reports. As for the content and significance of pictures and 
films they will be studied in the qualitative analysis.  
 
The process of calculating frequencies for this category: Whether the one report included one 
or more pictures they are recorded for once. The same applies for videos and info graphic. That is 




infographic is ten times, this means that 10 reports included infographics regardless of the time 
space which the infographic took in the report. 
 
5- Displaying voices included in the videos 
5-1 Complete display 
5-2 Partial display 
5-3 Incidental display plus muting the voice 
 
This category is allocated to check the hypothesis related to the ability of channels to exaggerate 
or simplify events making use of editing techniques. 
 
Complete display is when the voices included in the videos accompany the voice of the report 
reader (the news narration) throughout the studied report. For example, this happens when the 
journalist narrates news about demonstrations relying on activists’ videos as the source for images 
and showing the voices of the angry and scared demonstrators. That is when the viewer in full 
report hears the two voices, the voice of the journalist and the voice of events; as demonstrations 
and explosions.  
If the reporter is available on the ground; in the midst of the event, this is classified under the 
category of complete display.  
 
Partial display is when the viewer hears part of the voices including the videos. The news 
narration may tackle the process of bombarding houses of civilians by the government forces. 
Sometimes the bombardment sound is heard and some other times the channel only displays the 
voice of the report reader. 
 
Incidental display plus muting the voice. In this case the channel leaves a very narrow space for 
the voices included in the videos. The voice of the journalist or the report reader is more prominent 
in synchronisation with videos whose audio content was muted, or when this content was displayed 
in a very incidental way, maybe no more than a second or a few seconds throughout the whole 
report. The viewer might see images of bombardment, explosions and can see images of people 
running in panic but can’t hear anything except the news narration.  
 
6- Content orientation category 
6-1 Pro government 
6-2 Anti government 
6-3 Neutral  
 
Following specifying the topics around which the communication messages are about it is 
necessary to find out the orientation of this content. Is it negative, positive, or neutral regarding an 




the most used categories while studying the content of media although it raises a problem related 
to the procedures and criteria of specifying the content orientation (Khosh & Sarai, 2011; Tamar, 
2007; Alabd & Azmi, 2009). 
One solution to the problem of specifying the orientation is by classifying everything the 
researcher cannot classify under the subcategory neutral. Or when everything that cannot be 
classified is classified by the researcher under a new subcategory the researcher adds, which take 
for example the label other orientations (Tamar, 2007; M. Hussein, 1983; Toaima, 1989).  
 
I mentioned previously that many researchers are agreed that quantitative analysis of the content 
should be exclusive to the manifest meaning. According to Robson (1993), analyzing the implicit 
messages includes explanations that might be characterized by being subjective. 
But in reality, studying the manifest content only might not lead to accurate results. The channel 
may use the calumny through praise method, the method of indirect sarcasm through giving 
information that carry implicit meanings understood by the recipient who is influenced by the issue 
being raised, or the person who studied the variables and the given information on this topic. Or 
maybe the journalists speak in certain voice tones that carry indications opposing the manifest 
content: like when a journalist confirms that the government did not perpetrate a chemical 
massacre but speaking in a voice tone which suggests that the government is the only perpetrator. 
In this study it has been taken into consideration focusing on the manifest content, but at the 
same time all other indicators that specify the real orientation of the content were taken into 
consideration.  
 
The quantitative analysis also allows studying another group of variables like the effective 
personalities in the event (their characteristics and their actions), the goals of the content and the 
category of the target audience (Tamar, 2007; Abdul Hamid, 2009). However, studying these 
details will be realized in the qualitative analysis for the purpose of meeting the research goals. 
For example, the study purpose is to know how the channels highlighted the actions and 
characteristics of personalities, not knowing the frequency of appearance of these personalities. 
 
- The process of decoding content 
 
The content of the materials being studied was decoded and the frequency was calculated 
manually; no software was used for this purpose. In order to guarantee a higher level of accuracy 
the verbal content of the video reports being studied was transcribed on paper. This method enables 
calculating frequency in an accurate way, especially when it is related to studying the number of 
sentences that dealt with a certain topic. 
This method also helps conducting qualitative analysis much easier, where the researcher can 
read the text many times without having to listen to reports. In this way the news text is studied in 
two different ways: the first outside the video and audio context. The second is analyzing the text 




- Statistical processes 
 
The statistical processes followed in this study are calculating the frequency and the percentage. 
The sample of each year (2011, 2012, 2013) was studied separately. Then the frequency and 
percentage of the whole sample was calculated.  
 
- Reliability of research and stability of analysis 
 
The researcher conducted the analysis another time after three weeks from conducting the first 
analysis. This is one of the methods for measuring the reliability and stability of analysis (Stemler, 
2001). The number of categories which include frequency calculation was collated (some 
categories do not include frequencies like generic and three main categories; considered as 
classifying categories). The total number was 70 categories. The number of categories for the 
samples of the three years added to the number of the whole sample categories is 280 categories 
for each channel. The number of categories for the two channels is 560. The results of 552 




The quantitative analysis of the content faced some criticism, one of which is that it was 
considered a simple technique that does not allow a detailed statistical analysis. That is a technique 
that does not lead to significant indications (Morgan, 1993), as it neglects many of the messages´ 
aspects (Cheveigné, 2000(. Conducting a deep analysis of the content requires adopting a 
qualitative method because it helps understanding the message of the manifest and implicit 
meanings, and possibly may lead to understanding possible influences by the media message over 
the target audience (Macnamara, 2005). 
 
Some researchers consider the qualitative analysis is based on rules of conversation analysis 
(Charaudeau, et.al, 2001; Charaudeau, Maingueneau, 2002; Cislaru, Guérin, Morim, Née, Pagnier, 
Veniard, 2007) which is interested in studying speech or conversation (Charaudeau, Maingueneau, 
2002(. There are different visions about the boundaries of conversation analysis. According to 
Dubois (1962) such analysis is classified under the paradigm of linguistics which targets studying 
discursive applications of the society. B. Johnstone argues that discourse analysis is a means for 
studying the structural and functional aspects of the language being used. This is achieved through 
breaking down the material being studied into parts and analyzing them according to more than 
one perspective. As for Pêcheux, this approach relies on studying language on critical, 
philosophical, and political basis at the same time. However, Foucault went beyond the domain 
that only studies language and included a group of other components like behaviors and 
institutions. That is to say, conversation analysis does not only study vocabulary, sentence 




Several approaches can be considered for conversation analysis including: Conversational 
analysis (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1996), the analysis of the argument (Breton, 2007), the pragmatic 
(Reboul Moeschler, 1998), the theory of enunciation (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1997), or the semiotic 
analysis (Saussure, 1915).  
 
This study aims at analyzing the different components of the media message, the linguistic and 
non-linguistic components. For this reason, the semiotic approach was adopted. 
The semiotic approach is one of the main branches interested in analyzing media materials and 
the verbal and non-verbal communication )Emir, 2014(. This approach was successfully applied 
to qualitative research interested in studying the media content. This method helps revealing 
implicit meanings (Barthes, 1972). Relying on semiotic approach for analyzing the content of 
audio and visual communication is prominent, because it allows understanding and realizing 
various factors and aspects simultaneously. The available methods in the semiotic field enable 
describing and explaining the details of messages, thus leading to ability of understanding the 
mechanisms for creating, producing, and transferring meanings )Domenjoz, 1998; Clause Bruhn 
Jensen, 2002).  
 
Semiotics also called semiology was first defined by the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure 
as “the science of signs” (Sibhan Chappman, Christopher Routledge, 2009; Domenjoz, 1998). 
Semiology is a term used to designate the production and interpretation of a sign (Hadumod 
Busmann, 1996). It is the sciences of significations (Sidad, 2003).  
Barthes (1985) considers semiotics the only tool for ideological criticism. This approach allows 
studying the significations of synchronised verbal and non-verbal codes within the same message 
(Barakat, 2002). It also allows studying the pre and post contexts of the message (Gervereau, 
2000). Saussure sees that semiotics is the study of the life of signs within social life )Domenjoz,  
(1998 . It’s not possible to study the content of media in isolation of the social-cultural context 
)Emir, 2014(. 
 
Saussure considers that language or linguistics represent only one part of semiology, whereas 
Barthes considers that semiotics constitutes only a branch of linguistics because every semiotic 
system overlapping with language; things, images, behaviours etc. strongly have indications, but 
can’t do that in isolation of language. He also argues that human civilisation is still a civilisation 
of writing till today, although images are invading life of man (Barthes, 1987). Robert Schulze 
(1994) considers that man identity is related to his writing ability; there is a correlation between 
the existence of man and his ability to produce texts. 
 
Saussure sees the linguistic sign as not a thing and name but a concept and a sound image 
(Saussure, 1915), and the two components are strongly united. The language is a system of signs 




According to Umberto Eco (2005) man reads the surrounding universe and expresses it through 
different systems of signs, whether they were a language, drawing, or symbols.  
Communication processes and daily events, even the simple ones, are only achieved through 
signs. Semiology includes all symbolic systems; languages, traffic lights, military signs, images, 
films, legends, rituals, music, sounds, etc. (Bernard Lamizet, Ahmed Silem, 1994; Domenjoz, 
(1998 . All forms of signs are considered conductors of culture and ideology (Barthes, 1972( for 
they constitute system of significations (Barthes,  1968). 
 
A sign is something that replaces another thing (Eco, 2005). There are linguistic signs and 
semiotic signs like clothes and food, signs that are characterized by benefit and functionality. 
Semiotics studies internal organization and interaction among these signs (Barthes, 1985; Barthes 
1968; John Fisk 1990). Barthes labeled semiotic signs as functional signs because they are used 
(for example clothes) and have meaning at the same time. For Saussure, these signs are a system 
of codes through which we can understand the world (Shank, 1995).  
According to Peirce, a sign is characterised by three dimensions. The concreteness of the sign 
which means that a sign is something. The dynamic of the sign, because every sign has a purpose 
or is used for somebody. Finally, the relativity of interpreting the sign (Vincent Jouve, 1994; 
Barakat, 2002).  
 
Barthes and Saussure divided the sign into a signifier and signified. The signifiers bear different 
explanations. That is, each signifier could have several signifieds. These signifieds also generate 
other indications (Vincent Jouve, 1994; Barakat, 2002). A signifier is something concrete 
(physical); sound, image and text, whereas the nature of the signified is mental and psychological. 
Barthes (1985) considers that the signifier is the expression and signified is the meaning. 
According to Eco (1988), a sign has three dimensions, signifier, signified, and a referent. 
 
The sign is not poor, and not exclusive to one meaning; it may be rich with indications. There 
is no fixed rule that governs the relation between signifier and signified because signified is always 
related to contexts. A word, speech and all symbols are signs that carry different significances 
according to cultures (Eco, 2005). The impact also differs according to the interpreter of the text, 
image or symbol. Significance and impact depend on the culture of the consumer, his pre-
knowledge and his cultural taste. In other words, there are several factors and stimuli that make 
the indication and the impact of the signifier something relative that differs according to the 
different cultures and people (Eco, 2001). The meanings of texts and messages are constructed 
according to the perception of the recipient (Cheveigné, 2000(. 
 
According to Saussure and Eco, there are present and absent signifiers. Also, there are direct 
and indirect, lexical and perceptual signifieds. The sign could be iconic, rhetoric, suggestive, 




or meaning, denotative and connotative levels. This leads to having different interpretations of the 
message (D. Morsli et el, 1995; Clause Jensen, 2002).  
 
Denotation is the first level of signification; it means the permanent sense of a word excluding 
all subjective evaluations19. Connotation is an idea suggested by a word in addition to its main 
meaning (Oxford dictionary20). Connotative signs can be personal and individual or general and 
universal (Cuddon, 1998).  The subjectivity is a factor which allows more interpretations to the 
text (Barthes, 1968). Barthes showed how even nonverbal communication is open to 
interpretations through connotative meanings.  
 
In this study, semiotic analysis is divided into a group of topics according to the nature of these 
topics: public movements, pro and against the Syrian government, the picture of the president and 
the Syrian government, the image of the armed opposition, the results of the Syrian crisis, the 
picture of ethnicities and religious sects.  
Each topic includes studying linguistic signs, images, sounds and other signs related to the same 
topic. In other words, signs were not classified according to their nature; linguistic, visual or 
acoustic. Rather, according to the topics they deal with. The purpose of this classification is to 
facilitate understanding how the channels covered each topic separately. This classification allows 
concentrating and knowing all the signs that create mental images in the mind of the recipient 




Saussure differentiated between language and discourse. Language is a collection of systems 
and rules possessed by a human group and used for conversation and communication. On the other 
hand, discourse represents the applied manifestation of these systems and rules (Barakat, 2002). 
This study aims at knowing the significations of the discourse to which a group of linguistic rules 
and methods were applied; metaphor, metonymy, analogy, comparison, and the direct and indirect 
way (declarative and implicit). Eco (2005) considers that these rules are signs that establish 
relations with topics, which leads to creating mental images. For example, comparing a man to a 
lion. Comparison (the sign) established relation with the topic (the man) which led to creating a 
mental image: the man is strong and great like the lion.  
 
The media rhetoric is a cultural industry (Al-Imam, 1995), an industry that combines language 
and information within their different contexts and the technical mechanisms used to transmit the 
content. This production forms the awareness of the recipient (Al-Aqed, 2002). Through applying 
linguistic rules channels can transmit facts accurately or they can distort them. Barthes (1985) 
                                                             
19 Oxford Living Dictionary, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/denotation available on 14 August 2017.  
Reverso Dictionary, http://dictionnaire.reverso.net/francais-definition/d%C3%A9notation available on 14 August 2017.  





considers exaggeration, for example, is deviation from the truth. The deviation of signifiers 
generates other signifiers (Eco, 2005). Based on this principle, the research seeks to know the 




Analysing the content of the images and the semantic analysis can be carried out simultaneously  
)Shank, 1995). Picture is a dangerous means and a huge machine for moving groups; the picture 
creates a world opinion. It is a non-verbal language able to stir and motivate the viewer mentally 
and emotionally (Barthes, 1972(. The seen or imagined picture is a sign or group of signs that form 
a relation with the reality whether concrete or abstract. Studying any image means studying the 
signs included in this image (Toussaint, 1978; A. Mansour, 2014; Najib, 2003). Barthes (1980) 
considers that all the details included in the picture have meanings; the shape of the hat, the necktie, 
the colour of clothes are all signifiers that have indications.  
Believing something relies on seeing. Seeing something creates a collection of mental 
processes, knowledge and cognition. Seeing is the main way for knowledge )Gervereau, 2000, 
2001; Le Breton, 2006). 
 
The visual image can give an impression of concreteness (H. Jamieson, 2007). Gervereau 
(2001) classified the image into a mental image and a physical image. This research aims at 
studying the physical pictures which tackled the Syrian event and also at knowing the possible 
mental pictures, created by seeing the physical pictures. According to Gervereau (2000), analysing 
pictures passes through three stages: description, studying context, and finally interpretation. The 
analysis also includes studying the iconography; persons and things, in addition to studying 
techniques, colours, voices and kinds of shots )DC.Meyer, 2000-200621(.  
 
The Semiotic Analysis for This Research 
 
The verbal and non-verbal signifiers have been extracted and classified in accordance with their 
topics. The first step is characterized by classifying the signifiers in the areas of the following main 
topics:  the demonstrations supporting and opposing Al-Assad and the government; the image of 
president Assad as it has been presented by the two channels; the image of the government security 
and military forces; the image of the armed opposition; the conflict outcomes; and the image of 
ethnics and sects that have been highlighted by media. Next, the main topics have been divided 
into sub-topics. For instance, all the signifiers which deal with the pro-Assad processions (as a 
main topic) have been extracted, then they were pigeonholed into sub-topics such as the purpose 
of demonstrating, the slogans, the numbers of demonstrators, the places, and the Interviews with 
                                                             





the demonstrators, taking into consideration the significances of age, gender, clothes and other 
signs. 
 
The classification can be also considered as one of the research results because each sub-
heading in the semiotic analysis represents an outcome that contains signifiers which tackle one 
topic. The interlacing between the two levels of significance, the denotative and connotative, has 
been taken into consideration. First of all, the analysis depends on general description where the 
signifiers are put into their general contexts, then they are studied one by one. Each signifier 
requires independent explanation; therefore, I have not put them in tabulated groups. I have, rather, 
put them in a narrative frame to facilitate explanation and understanding. The value of some 
signifiers is connected to the historical context which they evoke, others need analyzing the 
linguistic structure, while some others derive their value from their relation to religious or 
customary values predominant in the recipient’s environment. I consider the contexts, in which 
some signs are put, signifiers in themselves. These contexts are essential to uncover the 
mechanisms of spreading propaganda and those of psychological war and manipulating the 
recipient. Therefore, it is necessary to study the contexts of mentioning the sources, those of 
sentimental enticements, those of historical recalls, those of employing the characteristics of 
Arabic language, those of adopting images, and those of spotlighting and obfuscating. The 
significances of contexts and meanings of signs help us recognize the identity of the targeted 
recipient of messages. Analyzing the significances of media personnel’s voice tone is considered 




For the purpose of analysing the news coverage, several disciplines should take part, in addition 
to the necessity to take into consideration the many variables that influence the mechanisms of 
media, thus influencing the awareness of the recipient who receives the messages of this medium. 
The most prominent variables are: the media logic which has two divisions, the media being 
studied which is a mass media (TV) in addition to professional practises by journalists. The second 
variable is the war logic, conflicts and using the media as a communication weapon. 
The disciplines that were made use of are: information and communication sciences, media 
sociology, politics, linguistics, history, propaganda and misleading, military sciences, sociology, 
and religion.  
 
To reveal the indications of some signifiers, it is necessary to rely on the observation method. 
Observation helps the researcher recognise closely the phenomenon under study (Bin Morsli, 
2003). Observation is not exclusive to focusing the senses only; it is also subject to mental 
processes (M. Al-Hasssan, 2009). It is examining the thing as it is, in order to know something 
new (Bohosh, 1999). Information are collected through listening or viewing something (Atwi, 




Rossman,1989). It is a process of learning through exposure to or involvement in the day-to-day 
activities by active looking, improving memory, informal interviewing, and writing detailed field 
notes (DeWalt&DeWalt, 2002; Schensul, Schensul and LeCompte, 1999).  
The researcher experienced events in Syria and contacted a variety of segments in the Syrian 
society. Observation is necessary to explain some details and the purposes of some media 
messages, because there is no accurate research dealing with these details. 
 
The Theoretical Framework of the Research 
 
This study is related to a group of interconnected theories: The Agenda-setting Theory, News 
Framing Theory, and the Gate keeping Theory. 
Gatekeeping Theory 
This theory was developed by Kurt Lewin in 1943. Its content is that the media material goes 
through several points (Gates) during its journey. Each gate is controlled by influential people who 
decide what should be included or deleted out of this material. That is to say, they control the kind 
and content of information that are broadcast and presented to the public. The longer the stages of 
production and information reception by the recipient are the bigger the influence of the directors 
of these gates becomes. The stages or corridors of the information are like the chain that is formed 
by several links, the direct contact is considered the simplest kind of these links.  
A group of influencing factors and criteria organise and control the processes of evaluating and 
selecting the content. The most prominent of which are: the means being subject to the ideologies 
that run and direct the mechanisms for producing information. And the journalist being subject 
himself to the conditions of the means; the financial, social, educational, intellectual, and religious 
status of the communicator. The social restrictions; values, customs, and cultural stereotypes that 
lead to predicting the public reactions to the messages (Shomaker & Vos, 2009).  
 
 The Agenda-setting Theory 
 
This theory is interested in studying relations between the mass media and the public exposed 
to such media. And it emphasizes that there is a close connection between the salience of a certain 
issue in the media and its salience amongst the sections of society (Abu Hassouna, 2015). The 
origin of this theory goes back to Walter Lippmann in his book: The public opinion (1922). 
Lippmann sees that mass media constructs mental images amongst the public about events. 
However, in many cases the public opinion is shaped when the media presents false information 
about issues that are of interest to the society; the recipient consumes these products and believes 
them (M. McCombs, 2011).  
 
Agenda setting refers to the process through which the media determines the issues that concern 




determining important issues   )J. Straubhaar & R. Larose, 2000; M.Sanchez, 2002); it is ordering 
topics according to their importance  )J. Watson, 2006(.   
 
The media can also highlight some events as being important topics even when they are not 
really so. Sometimes the purpose of highlighting is provoking government or societal reactions 
through attracting attention to some issues; highlighting makes the issues being raised a priority in 
the agenda of the recipient. The adoption by the individual of the mass media as a source of 
information determines how he realizes the realistic events. Appreciating the importance of the 
topic and adopting a stance regarding this topic (positive, negative or neutral), are directly related 
to how the media presents the same topic, the size of interest, and the nature of the stances towards 
the issue being raised (Al-Mazahra, 2012).   
 
Lippmann sees that the reaction of the recipient is towards the pictures or information presented 
to him, not towards the events that are actually happening; that are real events. Accordingly, the 
process of agenda setting aims at re-shaping events; reshaping reality, and then presenting this 
production to the interested public in order to achieve particular goals (M.Sanchez, 2002). 
 
Who sets the public agenda and who sets the media agenda? Lang sees that agenda setting is an 
interactive process in which governments, societies and mass media take part; each one affects the 
other (Nasr, 2003). The processes of selecting news and selecting particular sources and how to 
tackle these topics, are subject to the nature of the relation between the media and the decision-
makers; officials in high-ranking positions; positions that are political, military, economic or 
religious (Nasr, 2003). Determining priorities corresponds to the editorial policy of the media 
institution which aims at influencing the recipient and changing his orientations. At the same time, 
this policy or media ideology is affected by a group of variables that impose on it a particular 
ordering of priorities (Abu Hassouna, 2015).  
 
The overlap between the media agenda and the public agenda gave the recipient of the message 
a special importance. The recipient understands and realizes the media messages according to his 
own agenda; according to the size of his interest and his stance towards the issue (Abdul Hamid, 
2004). The influencing power of the media agenda depends on the personal experience of the 
recipient; does he live the issue being raised? Or his relation with this issue is indirect; he doesn’t 
live it and he has no personal experiences; he receives his information from the media (Amer, 
2008)? 
 
The media has to take into consideration the interest of society in a certain issue. Therefore, the 
media is affected by the priorities of the public directly or indirectly. At the same time this media 
can create interest among, or change priorities of the recipients (Makkawi & Assayed, 2000; 




Shomaker & Resse consider that the characteristics of those who work in media, their cultural 
and educational levels, their professional backgrounds, their orientations towards the topics being 
tackled and their income levels, affect the agenda setting (Nasr, 2003). Wanta and McCombs see 
that media affect each other. For example, low-profile media are affected by high-profile media; 
the interest and the way a world leading newspaper tackles a certain event may affect the coverage 




Highlighting a topic and neglecting another. Covering a particular side of a certain issue to the 
detriment of another side which leads to granting the recipient incomplete knowledge. The 
selection of sources, pictures, graphic, typography elements, and other methods for media 
processing (Soliman, 1999; Al-Qadi, 2008). According to G.E Lang & K.Lang, some topics need 
more coverage to attract attention. The issues being raised should be put in frames that give them 
meaning and make the process of understanding and realizing easy and possible; the realization by 
the public of the issues is closely connected to the selection of vocabulary and the language being 
used, and that the trust of the recipient in the people selected to talk about topics increases the 
influencing power (Soliman, 1999; Nasr, 2003). The intensive coverage of a certain issue leads to 
establishing this issue in the public agenda. The intensive coverage creates orientations and leads 
the recipient to adopt a certain behavior towards the issues (Rabie, 2008). The time duration; the 
length and shortness of the coverage have importance in creating impressions (Soliman, 1999).  
 
Methodology that can be adopted to analyze the agenda 
 
Analysing the communication content quantitatively and qualitatively. The researcher can study 
an issue or a group of issues that are tackled by the media whether within one period of time or 
within different periods (Al-Mazahra, 2012). Interviewing or surveying officials about the process 
of setting priorities for the media; those who supervise the processes of selecting and processing. 
It is also possible to observe the media action from within through observation to get to know the 
mechanisms and standards of selecting and excluding topics by the media (Al-Qadi, 2008).  
  
News Framing Theory 
 
This theory is employed to explain and clarify the role of media in shaping the knowledge and 
orientations of the public about different issues and events (Pippa Norris,1995; Abdu, 2009).  It 
allows measuring the explicit and implicit content of the news coverage (Ahmed, 2009).  Frames 
can be studied whether through quantitative or qualitative analysis. McCombs, Shaw and Weaver 
consider News framing theory as an extension or a second level of the Agenda-Setting Theory. 





The news frames are the ones that give meanings to the events and issues. Therefore, 
constructing frames is considered a critical media practice; a journalist should choose the suitable 
frame to present the event being covered (Mohsen, 2009).   
 
In his book Framing Analysis (1974), Erving Goffman argues that a frame is a mixture of 
processes of classifying, organizing and interpreting reality in a way that leads to placing events 
in their contexts, thus facilitating the process of understanding information (Oweis, 2008). Placing 
events in their contexts gives meaning to the content (Abdul Hamid, 2004). According to London, 
a frame is specifying the case or the news story, organizing thoughts and perceiving events   (S. 
London, 1993).  
  
Entman sees that framing is a selective process through which selecting some elements of a real 
case or event takes place, where these elements are highlighted in order to achieve a particular 
goal   (Entman, 2003, 2007).   
De Vreese argues that frames determine the issue being raised; they highlight aspects of the 
issue and neglect or ignore other aspects (De Vreese et al, 2001; Ahmed, 2007, 2009).  
Highlighting elements or marginalizing them happens for the purpose of achieving ideological 
goals related to the communicator or the means producing the news rhetoric (Bassiouni, 2008). 
Frames are a group of methods used to describe a problem, specify its causes, study its dimensions 
and the variables that affect it, know the effective powers that stand behind it, and then expect or 
set solutions for it (Entman, 1993; Makkawi & Assayed, 2000; Abdu, 2009).   
 
According to Tushman and Entman, there is a close connection between media frames and the 
priorities of the public; frames organize and influence reality because they are able to direct the 
attention of the recipient to a certain event or to elements of this event, thus leading to creating an 
orientation or behavior in response to that event (Scheufele, 1999; Entman, 1993). News frames 
create standards that are used by the public when they think of a certain issue or when they form 
their opinions and orientations about it (Ahmed, 2009; Mazroue, 2013). Frames construct the 
knowledge of the recipient (Mohsen, 2009).  In this way, it is possible to predict how the public 
interprets reality and events (Makkawi & Assayed, 2000; Mazroue, 2013).  
 
How to build news frames 
 
Entman refers to that constructing news frames happens through several methods: choosing the 
main words; keywords, metaphorical description, concepts, symbols, and visual images (Entman, 
1991). 
Capella and Jamieson emphasize the necessity that frames should be different from each other; 
the necessity that they should contain different linguistic and non-linguistic characteristics, in 
addition to the validity to represent the event. In other words, the case should be true, not faked by 




selection mechanism; focusing on aspects and neglecting others, the highlighting mechanism; 
repetition is one of the means which help establish information in the mind of the recipient, the 
exclusion mechanism; ignoring some aspects of the topic whether intentionally or unintentionally 
(Kamal, 2008).  
 
Gamson and Lasch see that it is possible to construct frames through a group of several 
sentimental and mental tools; achieving accord and harmony amongst these tools makes the impact 
of the message stronger (Najm, 2006). Sentimental tools are like: attractive phrases, rhetorical 
styles; metaphor, figure of speech, comparing, pun, giving examples to facilitate understanding, in 
addition to the content of the visual images. Mental tools could be something like: numbers, 
statistics and diagrams, giving the recipient explanations about the causes of the event and 
predicting results.  
 
Frames could also be determined through the orientation of the media towards the topic; 
negative, positive or neutral (Kevin M. Carrage, 1991(, or through: printing characteristics, for 
example the headings; main or sub, the sources and their orientations towards the event, and 
through the content of quotations and comments (Tan Kard, 2001).  
 
Lyengar and Simon (1993) defined two kinds of frames: Episodic frames and Thematic Frames. 
The episodic frame presents concrete issues; physical, like explosions, bombardment, theft, while 
thematic frames focus on issues characterized by being general and abstract. These frames increase 
the difficulty of influencing and persuading because of the difficulty of dealing with problems; 
following their causes and predict their solutions (Abdul Hamid, 2004).  
 
McCombs et al (1997) differentiated between two kinds of the attributes of news frames (Salem, 
2009). These attributes show the mechanism for building stereotypes about the realities, peoples 
and effective personalities. First, the Substantive Attributes; they manifest through presenting 
basic information about the issue without evaluation; the subjectivity of the sender does not show 
up. Second, the Affective Attributes, which are characterized by judgment or evaluation; the 
subjectivity shows itself through presenting information in a context which is either pro, anti, or 
neutral.  
 
The Pan and Kosicki (1993) paradigm for analysing news frames is based on studying a group 
of factors: first the syntactical construction of the story; succession of the details and paragraphs, 
that is studying how to structure the news event. This part also includes studying the sources. 
Second, the thematic structure; studying the main and pivotal ideas in the text. Third, the rhetorical 
structure. Grammar and stylistics are used to support the pivotal thoughts, thus helping achieve the 





Frames can also be classified on the basis of their nature; negative or positive (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1984). Valkenburg and Semetko classified frames according to the kind of issues and 
events: The frame of conflict, whether among individuals, groups, institutions, or countries. The 
responsibility frame; in this frame the link between the event and individuals is established; who 
caused the problem? The humanitarian issues frame; this frame includes interests, activities, 
sufferings and all humanitarian aspects. The economy results frame and other frames which tackle 
different topics (Ahmed, 2009).  
 
McCombs & Chyi added other criteria for classifying frames. The place-frame. It has several 
levels: international, national; like racial discrimination, local, the group level; the link between 
the issue and a particular group inside the country, and also the individual level; the link between 
individuals and issues or events. Second, the time frame. The most prominent attributes of the 
news coverage is being momentary and new. However, there are exceptions. Some frames care 
about events or issues related to previous time dimension; the past. And some frames care about 
the future, like when presenting predictions, expectations about, or solutions to some issues 
(Entman, 2003).  
 
Some factors that affect the construction of news frames 
 
Entman, Scheufele, and Shomaker talked about the influencing factors that determine the nature 
of news frames. The most prominent of which are: the attributes of the media person; his 
knowledge, education, experience, professional level, and his orientations towards issues. The 
media person sets frames whether consciously or unconsciously. The orientation of the means; the 
editorial policy of the media. This influencing factor plays a major role in building the news frames 
where the media tends to broadcast information that suit the ideology or beliefs of its owners and 
directors. The means is also affected by the influence of some political, social and religious powers. 
In this context, we see how the media is subject to the ruling powers and how the media person in 
the end is subject to the decisions of the means. The recipient is also considered an important 
affecting factor in frame construction. On the one hand he is the target of persuading; the means 
tries to influence him. On the other hand, the range of knowledge and awareness by the recipient 
gives information different meanings, thus it contributes in framing and classifying the idea. The 
sources and the presence or absence of some vocabulary have a great impact. The nature of the 
events themselves is considered one of the most important influencing factors. Some issues impose 
their presence in the media due to their importance to all parties contributing in the communication 
process; the sender, the means, and the recipient (Entman, 1993; Scheufele, 1999; Abdul Hamid, 
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Studying the features of the Syrian crisis and studying the content of media coverage of this 
crisis require referring back to the Syrian history. The characteristics of the society, its actions and 
reactions towards any case are related to the cognitive accumulations of this society. The “genetic”, 
cultural, intellectual, religious, and sentimental heritage influences deciding the track of individual 
behaviors, whether the individual is aware or unaware of the mechanism of such influence.  
 
According to archaeologists, Syria is considered to be the cradle of the earliest human 
civilisations. Many cities and kingdoms were established over this land, including Ebla, Mari, 
Ugarit, Aphamea and Palmyra. Many peoples lived in Syria, whether based on peaceful means, 
through migration or commerce, or through wars. The most prominent of these peoples are the 
Sumerians, the Akkadians, the Chaldeans, the Canaanites, the Arameans, the Hittites, the 
Babylonians, the Persians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Nabatis, the Byzantines, and the Arabs. 
The Ottoman Turks ruled Syria for four centuries, then this country went under the French mandate 
between 1920 and 1946 (Al-Helu, 2004; Jad El-Rab, 2005; Troudi, 2006; Balanche, A, 2006; 
duMont, 2012).  
 
There are some assumptions about the origin of the name Syria.  The name is derived from the 
Syriac word (Sir), which means the master. The feminine name is Sara and Syria, which mean the 
master ground or the ground of the masters. The name is derived from the Greek description; 
Assur and Assyria, (the land of the Assyrians). According to the Phoenicians, the name Syria is 
considered to be an expression for the land of the sun )Al-Hariri, 2013)22 
 
The current Syria is considered part of the Greater Syria or the Levant which were divided into 
smaller countries (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine) according to the Sykes Picot accord; the 
British-French accord in 1916, which aimed at distributing shares among colonial countries. Under 
the patronage of the British mandate, the state of Israel was created in 1948 and Palestine was also 
divided (Sultan, 1987; Al-Rubaie, 2005; Troudi, 2006). The geographical location of Syria 
increases its importance. Its borders with Jordan, Iraq, and Turkey, and its nearness to Palestine 
and the locations of Israeli presence placed it in the heart of conflicts and wars (duMont, 2012). 
                                                             
22 Al-Maany Dictionary. https://www.almaany.com/ar/name/%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A7/  






The current Syria is made up of 14 governorates, each one is further divided into smaller 
administrative units: region, city, town, village, farm, and a square; 61 regions, 210 towns, 6247 
villages, and 6717 farms (Qatash, 2002; Troudi, 2006).  
Religious and Sectarian Distribution of the Syrian Population 
 
The Syrian population is estimated to be 23000000 people. The Sunni Muslims form the 
majority; their population is estimated to be more than 75%, when the Sunni Kurds’ population is 
included. The population percentage of the Alawites ranges between 10% and 15%; their 
population is growing systematically.  The Alawites are mainly found in the counties of Lattakia, 
Tartus, and the countryside of the two counties Homs and Hama. The Druze sect constitutes nearly 
3%, mainly present in the county of Sweida and the Golan Heights. The Ismaelites constitute 1%, 
living in Salamiyeh, Qadmus, Alkhawabi, and Misyaf. The Twelver Shia constitutes 0.3%. The 
Christian percentage ranges between 8 and 10%; half of them are Orthodox. The Christian 
churches observed in Syria are the Evangelical Armenian, Evangelical National Christian, 
Orthodox Syriac, Catholic Syriac, Chaldean Catholic Church, Maronite Church, Orthodox 
Armenian, Catholic Roman Church, Assyrian Church of the East, and the Church of Jesus the King 
for the Chaldean Catholics in the governorateof Al-Hasaka (Troudi, 2006; S.Abdo, 2009; duMOnt, 
2012). 
 
Most of the Jews left Syria to Palestine. Their population was 4.4% in Damascus and 4.3% in 
Aleppo until the year 1943. The Kurds constitute nearly 9% of the total population; some of them 
are Muslims and some others are Yazidis (Ayazidis). There are no accurate statistics about the 
number of the Yazidis in Syria. Turkmen and Turks are 1%, as are the Circassians. The number of 
the Chechens ranges between 10000 – 15000 (Troudi, 2006; S.Abdo, 2009; duMOnt, 2012). 
The Christians and Druze follow their own legal systems and legislative courts in relation to 
Personal Status issues.  The other sects follow the Islamic-sharia-based law. The Syrian social 
construction was affected in recent decades because of the migration from the countryside to cities 
in addition to immigration abroad. The Syrian crisis also changed the demographic and numerical 
map of the Syrians (S.Abdo, 2009). 
  
Languages Spoken in Syria 
 
Arabic is the official language of the country. Syrian people speak Arabic with local dialects. 
On a daily basis, people do not use standard Arabic. Aramaic and Syriac are still spoken by 
inhabitants of some small villages like Malula, Jabadeen, and a part of Saydnaya and Yabrud in 
the countryside of Damascus, or in the north east of Syria like Qamishli, Qahtaniyeh, Hasaka, and 
Khabur. There are other languages spoken by some minorities in Syria like Kurdish, Armenian, 
Turkic, and Circassian. English is taught in schools. French is also taught in schools but to a narrow 





Rule in Syria 
 
Syria never enjoyed a self-rule. For a long period of time Syria was subject to foreign rule 
(Chouet, 1995). I will go back in history to the era of occupation of Syria by Alexander the Great 
in 333 BC. The Macedonian Empire broke apart following his death, and Syria was ruled by the 
leader Seleucus who established the Seleucid Empire in the year 312 BC (Hajal, 2004). The 
Romans took over Syria in the year 64 BC. At the time, Syria was in state of chaos because of the 
Seleucid rule and the successive wars that broke out among the parties fighting for power. The 
western part of the Levant (Bilad Alsham) came under the Roman rule, while the eastern part 
(Mesopotamia) was under the Persian control (Al-Hariri, 2013). Syria had a pivotal importance 
for the Romans; it was placed under the supervision of a Roman consul who had the authority to 
recruit armies and declare war. This is because Syria was the confrontation line with the Persians 
(Hajal, 2004). 
 
The Byzantine rule in Syria started in 330 AD. This period was marked by the recognition of 
Christianity by Emperor Constantine as an official religion (Hajal, 2004). The demise of the 
Byzantine rule in Syria started when the Muslim armies entered the Levant and defeated the 
Romans after Alyarmuk battle in 636 AD (Al-Helu, 2004). After the death of the Prophet 
Mohammad, the first caliphate launched wars against the tribes that renounced Islam. Following 
his victory over the apostates, this caliphate and the following caliphates had dedicated time to 
what is called ‘Islamic conquests’23. Many books about the Islamic religion heritage talk about the 
peacefulness of conquering many Syrian cities. The Syrians surrendered to the Muslims without 
fighting. The second group of cities were conquered after a long besiegement of huge Roman 
garrisons, like Damascus, Raqqa, and Homs. The third group was conquered after long and 
ferocious battles (Takkoush, 2002). 
 
The Omayyad Muslims ruled Syria from 662 until 750 AD. After that, Syria was ruled by the 
Muslim Abbasids from 750 until 1258 AD. The Abbasid Caliphate ended after the Mongols, led 
by Hulagu, occupied Baghdad; Syria then came under the Mongol rule from 1259 until 1260. The 
Mamluk Sultanate (One of the Islamic states that rose in Egypt) triumphed over the Mongols, thus 
Syria came under the Mamluk rule until the year 1516; at that time the Ottoman armies invaded 
the Levant and Damascus became an Ottoman province until the year 1919 AD (Al-Helu, 2004). 
The Ottoman sultans used to be titled as the Muslims` caliphates (Sultan, 1987). After the defeat 
of the Ottoman Sultanate, Syria came under the French mandate. King Faisal Ibn Al-Hussain was 
crowned as a king of Syria. This country was divided following the order of the French ruler into 
four states: The state of Damascus, the State of Aleppo, The State of Druze, and the State of the 
Alawites. In the year 1946 the French forces were evacuated from all Syrian land. Syria joined the 
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Arab League on the basis of a charter signed in the year 1945; Syria is considered a founding 
member of this organisation (Al-Rubaie, 2005; Mehli, 2011). 
 
After independence from France, Syria did not enjoy political stability. Military coups were 
commonplace during the period between 1949 and 1954. In 1958 a union between Syria and Egypt 
was established under the name ‘The United Arab Republic’ and continued until the year 1961 
under the leadership of the Egyptian leader Jamal Abdul Naser. The different inclinations, 
interests, and political visions led to the separation of the two countries. After that, Syria came 
back to the era of military coups (Qatash, 2002; Al-Hariri, 2013).  
 
Al-Baath Party took over the power in Syria in 1963 through a military action, called by some 
a ‘coup’ and called by some others ‘The Revolution of the 8th of March’ conveying that it changed 
the nature of the political authority, where for the first time power was reached by social forces 
comprised mostly by the middle class in cities and the countryside. This happened thanks to the 
coalition between workers, peasants, the revolutionary educated, and some small bourgeois groups 
(Habib, 1989; Hussein, 1996; Ghalioun, 2002-2003).  
However, conflicts spread among members of Al-Baath Party and the schism widened amongst 
the leadership following the victory of Israel over the armies of Syria, Egypt and Jordan in the year 
1967; Israel took over vast areas of Arab land including the Syrian Golan Heights (Qatash, 2002). 
At that time, Hafez Al-Assad was minister of defence and a member of the regional leadership of 
Al-Baath Party. He was opposing the policies of the president and the policies of some of Al-Baath 
Party leaders. In 1970, Al-Assad led what is known as the ‘Correctionist November Movement’; 
the most prominent features of this movement are a military coup against the president of the 
country and the secretary general of Al-Baath Party Nour Eldin Al-Atasi and appointing Ahmad 
Alkhatib as a temporary president. According to the supporters of this movement, it was imperative 
to abolish differences among the members of Al-Baath Party, and also it was imperative unifying 
forces and organising priorities; the conflict with Israel had to gain the main interest (Hussein, 
1996). 
 
In 1971 Al-Assad held the position of Syria’s president, backed by the army. He gained the 
favouring of many sectors of the Syrian society thanks to reconstructing the Syrian army and 
winning over Israel in the October War in 1973. 
President Assad was also the secretary general of the Socialist Al-Baath Party and the higher 
commander of the army and military forces. Al-Baath was the party ‘leading the country and the 
society’ throughout the rule of Al-Assad (Troudi, 2006). The slogan of this party is: One Unified 
Arab Nation with an Eternal Message. Its goals are: union, freedom, and socialism. That refers to 
the union of the Arab nation, liberation from occupation and imperialism, and establishing a 
socialist Arab system. The principles of the party emphasise the pioneering role of Syria in the Pan 
Arab Movement and the duty of the army to protect the homeland and guarantee the stability and 





- Syria During the Time of Hafez Al-Assad 
 
There are differences in the historical and analytical readings of the personality of president 
Hafez Al-Assad and the events witnessed during the period of his leadership. Kamal Deeb (2015) 
sees that the policies of Al-Assad laid foundations for stability after the period when the country 
was living time of chaos and coups; such policies also positioned Syria as a regional player within 
the context of conflicts inside and for the Middle East. Deeb considers the year 1970 as the year 
of change in Syria, since the Assad era ended the era of internal competing for positions among 
the leadership of Al-Baath Party (Deeb, 2015).  
 
In the 70s and 80s of the 20th century Syria went through several internal and external crises, 
starting from launching the October war against Israel in 1973, through entering the Lebanese war 
in 1976 and the break out of a militant Islamic movement inside the country between 1979 and 
1982. The Muslim Brotherhood used their Sunni sectarian position to attack the ruling regime led 
by Assad, being an ‘Alawite rule’ and that the claim for secularisation by the regime is nothing 
but another crime reflecting the heresy and infidelity of the Alawites. The rising popularity of Al-
Baath Party amongst the Sunni circles from the 50s angered the Muslim Brothers and increased 
their grudge against the ruling regime. In addition to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and 
the repercussions of the Iraqi-Iranian war (1980-1988), in the year 1984 Syria witnessed an internal 
crisis in the ruling body, which was the conflict between President Assad and his brother Rifaat. 
The events of the 80s led to the rise of the role of the security forces in the Syrian state and the 
transfer towards the security regime and to the leadership controlling all civil and military sectors, 
even the economic and financial resources of the country. Syria was affected by the war in Kuwait 
in 1990 and by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the supporter of Syria and the major source of its 
weaponry. The Syrian-Israeli conflict is considered one of the most dangerous events that tear the 
Middle East (Seale, 1992; Chouet, 1995; Deeb, 2015). 
 
In 1972, under the patronage of Al-Baath Party, the ‘Progressive National Front’ was created. 
It included a group of founding parties: The Socialist Baath Party, The Arab Socialist Union Party, 
The Socialist Unionists Party, The Arab Socialists Movement, and The Syrian Communist Party 
(Kaddah, 1991; Ghalioun, 2002-2003). The National Front was extended and included a new group 
of parties and organisations including: The Democratic Socialist Party, The National Al-Ahd 
Movement, and The Syrian Pan-Arab Socialist Party24. This front is headed by a central leadership 
including the secretary generals of the parties. The number of the members of the Arab Socialist 
Baath Party is half + 1 of the seats of the Central Headquarters of the Front. The most prominent 
mission of this front is to establish unity, cooperation, and protecting the pan-Arab security. The 
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priority used to be given to the members, and those who join Al-Baath Party; they had the priority 
in study and work. 
 
There is another group of parties which participate in the political activities in Syria including: 
The Democratic National Solidarity Party, The National Youths for Justice and Development, and 
The Democratic Pioneer Party. It is prohibited to belong to a group of parties, the most known of 
which is The Muslim Brotherhood Party (Kaddah, 1991; Ghalioun, 2002-2003).  
 
A set of economic, judicial, and social reforms and achievements were accomplished. The 
living circumstances got better in Damascus, the capital, which gained the biggest share out of the 
country’s resources. However, corruption was spread among the elite benefitting from their 
position in the regime. According to Deeb, Assad the father, had a wish to reform, but the 
malfunction was due to either the choice of the plans and executive mechanisms or to the 
corruption of the men in power. After the first Gulf War, a number of opposition movements 
appeared, asking for reform. Politics-wise, Al-Baath regime accepted the presence of independent 
members representing a third of the Parliament members, and some economic reforms were also 
put in place (Bauchard, 2008; Deeb, 2015). 
 
The Syrian economy from the 70s until 2000 was depending of several factors including: the 
oil revenues, the money transfer by Syrians living abroad, Arab and foreign countries’ aids, 
drought seasons, the structure of industry and commerce, the authority of the regime, the 
corruption of the state bodies, the exploitation by people of their positions for increasing personal 
wealth, the ineffectiveness of jurisdiction in relation to protecting personal property and 
adjudication of investment cases. The most serious causes of the stumbling of the Syrian economy 
in the 80s and 90s are related to depriving Syria of the western and international economic support 
because of its stances against Israel; Syria came under economic embargo repeatedly and for a 
long time (Deeb, 2015). 
 
 The USA and the European countries often criticised Syria, considering it as a country 
embracing and sponsoring terrorism through supporting the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Palestinian 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad, and the Iraqi resistance. The Iranian-Syrian relation and the Russian-
Syrian relation fed the international rejection of the policies of the ruling regime. Iran and Syria 
supervise arming Hezbollah and strengthening it quantitatively a qualitatively (Heydemann, 2000; 
Deeb, 2015).  
 
- Syria at the Time of Bashar Al-Assad 
 
In July 2000 President Bashar Al-Assad came to power. He adopted a project which he called 
‘The track of advancing and modernising in all Syrian state institutions’. The phenomenon of 




dominance of the one party started fading; some landmarks of political and cultural freedom started 
appearing (Al-Hariri, 2013). Assad the son wanted to liberate the political and economic system 
and to consolidate democracy inside Syria, so the start of his rule came to be known as the ‘Spring 
of Damascus’. Many sectors of the Syrian society and intellectuals viewed Assad as having future 
ambitions capable of transferring Syria into the world of development and modernity. Assad cares 
a lot about the Syrian Informatics Society considered the most important centre for opening the 
country to the most advanced technologies in the electronic communication world (Ghalioun, 
2002-2003; Troudi, 2006; Al-Daghidi, 2006).  
Even lots of intellectuals, media people, artists, and opinion leaders in Syria and the Arab world 
– who later became opponents to Assad – confessed their optimism about the ability of this young 
president to change situations in Syria. However, the security and military policy followed to solve 
the Syrian crisis changed their view and stances. 
 
The experience of ‘Damascus Spring’ stumbled for two reasons: the first is the contention 
regarding the methodology; Assad wanted it planned and gradual, whilst the opposition and the 
civil society wanted it a quick reform. The second reason was the foreign threats which 
accompanied this reformist experience. Many events pushed Syria to focus on consolidating its 
stability and defensive capability. Threats started since the end of the year 2000 when the second 
Palestinian Uprising broke out, to be followed by the ramifications of September 11th attack in 
2001, in addition to the American invasion of Iraq in 2003. The assassination of the Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri in 2005 affected Syria to a large extent and Syria had to withdraw 
from Lebanon. The economic and political embargo on Syria was tightened. Moreover, the war 
between Israel and Hezbollah broke out in 2006. The increase of foreign threats made continuing 
the process of liberalisation and reform characterised by hesitation, caution, and fear that Syria 
might lose its internal stability. After political prisoners were set free, and freedom was given to 
personalities belonging to many Islamic, liberal, and communist groups, the time of arrests and 
clamping down on the freedom of parties and media came back (Ghalioun, 2002-2003; Troudi, 
2006; Balanche, 2006; Bauchard, 2008; Al-Hariri, 2013; Deeb, 2015).   
 
In spite of pressures and embargo, Syria managed to reach self-sufficiency, regarding food 
provision, living requirements and power resources. This country has no external debts. The 
problem of city over-crowdedness was solved via the policy of balanced developing among the 
rural areas, cities, and the counties. An infrastructure network was launch all around Syria: 
airports; sea ports; dams; electricity; water, and communication networks. However, some villages 
still suffered absence of water pipes, and some others did not get electricity yet. The rapid increase 
of population creates numerous problems. The unemployment rate increased to 11.5% in the year 




unemployment problem25. The individual income is still low and does not fulfil the aspirations of 
many Syrians (Balanche, B2006; Bauchard, 2008; Deeb 2015).  
 
In order to achieve development and openness, Syria coordinated – on an economic level – with 
a group of Arab and non-Arab countries (Al-Hariri, 2013). Privatisation was allowed, especially 
in the communication sector. However, the first beneficiary of this openness was some relatives 
of Assad (Bauchard, 2008).  The education sector witnessed a huge advancement since the time of 
Assad the father. Much farming lands were reclaimed and the industrial production grew bigger. 
However, the corruption spreading in the different sectors severely hinders the processes of 
developing and modernisation. 
 
The Syrian Crisis within Its Contexts 
 
 The events of Syria, a ring in a chain 
 
   The Arab Spring, the Arab revolutions, the revolutions of the Arab Spring, were terms 
adopted by the media in describing protesting movements some of which were peaceful, the others 
were armed. They spread across a group of Arab countries. Their motives were similar due to the 
similarity of the situations and events the peoples of these countries lived. For long decades, the 
rulers and the kings have had hegemony over the reign subjugating the civilians to their will and 
command by all, direct and indirect, means. The spread of corruption hindered all the processes of 
development and progress. The gap between the rule and the people widened. The disappointment 
which resulted from the imposed censorship over all the sectors of life, especially the freedom of 
expression, led to the burst of the people's wrath. 
 
  Things started with the revolution in Tunisia from December 17th2010 to January 14th2011. It 
burst after Mohamed Bouazizi burned himself in protest against corruption, unemployment and 
poverty. It succeeded in overthrowing the previous Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali 
and obliged him to run away from Tunisia. This event provoked many Arab countries peoples. The 
revolution in Egypt started on January 25th, 2011.The demonstrator protested against the spread of 
corruption, the bad living situation, and security and political tightening. This revolution resulted 
in the stepping down of the previous president Hosni Mubarak on February 11th, 2011. After Egypt, 
Libya witnessed a protesting movement which started in the middle of February and led to the 
murder of Muammar Gaddafi and the overthrow of his reign. This movement was characterized 
by using weapons as from its beginning. It was not as peaceful as the Egyptian revolution. The 
revolution in Yemen also started in February. A group of young people in Sana'a University 
demonstrated demanding the stepping down of the previous president Ali Abdullah Saleh. At that 
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time, Saleh declared that he would not nominate himself for election again and that he would not 
hand power to his son. However, the demonstrations went on and many demonstrators were 
detained. This gave rise to the armed conflict in Yemen and a number of military personnel joined 
the revolution. In November 2011, the Gulf initiative was signed and, in accordance with its 
provisions, Saleh stepped down and handed power to the vice-president: Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi. 
The protests in Bahrain also started in February. The Bahraini government asked the help of the 
Cooperation Council of the States of the Gulf (GCC). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates sent soldiers to Bahrain in order to suppress the movements which were considered 
Shiite aiming to arouse fitna and seize power. 
 
Some other Arab countries such as Jordan, Algeria, KSA, Sudan, Iraq, Palestine, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Morocco and Mauritania intermittently witnessed protests but they had no great effect.  
  On March 15th 2011, Syria witnessed the start of a protesting movement. Its organizers on 
Facebook announced the necessity for the opponents to gather in the quarters and streets of regions 
to raise their demands the most prominent of which were eliminating corruption and realizing 
reform. A forerunner of this start was a spontaneous unplanned protesting event in Al-Hareeqa 
area in Damascus. It started when a policeman humiliated a Syrian citizen. The Syrians angrily 
gathered and began cheering "the Syrian people can't be humiliated". Later, this slogan became 
one of the most significant slogans of the opponents'. As from the first days of the time when the 
opponents came out to streets, firing took place. The Syrian government charged "infiltrating 
people" of shooting the regime's forces and the civilians altogether in order to shake stability and 
sow hatred between the state and the people. However, the opponents charged the government 
forces themselves of being responsible for the brutal murder operations. The conflict quickly 
turned into an armed one. The two sides exchanged charges about committing massacre against 
the civilians. The Syrian security forces continually negated their responsibility for killing the 
peaceful demonstrators while the opposition insisted that the regime committed the most brutal 
and violent crimes against the unarmed people. The slogan of overthrowing the regime became the 
most repeatedly cheered slogan (Al-Baiyoomi, 2017; Janabi, 2016; Mokannawi, 2015; Harahsha, 
2013; Shalash, 2013; Leila Vignal, 2012). 
 
  The data of the Syrian crisis are entangled and complex, the opinions of analyzers and 
interpreters strongly differ (Nasr et al, 2013). The interference of many Arab and non-Arab 
countries in the Syrian affairs made things more complicated. Who supports whom? Who finances 
whom? Why? What do the revolutionaries want? Islamization of Syria or freedom?  Secularism or 
Islamic rule? Political dictatorship or suppression and religious takfirism? Is what is going on in 
Syria a people's revolution or a proxy war which is run by the benefited countries? The media – 
influenced by the attitudes of the countries towards the Syrian cause – depict different images 






 The ethnic and religious diversity 
 
In several research like (duMont, 2012) and even in many newspaper articles, the Syrian society 
is described as a ‘mosaic’ due to its ethnic, religious, and sectarian diversity. The term ‘mosaic’ 
indicates art and beauty, but was such diversity really bliss for the Syrian society? Could diversity 
without awarenessfeed advancement of peoples? Probably the most important question is: How 
was such diversity created? 
We saw previously that Syria for a long time was occupied and governed by many peoples, 
eastern or western. Such peoples even fought against other peoples on the Syrian soil. This leads 
us to think of the volume of congestion and pressure accumulating, and possibly genetically or 
culturally inherited down to the current Syrian generation. How much freedom can be there under 
occupation or mandate? Was the Syrian people ready to exercise intellectual and political freedom 
following the end of the Ottoman occupation and French mandate? The number of the military 
coups, the huge schism among politicians and the mechanisms embodying such schism 
(assassinations, for example) may reveal how unready this people is for exercising a free and 
peaceful political activity.  
 
Hafez Al-Assad, who belongs to the Alawite sect, was the first Alawite president to rule Syria. 
For centuries, Syria was ruled by the Sunni commerce bourgeois who were totally subject to the 
Ottoman rule (Chouet, 1995). The Alawite sect was persecuted and marginalised politically and 
socially. The sect was also excluded, geographically and administratively, from the centre and 
mechanism of power. Many other minorities suffered the same, but the volume of Alawite 
sufferings was bigger; their women used to be sold or hired by Sunni families, particularly the 
wealthy families, until the sixties of last century. The Alawites ran away to the mountains and 
lived where there were no health services. Poverty was their main trait (Chouet, 1995; Troudi, 
2006). For the Sunnis and for the Twelve-Imams-Shia, the Alawites were viewed as the heretics 
of Islam; disbelievers, infidels, traitors, and apostates. They were recognised as a Shia Muslim sect 
after Hafez Al-Assad came to power (Chouet, 1995; Balanche, A, 2006). 
 
The name ‘Alawite’ means the supporters or followers of Imam Ali, the cousin of the Prophet 
Mohammad. They are sometimes called Nusayris, after Ibn Nusayr; an Iraqi from Basra. His 
followers fled from Iraq and came mostly to Aleppo in Syria (Balanche, C, 2006; duMOnt, 2012). 
The Alawites are divided theologically into several groups, including: the Haddadis and Khay-
yatis (Chouet, 1995). Their religious reputation among the Sunni Sect is distorted due to not having 
mosques, not wearing veils (hijab) by their women, and permitting drinking alcohol (Balanche, A, 
2006).  
 
The persecution suffered by the Alawites forced them to keep their religious beliefs marked by 
secrecy and reservation. They even lodged to ‘Taqiyah’ which means denying who they are 
sometimes and appearing in a way that suits and matches the trends of the dominant Sunni religion. 




stated that the Alawites are more infidel than Jews and Christians, and that war and Jihad (religious 
war) are religiously legal, even mandatory against the followers of this mystic course (Chouet, 
1995; Balanche, A, 2006). A question that can be asked is: Can the followers of this religious 
leader – who legitimises killing all those who disagree with him in thinking, whether religious or 
political – spread a free culture and accept the culture of those who are at odds with them? Can 
their slogans calling for democracy be believed? 
 
When the Muslim Brotherhood revolted against Al-Baath regime, their basic motive was not 
accepting the rule of the ‘non-believer apostate infidel minority’. They bombed, killed, and 
destroyed. They were severely clamped down security- and military-wise. Many of them were 
killed. In response to this suppression and to the secular movement, the number of mosques 
increased considerably, women stuck by the Islamic veil (Hijab), and many movements appeared 
wanting to redistribute the rule; the Sunni majority has the right to rule the state. The conflict 
between the ruling regime and the Muslim brotherhood reflects the conflict between the United 
States and Russia; the Muslim Brotherhood are known for their loyalty to Saudi Arabia, thus 
obedience to the United Sates, while the socialists are loyal to Russia (Corm, 1989; Troudi, 2006).  
 
During the rule of Assad the father, Sunni adherent men took the highest positions, the most 
known of which were, Mustafa Tlas, Abdulhalim Khaddam, and Abdullah Al-Ahmar. However, 
the security sector was largely in Alawite hands (Chouet, 1995; Deeb, 2015). 
 
 The obscurity of the Syrian identity 
 
The term ‘Arab’ is used even in much research – to denote the majority of the Syrian society. 
The Syriacs and Aramites are described as minorities, bearing in mind that they also speak Arabic 
and represent the origin of the Syrian people before Islam. This leads us to wonder: What is the 
foundation upon which this classification was done? If we assumed that the current Syriacs and 
Aramites adhered to their belonging, to the original nationality, what would make the Syrian Arab 
in scientific descriptions? The use of Arabic which was imposed after the spread of Islam, or the 
politically imposed nationalism? According to item 10 in Al-Baath Party Constitution, an Arab is 
whoever speaks Arabic and lives on an Arab land or aspires to live in such countries, with 
conviction that he belongs to such nationalism. Al-Baath viewed Islam as a unifying factor 
amongst the Arab peoples (Troudi, 2006). 
 
The on-going violence in Syria andapplied by all parties might be the result of belonging 
contradictions. Relating religion to politics and relating nationalism to religion are disastrous in a 
society which was forced for many centuries to succumb to foreign invaders; a society that needs 





Arabism is based on Islamism; Islam is determinist and fatalist (the word of God must be 
obeyed; the Quran). Islam is divided into so many sects and doctrines. The Sunni-Shia conflict is 
not a superficial conflict as portrayed by many who call for the necessity of the convergence of 
religions and doctrines. Accusing the other of unbelief is commonplace among the majority of the 
doctrines´ adherents, thus legalising killing and blood shedding is not unexpected. Hence, we are 
experiencing a vortex of variables which encourage violence and schism, especially when 
politically employed, and this was what happened in Syria.  
 
Al-Baath linked between Arabism, socialism, and secularism (Mehli, 2011), and tried to apply 
this approach in a society whose majority cannot apply critical thinking to the concepts in which 
they believe. The Sunni Muslims cannot suspect or even enquire about the credibility of the saying 
that ‘the Quran is the speech of God’, nor query the validity of the Hadith Shareef, registered 
sayings by the Prophet Mohammad (The Prophet Traditions). Even beyond that, many deny 
science when it contradicts a religious text, and permit punishing all those who regress from Islam, 
as did the first caliphate Abu Bakr when he launched wars against the apostates. The religious 
dictatorship prevailed for many centuries, supported by the political dictatorship. Both robbed the 
citizen of the right to think and the right to criticise, thus the right to know.  
 
Awareness should also be raised about the role of illiteracy in increasing the amount of 
fanaticism of all its aspects, tribal, religious and political. In the modern days the number of schools 
and universities increased, but the centuries-long-rooted beliefs still dominate that thinking of 
many sectors of the Syrian society. The cleric is viewed as the most important ‘ideological’ 
reference for those adhering to their doctrines. In addition to the intolerance of the cleric, his low 
academic and cultural degree is enough to create a takfiri (labelling as infidel whoever disagrees 
with one’s opinion) society, shaken from within.  
 
 Denying the other; the dominant policy 
 
This policy is not the product of the modern era; rather it is an accumulated heritage. A lot of 
historical events prove this, like the Islamic-Islamic conflict and the ideological conflict following 
independence from France, in addition to the actions and reactions of the sectors of the Syrian 
people towards those who oppose their views (in the context of the studied crisis). Dialogue needs 
understanding and accepting the other. However, what happened in Syria may be attributed in the 
first place to the culture of imposition and coercion. Analysing the rhetoric of the Syrians and their 
stances towards each other on the social media websites proves the dominance of the culture of 
“radically denying the other”. The most serious tool for this culture is demonising the opponent 






 Dividing the Syrian society into proponents and opponents to the policy of the two 
Assads 
The difference regarding opinions is centred around several major ideas. For the proponents, 
Assad the father managed to establish political stability in Syria following the time when chaos 
prevailed. He introduced many reforms and gave lands to the farmers after feudalism controlled 
everything. He improved the industrial and agricultural sectors; he led Syria towards self-
sufficiency; he reconstructed the Syrian army and could win over Israel (regaining honour 
following the defeat in the 1967 war). He protected Syria from a sectarianism-based civil war. 
Thanks to the Syrian support, the Lebanese resistance (Hezbollah) realized victories over Israel. 
The two Assads support the Palestinian resistance and allow the Palestinian organisations to 
resume their activities over the Syrian land. Assad the father, and later on the son, continuously 
sought to create a real Arab unity that constitutes a force able to deter all colonisation attempts. 
Syria is facing a major conspiracy because of its stances against Israel and the United States and 
because of its adherence to pan Arab nationalism. What is happening in Syria is not a revolutionary 
public movement; rather it is an American plot aiming at handing over the rule in Syria to the 
Muslim Brotherhood in order to break this country up on religious and sectarian bases, considering 
the policy of the Muslim Brotherhood is a takfiri policy that views minorities as infidel groups that 
should declare repentance and embrace the religion of the right path (Islam). The security and 
military grip in the country was and still is important because of the presence of the Israeli enemy 
(Ababsa, 2005; Troudi, 2006; Isaac, 2014). The opponents to the regime reject the theoretical 
foundations of the proponents, thinking that the two Assads contributed to shaking the stability of 
Syria and they supported the Zionist enemy. Reform is a lie and supporting the resistance is a mask 
for covering alliance with Israel and the United States. The two Assads exercised absolute 
dictatorship over the people. 
 
  Some data about the opposition 
 
The Syrian political opposition – represented by the Syrian National Council, the National 
Coalition for Syrian Opposition and  Revolution Forces, Syrian Revolution General Commission, 
the Stream of Building the Syrian State, and the pro-government opposition–could not get unified 
for long years in spite of "the international efforts" which tried to make the opposition go hand in 
hand. These leaders come from different ideological origins and doctrines. They live in a 
confidence crisis among each other. Their views about the decisions that should be made vary 
severely. They disagree about the resources and about distributing them among each other. And 
what is more important is their tendency to access governance or get a high rank. The missing 
command of the opposition made the protesting movement demagogic, anarchic and lacking a 
clear vision. The communication between the leaders and the demonstrators was utterly missing. 
Some of the leaders called for foreign interference in Syria and announced their disappointment 
because the countries did not take this step. For the opponents of the western policies in the Arab 




conflict and the competition among the regional supporters, such as KSA and Qatar, also 
contributed to the failure of the process of collaboration among the Syrian opposition leaders 
(Mahmoud, 2013; The Middle East, 2013; Sayegh, 2013). 
 
The armed opposition started as combatant groups spreading in various areas of Syria which 
called themselves "the Free Army" and got recognized and supported by many countries. 
According to the military command of the Free, the officers and soldiers who defected from the 
government Syrian army form the core of the Free Army26.  However, the Syrian government 
disproves these allegations and says that some defectors are only pretexts to cover the conspirators 
who send soldiers to fight the Syrian army27.  
 
Marwan Qabalan (2013) sees that the map of the formations of the armed military opposition 
were not clear in 2011 and 2012; these formations lack the coherent structure and a central 
authority which is able to unify them. All of them have one clear aim which is the elimination of 
the ruling regime. However, their vision is blurred and their strategies are conflicting. They 
disagree about anything else other than the goal. Their main disagreement is about the identity and 
the political system of the future Syrian state.  
Qabalan divided these formations into two main streams: the first is a stream with a secular 
tendency. This formation is often connected to and falls under the Free Army. The second 
comprises the battalions and brigades with Islamic trends, whether they are combatants from Syria 
or foreign ones. As to 2012, this formation contained 600 factions. The illiterate groups form the 
largest part of the leaders of this stream. 
 
According to Qabalan, these formations were originally formed spontaneously; they began as 
a reaction against the practices of the government forces against the people. He also sees that the 
regime was the only winner of the militarization of the revolution so as to justify its aggressive 
acts. Nevertheless, the supporters of the regime – from all the people's and elite slices – see that 
the armed opposition was formed as a part of a bigger conspiracy plotted by many countries. Some 
military formations were formed and trained during the events and others were ready and prepared 
before the wave of the Arab protests28. 
                                                             
26 Al-Jazeera channel, “Free Syrian Army”, 02 November 2014. Available:  25 April 2017. 
http://www.aljazeera.net/encyclopedia/military/2014/11/2/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D9%88%D8%B1%D9%8A-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B1 
BBC Arabic, “Free Syrian Army”, 17 November 2011. Available: 29 April 2018. http://www.bbc.com/arabic/middleeast/2011/11/111116_syrian_free_army_qa 
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Hereunder, I list some of the "secular" militant formations: The Temporary Military Council of 
the Free Syrian Army, The Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army, the Joint Military 
Command of the Syrian Revolution, the Syrian National Army, the Joint Command of the Syrian 
Military Councils, the Supreme Joint Military Command Council. 
 
Some of the features of this stream are as follows: a lot of its leaders run things from abroad, 
especially Turkey. It does not have the tools of communication with the people. In addition, it does 
not promote ideas well. It is in a state of conflict and a lack of co-ordination with and confidence 
in the political opposition. The military command is divided and dispersed as the visions are 
divergent and even blurred. This command desires to gain power on bases of the right to lead and 
of the precedence of defection. Some of them argued that it is necessary to stick to military 
hierarchy. In addition, the most prominent reason for disagreement is obeying different financing 
actors. The leaders more or less united when they saw that their disagreement was the reason 
behind the progress of the government forces. The Joint Command of the Revolution Military 
Councils realized progress because of the blessing of some important and effective religious 
figures (Qabalan, 2013) 29. 
 
As for the formations with Islamist tendency, the demonstrators adopted a sectarian discourse 
as at the start of the protests. Some countries supported the Sunni Islamist tendency and the internal 
sectarian divisions in Syria which reinforced the Islamization of the revolution. Many forces and 
streams adopt the political Islam – especially the Sunni – in facing the regime (Qabalan, 2013). 
 
The Most Significant and Effective Islamic Forces on the Syrian Arena Are:  
1- Jabhat Al-Nusra. It advocates Jihad and sees that the overthrow of Al-Assad is the first step 
towards an Islamic state. It adopts extremist and offensive discourse and behavior towards the 
religious minorities. It considers itself the first defender of the Sunni sect against those whom 
it calls "Al-Nusairiyyeen" instead of Alawites, and those whom it calls "rawafed" instead of 
Shiites. Many of its members are experts in fighting due to their participation in what they call 
"Jihad arenas" in many countries some of which are Iraq and Afghanistan. It also contains many 
nationalities. One of the most important reasons why it appeals to the Syrians is that its external 
financing is very strong. This organization declared its loyalty to Al-Qaeda under the command 
of Aymen Al-Dhawahiri. Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of Al-Qaeda branch in Iraq, 
declared integrating his organization to Al-Nusra and announced the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria. Jabhat Al-Nusra depends on suicide bomber attacks. Its informational strategy is identical 
to that of Al-Qaeda.   
 
                                                             






2- The Syrian Islamic Front includes a group of brigades and battalions some of which are: 
The Battalions of Ahrar Al-Sham, Al-Haq Brigadein Homs, AtbaaAl-Rasoul, Al-Fath Al-
Mubeen and Islamic Al-Fajr Movementin Aleppo and its suburbs. Most of these groups belong 
to the salafi – fundamental – stream. They advocate Jihad in the cause of building an Islamic 
state against the Irani and Safawi invasion which aims at establishing a Shiite state that includes 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. One of the principles of these combatants is that the 
agreements between them and other countries should not contradict Islamic Sharia; Islam shall 
be the compasses of any action and reaction. 
 
3- The Caucus of Ansar Al-Sham consists of a number of battalions and brigades distributed 
among several areas. Each faction is responsible for a specific area. Some of them are: Al-
Sahaba Battalions, Ahfad Al-Rasoul Brigade, Al-Furqan Battalions, Islam Brigade and Al-
Habib Al-Mustafa Brigade. 
 
4- Syrian Islamic Liberation Front. The most prominent characteristic of this front is its 
conflict even against the Sunni sect. It calls some individuals "the sick brothers" who need to 
be guided and forced to practice the religious obligations so that they may get the satisfaction 
and blessings of Allah (Qabalan, 2013) 30.  
 
Koran and Sunna are the reference sources for all the factions of the Islamic stream. However, 
the armed forces do not have a united political or military body. Intellectual differences dominate 
them. Some of them adopt international Jihadi thought similar to that of Al-Qaeda. Some of them 
have moderate Islamic discourse while the majority categorize themselves in the field of salafi 
thought or fundamentalism. The interface among them is that they fight a "disbelieving regime" 
(Qabalan, 2013). 
 
Bloody conflicts prevail among the factions. These conflicts reach the degree of assassinating 
the most important leaders. For example, the flaming conflict between Jabhat Al-Nusra and Al-
Farouq Battalion. The relation of this stream with the political opposition is weak. Jabhat Al-Nusra 
refuses to work with the political opposition considering it as a western project which aims to 
encircle the Islamic project (Qabalan, 2013). 
 
The Islamic armed stream is characterized by the ability to influence people because of the 
factors it has: the enticing religious discourse, the robust financing, the active relief networks 
                                                             
















The ethnic and religious diversity in Syria is the result of wars and conflicts. The fighting among 
Muslims is for the purpose of holding the rule and imposing religious visions, interpretations and 
applications that suit their inclinations. The Syriacs are treated as an accepted minority among the 
majority, although they are the original inhabitants of Syria. The historical heritage of the Syrian 
Armenians is full of sadness; they came to Syria following the massacres perpetrated by the 
Ottoman State against them. The same applies to the Kurds who came to Syria because of the 
Turkish oppression. A group of achievements and reforms were carried out, but corruption is still 
widespread in most working sectors in Syria. In the light of such information, the events of the 






An Overview on Al-Jazeera 
 
The Context in which Al-Jazeera Took Place 
  
A channel created by the Emir of Qatar Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani gaining power in 1995 
by a coup against his father (el Oifi, 2004). The advent of Al-Jazeera was in 1996. Its name means 
"the peninsula" (Huyghe 2).  The Qatari government has allocated 150 million US dollars as a 
loan. It is an amount helping the channel in the first five years of broadcasting, then Al-Jazeera 
must achieve self-financing by advertising or by its media products (Sayed Ahmed, 2013).   
 
The emergence and success of Al-Jazeera were accompanied by the public disinterestedness in 
the programs produced by the national media that glorify emirs, kings and presidents. These media 
get away from communities’ concerns.  
In 2002, Al-Jazeera congratulated itself for having a public base of 35 million viewers in the 
Arab world. According to Jassem Al-Ali, director of the channel, there are 200,000 subscribers in 
the United States and Canada and the number increases 2500 per week. Many public places, such 
as London restaurants, install satellite antennas to allow visitors to follow Al-Jazeera (Miladi, 
2005).  
 
The Qatari government was suffering from a bias applied by the Arab media. For example, in 
a confrontation, Saudi Arabia succeeded, thanks to the media support, to invade a border 
gendarmerie of Qatar; the media legitimized Saudi actions.  
The genesis of this television responds to the internal circumstances of Qatar and to the 
problems this country faces in its regional environment, particularly its relations with Saudi 
Arabia. After the 1991 war, the Gulf Emirates found out their fragilities and their structural 
weaknesses. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has raised fears among the Qataris, fear of having the 
same fate; it is possible that Saudi Arabia invades their territory. Reason why Qatar had to seek a 
protector, the alliance with the United States was the choice (el Oifi, 2004). Qatar aims to be the 
best ally of the United States that is why it opens its territories by welcoming American troops 
who left their Saudi bases (Huyghe 2).  The Qatari-American relationship is getting stronger. The 
US military has set up a general command near Doha. In this context it is not easy to understand 
neither the identity of Al-Jazeera nor its functioning (el Oifi, 2004). 
 
Saudi Arabia is a powerful competitor of Qatar. The two countries are trying to capture 
transnational feelings. Both countries seek American support and benevolence (el Oifi, 2004). 
The Saudi leaders have one objective: to control the Arab media sector; they must dominate the 
informational machine. A goal born in the 1950s and 1960s, during Nasser's propaganda period. 
This president aimed at the unification of the Arab countries. At that time the Arab nationalism 
could create internal struggles between supporters and protesters. Saudi Arabia applied a 




language media. It aimed at the formation of public opinion and the avoidance of any criticism 
addressed to the kingdom and especially to the royal family (el OiFi, 2004).  
 
Following the appearance of Al-Jazeera and its editorial policies, the Saudi media strategy was 
broken. The space of the Arabic-speaking media is shaken by the Qatari options. Distinguishing 
itself from the Saudi media strategy is a priority for Al-Jazeera. To differentiate itself, the channel 
focuses on three axes: the location, the choice of personnel and the reference ideology. It was 
necessary to find a new strategy to change the Arab communication landscape at all levels. Al-
Jazeera did not hesitate to clarify the impasses and the ineffectiveness of the Saudi media (el OiFi, 
2004). 
Following the influence of Al-Jazeera on the Arab opinion and to enter into a competition with 
it, American politicians have launched Arabic-speaking televisions and radios such as Radio Sawa 
and New Iraq TV (Miladi, 2005).  
 
Personnel 
Al-Jazeera Chairman of the Board is Hamad Ben Thamer Al-Thani, a relative of the royal 
family. The journalists of the channel are of different Arab origins. The pre-eminence of Lebanese 
journalists seen in the Saudi field is over. The Saudi media were based on an alliance between 
Saudi money and Lebanese know-how, whilst Al-Jazeera adopts the pan-Arabism to recruit staff. 
Its strategy is to stay far of the Saudi orientations. By the journalists of Al-Jazeera, the different 
Arab nationalities are represented; the Saudi and Lebanese dominance is over (Sayed Ahmed, 
2013; Miladi, 2005).  
Al-Jazeera's core staff had the experience of the BBC channel. In 1994, by a contract, the group 
of a private Saudi television (Orbit) took advantage of the know-how and international reputation 
of BBC television to create a new Arabic-language channel. This channel was to broadcast in one 
and a half year, but the contract was cancelled because of a misunderstanding regarding the 
editorial line of this new television. However, Al-Jazeera officials used this cancellation of the 
contract and recruited the most famous journalists such as the Syrian Faisal Al-Qassem, the 
Jordanian Sami Hadad and Jamil Azer or the Tunisian Mohammed Krichen. These journalists 
restore the professionalism, rigor and experiences of the BBC at the same time they maintain an 
Arab ambience (el OiFi, 2004; Miladi, 2005).  
Al-Jazeera Strategies 
 
The emergence of Al-Jazeera in a small country highlights the need of Qatar to achieve 
democratic change and to face the challenges. Qatar began to live in a democratic and pluralistic 
atmosphere. Al-Jazeera became the symbol of the Gulf States; an island of freedom surrounded by 





The channel has assigned itself a major objective: to support the Palestinians, particularly 
during the Intifada. Its relations with Qatar's foreign policy remain vague, reason why some people 
call Al-Jazeera an alibi of the Qatari regime; a means by which the Qatari government indirectly 
passes its ideas. The Foreign Minister Hamad Bin-Jassim Al-Thani confirms that Al-Jazeera is an 
independent media, particularly in terms of its editorial policy (el OiFi, 2004; Miladi, 2005). 
 
The channel is considered as a bearer of the Qatari official ambition to become a mediator of 
regional debates. Al-Jazeera highlights Qatar's mediation to improve the relations between several 
Arab countries like Sudan, Yemen and Iran. When the will of the Jordanians was to bring the 
leaders of Hamas out of their territory, Qatar opened the door and welcomed them. In order to 
prove its capacity as a mediator between civilizations, in April 2003, Qatar organized a conference 
in which Muslim and Christian students from different origins took part (Miladi, 2005). 
 
In the Arab world, there are three levels of information flows: international level, Arabic-
speaking foreign media broadcast to the Arab territories, particularly the BBC and CNN. National 
level, represented by the state media which aim at the legitimization of the policies of the regimes. 
The third level is pan-Arab or transnational, represented by media attempting to overcome national 
cleavages and obstacles. The goal of these media is the Arab viewer. Al-Jazeera may present the 
third level (el OiFi, 2004; Miladi, 2005, Al-Ghadban, 2010). 
 
The attention is increased on these pan-Arab media whose unusual interpretations of the facts 
are observed. These channels attempt to mirror the ideologies that are spread among the 
populations and to reflect the public preferences. Before the launch of Al-Jazeera, the Arab world 
was not witness of a free media space; it was the Arab media located abroad that relatively 
represented the informational liberalization. After the outbreak of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975, 
a part of the Lebanese press was migrated to Europe. The Saudi media were based in London or 
Italy. The Arab capital that was invested abroad confirmed the impossibility of building a media 
field characterized by a real liberation within the Arab world. The creation of Al-Jazeera was in a 
context in which Lebanese journalists became servants of the Saudi princes whose media empire 
was set up outside (in Europe) without taking ethical considerations into account. Al-Jazeera aims 
at demonstrating the ability to have a free Arab media at all levels. Gradually, the Saudi media 
installed in the West returned to Arab territory, especially to the United Arab Emirates, but not to 
Saudi Arabia (el OiFi, 2004). 
 
The launch of Al-Jazeera was accompanied by the abolition of the Qatari Ministry of 
Information. This gave the people an impression that they had a gift that would open the door to 
free and pluralistic information. This information is distinguished by the fact that it is produced in 





Al-Jazeera emerged in an unstable geopolitical context, the notion of Nation-State was 
contested and the power of transnational identifications was remarkable. The channel faced the 
accusations of the Arab nationalists. According to them, Al-Jazeera is a sign of the weakness of 
the Arab nation. In order to legitimize the existence of Al-Jazeera, Qatar aimed at capturing 
transnational, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic feelings, with the aim of instrumentalising them in 
legitimating a disputed national identity (el OiFi, 2004, Al-Ghadban, 2010). 
 
Al-Jazeera journalists congratulate themselves on their premises and proudly write: "The whole 
world looks at CNN and CNN looks at Al-Jazeera!" (Huyghe 2).  
During the first Gulf War, America propagated its images via CNN with no fear of competition. 
It chose carefully its information frames; its images were chosen according to its propaganda. 
Because of Al-Jazeera, the American monopoly of images has been lost as there is an Arab look 
at the world; the interpretations of events are no longer subjected to mono-sense. This created a 
geopolitical battle of information. By covering the movements in Iraq, Al-Jazeera has established 
a communication counterbalance that managed to cope with US military superiority (Huyghe 2; el 
OiFi, 2004). At a time when a large majority of televisions were adhering to the new prohibitions 
such as the prohibition to show dead bodies, Al-Jazeera continued to expose another vision of war 
(Huyghe 2). Al-Jazeera changed the functioning of the Arab media, but also prompted the Western 
media to question their conventional norms regarding the coverage of the wars and conflicts 
(Miladi, 2005). 
 
Through its programs, which are different from the broadcasts of state-owned television stations 
whose audiences are bored, Al-Jazeera quickly became a symbol of liberalization of the Arab 
media discourse. It abandoned the propaganda of the Arab regimes and opened the doors to the 
criticisms of the situations that worry the different Arab communities. The success of Al-Jazeera 
is the result of the mixture of three visions: Arabism, Islamism and liberalism (el OiFi, 2004). In 
its shows, the trends Arab, Islamic and liberal are mixed. In many programs, speakers having 
nationalist visions are regularly invited. The adopted slogans refer to the nation and Pan-Arab 
solidarity. The struggles against the Colonialism and Zionism are also represented by the images 
that Al-Jazeera evokes (el OiFi, 2004; Huyghe 2, Al-Ghadban, 2010). 
  
The weekly program "Opposite Direction" may present the nationalistic trend of the channel. 
Programs like "Sharia and Life" are the mirror of Islamic sensitivity. Youssef Al-Qaradawi is 
frequently invited on Al-Jazeera. The program "Several Opinions" reflects the liberal sense of the 
channel. This program is the space of very divergent personalities -politically and ideologically. It 
is also possible to see Israeli officials or supporters of Zionist and American policies. They are 
invited to face the Arab interlocutors. For the first time in the Arab media landscape, Israeli leaders 
or journalists can be listened by the Arab peoples. The success of Al-Jazeera is a result of the 





Before 11 September 2001, Al-Jazeera was an elite channel (Miladi, 2005). The remarkable 
increase in Al-Jazeera's visibility, both regionally and internationally, is due to its exploitation of 
the crises experienced in the Middle East. The role of this channel in the orientation and formation 
of public opinion cannot be negligible (el OiFi, 2004). Its acknowledged credibility and popularity 
are the results of its coverage of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq in a way different from that 
of American media (Miladi, 2005). 
 
Al-Jazeera has gained the confidence of private sponsors. Many brands regularly appear: DHL, 
Sony, Western Union, National Bank of Qatar, Qatar Petroleum, Islamic Bank of Qatar, Gas of 
Qatar and others. Advertising is a very important financial source for Al-Jazeera. To attract 





The slogan of Al-Jazeera is "Opinion and its Opposite". It is considered the first Arab 
information channel. Its programs consist of: regional and international information followed by 
analysis of specialists, debates and discussions on different events, information on the economy 
and sports, documentaries and educational shows. The channel presents itself as an independent 
and international media, competitor of the strongest media like BBC and CNN (Baghdadi 2, 2009). 
 
On Al-Jazeera, a phenomenon which is not usual on the Arab waves occurred. The Arab 
regimes can be criticized by the opponents. The channel constantly evokes the impotency of the 
Arab world and the weaknesses of the regimes that are not able to overcome the challenges. Al-
Jazeera was able to invent a new identity for the Arab media while covering tortured prisoners in 
Palestine or Iraq, civilian victims, grieving women and Arab popular anger (Huyghe 2).  
 
Many Shows allow viewers to speak live over the telephone. The program “Al-Jazeera Pulpit” 
is considered very important. A program animated by several journalists in which Arab audiences 
can demonstrate their frustrations, anger and emotions with regard to the case in Palestine. 
Through broadcasting images of material damage and killed people, Al-Jazeera opened the 
opportunity of calling for fund-raising for the coalition of Arab and Muslim charities "Union for 
Good" aiming at the benefit of the Palestinian population. 
Al-Jazeera offers the sphere to witnesses who tell about the Israeli atrocities and the blocked 
people in Jenin, Ramallah and Nablus. The audiences express the difficulties they suffer from. The 
channel also announces the dates of the gatherings organized in different places.  
In April 2002, through the program Al-Jazeera Pulpit, Arab children from several countries 
could show their feelings and send messages of support to Palestinian children. According to 




There was a state of revolt in the Arab streets following the events of Jenin, we wanted to exploit 
this frustration and propose an outlet for Arab public opinion to be able to express.   From the 
outset, we did not wish to have editorial control over the content; we wanted to let the public react 
spontaneously and freely (Miladi, 2005). 
 
The channel is recognized by its broadcasting of the recordings (video or audio cassettes) of 
Al-Qaeda and its leader. The American authorities see that Bin Laden profited from his 
appearances on the screen of Al-Jazeera; he gave secret instructions to his supporters (Huyghe2; 
Sayed Ahmed, 2013). 
At a time when the appearance of moderate or radical Islamic groups was completely censored 
on the media in the region, Al-Jazeera was Osama Bin Laden's letterbox. This transmission has 
multiplied the popularity of Al-Qaeda but also the popularity of the channel in the Arab world and 
in the diaspora. The deployment of the Internet has facilitated the propaganda of terrorist groups; 
Al-Jazeera is no longer the only space in which the actions of Al-Qaeda are seen. By using digital 
means and new communication technologies, Al-Qaeda no longer needs to disturb itself by 
convincing mass media to issue its press releases. Terrorism has its own media (Miladi, 2005; 
Huyghe 2). 
 
Some journalists have resigned, such as Hafez Al-Mirazi; Head of the Washington office. For 
him, the channel witnesses a dramatic editorial change favourable to the Islamic, this was seen in 
the columns of the daily Al-Hayat whose journalist chooses Figures presenting the Islamist hard-
line. The divergence within the editorial team of Al-Jazeera caused a drift of the editorial line 
towards a strong appearance of the Islamists. Banalizing violence even distort the reality are results 
of this media change (Ferjanie, 2008). 
 
The impotency of the international media to achieve an unbiased coverage of events, such as 
the Israeli-Palestinian war, has helped Al-Jazeera to advance its atypical methodology. Al-Jazeera 
did not hesitate to issue images that western channels like CNN and BBC had refused to broadcast 
(Miladi, 2005).  
During the American fight against the Taliban, Al-Jazeera was the only television allowed to 
cover in Afghanistan. Al-Jazeera's presence was remarkable thanks to its cameras filming on the 
ground. Its reports revealed other informative frameworks than those chosen for the benefit of the 
American propaganda. The channel showed the catastrophic outcomes of the war. That is to say, 
the sides that America tried to hide were presented on Al-Jazeera. The reports tried to prove that 
the missiles do not avoid women and children to only strike bearded men that are head cutters. Al-
Jazeera attempted to create emotions favourable to the victims. The influences of this 
representation of the dramatic consequences are multiplied when the viewer and victims have the 





Al-Jazeera succeeded in facilitating pan-Arab dialogue and in addressing issues that directly 
affect the interests of the communities in the region. The regimes' control over media content is 
torn, and the foreign policies of these regimes can be tackled by the transnational channels, 
especially by Al-Jazeera.  
In 1998, the coverage of the American strikes against Iraq enriched Al-Jazeera's distinctiveness 
and eventually the size of its audience increased. For the first time, viewers in the region saw an 
Arab television that could interpret events other than the national media that downplayed the facts.  
By covering the war in Iraq, Al-Jazeera tried to achieve a balance. It gave the floor to the 
members of the government or to the Iraqi leaders but also to the Americans; its correspondents 
accompanied the American army (el OiFi, 2004; Miladi, 2005). 
 
The coverage of the second Palestinian Intifada and the Israeli repression without reservations, 
demonstrated the Arabian face of the channel. The live information was multiplied. Interviews 
with leaders of Hamas and Islamic Jihad played the role of legitimizing Islamic movements in 
Palestine; the Arab public opinion retained a favourable image. Al-Jazeera correspondents in the 
occupied territories and in Israel, Walid Al-Omari, Chirin Abu Aqila, and Javara Al-Boudyri, 
became stars (el OiFi, 2004). Through its coverage of the second Palestinian Intifada and its 
pluralistic broadcasts, Al-Jazeera was able to win a large Arabic-speaking audience. Thirty-five 
million viewers in the Arab world but also a considerable audience outside. Al-Jazeera is 
considered a credible source for millions of viewers. Several events would show the influence of 
this television on the public opinion. For example, when Saddam Hussein's sons were killed by 
the Americans, it was necessary to expose their corpses on Al-Jazeera's screen. This exhibition 
could quiet the pretensions that consider the killing a fabricated affair (Huyghe 2).    
 
Several programs are spaces of confrontation of conflicting and widely divergent opinions. One 
of these broadcasts is the program “The Opposite Direction” or “The Opposite Sense”. It is inspired 
by the American program "Crossfire" (Huyghe 2).  
Through the selectivity of words, the channel draws the mental images which reshape the facts. 
Al-Jazeera maintains a balance in terms of information framing, but the choice of vocabularies 
demonstrates its attitudes. For example, it called the Anglo-American coalition "Invasion Forces".  
The perception of the war in the Arab world is directly influenced by the words used in media. 
The Americans presented the war as a “Liberation of the People”, however, Al-Jazeera presented 
it as an “Occupation of an Arab country” (el OiFi, 2004).  
 
Encountered Obstacles  
 
Since the Americans consider Al-Jazeera to be the Channel of Bin Laden, the offices of this 
media were bombed in Kabul but also in Baghdad and Fallujah in 2003 (Huyghe 2). 
Al-Jazeera was exposed to pressures of Arab politicians and Western powers due to its coverage 




negatively (Miladi, 2005). The United States, through the voices of Powell, Rumsfeld or Armitage, 
opposed Al-Jazeera's information and pressurized the Emirate of Qatar (Huyghe 2). Tayssir 
Allouni, one of the channel presenters, was arrested in Spain following accusations of having links 
with Al-Qaeda (Huyghe 2). 
 
Al-Jazeera met the dissatisfaction of the Arab regimes (Baghdadi 2, 2009). In June 2004, the 
offices of Al-Jazeera were closed by the new Iraqi authorities. Other closures have occurred in 
Jordan and Kuwait due to several complaints that have been filed by Arab governments (Huyghe 
2). Jordan closed the channel´s office for four months for the reason that the journalist treated 
badly the personality of the king. In Algeria, the electricity was purposely cut off to prevent the 
receiving of a program broadcasted by Al-Jazeera. This program was devoted to the Algerian civil 
war as well as to the role played by the army in this war. Egypt accused the channel of applying 
incitement to religious and doctrinal hatred, which is why Al-Jazeera journalists were followed by 
the authority (Baghdadi 2, 2009).  
 
Some of Al-Jazeera journalists died while covering wars, such as Jordanian journalist Tarek 
Ayoub who was hit almost directly by an American missile in Iraq. 
Despite the US pressure and the requirements of the Iraqi interim authority addressed to Qatar, 




The opinions are divided regarding the purpose of Al-Jazeera and its affiliation. It is possible 
that the Americans tried to liberalize the Arab media in order to obtain political moderation. Al-
Jazeera's slogan "Opinion and its Opposite" and the diversity of opinions on each treated subject 
may reflect this trend of liberalism. But the fact that Al-Jazeera criticizes the Washington policy 
applied in the region makes the entire media policy of the channel a thought contestable by the 
American Administration. Despite the known dominance of the United States over Qatar, the 
creation of Al-Jazeera may not be dogmatically exogenous. The coverage of the war in Iraq could 
confirm the independence of the channel whose the content of massages was contradictory to the 
official attitudes of the Qatari government that welcomed the American troops on its territory. 
However, Al-Jazeera is criticized to be a device working for the benefit of the American 
Administration, both to calm down the erupting anger of the Arab people because of the American 
hegemony, and to legitimize the installation of the American troops in region (el OiFi, 2004). 
 
The channel was accused of being a means used by the Americans to tremble the Arab world 
and to control the territory and wealth of the region. Al-Jazeera propagates the American project 
and propaganda in the Arab world (el OiFi, 2004; Miladi, 2005). Some see it as an associate of the 
Taliban television. However, others see it as CNN television but in Arabic. Western governments 




popularity of terrorists (Miladi, 2005, Sayed Ahmed, 2013). Since it covered the war in Iraq, in a 
manner contrary to the Western propaganda, it was accused of being financed by Saddam Hussein. 
As it gives the floor to Israeli leaders, it is accused of being supported by Mossad funds. By 
addressing problems of US, Al-Jazeera is estimated to be funded by the CIA (Miladi, 2005). 
 
For some, this channel was created with the aim of normalizing the Arab relations with Israel, 
and also it was built under Jewish supervision. Through its screen, it is possible to see foreign 
leaders who apply the marketing of their options. Israeli leaders defend their stances, this has made 
the Arab acceptance of Israeli opinions easier (Sayed Ahmed, 2013). (Before the existence of Al-
Jazeera, it was impossible to accept listening to the opinions of an Israeli). In 31 March 2013, 
Mossad's former president, Shabtai Shavit, said in a statement in the Israeli daily Yedeoute 
Ahranoute that Qatar has played a historic role in favor of Israel, this country is considered an 
active arm of the American and Israeli policy in the Middle East and the Arab region (Sayed 
Ahmed, 2013).   
 
One of the arguments of the opponents of Al-Jazeera is that this channel confirms the American 
pretensions. The channel tries to link and confuse the terrorist operations with the Arabs and 
Muslims. It propagates the ideology of the Arab Resistance which is led by terrorist and extremist 
forces; it covers and legitimizes all operations. Al-Jazeera broadcasts recordings that show the 
killing and the kidnapped people. It spreads the terror that terrorist groups are aiming at. 
Sometimes, it gives the scope to extremist Islamists breaking the laws of their countries. However, 
it neglects the figures having projects favourable to nationalism and aimed at the development of 
the Arab countries (Sayed Ahmed, 2013).    
 
In the West, the channel also met with criticism. The United States and Britain did not accept 
Al-Jazeera's method of covering the war in Iraq because it distorted the image of the Western 
liberators (Baghdadi 2, 2009). 
 
Criticism of the Channel´s Programs  
 
The program "Opposite Direction" aims at putting in front of the viewer several opinions on 
the same dealt issue. The Syrian presenter Faysal Al-Qassem guides the dialogue in a theatrical 
way, creating by his noisy interventions a mental disturbance in the mind of receiver. At the end 
of this show, the viewers become stricter and too attached to their ideas; the tolerance is lost. 
The program "More Than One Opinion" in which the journalist Sami Haddad interrupts the 
discussions of the guests in order to demonstrate his own opinions. He also comes out of the main 
treated axis to address secondary subjects which clearly spoils the debates. 
Through the "Without Limits" and "Witness of the Era" programs, the Egyptian journalist, 




the guests' trends and those adopted by the leaders of the channel. The guests often support the 
Islamic leadership and represent the thoughts of Muslim Brothers (Al-Ghadban, 2010).   
 
The independence of Al-Jazeera is criticized because of its submission to the constraints of the 
policy of Qatar (Miladi, 2005). Mohamed Kreshan, a journalist working for Al-Jazeera, says in his 
book "Arab satellites and the questions of the nation" that Al-Jazeera lacks freedom in dealing 
with internal Qatari affairs. The channel talked limitedly about the involved people in the failed 
attempt of a coup against the Emir of the country. It avoids the treatment of sensitive internal 
subjects like the denationalization of thousands who belong to Al-Ghufran tribes under the pretext 
that they had participated in the coup attempt. And like the displacement of people from the Al-
Moura tribe to the United Arab Emirates. The relationship between Al-Jazeera’s emissions and 
Qatar's foreign policy remains unclear (el Oifi, 2004, Baghdadi 2, 2009). 
 
Al-Jazeera continued to grow its audience despite the accusations of being far from the 
deontology adopted by other Arab media (Miladi, 2005). 
 
Specialized Expansion of the Channel 
 
In December 2006, Al-Jazeera in English was launched. It aims to be the unique alternative of 
the Arab media addressing the West. It adopts a presentation of the Arab world and Islam suits the 
trend of its possessors and leaders who strive to present themselves as the bearers of the Arabism 
and Islamism to the whole world. Through the direct, fast and full of suspense coverage, the 
channel has managed to multiply its audience (Al-Ghadban, 2010).   
 
Al-Jazeera company has several channels as well as training and research centers including: Al-
Jazeera Informational, Al-Jazeera Sport; launched in 2003, Al-Jazeera Live; launched in 2005, Al-
Jazeera For Kids; launched in 2005, Al-Jazeera International; launched in 2006 (in English), and 
Al-Jazeera Documentary; launched in 2007 (Shaheen, 2008). Al-Jazeera Center for Training and 
Development. It conducts media workshops and teaching the public relations is one of its 
objectives. The Center of Al-Jazeera Studies and Research is devoted to studies on communication, 





An Overview on Al-Manar 
 
The Lebanese Media Landscape 
 
In Lebanon, this small country with many parties and consequently numerous media, the civil 
war, which broke out in 1975 and ended in 1990, had a notable role in the emergence and 
deployment of the militia media. The complexity of the Lebanese media is linked to the 
contradictions and several types of divisions that across Lebanon. There is no national media; it is 
the communitarianism that builds up the identities of the communication channels and the different 
political parties control the media space. This seizure transforms the media into propaganda tools. 
This is easily observed especially during the intra-Lebanese belligerences (Saada, 2009).  
 
In May 2008, following the signing of the Doha Agreement, Qatar's Prime Minister Sheikh 
Hamad Bin Jassim Al-Thani clarified the need for media roles to alleviate political tensions; media 
must calm the spirits and not to cause an escalation. 
To reduce propaganda, a law has been enforced, yet the objective has not been achieved; the 
law remained disregarded. In addition, a verbal escalation of different political leaders was noticed 
in the media. The political, religious and confessional variables influencing the Lebanese media 
create a difficulty in seeing objectivity and neutrality that would be adopted by these media (Saada, 
2009).  
 
Since 1990, thanks to new information and communication technologies, the media sector has 
improved while maintaining its loyalty to communitarianism. 
The media applied self-censorship by addressing several issues including the most particular 
subject: the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The Resolution 1559, adopted by the UN Security 
Council, created a real division within these media. This resolution demands the withdrawal of 
any foreign presence particularly the Syrian forces, whereas the Lebanese political parties have 
different points of view which were remarkably presented in the media (Saada, 2009).  
 
On 14 February 2005, after the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafic Al-Hariri, the 
differences between the parties have strengthened; Syria is accused by a part of Lebanese 
population to be behind this attack. The media became propaganda weapons used by the two 
opposing camps: the Coalition of 14 March and the Camp of 8 March (Saada, 2009). 
The 14 March coalition, created as a result of the assassination of Rafic Al-Hariri, demands the 
independence of Lebanon from intra-Arab and regional problems. Several media support this 
political vision: Future Television belonging to Al-Hariri family representing the Sunni 
community. The Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (LBC) representing the Maronite Christian 
community. Murr Television representing the Orthodox community. It was closed in 2002 because 





The 8 March Camp employs several media that symbolize opposing visions: Al-Manar 
Channel. NBN Television transmitting the ideology of the Amal Movement of Nabih Berri; 
president of the parliament recognized by his solid relation with the Syrian regime. OTV, Orange 
Television belonging to the Free Patriotic Current of General Michel Aoun. NTV or News TV that 
is not subjected to a political leader but its communist and pan-Arab attitudes make it appear as a 
media supporting the vision of the Opposition (8 March) (Saada, 2009).   
 
The two sides exchange accusations. The media of the coalition 14 March claim the 
involvement of the opposition parties in the assassination of Al-Hariri, while the media of 8 March 
do not hesitate to accuse the camp of 14 March to be supported by Israel and the United States 
(Saada, 2009).  
Even before the “Arab revolutionary movements” that began at the end of 2010, the Lebanese 
media were and still are divided according to the attitudes of the parties as regards the Syrian 
policy.  
 
History of Hezbollah 
 
In 1982, the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon (IRL) was born; a military organization with 
religious Shiite orientation. Its creation is a reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and its main 
mission is the defense of the Lebanese territory in particular the south of the country. After a few 
months, institutions defending the social and political interests of the (IRL) were established. 
Institutions whose name is: Hezbollah (the Party of God). The Resistance and Hezbollah 
complement each other, the first ensures the military defense against the occupier and the second 
directs political and social assurances so that the Resistance reaches its objectives (Daher, 2011).  
 
The Resistance was founded by Sobhi Al-Tufayli and Abbas Al-Moussaoui31. Thanks to his 
Iranian relations, Sobhi Al-Tufayli was able to establish the (IRL). This construction is supported 
by logistical, financial and organizational aids of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. 
In 1992, Hezbollah was integrated into the parliament, it could since then make its voice and 
wills heard. Over the years, both IRL and Hezbollah have been able to develop their strategies. 
They have adapted to national, regional and international contexts while maintaining the basic 
objectives and roles (Daher, 2011).  
 
The means of the IRL were improving over the years. In 1985, IRL pushed the Israeli 
government to partially withdraw from southern Lebanon. In 1992, Hassan Nasrullah32 became 
the leader of the IRL, from that moment, the operations of the IRL against the Israeli troops are 
carried out regularly; bombarding Israeli locations and attacking their convoys. In 2000, Israel was 
                                                             
31 The first two General Secretaries of the Resistance. They are Shiite religious.  




forced to withdraw its forces from the majority of southern Lebanon and it acknowledged its 
inability to defeat the IRL (Daher, 2011).    
 
Since Israel has maintained domination over many Lebanese territories like the Shebaa hamlets 
and the Kfarchouba heights, this gave the IRL an opportunity to argue its willingness to keep its 
weapons after the liberation of 2000. After this date, the main mission of the IRL is to liberate the 
remaining occupied territory and to release the Lebanese prisoners detained in Israel.  In 2004, the 
IRL managed to release 450 Arabs. Following an operation by which many Israeli soldiers were 
detained by Hezbollah, an exchange was made (Daher, 2011). 
 
In 2006, the July War broke out; the 33-Days War. Israel bombarded, applied air and land 
attacks against Lebanon, and concentrated on Shiite areas. The capacity of the IRL was limited to 
land actions or rocket fire in the direction of northern Israel. At the end and after dramatic results, 
Israel took out the forces participating in this war. After this conflict, the Resistance continue 
arming conspicuously and it confirms that it is prepared for any possible attack of the enemy. 
In 1990, the Taif Agreement ended the civil war. It demands the disarming of the militias and 
evokes the Syrian guardianship over Lebanon. Under this tutelage, the IRL was allowed to keep 
its arsenal and to resume its fight against Israel (Daher, 2011).   
 
The Media of Party  
 
Hezbollah has several media devices: the weekly Al-Ahd (the Convenant) since 1984, the Al-
Nour (the Light) radio since 1988, the electronic weekly Al-Intiqad (the Critique) since 2008, the 
monthly magazine Baqiatollah (What Remains of God) and the Al-Manar TV channel. Thanks to 
its massive presence, Al-Manar became the main media device of the Party; it is the most important 
space to reflect massively the self-image that Hezbollah wants to give. It is an Arabic-language 
channel with anti-Zionist and anti-Israel tendencies (Combe, 2006, Lamloum, 2009).  
 
On 3 June 1991, the terrestrial broadcasting of Al-Manar TV was born.  In the Southern Suburb 
of Lebanon, this television began its experimental diffusion, the transmission lasted daily 6 hours. 
In October 1991, the first news bulletin was launched, it was a 20-minutes bulletin (Shaheen, 
2008).   
On 17 September 1996, the Lebanese Council of Ministers decided to allow Al-Manar 
television to continue its transmission exceptionally until the end of the Israeli occupation of 
southern Lebanon, provided that the emissions must be limited; dealing exclusively with the 




In 1997, Lebanese Communication Group appeared. This institution encompasses Al-Manar 
Television and Al-Nour Radio33. Al-Manar became a member of the Coordinating Committee in 
the Arab States Broadcasting Union (Hammoud, 2007). 
 
In 1998, Al-Manar undertook a contract with the French company (Thomson). It aimed at 
building a studio of digital production. In order to obtain sophisticated digital techniques, an 
agreement with Sony was made. Staff training took place in France, Brittany, the Netherlands, 
Tunisia and in other places. A staff was sent to France in order to get the knowledge and mastering 
the administration of digital studios. In 2000, Al-Manar television was developed thanks to its 
transformation into a satellite channel (Hammoud, 2007). This Television covers territories around 
the world by the Arabsat, Badr3, Nilesat and other satellites (Huyghe 1, 2010). It was broadcasting 
its programs in Europe via the French Law Society; Eutelsat (Combe, 2006).  
 
In 2004, the party established the "Lebanese Association for the Arts". In 2010, this association 
was split into two organisms: Al-Rissala association "the Message" and the association "Reviving 
the Legacy of the Resistance" (Chiara Calabrese, 2013).  
 
Directors and Staff 
 
Hezbollah adopts a culture of secrecy to ensure survival. Since Al-Manar is an institution 
subjected to the demands of the Party, it is difficult to trace with certainty the forms of organization 
and management applied to communication structures. The leadership of Hezbollah designate the 
cadres who lead Al-Manar. The directors of the channel are linked to the first generation of the 
founders of the Party. These directors are known for their historic struggle against the Israeli 
occupation. They are the founders of the Islamic Resistance against Israel and they have deep 
political experiences in the context of the Iranian Revolution and the Israeli occupation of Lebanon 
(Lamloum, 2009).  
 
The organization chart of Al-Manar consists of six departments directed by officials in 
accordance with the areas: social, religious, children and youth programs, sports, cultural 
programs, Lebanese and external programs.   
The technical staff and journalists are young and mostly have Shiite tendency, of South 
Lebanese origin, graduates and bilingual. Hezbollah militants and supporters of the Resistance are 
also positioned without distinction for important tasks within Al-Manar. This channel engages 
approximately 350 employees including its correspondents abroad. After the events of 11 
September 2001, the number of correspondents was multiplied. New offices were opened, and the 
                                                             






channel must keep up with new world conditions, new issues and new audience (Hammoud, 2007; 
Lamloum, 2009).  
 
The Women have intermediate responsibilities precisely in the information sector; they are 
dependent on a male administration because of their absence from management positions 
(Lamloum, 2009). The female presenters are veiled. Their seriousness gives a picture of a woman 
very different from those that appear on other channels´ screens where women are exposed as less 
serious presenting superficial programs (Fontan, 2005). 
 
Strategies and Objectives 
 
Hezbollah's success in ending the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon makes "Resistance" 
a media principle in the party propaganda. Hezbollah's popularity has increased because of its 
military success. This popularity is among the Lebanese Shiite milieu as well as among the Arab 
and Muslim societies as Israel is their common enemy (Hammoud, 2007; Chiara Calabrese, 2013).  
 
According to the director of Al-Manar, their priority is to adopt a unitary Arab-Muslim 
discourse and to avoid the intervention in quarrels and differences of local forces and Arab 
regimes. Their channel does not seek the suspense; it relies on sobriety, seriousness and objectivity. 
The Arab and Muslim communities abroad; in the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe, 
ask the staff of Al-Manar, through consecutive messages, to deploy satellite broadcasting of the 
channel as the programs are appreciated by these audiences (Hammoud, 2007).  
 
The basic missions of the channel are to make known the activities of the Resistance by showing 
the importance of its role. To defend and support the Palestinian people and confront the Occupier 
(Israel) until the Palestinians get back the occupied territories. To broadcast programs suitable for 
the Arab-Muslim family; away from suspense and violence. To focus on tolerant religious values 
and to strengthen and support the dialogue between supporters of different religions and cultures 
(Shaheen, 2008). 
According to the director of the channel, the purpose of the creation of this establishment is to 
cover the operations of the Resistance. The coverage should be capable of giving viewers a true 
image facing the image given by the Western media that represent the Resistance as a terrorist 
organization. Through Al-Manar the history of military resistance is written. It is the means of 
keeping in memory the victory of the Resistance (Chiara Calabrese, 2013).  
 
The West classifies Hezbollah as a contradictory of democracy and considers it a terrorist 
organization. In 2000, in the speech of the State of the Union of the United States, Bush declared 
the party as a terrorist organization having a single purpose: destroying the Western democratic 
principles. In 2001, Hezbollah condemned the 11 September´s attack as a way of asserting its non-




legal right; fighting against who violates the rights of others. Al-Manar is the hand of the party to 
change its old image given by Arab and Western countries (extremist, terrorist and 
fundamentalist), by a new image; tolerant party, human and having moral objectives. Its priority 
is the National Interest; it is necessary to abandon the sectarian controversies to keep the National 
Unity (Fontan, 2005). The mission of the channel is to create a legitimacy favouring the ideology 
of the Islamic Resistance and consequently favouring the military operations of Hezbollah 
(Lamloum, 2009).  
 
The contexts surrounding Hezbollah obliged it to rebuild and show itself by a new face. Al-
Manar presents the changes in the identity and priorities of the party. It abandons Shiite or pan-
Islamism by promoting and propagating pan-Arabism.  
In 2000, after the end of the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, the role played by 
Hezbollah (Liberator of Lebanon) was no longer effective. Its main objective was to put an end to 
the Israeli existence in Lebanon. The party had to find another way or another mission to persist 
that is why the notion of the “Pan-Arab Defender” is adopted; Defender of Arab rights against 
imperialism. By Al-Manar, the party presents the pan-Arab trends and the Arab fears of the western 
community and vice-versa. Hezbollah focuses also on the unification of the Lebanese people 
(Fontan, 2005). 
 
Through Al-Manar, Hezbollah propagates several expressions of which: the “Culture of 
Resistance” and the “Society of Resistance”; society that is built in institutional frameworks 
bearing the ideology of the party (Chiara Calabrese, 2013).  
The coverage of the Al-Aqsa Intifada and the American war against Iraq was a basis for 
showing Hezbollah´s purpose which is fighting against Israel as well as against the countries with 
colonial motives in the Arab world (Fontan, 2005).  
The dimension of the concept of Resistance was widening. Militarily facing the enemy is only 
one part of the functions of this Resistance. It is a "choice of life" a "methodology" according to 
Hassan Nasrullah; it is necessary to resist politically, culturally and by the media (Chiara 
Calabrese, 2013). Al-Manar is proud to be the first to deal psychologically with the “Zionist 
enemy” (Fontan, 2005). 
 
A functionality of Al-Manar's programs is the insistence on the irrefutable victory of the 
Resistance. For example: the television series "The Victorious" tells the story of the Israeli 
occupation of Lebanon while showing the importance of  the resistance as the only choice to win 
the war. Resisting is the equivalent of gain and victory (Chiara Calabrese, 2013).   
One of the objectives of Al-Manar's programs is to unite the Lebanese around the ideas of the 
Party. This tendency is represented by journalists or thinkers having a respected and serious look 








The channel presents itself as a respectful and serious media which is able to be followed with 
confidence by all. Al-Manar takes into consideration the different ages and social segments. The 
subjects dealt by this television vary: political, economic, social and sportive. Al-Manar tries 
consecutively to improve its emissions (Fontan, 2005; Hammoud, 2007).  
 
A majority of the themes proposed by Al-Manar does not address internal political issues, rather 
it deals with the relations between Lebanon and its neighbors (Huyghe 1, 2010). The channel 
covers activities carried out in Lebanese territory and in Arab countries. It produces programs that 
tackle the stories and facts of Arab and international leaders, thinkers and writers. It presents itself 
as a family channel having educational objectives by devoting a remarkable part to the 
entertainment and to the programs of the young people, children and women. The channel 
produces 80% of its programs, while 20% are Arab products (Shaheen, 2008). 
 
In its “Foreign Press” program, Al-Manar analyzes articles from foreign media such as 
LeMonde, Le Nouvel Observateur, le Point or Newsweek. These articles deal with movements 
that may have an impact on the Arab world particularly on the Middle East (Fontan, 2005). 
 
There are two currents within Hezbollah.The first is conservative and the second is less 
conservative even with a liberal tendency. This division of currents influences directly the contents 
of Al-Manar's programs.  
Several programs could give the impression that the conservative current tries to keep its control 
on the channel. However, several other programs are being made to broaden the audience and to 
attract the non-Shiite Muslims and non-Muslims through renouncing many ideological and 
religious dogmas. 
Al-Manar's programs show two faces of Hezbollah, the first one is Lebanese; interested in 
internal movements, the second is Arab. The party seeks to become respected not only in the 
Middle East but also in other Arab nations (Fontan, 2005). 
 
By covering and fully supporting the Palestinian Intifada, the credibility of Al-Manar was 
recognized by the Palestinian people. The lack of a credible media source inside Palestine, 
especially the authority´s media, gave Al-Manar the opportunity to increase its audience. The 
channel was broadcasting videos of amateur activists in the field (Lamloum, 2009). In October 
2000, Al-Manar increased its coverage of the Palestinian Intifada from four hours to 18 hours, 
which made the party and the channel defenders of the Palestinian people and their rights. In 
Palestine, Al-Manar is followed by satellite. The citizens see it as a bearer of Islamic values without 





Through several television series political messages are emitted. These messages suitable for 
the ideology of the party. Ironic programs mocking and criticizing Israel and America are 
remarkable. The main objective of these broadcasts is to tell the Palestinian people that the party 
is with them; the party supports them (Fontan, 2005). 
 
According to a BBC Monitoring study, Al-Manar rose from 83rd among Arabic-language 
televisions to the tenth, this was thanks to its coverage of the 33 Days war in summer 2006. 
Because of Al-Manar this war multiplied the popularity of the party struggling against the Israeli 
army. But also, the actions and operations of Hezbollah which are admitted by the Arab 
populations gave a special value to the channel; the profits are reciprocal (Fontan, 2005; 
Hammoud, 2007; Lamloum, 2009). 
 
In order to obtain financial and political support, religious messages were issued frequently. 
These messages were addressed to the Lebanese community as well as to other Arab people. The 
presentation of war victims with the statements of the "martyrs" being with their families for the 
last time, while arousing the popular emotions, is also a tool to get a support of different types 
(Fontan, 2005). Al-Manar is recognized by recordings of "martyrs", those who leave their last 
messages in which they are proud to go to the death for holy goals; they sacrifice themselves to 
give life to others (Hammoud, 2007).  
 
Psychological warfare supports the military war against Israel. Influencing the morale of 
Israelis through programs broadcasted in Hebrew is a main weapon. The enemies appear very 
weak; they cry because of the action and reactions of the fighters of Hezbollah and they return 
home by being dead. Israeli statements affirming the strength of Hezbollah are mentioned; the 
enemy recognizes the abilities of the party. Parts of the ironic Israeli programs criticizing the Israeli 
army are translated into Arabic and in which the power of Hezbollah is recognized and the 
credibility of the promises of the leader Hassan Nasrullah is marked (Fontan, 2005; Hammoud, 
2007). 
 
The program (Conversion of The Image) which studies the coverage of the Israeli media of the 
Palestinian Intifada was widely received by Arab viewers because they found their image in the 
enemy media; how Israel describes the events. Al-Manar programs aim at showing what Israel is 
trying to hide: the killed Israeli fighters and the failures while facing the Palestinians. Moreover, 
Al-Manar intends to show the Arab peoples the hateful accents found in Israeli programs (Fontan, 
2005).  
 
Al-Manar values the science of propaganda. It is interested in the practices of the theories of 
psychological war. The channel’s messages must encourage and excite the Arab populations, at 
the same time the panic and fear must be created in the midst of the enemy’s community. The 




prompted one of the Israeli leaders to declare the superiority of the psychological weapons of the 
channel; Al-Manar is victorious in the propaganda war (Shaheen, 2008). 
 
In March 2000, the Hebrew Information Section was born; a new psychological weapon. This 
section is devoted mainly to highlight the contradictions of the Israeli community, the lies of the 
leaders, and to incite the Israeli people against the authorities (Hammoud, 2007). 
 
In September 2003, at the second National Conference for the Arab and Islamic media held in 
Beirut, Hassan Nasrullah spoke of the importance and the role of Al-Manar especially at the time 
of wars, either in Palestine or in Iraq. In his view, two approaches are required to address to 
audiences: if the message is directed to non-Arab countries particularly occidental, it is necessary 
to give an image of the victimized people (rhetoric of victimization), but if the message targets the 
Arab populations it is important to give the image of the brave; of the heroes beating the enemy 
and achieving remarkable successes (rhetoric of heroism).  
Sowing hope and insisting on that the Resistance is the only solution and the only choice in 
order to achieve good results are the basis of the propaganda of Hezbollah.  
The semantic order in the language of Al-Manar is interesting. For example, instead of using 
the word "killed" for a Palestinian it uses the word "martyr". The vocabularies adopted in the 
information live broadcasted, in Arabic and in English, are not the same. To qualify the State of 
Israel in information in Arabic, the channel adopts defamatory appellations as: "Zionist entity", 
"Zionist enemy". But it describes the Israeli Sate, in the information in English, by "Occupier of 
Palestine". The contents of the information are same in both languages but the form, the choice of 
concepts or appellations change (Fontan, 2005). All kinds of programs; information, 
documentaries etc. aim at raising the popular Lebanese and Arab morale to face the external enemy 
(Mohsen, 1998; Hammoud, 2007). 
 
The channel broadcasts flashes in Hebrew like (We Are Watching You). These aim at creating 
fear in the hearts of Israelis (Fontan, 2005). The qualitative progress of Al-Manar’s emissions 
prompted the Israeli Television to say that Hezbollah realizes its attack without launching 
weapons; it is done by the "cannons" of Al-Manar Television (Hammoud, 2007). 
A flash presents an Israeli soldier’s helmet rolling and followed by a big rock, finally, this great 
rock crushes the helmet. These pictures are accompanied by a written sentence: “Occupation to 
disappearance”. The flashes are distinguished by their distance from ordinary ideological 
discourses and by their facility; presenting deep ideas with ease. The choice of vocabularies aims 
to strongly touch the viewer without using boring sentences of which the Arab populations are fed 
up (Hammoud, 2007). 
 
Clips are very important tools at the level of psychological warfare. They are used intensively. 




of the programs. The Head of Programming and Orientation Youssef Ed-Dahabi clarifies that this 
team takes into consideration the avoidance of any kind of exaggeration or incorrect glorification.  
Clips are both temporary; dealing with current issues, and main clips whose broadcasting is 
repetitive. For example, on the occasion of the Israeli attacks against Lebanon, the Islamic 
Resistance Support Association produced a clip, the voice-over was made by Antoine Kerbaj the 
Lebanese Christian actor. This choice carries an implicit message: the Resistance is not  sectarian; 
the Resistance represents the Lebanese people of all religions and sects (Hammoud, 2007).  
 
The civil peace is a concern presented by the messages of the clips and by many programs. 
“Lebanon is not a battlefield, it is a field of coexistence” this sentence is the end of a clip. To close 
the gap between Hezbollah and the Al-Hariri Future party, Al-Manar broadcasted a clip 
encompassing the image of the leader Hassan Nasrullah with the image of President Rafic Al-
Hariri. These images were accompanied by these sentences: “Resistance to protect Lebanon, 
Resistance to build Lebanon”. This gives the impression to the people that there is no real problem 
between the two parties, these two forms of Resistance complement each other, the Future party 
is there to build and Hezbollah is there to defend (Hammoud, 2005). 
 
Because of their support of Saddam Hussein against US forces, Hezbollah and Al-Manar have 
created a disappointment among the Iraqi Shiite milieu. Hezbollah intends to confirm its pan-Arab 
influence while taking advantage of the invasion of Iraq by the coalition led by the United States. 
Flashes issued on Al-Manar attempted to denounce US policy and actions in Iraq and to present 
the Iraqi people as innocent victim of the massacres of Americans and Israelis. 
The return of the Iraqi Shiite audience to Al-Manar began when the alleged objectives of the 
war were not realized, especially the freedom (Hammoud, 2005). 
 
The channel has succeeded in attracting a broad audience thanks to its transparency and the 
diversity of its programs. To increase its audience and to satisfy the different religions and cultures, 
Al-Manar had to change its speeches; it should take into consideration non-Muslims and their 
interests. The broadcasts became more diversified (Fontan, 2005). Following the influence of Al-
Manar in the Arab and regional space, the Washington Institute Near East Policy hired a researcher 
in order to write a book on the channel (Hammoud, 2007).  
 
In 2006, during the war of July, Israel bombed the building of the channel. This establishment 
is constructed of five floors. The destruction prevented the broadcasting for only two minutes. The 
channel has resumed its work by 75 to 80% of its potentials, with a staff contains 280 of 350 
people. The continuing dissemination accompanied by qualitative coverage of field events has 
made Al-Manar the main source of information covering the events on the fronts of the war. It 
issued the immediate military announcements. At that time, Al-Manar’s audience was 250 million. 
The military successes of Hezbollah forced Israel to stop this war, which increased the party 





After this success, the media of the Lebanese political currents and the media of the Arab 
governments, opponents of the methodology of Hezbollah, began to deform the image of the party, 
the image which Hezbollah has drawn of himself. According to these media, the party has 
implicated the country in a devastating war, it is a sectarian party supported and financed by Iran 
which aims to pass its ideologies in order to reach its interests in the Arab world. The result of this 
media war against Hezbollah was the loss of a large audience. The doubts about the real objectives 
of Al-Manar were multiplied (Al-Ghadban, 2010).  
 
Obstacles Facing Al-Manar 
 
The channel has been exposed to numerous criticisms at European and American level. It is 
considered a terrorist channel (Baghdadi 1, 2009). Al-Manar was accused of incitement to hatred 
and violence. On December 2nd, 2004, in its information in French, Al-Manar declared that Israel 
is carrying out a campaign against it in order to stop its transmission in Europe because its 
broadcasts reveal the truth of events in Palestine and Lebanon. Al-Manar confirmed that this idea 
was admitted on Israeli Television (Hammoud, 2007).  
 
In Ramadan, October-November 2003, a Syrian serial inspired by the “Protocol of the Elders 
of Zion” was issued. This serial, "Al-Shatat"; "the diaspora" deals with the global Jewish 
conspiracy aiming to dominate and control the whole world.  This domination should be realized 
by the power of money and sex. This artistic work was described as anti-Semitic.   It was not issued 
on the Syrian channels reason why Hezbollah appeared as a platform by which Syria expresses 
itself. The serial has stirred up the Jewish milieu in France. The President of the Representative 
Council of the Jewish Institutions in France alerted the public authorities (Fontan, 2005; Combe, 
2006). 
In response to Israeli accusations of Al-Manar of being anti-Semitic, the director of the public 
relations of Al-Manar Ibrahim Farhat explained that they highlight the practices of the Occupier 
against the unarmed citizens, but they respect the Jewish religion, they recognize and dialogue it, 
they  have no problem with this religion, “then how does hostility exist?” (Hammoud, 2007, P.62). 
 
As Al-Manar uses a French satellite, so it is subject to French laws. Sections 1 and 15 of the 
Act of 30 September 1986 prevent the issuance of content provoking racial and religious hatred. 
Theoretically the application of French law is possible but practically several obstacles are found 
(Combe, 2006). 
Controlling the satellite channels´ broadcasts on French territory is a challenge. The Conseil 
Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA) has declared its powerlessness. Extra-European satellite 
channels must be agreed with the CSA; this contract makes the transmission legal. Yet, there was 
no convention regulating the diffusion of Al-Manar on Eutelsat. This administrative deficiency 




to carry out an agreement with the CSA which imposes the submission of Al-Manar to its 
requirements. Al-Manar was obliged to present a file in which it is requested to be contracted with 
the CSA before October the 1st, 2004. In case if Al-Manar does not respect the deadline or if the 
CSA rejects the request for the convention, the channel will be disconnected on Eutelsat on 30 
November 2004. The file was presented by Al-Manar and accepted by the CSA, a one-year 
agreement was made. Al-Manar was subject to strict conditions: not to undermine the dignity of 
the person, not to incite hatred, violence or discrimination, and not to encourage attitudes of 
rejection or xenophobia. Ethical obligations must be respected. In case of non-compliance, several 
punishments would be applied including stopping the broadcasting and reducing the contract 
deadline. The CSA will be able to take a decision unilaterally; it may terminate the agreement. The 
CSA has set up a surveillance system, it is a qualified Arabic-speaking and sworn-in staff. 
Considering several overruns committed by the channel, the administrative Judge took the 
decision to stop the diffusion of Al-Manar on Eutelsat. This decision was confirmed by the Council 
of State on January the 6th ,  2006 (Combe, 2006). 
 
Al-Manar is part of a bunch of Arab channels, including the National television of Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait which broadcast on Eutelsat via Arabsat satellite. Al-Manar's ban would have 
caused the interruption of these other channels, for which reason Al-Manar asked Arabsat to 
remove it from the bouquet emitting by Eutelsat (A.Hamoud, 2007). 
 
The prohibition of Al-Manar broadcasting is not useful, technical challenges made it of little 
importance. Al-Manar can broadcast by other satellites that cover territories around the world and 
the power of the CSA cannot be imposed (Combe, 2006).  
In fact, Al-Manar is not the only channel that carries anti-Israel messages, several Arab or 
Islamic media are involved. This truth would make the punishment carried out by the CSA 
practically ineffective.  
This State powerlessness, with regard to the control of the contents presented by satellites, 
affects all countries. For example, Bridge Television, received by cable in America, its broadcasts 
are addressed particularly to American Muslim populations. These diffusions are charged with 
images of terrorists and extremists (Huyghe 2).  
 
Since 2004, Al-Manar devoted a service built of ten employees to its website. Following the 
interruption of its broadcast on Eutelsat, the Direction of the channel has increased its attention to 
its website. Internet becomes an instrument supporting the other communication devices carrying 
Hezbollah’s propaganda (Lamloum, 2009).   
The new communication techniques cause the loss of true control over the media contents. The 
website of the channel allows the audience to find the information and the different published 
programs (Combe, 2006). New information and communication technologies have broken the 




deployment of Arabic-speaking satellite channels created a competition between media narrations 
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An Overview on Propaganda 
 
   As I mentioned in the second chapter, I have previous knowledge of the studied topic. This is 
due to my daily follow-up of the coverage of the events in Syria by Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar’s 
channels. This knowledge enticed me to classify this research in the propaganda field as I argue 
that each message is propaganda disregarding the nature and degree of the sender’s connection to 
the event. This is what Jacques Driencourt, who believes that everything is propaganda, 
emphasizes (Ellul, 1973). It is impossible for ideologies to survive, continue and be fruitful without 
the media within which most of the information is categorized as propaganda. Propaganda does 
not live without media, and most of the content of media is propaganda (Bernays, 2007). Success 
in the military war is closely connected to the strength of propaganda. Analyzing the news frames 
and the verbal and non-verbal signs of all kinds and forms requires deep knowledge of propaganda 
which employs the strength of signs and symbols in order to influence the recipient (Al-Assaf, 
2012). Then, my classification of this research in the field of propaganda emerges from my belief 
in its comprehensiveness. Propaganda does employ the verbal and non-verbal signifiers, not vice 
versa. The ideas and ideologies can be understood only through the study of the verbal and non-
verbal signs. Spread is an aim of every ideology. Eventually, the study of ideologies first and 
foremost falls into the field of propaganda. To prove this argument, in this chapter I am going to 
tackle a group of pivots which put propaganda in its historical context and in the course of its 
development up to the present time. These pivots deal with the fields, forms and conditions of the 
existence of propaganda in addition to its tools and its linkage to the forms and types of media. 
Moreover, they will tackle the relation of propaganda to the nature of societies, the factors of the 
success of propaganda and the propaganda technical methods which are directly connected to 
structuring the content. Finally, the chapter is going to briefly highlight the basic principles of 
propaganda in the times of war which is going to allow us to compare these principles to those of 




Propaganda has been studied in various fields such as: History, Journalism, Politics, Sociology 
and Psychology. It has also been studied from multi-specialized perspectives and points of view. 
Historically speaking, the study of propaganda deals with examining the practices of the 
propagandist as events, and studying the subsequent events which can be considered consequences 
resulting from practicing propaganda. In journalism and media, the study of propaganda means 
analyzing and perceiving the mechanism of media management, the mechanism of information 
formation, and the factors of structuring the mental image. In political sciences, propaganda deals 




and the effect of the public opinion on the bases of the elite.  In the light of sociology, propaganda 
means the study of the social movements and counter-movements, the actions and reactions 
towards several issues and subjects. In the field of psychological analysis, propaganda means 
studying and determining the probable effects on the individuals (Jowett & O´Donnell, 2012). 
 
Any talk on propaganda must be accompanied by a talk on the public opinion. Propaganda is 
unimportant without masses or recipients who interact and get affected (Hammoud A, 2008). 
Public opinion is the dominant view among a group of individuals or communities who share 
common interests and concerns towards an attitude, an event or a subject. It is the prevailing 
values, views, beliefs and judgments regardless of their validity (Doob, 1966; Hilmi, 2005). Le 
Bon discusses the psychology of the masses who are subjected to many incentives some of which 
are positive and others negative, but their power of effectiveness is so great that the survival 
instinct sometimes vanishes because of them (Le Bon, 1997). There are different levels of public 
opinion. It can be local (specific of an area), or specific of a certain country and it can be universal. 
The spontaneous public opinion takes place when people communicate with each other and when 
they are concerned about the same issue. Unquestionable public opinion includes all the ideas and 
attitudes about what man needs to improve the structure of society from bad to the better like 
eliminating corruption and realizing economic and security stability. The inactive public opinion 
is characterized, for example, by an attitude of indifference in front of the government due to 
weakness or fear. The active public opinion is completely clear when the people, for example, 
revolt against the ruling government so as to overthrow it. Temporary public opinion is related to 
a subject, and specific time and place such as wars and natural disasters. The holistic public opinion 
is related to everything concerning religion, general ethics and customs. The covert public opinion 
is formed when the society cannot express its true opinion or attitude. The overt public opinion 
appears when the people can express themselves especially through different mass media 
(M.Abdullah, 2011; Hammoud A.B 2008; Hussein, 1997; Al-Tuhami, 1982). 
 
Origin of Propaganda 
 
These days, propaganda is being employed in various fields and considered one of the most 
important and serious means of affecting the opinions and morale of individuals. It has got 
specialized experts whose help countries seek so that they can realize victories. Defeating the 
enemies requires close contact between the militant operations on the one hand and propaganda 
and its pillars on the other (Yousef, 2004). 
 
Propaganda is as old as man himself. He has spontaneously practiced it and has been an expert 
in creating new methods of affecting others. However, elevating propaganda to the level of an art 
and a science – scientific technique – is relatively modern in man's history (Nilsson & Österlund, 
2014; Al-Assaf, 2012; Al-Ridha, 1998). Plato discussed the importance of what should be said to 




discipline and the leaders (Al-Shirazi, 2006). The German media scholar Claus Martin attributes 
the origin of propaganda to Aristotle (Mustafa, 2006). Aristotle dealt with the discourse arts and 
divided the communication attitude into factors: the orator or the sender, the masses or the 
recipients, and the speech or the message. He discussed the importance of the orator's knowledge 
and understanding of the thoughts he introduces to the masses as well as the sender's perception 
of the characteristics of the masses in order to ensure a greater impact (Al-Shirazi, 2006). 
 
The Greeks and Pharaohs practiced propaganda so as to create a sense of strength in the fighters 
and convince the political and intellectual opponents. The Romans employed many methods of 
propaganda some of which are processions and parties in honor of the victorious leaders, and 
orations and rhetoric during elections. As for many civilizations, propaganda was one of the most 
employed means of unifying the people as well as legalizing wars to realize expansion and 
establishing empires (Mustafa, 2006; Al-Omari, 1965; Abdul-Qader, 1962). The leaders employed 
all means so that they could magnify their ideas and create great images of themselves (Nilsson & 
Österlund, 2014).  
 
In addition, many stories and teachings of the Old Testament can be interpreted as propaganda 
texts which include a lot of the characteristics and basic factors of propaganda. They justify and 
legalize any aggressive actions against the opponents in opinion and doctrine (Mustafa, 2006). The 
discourse content of the Quran, as the basic law of Islam, includes a lot of the characteristics of 
propaganda: inducement and intimidation, promising and frightening, warning and threatening 
(Al-Shirazi, 2006).The system of governance in Islam included what is called Da'wa – Missionary 
activity – where the Da'ia – preacher –employs all his rhetorical and intellectual abilities so as to 
affect the recipients and entice them to embrace Islam (Al-Assaf, 2012; Al-Dulaimi, 2010). 
 
The term "propaganda" is derived from the Greek "propagatus" which means producing a new 
plant from a parent plant. This term was first employed by the Pope Gregory XV in 1622when he 
realized that it was no longer possible to impose religious unity by force. The Pope established an 
authority for spreading the Catholic doctrine peacefully and without resorting to war (Jowett & 
O´Donnell, 2012; Chomsky, 2002; Pratkanis, 1992)35 . A lot of historical studies attribute the use 
of the term "propaganda" to Pope Urban VIII who established a propaganda council in 1627 for 
spreading the Catholic doctrine with the purpose of facing the Protestant movements. He set up a 
training authority for propaganda "Collegium Urbanum" which was oriented towards the foreign 
tasks of the Catholic Church (Bernays, 2007; Sukkari, 1991). In France the term propaganda was 
used to indicate to the materials employed in elections such as leaflets and posters. Until World 
War II, it indicated to every communication campaign, whether private or public, in order to spread 
and promote ideas (Chomsky, 2002). 
                                                             





The invention of printing by the German Gutenberg in the fifteenth century played a vital role 
in the spread of propaganda by printed means such as newspapers, periodicals, leaflets, and news 
messages. In the 18th century, propaganda was used in its political meaning and modern means 
especially press (Bernays, 2007; Taylor, 2000; Al-Omari, 1965). The same thing applies to the 
roles of radio, telephone, telegraph and even railways. The development accelerated the spread of 
information (Bernays, 2007). 
The French revolution established the concept of propaganda; the press had a huge ability of 
affecting the masses which led the politicians to employ it as a major means in the political conflict. 
Napoleon Bonaparte employed the press propaganda in order to strengthen the morale of the 
French soldiers and to introduce the aims of his campaigns to the peoples he conquered (Al-
Maslami, 1990; Dominique, 1960).   
 
For a long time, the term propaganda was not a signifier of the negative motives and desires of 
the propagandist. However, the 20th century imposed a bad mental image of propaganda and made 
it seem as a form of lying, deception and misleading (Andén, 2005; Saad, 1979; Linebarger, 1954). 
During the World Wars I and II, propaganda was practiced in a misleading way. False news which 
demonized the opponents and dehumanized them was spread. A lot of the pillars of propaganda 
aimed at raising the morale of the allied fighters and weakening that of the enemy. It was practiced 
as ideological wars and many dictatorial governments employed it with the purpose of achieving 
power and of expanding governance. For instance, the fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, and 
Stalin's propaganda which aimed at eliminating the opposition. Communism did not differentiate 
between propaganda and incitement in such a way that propaganda became a means of destroying 
the bourgeois concepts and spreading the socialist ideas )Nilsson & Österlund, 2014; Yousef, 
2004; Denquin, 1997; Carruther, 1994; Saad, 1979). 
 
During World War I, the American president Wilson established a propaganda committee in 
whose membership great academic intellectuals and theoreticians participated (Mustafa, 2006). 
Under the management of the Propaganda Minister "Goebbels", the German propaganda addressed 
the emotions and feelings of the people leaving no place for thinking and analyzing. On the other 
hand, the allies launched a psychological war depending on basics of propaganda. So, the war 
among the countries showed that propaganda was a necessary weapon of winning the military war 
)Nilsson & Österlund, 2014; Jackall, 1995), The two World Wars turned propaganda from an 
experimental art into a field with rules. Propaganda was no longer exclusive to war, it rather 
extended to peace times and the success of any political regime became strongly dependent on the 
pillars of propaganda and the strength of its impact (Sukkari, 1991; Al-Omari, 1965). 
 
Many countries abhor the term "propaganda" for historical and a lot of other reasons the most 
important of which is the connection of propaganda to the goals of the propagandist who is directed 
by the desire to control and rule rather than its connection to objectivity. Due to their rejection of 




work of spreading propaganda. For example, The Ministry of Culture, National Guidance, Moral 
Guidance. Through these bodies, the state practices a propaganda activity with the aim of 
controlling the minds and feelings of people in order to entice them to support and back its policy 
and, eventually, urging them to respond to the ideas and attitudes it advocates and to get subjected 
to all the alterations which it imposes (Al-Dulaimi, 2010; Al-Shumaimari, 2010; Mustafa, 2006). 
 
Definition and Labeling of Propaganda 
 
Propaganda employs persuasive strategies. However, it differs from persuasion in target. 
Propaganda is a form of communication which tries to achieve a response that reinforces the 
propagandist's targeted end and purpose. Persuasion is an interactive process which tries to meet 
the needs and desires of both the persuader and the one who is persuaded (Jowett & O´Donnell, 
2012). Ellul sees that propaganda, regardless of the labels we give it, has to a great extent become 
a general phenomenon in the modern world. He also considers most people as very easy preys of 
propaganda (Ellul, 1973). 
 
Propagandists are any actors that attempt to affect the recipient (Ellul, 1973). They are those 
who impose the daily life rules and the details of our activities on us. They could be people from 
different sectors, people who lead views and promote ideas which serve their interests: presidents, 
clergymen, politicians, journalists or any other person interested in affecting the behavior of people 
(Bernays, 2007; Linebarger, 1954). 
 
Tonnies sees that propaganda is provoking the public opinion extensively in order to spread and 
consolidate ideas regardless of their validity, truthfulness or accurateness. Merton defined 
propaganda as a set of symbols (signs) which affect opinion, belief or behavior towards the issues 
about which the slices of the community disagree. As for Calter, propaganda is an intended attempt 
done by an individual or a group in order to form or change the tendencies of other groups through 
employing the means of communication. The goal of this is achieving the conformity between the 
reaction of the people exposed to the impact of propaganda and that which is desired by the 
propagandist (Al-Assaf, 2012). 
 
According to Oxford Advanced American Dictionary, propaganda is: “Ideas or statements that 
may be false or exaggerated and that are used in order to gain support for a political leader, party, 
etc.”36. 
English Oxford Living Dictionaries defines propaganda as: “Information, especially of a biased 
or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view”37. 
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According to Cambridge Dictionary propaganda is: “information, ideas, opinions, or images, 
often only giving one part of an argument that are broadcast, published, or in some other way 
spread with the intention of influencing people's opinions”38.  
 
The definitions of propaganda in the dictionary of "Military Terms" can be summarized by: 
information, opinions, doctrines or special forums aiming at supporting the national goal. It is 
designed to affect opinions, points of view, passions, or behavior of any group in the favor of the 
official whether directly or indirectly (Amin, 1992).   
Propaganda is mentioned in "A Dictionary of Media Terms" as follows: It is influencing the 
mass opinions and beliefs in order to make them adopt a given, negative or positive, direction 
towards a system or a doctrine. Propaganda also attempts to prepare the moods of the individuals 
to accept and absorb points of view (Badawi, 1977). 
Propaganda in the opinion of Joseph Goebbels, the Nazi Minister of Propaganda, is the ability 
to convince the masses of a certain idea so that each individual becomes strongly faithful in it. 
This idea becomes such a fixed doctrine that the individual can neither escape nor dispose of it 
(Khalil, 1982). 
 
According to Malcolm, propaganda is employing symbols in an intent, organized planned, and 
suggestive way with the purpose of altering and controlling opinions, ideas and values. Propaganda 
is always located in a socio-cultural context without which its psychological and cultural features 
cannot be understood (Malcolm, 1970). 
Doob sees that propaganda is the organized attempt which an individual or individuals with 
interest perform in order to control the attitudes and actions of a group of individuals through using 
insinuation. The goal of propaganda is leading the individuals or groups to embrace a certain idea 
or tendency, or leading them to do something (Doob, 1989, 1966). In accordance to Walter 
Lippmann, propaganda is the attempt to influence the personalities of individuals and control their 
behavior for purposes which are considered unscientific or of susceptible value. This takes place 
in a certain society and at a definite time (Lippmann, 1922). 
 
For Lasswell (1927) , propaganda is deception through symbols, words, images, music and lines 
which aim at achieving the intended goal. From Berelson's viewpoint, propaganda is the attempt 
of influencing the trends of a group of individuals about a raised issue. It endeavors to create 
collective trends through employing expressive symbols (Berelson & Janowitz, 1966). Lenin sees 
that the basic factor and constituent of propaganda is thrilling, instigation and agitation among the 
people's factions (Yousef, 2004). 
As for Jacques Ellul, it is necessary to study propaganda as a social phenomenon. In its broad 
meaning, propaganda includes the following fields: 1- Psychological action, where the 
propagandist seeks to change the opinions in psychological means. 2- Psychological war fare, 
where the propagandist deals with a foreign or internal opponent trying to destroy their morale 
                                                             




through psychological methods. Logical arguments may be employed, too. Making the opponents 
doubt their beliefs and actions is one of the most prominent tasks of psychological war. 3-Re-
Education & brain washing, this approach aims at turning the opponent into an ally or at mobilizing 
the targeted masses to serve the interests of the propagandist. 4- Public & human relation: including 
public relations into propaganda helps make the targeted individual or society comply with the 
goals of propaganda (Jowett & O´Donnell, 2012; Dale & Gould, 2001; Ellul, 1973).  
 
Propaganda can be considered a tactic for social pressure in such a way that it creates groups 
having a unified psychological build; propaganda should achieve mental and emotional 
homogeneity among the targeted individuals (Al-Shumaimari, 2010; Larsåke, 2005).   
In accordance with Hitler, ideas or propaganda cannot be considered successful unless they are 
embraced by the majority of the people who show their readiness to fight and sacrifice in their 
cause (Jowett & O´Donnell, 2012; Linebarger, 1954). 
Propaganda includes the efforts exerted by the propagandist for directing or subjugating the 
ideas and actions of the people. The efforts of subjugation and direction are centered on the fields 
of controversial beliefs and values among these people. In order to achieve this goal, the 
propagandist employs the various sorts of symbols: words, images, colors, gestures and others (Al-
Dulaimi, 2010; Larsåke, 2005). 
 
Propaganda mostly entices people to adopt behaviors without thinking. The absence of logic 
controls the relation between propaganda and the recipient; the recipients neither pay attention to 
nor seek the logical reasons which motivated them to embrace the ideas yet they strongly support 
and defend the bases of the propaganda they believe in (Badr, 1997; Hussein, 1997). The attempt 
of persuading others to accept a certain doctrine often depends on illogical background which does 
not give evidence or proofs. However, generally speaking, propaganda no longer uses the same 
mechanisms of the first half of the last century when it was based on lies, emotional enticement, 
and ignoring logic and science. The immense progress of communication means and information 
exchange imposed new rules on propaganda. In order not to lose its strength and ability of 
influence, propaganda had to change the rules which control it; employing logic, proofs and 
evidence has become important in the process of polarizing the public opinion (Al-Shumaimari, 
2010; Troude-Chastenet, 2006). Previously, propaganda depended on the personality of the 
propagandist, his personal talents and his individual ambitions. Today, it depends on scientific 
analyses and accurate studies. In order to secure success, the propagandist has to carry out accurate 
equations and perceive all the data which affect the influential ability of propaganda (Larsson, 
2005; Andén, 2005; Ellul, 1973). 
 
According to Jacques Driencourt everything is propaganda because everything in the political 
and economic fields seems penetrated and formed through propaganda (Ellul, 1973). Propaganda 
enters the field of industry and that of controlling workers. It exists in all the fields and especially 




information and facts, but half the news and media information is considered propaganda and 
attempts to influence the minds and public opinion (Bernays, 2007). Every day, we are exposed to 
or bombarded by persuasive messages which fall upon us one after the other. These calls attempt 
to convince us through manipulation of symbols and toying with the basic human sentiments. This 
age or time is that of propaganda (Linebarger, 1954). 
 
A lot of American sociologists have totally abandoned the term "propaganda" considering that 
it is very difficult to define and limit its dimensions accurately. Many observers consider that 
propaganda is a set of gimmicks, applications and practices. In addition, specialists in sociology 
and psychology reject the scientific feature or characteristic of these practices. Some researchers 
think that propaganda is considered a technique rather than a science. However, the new technique 
or the modern propaganda is based on several branches of knowledge and science. Apart from the 
progress of scientific research in the fields of sociology and psychology, propaganda would have 
remained in its initial stages and would not have become strong and of enormous influential ability 
as it is now (Ellul, 1973). 
 
The Fields of Propaganda 
 
Propaganda has several types and forms, some of which are commercial, political, religious, 
and moral. Moreover, the names of propaganda differ: politically, it means promotion or 
propaganda; economically, it means advertisements; and religiously, it is called missionary. 
There are common features between the skills required by commercial advertising and the other 
types of propaganda as, eventually, ideas are marketed products. Nevertheless, commercial 
advertising is easy in comparison with the other types. The bases, limits, abilities, and methods of 
commercial advertising have become accurately known by the advertisers. Most commercial 
advertisements depend on repetition and stimulants connected to the social factors and controls in 
addition to motivating instincts and instinctual motives. However, political, social or religious 
propaganda is considered a more difficult task due to the interference of factors and effects which 
are characterized by intricacy and complexity. Moreover, the goals of propaganda differ; the 
commercial one aims at material profit, but the goals of the other types are linked to changing the 
beliefs and behaviors. Achieving material profit could be part of their tasks in the service of the 
interests of the propagandists (Jowett & O´Donnell, 2012; Al-Assaf, 2012; Al-Dulaimi 2011; 
Chomsky, 2001).  
 
The political propaganda which governments, parties, and pressure groups carry out differs 
from the social propaganda which is less obvious and closer to social upbringing that is considered 
a process of implanting the prevailing standards and values through which the society fuses its 
members. Social propaganda is based on the rule of indoctrination where the propagandists implant 
the beliefs which they want the targeted society to adopt. The implantation process is carried out 




teaching, and even in social services, the individual becomes wholly surrounded by the principles 
and beliefs which are intended to be disseminated. Sometimes, the political propaganda coincides 
with social propaganda when this is to the advantage of the propagandist (Troude-Chastenet, 
2006). 
 
The political propaganda is the attempt to influence the public opinion and the behavior and 
attitudes of the society or societies towards a certain issue or issues. It is the language directed to 
the masses, the means which employs all the forms of symbols in order to achieve a propaganda 
goal (Durandin, 1986). 
Political propaganda is mixed and interlaced with other terms such as incitement. Incitement is 
urging to carry out a certain action or arousing to abstain from doing a certain action. Incitement 
may have many forms. According to Lenin, it is using half the truth and slogans to mobilize the 
masses who are unable to understand the complicated truths. However, political propaganda, in 
the viewpoint of Lenin, is employing the historical and scientific proofs in order to persuade the 
educated minority. The incitement and propaganda collaborate to ensure the success of the 
persuasive and influential process on the largest scale (masses and intellectual elite) (Al-Abd, 
2008). 
 
Counter political propaganda is a synonym of the concept of "political war" the use of which 
was common in Britain after World War I then, later, spread and expanded during World War II. 
Political war depends on the direct and indirect legible, aural and visual communication channels 
(Schiller, 1986; Mousa, 1986). The offensive propaganda mainly concentrates on people rather 
than objects. Simultaneously, it tackles the objects related to the daily needs of the people; 
information of social and economic value (Al-Obaidi, 1995). 
 
Political propaganda plays with emotions in order to create a state of intellectual tension and 
emotional charges which must lead to deforming the logical sequence (Sukkari, 1991). Propaganda 
is the process of psychological agitation with the purpose of achieving the manipulation with the 
logic of the recipient or the person exposed to propaganda. However, this does not mean that 
propaganda does not address the mind and try to persuade it with arguments and proofs; in many 
cases, it tries to simultaneously attract the mind and emotions of the recipient (Rabee, 1970; Nasr, 
1967). 
 
The Forms of Propaganda 
 
   Types of propaganda differ in accordance with the desired influences, its trends, and the 







According to its content, propaganda is divided into white, grey and black. 
1- White propaganda: it is considered an open activity which has clear features and goals. 
The propagandist shows his/her opinions and beliefs and pleads a response, backing and 
support by the recipient. So, the source is known, and its aims are explicit, and the masses 
know and recognize that they are being subjected to an attempt to influence them. 
2- Black propaganda: it does not uncover its identity, true sources and goals. The people 
do not recognize that there is someone who wants to affect them or to incite them to 
embrace ideas and beliefs for the purpose of creating behaviors that accord with the goal 
of the propagandist. If directed to the opponent or enemy, black propaganda grows in a 
secret way in order to spread fitna and confusion of the public opinion. 
3- Grey propaganda: it stands in the middle between the black and white propagandas. It 
uncovers some of its features and hides others. For example, it may show its true sources 
and hide its goals (Al-Dulaimi, 2011; Al-Shumaimari, 2010; Linebarger, 1954). 
 
According to its sources, propaganda is divided into vertical and horizontal. 
1- Vertical propaganda: it comes from the top of the political, social or religious authority's 
pyramid. It aims at influencing the basis represented by the public. So, this propaganda 
moves from the top to the bottom. It wraps the masses while those who practice it remain 
outside the wrap; the propagandist remains away from the masses although he is one of 
them, and the reactions of the masses are responses to the calls and voice of the leader. 
Mostly, the individuals enter a state of intellectual and practical slumber; they never make 
decisions and just respond to and carry out those of the leader (Al-Assaf, 2012; Troude-
Chastenet, 2006; Abu-Isbaa, 1999). 
 
2- Horizontal propaganda: it is launched by a member of a certain group rather than by the 
head of an authority or a president. One of its goals is that the propagandist becomes the 
head or the leader of the group. It is clearly applied in the elections of the parties. Ellul sees 
that horizontal propaganda is a form of propaganda which recently developed as far as its 
content is concerned; it can be political or social or both. It is considered horizontal because 
it takes place inside the group rather than from top to bottom. The individuals are equal; 
they communicate with each other and have the duality of discourse. The most prominent 
characteristic of this propaganda is that it takes place in small groups so that the individual 
can carry out activities and dialogues and can form or crystallize his/her opinion after 
studying the opinions of the other individuals who belong to the same group. The degree 
of persuasion and influence could be slow in horizontal propaganda because meetings must 
be continually available. Also, people must be organized accurately as each individual 
should belong to a group that should not contain a large number of members so that each 
individual can have the opportunity to participate. Homogeneity is a characteristic that 






According to its function propaganda is divided into agitating and integral. 
1- Agitation propaganda: it is led by a group or a party that endeavors to govern. 
Through it, the masses are agitated in order to accept changes that may be radical in many 
fields and levels. It is the greatest and the most visible. It is important during the times war 
as it plays the role of justifying malice and hatred towards the enemy. This propaganda can 
also be devastative or provocative of revolutionary movements or movements of change 
(Troude-Chastenet, 2006; Ellul, 1973). 
 
2- Integration propaganda: it aims at creating social equilibrium, unifying and 
strengthening the society. This propaganda is the favored one by many governments. It 
may be important in the countries which contain different nationalities and races or in the 
newly independent young countries. Integration propaganda is considered more accurate 
and complicated than the Agitation propaganda because it requires deeper psychological 
analyses of the society's slices. Moreover, it does not seek temporary stimulation; it, rather, 
aims at building a homogenous social structure (Al-Assaf, 2012). The agreement or the 
unity of attitude and opinion are the main causes for the success of any movement or action; 
unity is the source of the power of efficiency.  This propaganda is efficient as long as it is 
directed to comfortable, settled, educated and more enlightened medium.  However, Ellul 
believes that the more enlightened individuals are the more difficult to persuade, 
manipulate or control. There is a big need for this type of propaganda for flourishing the 
technical society. The mass media, which greatly helps the reinforcement of the results of 
integration propaganda, is employed (Troude-Chastenet, 2006; Ellul, 1973). 
 
According to its method, propaganda is divided into explicit and implicit. 
1- The explicit propaganda is open, led by a known organization, and has clear goals. 
2- The implicit propaganda hides its sources and goals, and the public opinion is 
unaware of it; therefore, it is extremely dangerous (Al-Assaf, 2012).  
   Ellul (1973) sees that it is still quite difficult to define the constituents and nature of 
propaganda since it is a secret action to a large extent. 
 
The Conditions of the Existence of Propaganda 
 
Pursuant to Ellul, a group of social and objective conditions should be available. The social 
conditions are characterized by the existence of an individual society and a mass society (two 
integrated rather than contradicted societies), the existence of a public opinion, and mass media. 
The most prominent objective conditions of the existence of the comprehensive propaganda are 1.  
At least the need for a medium living standard. The propagandist cannot reach the poor individual 
who cannot afford and obtain the mass media; the living standard is the one which provides people 




existence and nature of propaganda are linked to the cultural and educational standard of the 
recipient. The agitation propaganda may be suitable for the uneducated people or those who have 
a low educational and cognitive degree. However, the propaganda which is based on logical and 
intellectual grounds is directed to those who have a convenient degree of knowledge. The messages 
directed to uneducated people must include crude, primitive, simple and clear information that is 
able to oblige them to be simply convinced. Whereas the educated people may not be persuaded 
or have their ideas satisfied by simple propaganda. Evidence and logic are important basis to play 
with the ideas of the educated; this is a principle of the Nazi propaganda (Troude-Chastenet, 2006; 
Linebarger, 1954).   
 
The Means of Propaganda 
 
   The propaganda ideas can be promoted through a lot of means of communication the most 
prominent of which are:  
1- The printed means: like newspapers, magazines, books, periodicals, leaflets, wall 
charts and posters. 
2- Aural means: such as speeches, songs, chants, and dialogues. Radio is considered one 
of the most important vocal means. 
3- Visual means: like photographs, signs, flags, symbols and slogans. 
4- Audio-visual means: combines voice with image such as television, movies, theatres 
as well as shows and processions. Combining image with voice leads to deepening the effect 
of propaganda (Al-Assaf, 2012; Al-Dulaimi, 2011).  
 
There are also other means such as press conferences and meetings. Some countries have or 
form cultural institutions, universities, institutes, schools, libraries and banking services in other 
countries so that they can spread propaganda indirectly (Jowett, & O´Donnell, 2012). In 
accordance to Chomsky, propaganda spreads everywhere and by all means even churches, schools, 
and all institutions have a propaganda purpose (Chomsky, 2002). 
 
In order to achieve the optimal purpose of propaganda, the convenient medium or media should 
be chosen. Moreover, cultural diversity and the differences of the tastes of the targeted masses 
should be taken into account during the propaganda programs are being formed. The interaction 
between the mass media and the direct personal means of communications doubles the influential 
ability of propaganda (Mustafa, 2006; Troude-Chastenet, 2006). 
 
The progress of communication techniques increases the effect of propaganda, but it 
simultaneously causes the propagandist to face huge challenges. The recipients may be exposed to 
propaganda and counterpropaganda at the same time, or may be exposed to a group of 
propagandas. Consequently, the process of polarization and persuasion them will be easy only if 




the formation of the individual's trend into consideration. In other words, the process of 
propaganda model building needs strong intellectual planning. This progress must be very 
magnificent, but the development of information led to exposing the human being to hundreds of 
messages daily. The exposure of the recipient to pressure makes him reply by short messages, at 
any time he/she can, with short perceptive or mental processes. The ability to think and go deeper 
in ideas is not available because of the immense pumping of information (De Craecker-Dussart, 
2011; Linebarger, 1954). 
 
Who manages the internet? Many electronic crimes take place every day. How can the flow of 
wrong information be stopped without violating the freedom of expression? How can the 
misleading information be eliminated? These pivots show how dangerous the internet is as a free 
space for practicing propaganda and spreading it on the largest scale (Goulet, 2015; Kavumbagu, 
2003).  The internet is able to deeply influence the minds of the people and lead the social behavior. 
It changed people into preys of misleading, but it broke the one information mould which the 
censorship of governments controls (Peltier, 2014; Kavumbagu, 2003). The internet is not only a 
space for misleading but also for uncovering misleading (De Craecker-Dussart, 2011). This 
network is a broad area for all the contradicting ideas such as inviting to integrate in one peaceful 
and settled world and inviting to hate the others and accusing them of being unbelievers (Peltier, 
2014; Kavumbagu, 2003).The relative free service of the internet, the interactive characteristic 
caused all to be senders and recipients at the same time; everybody is active in the communication 
process, the possibility of mixing the image with the sound in writing, in music and in colors. All 
these factors increased the importance of the internet as a means for pumping propagandas and 
influence (Peltier, 2014; Huyghe, 2013; Kommers, B.S., 2001). Music makes propaganda 
permeate the people more strongly. Exploiting music is able to direct and lead the masses; music 
plays a vital role in cultural development. The talk about the seriousness and importance of music 
is attributed to Plato. Employing music by the oppressive regimes makes it a dangerous weapon 
that controls the emotions and energy of the peoples which receive the propagandas of these 
regimes. The Nazist propaganda interfered in the content of the German music; it obliged the 
musicians to follow a pattern which satisfies the leaders of the propaganda and the Nazi party. As 
for the musicians, the party continued attempting to purify the symphonic orchestras from the Jews 
and other "lower races"; the works of those who belong to Jewish origin were banned in addition 
to expelling the musicians and the critics who do not recognize the Nazist aesthetics (Andersson 
& Geisler, 2007). 
 
Means differ pursuant to the type and goal of propaganda: Strategic and Tactical Propaganda 
 
Strategic propaganda is characterized by plans and goals which are carried out and achieved on 
the long run. It is characterized by comprehensiveness and place and time unlimitedness. It may 
aim at spreading and reinforcing ideas and beliefs for many generations in a row, so its influence 
can be large and deep; the idea may turn into a social doctrine. On the other hand, the plan of 




propaganda in which the methods of inducement and intimidation, and raising or destroying the 
moral of the targeted society (Yousef, 2004; Hamza, 1987; Schiller, 1986). 
 
Means of strategic propaganda 
Strategic propaganda requires mobilizing many media in order to implant, nourish and deepen 
ideas into the intended societies. In order that any piece of information can become a prevailing 
social doctrine or taken for granted and axiomatic, the propagandist should pump this piece of 
information into the communication channels in a way that surrounds the recipients from all sides 
in order to make them reach the stage of believing the idea and eventually absolutely believe in it 
and probably be ready to sacrifice their lives in its cause. The mass media are considered one of 
the most important means of strategic propaganda (Mustafa, 2006; Yousef, 2004; Hamza, 1987; 
Ellul, 1973). 
 
Means of tactical propaganda 
   These means are often employed during war targeting both the military personnel and 
civilians at the same time. Destroying the morale of the opponent and raising that of the supporting 
people and soldiers is considered the most prominent tasks. Words and symbols stand side by side 
with the battles in such a way that the effect of a propaganda sentence may be more dangerous and 
effective than the cannons and machine guns (Raileanu, 2013). Tactical propaganda is 
characterized by being continuous and condensed. Here are some of the means of tactical 
propaganda: 
1. Leaflets: according to Goebbels, leaflets are considered an effective means of 
provoking revolution, rebellion, attacking certain factions, or enticing to support a party or 
an authority, as it is characterized by easiness of distribution and simplicity of forms. The 
way the leaflets are distributed is itself considered a means of war. Goebbels sees that 
throwing the leaflets on the enemy's ground by planes may create a cloud of sadness and 
dismay in addition to weakening the psychological steadfastness of the enemy. The 
German planes used to throw pieces of paper on the enemy's soldiers asking them to 
surrender as the battalion No. so and so did, even though this did not happen (Mustafa, 
2006). Leaflets were the most common means before radio (Sukkari, 1991; Khalil, 1982). 
2. Press conferences: they are considered a kind of face-to-face communication 
which can achieve a high degree of persuasion. Moreover, when mass media transmit them, 
their persuasive ability doubles. Nazist propaganda was characterized by the ability of the 
propagandists to choose the meetings sites or the places where Hitler or Goebbels made 
their speeches in order to mobilize the public opinion of the German people (Hamza, 1987; 
Khalil, 1982; Al-Omari, 1965). 
3. Speeches of Presidents: during carrying out the propaganda plans, Hitler was 
careful about the necessity of choosing the places where he used to make his speeches. 




masses in order to be able to polarize the largest possible number of the targeted masses 
(Mustafa, 2006).  
4. Propaganda Planning Institutions: a ministry of propaganda was established at 
the time of Hitler. The Propaganda Minister Goebbels had such a great stature that made 
him seem (as far as importance is concerned) the second man in the country next to Hitler. 
This ministry carried out central planning of propaganda and conveyed and literally 
implemented the sayings and commands of the minister. Watching people's trends and 
reactions during listening to foreign radios was one of its most prominent tasks )Nilsson & 
Österlund, 2014 ; Andersson & Geisler 2007; Mustafa, 2006). 
 
Propaganda in Accordance with the Nature of Societies 
 
   There is difference between the methods of applying propaganda in a democratic society from 
a dictator society. However, the desire to dominate and control is the same (Bernays, 2007). From 
the viewpoint of Chomsky (2002), conscious playing with the public opinion and social behavior 
of the masses is a prominent characteristic not only in the dictator societies, but also in the 
democratic societies. The availability of the means of communication and techniques leads to 
facilitating the process of controlling the ideas and the social awareness. Chomsky sees that 
democracy is in danger because many media networks are controlled by the non-government 
tyrants (the private sector). The democratic society is dominated by the smart or conscious 
manipulation which controls, manages and directs the opinions and habits. The manipulators or 
controllers form an invisible government which manages the state and directs the course of events 
in a way that serves their interests. We are really ignorant of those who control us, manage the 
affairs of our lives, form our tastes, mould our souls and minds, and blow the ideas into us in such 
a way that we think they are our doctrines. The invisible leaders dominate millions of human 
beings. Generally speaking, one does not perceive how the data and behaviors of those who occupy 
the frontal part of the scene are ordered by intelligent persons who operate behind the scenes 
(Bernays, 2007). 
   In the democratic society, public opinion is controlled by actors who employ and make use 
of the originally existing traditional social powers which have a great influence on people. These 
actors create and innovate new tools and methods that enable them of dominating the world and 
controlling the course of events, and help them to link the world together. Theoretically, each 
individual forms his/her opinion about the general issues and what is related to private life, but 
practically, if all the citizens read and studied the total of abstract information which orbits 
economy, politics and others –  even the simplest topics, they would understand that it was 
impossible to reach any result whatever it was. Therefore, people voluntarily allow the 
governments and the hidden invisible people to manage and choose the information in order to 
highlight the most important problematic. We accepted that our leaders in addition to the 
journalists and media personnel who serve these leaders and their ideas impose on us what 




things that are of interest to the recipient masses (Bernays, 2007). The industrial capitalist system 
imposed a new formula of control. The capital owners or the special powers dominate the 
governments and, eventually, control and determine the public identity or opinion. Dominating the 
public awareness is quite important in order to entice people to practice behaviors which satisfy 
the propagandist. Propaganda is able to mobilize the power and the money. The business society 
is characterized by great influential power on the societies in which we live (Chomsky, 2002). The 
minority can influence the majority (Bernays, 2007). 
 
Propaganda in dictator and democratic societies creates different forms of slavery, compulsory 
and voluntary or optional slavery. Ellul sees that there is no democracy without information but 
there is no information without propaganda. So, democracy is based on propagandas, and 
propaganda in itself is a negation of democracy (Troude-Chastenet, 2006; Ellul, 1990, 1957, 
1952). 
 
Factors that Ensure the Success, Efficiency and Power of the Influential Results of 
Propaganda 
 
   Propaganda messages alone– away from their social, cultural, psychological, and technical 
surrounding –cannot strongly influence the targeted recipients. The collaboration of many factors 
ensures greater efficiency and increases the influential ability of propaganda (Taylor, 2000).  
1. The monopoly of media guarantees the propagandists to control the contents of the 
messages directed to the masses, eventually they can transmit and reinforce the ideas and 
beliefs which serve their interests. Controlling the contents of images and texts draws the 
mental images which satisfy the desires of the propagandists into the mind of the recipient. 
Mental images are nothing but the result of these intellectual and informational products. 
The people adopt several images and characters which the media creates. The absence of 
opposition or counter propaganda facilitates accepting the published ideas by the people 
even if they were of one-sided direction (Lemieux, 2005; Andén, 2005; Svenbjörn, 1981). 
 
2. Exploiting the contexts. The efficiency of propaganda increases in case the 
propagandist exploits the prevailing beliefs, the established trends and the deeply 
entrenched behavioral patterns. Propaganda should be put in stereotyped contexts which 
are already known by the targeted masses (Al-Dulaimi, 2004). Propaganda depends on and 
strengthens previously existing trends (Troude-Chastenet, 2006). In many cases, political, 
religious or social propagandas influence the people who already have a holistic or partial 
conviction in the subject of the propaganda. In other words, the influence of propaganda is 
related to the degree of the propaganda's ideas connection to the desires, feelings and 






3. Encirclement. It means that the propagandist encircles the recipient with 
propaganda messages through employing more than a communication means and through 
discourse diversity; that is, all symbols and significances should be employed for the 
purpose of achieving a greater influence (Al-Assaf, 2012; Taylor, 2000). Encirclement can 
be called Total Propaganda (Ellul, 1973). 
 
4. Reinforcement. This factor is related to personal communication. The propagandist 
resorts to this type of communication in order to reinforce the role of media in order to 
realize the propaganda goals. The face-to-face communication completes the work of the 
central propaganda system represented by the mass media or by discussions and 
conferences which are carried out in groups. The propagandist's direct personal 
communication with his/her followers or groups increases the degree of their being 
influenced by the discussed ideas and visions (Al-Dulaimi, 2004). 
 
5. The continuousness of propaganda. Propaganda should be continuous non-stop for 
a period of time proportional to its nature. Pursuant to Ellul, continuality means giving no 
way to the recipients to contemplate or think, as they are subjugated to propaganda ideas 
all the day (Ellul, 1973). 
 
   One should attempt to keep the individuals in the margin; they should not be allowed to get 
together or to do any activity or interference in the social conflicts. One should attempt to keep the 
individuals as an immobile element, and if they moved, their movement should be to the advantage 
of the propagandist (Chomsky, 2002). 
 
Propaganda's Technical Methods  
 
1. Assertion: it means introducing information in a vivid enthusiastic way without 
being necessarily true. No detailed explanation or a presentation of the background of the 
event is required; the piece of information is briefed but fairly acceptable without inciting 
or creating questions in the mind of the recipient. The propagandist may suggest an idea 
employing a short phrase such as "Our principles are the best" without presenting an 
evidence proving the validity of the slogan (Kommers, B.S., 2001; Linebarger, 1954). 
 
2. Repetition: there is a close relationship between repetition and believing. 
Repeating phrases leads to believing them. Even lies can be believed when repeated. 
However, the propagandist should avoid boring repetition as it may cause a contrary result 
of the desired one (Al-Assaf, 2012; Al-Dulaimi, 2011; Hamza, 1987). Repetition is one of 
the methods of changing public opinion. It is a way of pressure on the masses targeted by 
the propaganda. Few ideas and much repetition realize the optimal goal. Moreover, 
repeating the same idea is preferred to be through new words and symbols so that the idea 




Goebbels, the reason why the Catholic Church succeeded is repeating the same thing for a 
long time; therefore, propagandists should follow its example. Repetition also helps in 
persuasion (Nilsson &Österlund, 2014; Al-Ridha, 1998; Linebarger, 1954) . 
 
3. Exaggeration. This method is employed in many types of propaganda such as 
commercial, political and religious. There is a relationship between the excess of 
exaggeration and the size of the propagandist rivals. The greater the rival is, the more 
exaggeration the propagandist needs in order to draw the attention of the recipient masses 
and to influence their ideas and consequently their decisions and behavior (Al-Assaf, 2012; 
Al-Dulaimi, 2011; Hamza,1987). 
 
4. Name calling. This type is used during war time and political confrontations. It 
depends on employing derogatory language or words with negative significances to 
describe the enemy and its actions. Propaganda seeks to create prejudices and nourish 
negative feelings towards the enemy through describing it, calling it names and likening it 
to things hated by the people. Mostly mockery is employed to realize this purpose 
(Linebarger, 1954). 
 
5. Glittering generalities. It is noted in the field of political propaganda. It is 
vocabulary with positive significances which are associated in the mind of the individual 
to highly regarded values. Using these vocabulary items motivates the recipient to accept 
any idea without any reasoning because of the values and signifiers which each item has 
and which the recipient people would accept without any reservation. For instance, 
"Democracy" is a vocabulary item that has positive significance and suggests the desire of 
the people to be free and to practice freedom to the greatest possible degree. If it was used 
in a party's logo it would ensure a higher influential ability. "Honor, glory, love of country" 
are words which are used as glittering generalities. To avoid falling in the trap of ringing 
words, the recipient should look for the value of the idea regardless of the words used to 
explain the idea (Kommers, 2001; Linebarger, 1954). 
 
6. Reincarnation, Similarity, Imitation and Plain Folk. Through this technique, the 
propagandist seeks to persuade the crowds that his viewpoints and ideas reflect those the 
common person has and that he/she works hard in favor of the citizens. This is realized in 
many ways some of which are: A-language selectiveness, messages are formulated in an 
easily understood language. Even dialects can be used if this realizes the goal (Linebarger, 
1954). B- Familiarity and identification with the surrounding medium of the recipient of 
the propaganda. That is, the ideas of the propaganda are put in a context which includes 
details and events which the recipient lives with and understands as they belong to his own 
and his surrounding experience. C- Reincarnation of interests. This takes place when the 




method is sometimes considered one of the harshest and most quibbling methods because 
it exploits the worries and desires of the recipient in order to achieve the goal. Mostly, the 
individual becomes a victim whose innocence has been exploited as he/she rapidly believes 
this propaganda which has a direct relationship with his/her interests (Al-Assaf, 2012; Al-
Dulaimi, 2011;  Hamza, 1987). 
 
7. Recipient-credible testimonials. The stronger the relation between the source and 
the recipient, the more the influence of propaganda becomes. For example, quoting the 
opinion of a clergyman or a politician who is considered a leader for the public opinion 
ensures the success of propaganda goals. Many people believe in things which they do not 
know about and which they did not gain from their own experience, but they accept the 
ideas only because they came from sources that are credible for them (Linebarger, 1954). 
 
8. Bandwagon. Pursuant to the Institute for propaganda Analysis in 1938, bandwagon 
is considered one of the most prominent techniques of propaganda which is employed 
during war and peace times. Bandwagon is a call directed to the individual in order to join 
the crowds. This technique seeks to persuade the individual that an actor (the party, group 
…) is the winner as the majority supports and joins this crowd. So long as many people 
believe and join this party, victory must be imperative; the party is strong and undefeatable. 
Man usually wants to belong to the victorious side. Modern propaganda has changed and 
one of its tasks is persuading the individual that so long as many people belong or support 
a certain party, this targeted individual has to join the crowd or he/she shall be excluded or 
alienated (Linebarger, 1954).  The persuasion process is accomplished through a 
psychological unification process. When the recipient is in a crowd influenced by the 
people and the common language or even common priorities, propaganda ensures 
achieving a great influence on both levels of thought and behavior (Troude-Chastenet, 
2006; Kommers, B.S., 2001). 
 
9. Simplification. The simpler the message, the better the propagandist ensures that 
it is understood and the more influence it has on the largest possible number of recipients. 
Complexity causes boredom and reluctance to complete the message. Propaganda may take 
the form of brief slogans that are easy to be learnt and memorized, or it could be in the 
form of a short statement which has clear words.  The combination of simple phrases and 
easy tunes (tuned slogans) increases the ability of propaganda to spread. Simplicity can be 
an adopted style even if propaganda is in very complicated political, economic, 
philosophical or religious fields (Al-Assaf, 2012; Al-Dulaimi, 2011). Simplification 
(Stereotyping) is important when the messages are directed to uneducated masses 






10. Emotional enticement. Nazist propaganda is considered one of the most 
prominent users of this method. Propaganda, for Hitler and Goebbels must depend on 
emotional enticement not on discussion and persuasion. Hitler used to believe that women 
form a big proportion of the masses, therefore the people's response is mostly more 
emotional than mental. Hitler believed that the memory of the masses is weak and that the 
individuals respond more to that who forcibly motivates them than to that who persuades 
them because repeated slogans motivate their emotions whereas mental evidence has much 
weaker influence. According to Chomsky, one of the methods of creating sympathy in war 
propaganda is concentrating on the victims who belong to the propagandist and eliminating 
any news concerning the opponent's victims (Foley, 2015; Andén, 2005). 
 
11. Euphemisms. The propagandist uses this technique in order to calm the masses. 
She/he tries to present unpleasant events in a way that makes it more acceptable and 
palatable by the recipient through employing palliative and softened expressions. The 
propagandist may resort to vague and indirect expressions in order to soften an offensive, 
severe and hard idea. This technique is much employed in military discourse especially 
during wars (Linebarger, 1954).   
 
12. Method of diverting attention. This method is adopted when it is difficult to 
oppose the prevailing opinion among the masses about a certain subject. Opposing the 
overwhelming public opinion would not give any result, so politicians or public opinion 
leaders resort to diverting the attention of the masses towards another subject which is of 
interest for the masses (Al-Dulaimi, 2011; Hamza, 1987). 
 
13. Lesser of two evils. This technique is very much used during war in order to 
persuade people of the necessity to sacrifice or to justify the difficult decisions. The task 
of this technique is persuading people to accept an idea through presenting it as if it were 
the less violent choice or the solution of the least loss. It is always accompanied by blaming 
the enemy and portraying it as the basis of all current problems and chaos (Linebarger, 
1954). 
 
14. Method of fabricating crises. It is the method of exploiting some events and 
conditions to create a crisis which is able to influence the public opinion and motivate the 
masses to adopt a behavior that serves the desire of a certain country or party. Fabricating 
crises has many forms such as enticement to do acts of sabotage, fabricating false news 
that provoke chaos and instability in the society, launching terrorist acts, and destroying 






15. Pinpointing the enemy. This technique is employed during war time and political 
campaigns or discussions. It attempts to simplify the complicated situations through 
depicting an individual, a group or a country as the enemy (Linebarger, 1954). 
 
16. Method of inflicting terror and chaos. The Nazist propaganda is considered 
excellent and skillful in exploiting man's motive and need of feeling safe. The Nazi 
propagandists sought to provoke fear and terror. According to Hitler, subjugating peoples 
to the leader's will may be accomplished through creating a situation of horror and chaos. 
He believed that whether propaganda is directed to the interior or exterior (for instance, the 
enemy's masses), inability of logical thinking, inconsistency of feelings, uncertainty, 
hesitation and horror are all factors that help to subjugate the masses to the desire and goals 
of the propagandist. Intimidating people against a foreign enemy or an ideology whose 
adopters want to control our minds in order to exploit the country's resources or for another 
purpose is considered an important approach (Chomsky, 2002). Many countries adopted 
the same approach. Western countries spread fear and terror among the people and 
intimidated them against the expected communist invasion. Demonizing the opponent is 
one of the important methods of ensuring the popular support (Nilsson&Österlund, 2014; 
Andén, 2005; Yousef, 2004; Khalil, 1982). Creating fears makes the propagandist skillful 
at showing herself/himself as the savior (Foley, 2015). This technique makes use of the 
survival instinct and the fear of annihilation to mobilize the people (Linebarger, 1954). 
 
17. Method of lying and misleading. Chomsky  (2002) sees that the propagandist is 
characterized by a big ability to lie. As for Goebbels, the basic skill of the art of propaganda 
is the ability to mix lying with truthfulness. The presented material should not be true but 
it should be believable. Lies are used to influence the emotions of both the friends and the 
enemies (Yousef, 2004). 
 
Misleading can be applied by the method of "Selective Control"; selecting a part of the 
truth and omitting the other. Card stacking, or selective omission is a very effective 
technique on the recipient masses. Even if all the presented information were true, the 
seriousness lies in eliminating the other information which makes the truth blurred and not 
clear (Nilsson & Österlund, 2014; Jowett & O´Donnell, 2012; Linebarger, 1954).  
 
Pursuant to Goebbels, truth is the biggest enemy of countries. During war, for instance, 
countries play with the ideas and feelings of people through obscuring or exposing the 
results of wars. In order to raise the morale, the government hides a lot of truths or presents 
them in a way that differs from reality. In order to increase the illusion of the recipient, the 
propagandist employs during the talk several techniques such as imperfect pronunciation, 




18. Rumors. It is an unverified story that spreads in society. It allegedly has a certain 
happening (Drever, 1955). It is a believable case or a statement which is spread from a 
person to another without having any standards that control its credibility and correctness. 
It is a promotion of fabricated news which talks about unreal incidents depending on the 
style of magnification, exaggeration and deformation in order to ensure influencing the 
public opinion (Hilmi, 2005; Darwish, 1993). 
 
Wars and the atmosphere of instability are considered important reasons of spreading 
rumors which are not subject to criteria of truthfulness, impartiality and objectivity 
(Schiller, 1986). When these rumors are used during war times, they work as a weapon of 
psychological war; as they provoke the emotions of the masses and confuse the ideas (Abu 
Al-Nil, 1986). 
 
The speed of spreading the rumor is proportional to the importance of the event which 
it talks about and to the vague contexts which surround this event (Schiller, 1986).The 
importance and seriousness of rumors emerge from the psychological effects which they 
leave behind and from their ability to decide the result of wars most of the time. In many 
cases rumors spread in informal ways and from unknown sources then cause very serious 
effects on the levels of social behavior and conduct (Al-Juwair, 1995; Najati, 1960). 
 
Certainly, the launcher of any rumor has a goal. However, the rumor could be trivial 
containing shallow unimportant stories on many levels. Nevertheless, it may take a space 
of the daily social dialogue. Rumors may also include tales and jokes. During its 
development, many changes happen to the rumor; the propagandist launches a rumor which 
later comes back distorted to her/him (Hilmi, 2005; Abu Al-Neel, 1986).  
 
One of the characteristics of the rumor is that it includes part of the truth. This 
characteristic is considered a basic core for structuring and spreading the rumor in the 
mediums which suffer from violent intellectual suffocation and where the sources of true 
news are few. The reason for this is serving certain goals. The more information monopoly, 
the stronger the stagnation, and the more the street is intellectually and emotionally 
congested, the greater the influence of rumor will be. 
 
The rumor may target local, regional and international societies or groups. The contents 
and goals of rumor also vary; they may be social, political, economic or martial (Mclaurin, 
1982; Najati, 1960). 
 
Types of rumor 
Here are some types of rumor: 




Impulsive rumor: it spreads fast. The more the rumor is connected to subjects which 
simulate the fears or interests of the people, the faster it spreads and the more effective it 
is. For instance, the rumors related to catastrophes and wars, those which create strong 
emotions such as fear, anger, or the victorious feeling. 
Submerging rumor: this type appears and disappears in certain periods of time 
according to circumstances and contexts. In other words, it floats for a length of time, then 
sinks and floats again and so on. 
Creeping rumor: this grows slowly and spreads in a mysterious atmosphere (Hilmi, 
2005; Al-Juwair, 1995; Darwish, 1993; Ghunaim, 1968).  
 
 Rumors from the viewpoint of subject 
Rumors of hope, wishes and dreams. They are associated with the desires and 
expectations of the groups whom these rumors are promoted among. The more they are 
associated with the needs of the targeted individuals, the faster they spread and stronger 
influence they have. Some people may believe them even if they doubt their credibility 
only because they need to satisfy their needs and realize their hopes. During wars, these 
rumors aim at reinforcing the people's confidence in victory and at encouraging the soldiers 
to fight. At the same time they aim at enticing the civilians to be patient, silent and steadfast 
(Mustafa, 2006; Al-Abd, 1993). 
Rumors of disappointment, hopelessness and fear.  This type exploits hard times 
such as wars. It also makes use of the psychological consequences resulting from the 
situations of fear and anxiety. Man is more vulnerable to believe and get affected by 
illusions and loses the ability to understand the events and incidents in a logical and 
regulated way. She/he is ready to believe everything she/ he hears especially when the 
rumor strongly addresses man's survival instinct (Mustafa, 2006; Ghunaim, 1968). 
Rumors of hatred and loyalty-shifting. This type aims at mobilizing the individuals 
against a person, a group, a party or even a country. The more the rumors are linked to the 
interests and fears of the targeted masses, the more their rejection, hatred and 
disappointment against a certain actor increase (Mustafa, 2006). 
 
Strategies of confronting rumors: confronting rumors is considered one of the forms 
of crisis management; many crises happen as a result of rumors. The most prominent 
strategies employed in confrontation are: 
1- Concentration strategy: it means transmitting condensed messages through 
several mass media to the different groups on each patch of the places where the rumor 
spreads. 
 
2- The psychodynamic strategy: it is based on the rules and theories of 
psychology. It concentrates on the relation between the individual's stimulus and 




biological, emotional and perceptive. It causes an influence which produces a reaction 
or a behavior (response). This strategy concentrates on realizing emotional appeals and 
motivating the perceptive activities of the individual in order to confront the rumor. 
 
3- The socio-cultural strategy: this strategy takes into consideration that the 
individual's behavior is subject to societal pressures and controls. These systems 
control the societal reaction towards any media message. The adjustment of the social 
behavior requires the adjustment of the cultural and societal controls. If media could 
not modify the behavior, it should at least make use of the existing controls and put the 
media messages in contexts that simulate and harmonize with the prevailing cultural 
doctrines in order to achieve the desired influence on the targeted masses. 
 
4- The meaning construction strategy: through this strategy, the propagandist 
seeks to adjust or create meanings for the symbols surrounding the targeted man. This 
means that the media influence must rise to the degree of creating societal and cultural 
patterns that serve the interests of the propagandist. Due to the influential power of the 
propaganda, several societies maintain and hold tightly false mental images about 
persons or events or practice their behaviors and attitudes on the basis of these images. 
 
5- The problematic situation strategy: this strategy often employed in the case of 
crises and catastrophes. It is characterized in that it does not aim at achieving persuasion 
directly. Rather it provokes the masses to follow up the events and the analyses of the 
specialists so that mass media can pave the way to form the public opinion.  
 
6- The prevention strategy: the strategies which confront rumors are 
characterized by being defensive; they are employed to retort to the spread of a certain 
rumor. However, the prevention strategy is based upon raising the awareness of the 
citizens before a crisis which might result in the spread of other rumors that are able to 
disturb security and create chaos takes place. Raising awareness may include 
explaining the concept of rumors, their causes and dangers (Mustafa, 2006; Yousef, 
2004; Hijab, 2003). 
 
The Basic Principles of Propaganda During War Time 
 
Pursuant to Anne Morelli (2001), there is a group of basic principles for propaganda during the 
time of war regardless of the identity of the propagandist. The most important of these principles 
are: 1-We do not want war. The rulers of countries always assure that they do not want war but it 
is an obligatory situation.2- The opponent camp is the only one who is responsible for the war. 
The enemy launched the war and we have to retort. 3- Demonizing the enemy. Propaganda 




Personifying the opponent is an important technique; the ability of the people to imagine or 
symbolize the enemy as a thing or a person magnifies the influential power of propaganda. A 
human group may not be able to abstractly hate the whole people; therefore, personification is 
necessary so that the hatred and rejection energy can be poured on a definite point. 4-We defend 
noble causes; there are no individual interests. The propagandist cannot admit the real causes of 
war; so she/he employs the values that attract the recipient and make her/him justify any militant 
action. 5- The enemy deliberately commits grievous acts. If we made mistakes, they would be 
unintentional. War is a conflict between civilization and barbarism. Our enemy practices brutality 
with no faith or legal deterrent.  6-The enemy uses prohibited weapons. We respect the rules of 
war and fight honestly and with commitment to conventions. Yet the enemy does not. 7- Our losses 
are very low, but those of the enemy are very enormous. 8-The educated people and artists support 
our cause. 9- Our cause has a holy characteristic. So, it has to be defended and fought for till death. 
10-Allthose who doubt our propaganda are traitors (Morelli, 2001). 
 
In accordance with Elull, defining the true dimensions of propaganda requires studying it in the 
light of the contexts of civilization or of events. He also considers that the flaw or shortcoming 
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Chapter 5  
 
 
The Quantitative Analysis Results of the Studied Samples 
 
 
   This chapter is specified for presenting the quantitative analysis results of the samples of the 
studied channels. Initially, the analysis results of each channel are presented apart. Then a graphic 
representation compares the rates of the total samples of both channels. The quantitative analysis 
is limited to brief explanations of the results since the qualitative analysis is the one which includes 
detailed treatment of the significances. For instance, the quantitative analysis is exclusive to 
demonstrating the repetitions and rates of the anti-government demonstrations but the qualitative 
analysis deals with all the signifiers related to this topic. In order to avoid repetition, I summarized 
the explanation in the quantitative analysis so as to make it limited to giving a panoramic image 
of the trend of channels as the qualitative analysis tackles the details of the mechanisms of the two 






The Quantitative Analysis Results of Al-Jazeera Channel’s Sample 
 
 
   The quantitative results are divided into the sample results of the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 
in addition to the channel’s total sample. 
 





2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Channel 
Correspondents 
0 0 8 3.17 11 2.68 19 1.9 
Media 27 7.96 18 7.14 14 3.42 59 5.9 
News Agencies 13 3.83 2 0.79 2 0.48 17 1.7 
Official Reports & 
Data 
14 4.12 15 5.95 19 4.64 48 4.8 
Statements by 
Official Figures 
24 7.07 18 7.14 8 1.95 50 5 
Opposition Sources  223 65.78 148 58.73 333 81.41 704 70.4 
Eyewitnesses 13 3.83 29 11.50 15 3.66 57 5.7 
Archive 7 2.06 3 1.19 1 0.24 11 1.1 
Unidentified 
Sources 
18 5.30 11 4.36 6 1.46 35 3.5 
Sum 339 100 252 100 409 100 1000 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
33.9% 25.2% 40.9% 100% 
 
   Table No. 1 exhibits the repetitions and the rates of the Source Main Categories. The result 
shows that Al-Jazeera mainly depended on the sources of the opposition by 70.4% in the total 
sample. The opposition sources were the first reference of Al-Jazeera during the three studied years 
by 65.78% in 2011, 58.73% in 2012 and 81.41% in 2013. 
   The correspondents did not form a main source of news coverage for Al-Jazeera. Their rate, 
relative to the other sources, was only 1.9%. The media was Al-Jazeera’s second source by 5.9% 
for the total sample. The dependence of Al-Jazeera on media which was at the rate of 7.96% in 
2011 decreased to reach 3.42% in 2013. The rate of eye witnesses in the total sample was 5.7%. It 




   The Statements by Official Figures accounted for 5% in the total sample. In 2011, it was 
7.07% and in 2012, it was 7.14% while it fell to 1.95% in 2013. This decrease reveals the channel’s 
disregard for the official figures as actors in the events of the crisis. 
   Official Reports & Data constituted 4.8% of the total sample. The rates of this category 
converged for the samples of the three years; 4.12% in 2011, 5.95% in 2012 and 4.64% in 2013. 
   News Agencies Category was a source of Al-Jazeera’s by a rate of 1.7% in the total sample. 
It was 3.83% in 2011 then decreased to 0.79% in 2012 and 0.48% in 2013.This may show Al-
Jazeera’s desire to present itself as a strong media entity whose ability to collect information is 
equal to that of press agencies. 
   The Archive represents only 1.1% in the total sample; 2.06% in 2011, 1.19% in 2012 and 
0.24% in 2013. This makes Al-Jazeera’s news seem up-to-date, live and direct. 
   The Unidentified Sources Category represents 3.5% of the total sample. It was 5.30% in 2011 
and 4.36% in 2012 then declined to 1.46% in 2013. 
 
Source Subcategories  
 
Table 1 – 1 
Channel 
Correspondents 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Full Presence in The 
Report 
0 0 8 100 11 100 19 100 
Partial Presence in 
The Report 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 0 0 8 100 11 100 19 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
0% 42.10% 57.89% 100% 
 
   Table No. 1-1 demonstrates the repetitions and rates of the category of the channel’s reporters. 
The results reveal that the channel did not depend on the reporters as a source for its news in 2011; 
the rate of the reporters’ category relative to the other sources is 0%. The channel attributes this to 
the censorship the Syrian state imposed on media. In 2012, the channel mainly depended on native 
Syrian amateur correspondents to cover the events on the ground. In 2013, some professional 
reporters started their field coverage of events, but the presence of the amateur correspondents was 
still overwhelming. Full Presence in the Report rated 100% in 2012 and 2013 while Partial 
Presence in the Report was null. This signifies that the channel dispenses with other sources when 
there is a reporter on the ground, or it reflects the channel’s desire to emphasize on covering the 







Table 1 – 2 
Media 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Syrian 25 92.59 18 100 11 78.57 54 91.52 
Arab 0 0 0 0 1 7.14 1 1.69 
International 2 7.40 0 0 2 14.28 4 6.77 
Sum 27 100 18 100 14 100 59 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
45.76% 30.50% 23.72% 100% 
 
   Table No. 1-2 is about the repetitions and rates of the Media Category. The Syrian media 
made up 91.52% in the total sample; 92.59% in 2011, 100% in 2012 and 78.57% in 2013. Most of 
the contexts in which Al-Jazeera used information from the Syrian media aimed at emphasizing 
the channel’s credibility and at reporting the Syrian propaganda and discrediting it at the same 
time. The International Media accounted for 6.77% in the total sample; 7.40% in 2011, 0% in 2012 
and 14.28% in 2013. Al-Jazeera mostly depended on the international media in the context of 
talking about international opinions and attitudes about what is going on. This media was not a 
source of reporting the events on the Syrian ground. This may show the channel’s desire to 
marginalize the role of international media as a news source. Al-Jazeera did not depend on the 
Arab Media as an information source in 2011 and 2012. The rate of this media in the total sample 
is 1.69%. The channel only once recalled information from an Arab channel, which indicates Al-
Jazeera’s nearly absolute dispensing with Arab media reference. 
 
   Table No. 1-3 demonstrates the repetitions and rates of News Agencies. International 
Agencies constituted 70.58% of the total sample; 92.30% in 2011, but 0% in 2012 and 2013. Arab 
Agencies rated 0% for the three years. The Syrian Agencies made up 29.41% in the total sample; 
7.69% in 2011, 100% in 2012 and 2013. The contexts in which the channel used information from 
the Syrian Arab News Agency mostly aimed at negating the Syrian government’s propaganda or 
at showing a kind of media professionalism; covering the viewpoints of the different parties. The 
repetitions concerning the International News Agencies Category are only 17 out of 1000 sources. 
Table 1 – 3 
News Agencies 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Syrian 1 7.69 2 100 2 100 5 29.41 
Arab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
International 12 92.30 0 0 0 0 12 70.58 
Sum 13 100 2 100 2 100 17 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 




This makes certain that Al-Jazeera desired to present itself as a media entity whose strength equals 
news agencies.  
 
Table 1 – 4 
Official Reports & 
Data 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Syrian 6 42.85 3 20 4 21.05 13 27.08 
Arab 1 7.14 0 0 0 0 1 2.08 
International 7 50 12 80 15 78.94 34 70.83 
Sum 14 100 15 100 19 100 48 100 
The Whole Proportion of 
The Category 
29.16% 31.25% 39.58% 100% 
 
   Table No. 1-4 exhibits the Official Reports & Data Category. The channel was mainly 
interested in international reports by 70.83% in the total sample: 50% in 2011, 80% in 2012 and 
78.94% in 2013. The Syrian Reports constituted 27.08% in the total sample; 42.85% in2011, 20% 
in 2012 and 21.05% in 2013. The Arab Reports made up only 2,08% in the total sample; 7.14% in 
2011 and 0% in each of 2012 and 2013. Most of the contexts in which the reports were recalled 
were meant to emphasize the dictatorship of Assad and the suffering of the oppressed people.  
 
Table 1 – 5 
Statements by Official 
Figures 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Syrian 13 54.16 4 22.22 4 50 21 42 
Arab 1 4.16 2 11.11 2 25 5 10 
International 10 41.66 12 66.66 2 25 24 48 
Sum 24 100 18 100 8 100 50 100 
The Whole Proportion of 
The Category 
48% 36% 16% 100% 
 
   Table No. 1-5 exhibits the repetitions and rates of the Statements by Official Figures. 
International Official Figures represented 48% in the total sample; 41.66% in 2011, 66.66% in 
2012 and 25% in 2013. The Syrian Figures constituted 42% in the total sample; 54.16 in 2011, 
22.22% in 2012 and 50% in 2013. The Arab Figures made up 10 % in the total sample; 4.16% in 
2011, 11.11% in 2012 and 25% in 2013. The Syrian figures convey the Syrian propaganda while 
the international ones criticize and oppose the Syrian government. This gives an impression how 
the popularity of Assad is local and limited and how the opposition is, locally and internationally, 







Table 1 – 6 
Opposition Sources 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 




110 49.32 55 37.16 253 75.97 418 59.37 
Political & Military 
Figures 
14 6.27 15 10.13 21 6.30 50 7.10 
Sum 223 100 148 100 333 100 704 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
31.67% 21.02% 47.30% 100% 
 
   Table No. 1-6 demonstrates the repetitions and rates of the Opposition Source. Organisations 
& Coordination Committees accounted for 59.37% in the total sample; 49.32% in 2011, 37.16% 
in 2012 and 75.97% in 2013. Civilian Activists constituted 33.52% in the total sample; 44.39% in 
2011, 52.70% in 2012 and 17.71% in 2013. Political & Military Figures, made up the least rate, 
7.10% in the total sample; 6.27% in 2011, 10.13% in 2012 and 6.30% in 2013. The dependence of 
Al-Jazeera on Organisations & Coordination Committees and Civilian Activists more than 
Political & Military Figures helps to show the opposing movement against the Syrian government 
as a popular one more than it is one of figures and leaderships.  
 
Table 1 – 7 
Eyewitnesses 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Identified  0 0 1 3.44 2 13.33 3 5.26 
Unidentified  13 100 28 96.55 13 86.66 54 94.73 
Sum 13 100 29 100 15 100 57 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
22.80% 50.87% 26.31% 100% 
 
   This table deals with the repetitions and rates of the Eyewitnesses Category. The Unidentified 
Eyewitnesses made up 94.73% in the total sample; 100% in 2011, 96.55% in 2012 and 86.66% in 
2013. The Identified Eyewitnesses accounted for 5.26% in the total sample; 0% in 2011, 3.44% 
in2012 and 13.33% in 2013. This rate reflects Al-Jazeera’s unwillingness to give special details 
about eyewitnesses or its carelessness about their identity. I argue that refraining from mentioning 
any information about eyewitnesses may help make each one a representative or a public speaker 
of the Syrian people. Mentioning information frames the identity of the eyewitnesses while 






   Table No.1-8 exhibits the repetitions and rates of the Archive Category. The channel 
depended on video footages by 100% for the three years. It did not use fixed photographs. This 
contributes to maintaining the liveliness of the news.  
 
 
   This table is concerned with the Unidentified Sources. Al-Jazeera, for example, would state: 
“Media reported” or “An official personality declared” without mentioning any more information 
about the source. Official Personalities Category accounted for the highest rate, by 65.71%, in the 
total sample; 55.55% in 2011, 90.90% in 2012 and 50% in 2013. Official Reports & Data 
constituted 25.71% in the total sample; 27.77% in 2011, 9.09% in 2012 and 50% in 2013. The rate 
of Media & News Agencies was 8.57% in the total sample; 16.66% in 2011, 0% in each of 2012 
and 2013. Refraining from identifying the reference accurately or mentioning it in plural form such 
as “Agencies reported” may contribute to making the news seem true as many news agencies 
reported it – linking the diversity of the source to credibility. Keeping the reference anonymous 




Table 1 – 8 
Archive 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Video 7 100 3 100 1 100 11 100 
Photograph 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 7 100 3 100 1 100 11 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
63.63% 27.27% 9.09% 100% 
Table 1 – 9 
Unidentified 
Sources 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Media & News 
Agencies 
3 16.66 0 0 0 0 3 8.57 
Official Reports & 
Data 
5 27.77 1 9.09 3 50 9 25.71 
Official 
Personalities  
10 55.55 10 90.90 3 50 23 65.71 
Sum 18 100 11 100 6 100 35 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 




2- The Source Orientation Category 
 
Table 2 
Source Trend  
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Pro-Government 47 13.86 34 13.49 24 5.86 105 10.5 
Anti-Government 290 85.54 207 82.14 377 92.17 874 87.4 
Neutral 2 0.58 11 4.36 8 1.95 21 2.1 
Sum 339 100 252 100 409 100 1000 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
33.9% 25.2% 40.9% 100% 
 
   Table No. 2 shows the repetitions and rates of the Source Trend. The Anti-Government Trend 
accounted for 87.4% in the total sample. The Pro-Government one constituted 10.5%. The Neutral 
one made up only 2.1%. The anti-government trend was overwhelming in the three years by 
85.54% in 2011, 82,14% in 2012 and 92.17% in 2013. Al-Jazeera recalled the pro-government 
trend in given contexts, the most prominent of which was disproving the government propaganda 
or displaying that the news content is balanced through including different viewpoints. The Neutral 
Trend sources represented 0.58% in 2011, 4.36% in 2012 and 1.95% in 2013. 
 
3- The Topic Categories 
 
Table 3 – 1 
Public Movements 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Pro-Government 4 10.52 0 0 0 0 4 8 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 38 100 10 100 2 100 50 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
76% 20% 4% 100% 
  
  Table No. 3-1 contains the repetitions and rates of the Public Movement Category. The Anti-
Governments made up 92% in the total sample by 89.47% in 2011, 100% in each of 2012 and 
2013. The Pro-Governments constituted 8% in the total sample by 10.52% in 2011, 0% in each of 
2012 and 2013. The channel did not cover any movement of the Civilian Opposition Against 





   Table No. 3-2 deals with the repetitions and rates of the category of Activities by The 
Conflicting Armed Sides. The Regime’s Activities constituted 72.29%in the total sample by 
91.66% in 2011, 73.43% in 2012, then decreased to 59.92% in 2013. But the Armed Opposition’s 
Activities made up 27.70% in the total sample by 8.33% in 2011, 26.56% in 2012, then increased 
to 40.07% in 2013. 
 
   Table No. 3-2-1 contains the repetitions and rates of the Regime's Activities category. In the 
total sample, 82.31% of the activities were Against Civilians by 91.60% in 2011, 87.23% in 2012 
and 69.42% in 2013. The activities Against Militants accounted for 17.68% in the total sample by 
8.39% in 2011, 12.76% in 2012 and 30.57% in 2013. This selectivity helps make the crisis seem 
as a war held by an armed regime against unarmed people rather than against the armed parties. 
Most of the contexts which dealt with the regime’s actions against the armed opposition were about 








Table 3 – 2 
Activities by The 
Conflicting Armed 
Sides 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Regime’s Activities 143 91.66 141 73.43 157 59.92 441 72.29 
Armed Opposition’s 
Activities 
13 8.33 51 26.56 105 40.07 169 27.70 
Sum 156 100 192 100 262 100 610 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
25.57% 31.47% 42.95% 100% 
Table 3 – 2 – 1 
Regime's Activities 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Against Civilians 131 91.60 123 87.23 109 69.42 363 82.31 
Against Militants 12 8.39 18 12.76 48 30.57 78 17.68 
Sum 143 100 141 100 157 100 441 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 








2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Against Civilians 3 23.07 3 5.88 4 3.80 10 5.91 
Against The Regime 10 76.92 48 94.11 101 96.19 159 94.08 
Sum 13 100 51 100 105 100 169 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
7.69% 30.17% 62.13% 100% 
 
   Table No. 3-2-2 includes the repetitions and rates of the Armed Opposition’s Activities 
Category. The results demonstrate that 94.08% of the opposition’s activities in the total sample 
were Against the Regime by 76.92% in 2011, 94.11% in 2012 and 96.19% in 2013. Opposition’s 
Activities against Civilians made up 5.91% in the total sample by 23.07% in 2011, 5.88% in 2012 
and 3.80% in 2013. Most of the news that included the armed opposition’s activities against 
civilians were in contexts where the government’s propaganda about armed people who destroy 
the country was recalled or Al-Jazeera often presented this propaganda in order to rebut it. 
 
Table 3 – 3 
The Consequences 
of The Conflict 
Between The 
Regime & The 
Opposition 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Deaths 57 75 34 48.57 35 52.23 126 59.15 
Wounded People 6 7.89 13 18.57 13 19.40 32 15.02 
Displacement and 
Refuge 
6 7.89 10 14.28 12 17.91 28 13.14 
Economic and 
Services Situation 
7 9.21 13 18.57 7 10.44 27 12.67 
Sum 76 100 70 100 67 100 213 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
35.68% 32.86% 31.45% 100% 
 
   Table No. 3-3 shows the repetitions and rates of the Consequences of the Conflict between 
the Regime & the Opposition Category. Al-Jazeera allocated the largest space for talking about 
the deaths. The Deaths Category accounted for 59.15% in the total sample by 75% in 2011, 48.57% 
in 2012 and 52,23% in 2013. The Wounded People Category was the second. Its rates were 15.02% 
in the total sample by 7.89% in 2011, 18.57% in 2012 and 19.40% in 2013. The third was the 




2011, 14.28% in 2012 and 17.91% in 2013. The Economic and Services Situation Category had 
the least rate in the total sample by 12.67%; 9.21% in 2011, 18.57% in 2012 and 10.44% in 2013. 
 
Table 3 – 3 – 1 
Deaths  
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Government’s Deaths, 
Civilian & Military 
7 12.28 2 5.88 3 8.57 12 9.52 
Opposition’s Deaths 
Civilian & Military 
49 85.96 29 85.29 29 82.85 107 84.92 
Other Party’s Deaths 1 1.75 3 8.82 3 8.57 7 5.55 
Sum 57 100 34 100 35 100 126 100 
The Whole Proportion of 
The Category 
45.23% 26.98% 27.77% 100% 
 
   Table No. 3-3-1 demonstrates the repetitions and rates of Deaths Category. The channel 
highlighted Opposition’s Deaths, Civilian & Military, whose rate was 84.92% in the total sample 
by 85.96% in 2011, 85.29% in 2012, and 82.85% in 2013. This makes the opponents seem as 
victims; victimisation discourse. The Government’s Deaths, Civilian & Military Category had the 
following rates: 9.52% in the total sample by 12.28% in 2011, 5.88% in 2012 and 8.57% in 2013. 
The Other Party’s Deaths Category accounted for 5.55% in the total sample by 1.75% in 2011, 
8.82% in 2012 (the channel did not identify the dead people; its discourse was general, only 
mentioning that there were murdered people) and 8.57% in 2013; these murdered people were 
from the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Iraqi Abu Al Fadl Al Abbas Brigade. 
 
Table 3 – 3 – 2 
Wounded People 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Government’s 
Wounded People, 
Civilian & Military 
0 0 1 7.69 1 7.69 2 6.25 
Opposition’s 
Wounded People, 
Civilian & Military 
6 100 11 84.61 11 84.61 28 87.5 
Other Party’s 
Wounded People 
0 0 1 7.69 1 7.69 2 6.25 
Sum 6 100 13 100 13 100 32 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 





   Table No. 3-3-2 deals with the repetitions and rates of Wounded People Category. Al-Jazeera 
underlined Opposition’s Wounded People, Civilian & Military. This category accounted for 87.5% 
in the total sample; 100% in 2011, 84.61% in each of 2012 and 2013. The rates of Government’s 
Wounded People, Civilian & Military Category were 6.25% in the total sample; 0% in 2011, 7.69% 
in 2012 and 7.69% in 2013. Similarly, the Other Party’s Wounded People Category made up 
6.25%in the total sample; 0% in 2011, 7.69% in 2012 (the channel did not identify the wounded 
people; its discourse was general, only mentioning that there were wounded people) and 7.69% in 
2013; these wounded people were from the Hezbollah. 
 
Table 3 – 3 – 3 
Displacement & 
Refuge 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Internal 2 33.33 5 50 6 50 13 46.42 
Abroad 4 66.66 5 50 5 41.66 14 50 
Unspecified 0 0 0 0 1 8.33 1 3.57 
Sum 6 100 10 100 12 100 28 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
21.42% 35.71% 42.85% 100% 
 
   Table No. 3-3-3 shows Displacement & Refuge Category. Extraterritorial Refuge constituted 
the following rates: 50% in the total sample, 66.66% in 2011, 50% in 2012 and 41.66% in 2013. 
Internal Displacement Category accounted for the following rates: 46.42% in the total sample, 
33.33% in 2011, 50% in each of 2012 and 2013. Unspecified Displacement & Refuge was 
mentioned once in the news by 3.57% in the total sample, 0% in each of 2011 and 2012, and 8.33% 
in 2013. Al-Jazeera dealt with the topics of displacement and refuge in the same degree which 
indicates the equal importance of the situations of the displaced people inside the country and 
refugees abroad. 
 
Table 3 – 3 – 4 
Economic & 
Services Situation 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Good 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Medium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bad 7 100 13 100 7 100 27 100 
Sum 7 100 13 100 7 100 27 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 





   Table No. 3-3-4 exhibits the repetitions and rates of Economic and Services Situation 
Category. Al-Jazeera presented the economic and services situation in Syria as bad by 100% 
throughout the three years. The channel adopted exaggeration as a propaganda means in order to 
influence the recipient. 
 
4- The Visual Content Category 
 
Table 4 
The Visual Content 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Video 40 86.95 44 83.01 48 84.21 132 84.61 
Infographic 5 10.86 7 13.20 8 14.03 20 12.82 
Photograph 1 2.17 2 3.77 1 1.75 4 2.56 
Sum 46 100 53 100 57 100 156 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
29.48% 33.97% 36.53% 100% 
 
   Table No. 4 is allocated to the Visual Content Category. The results show that the channel 
mainly depended on video footages by 84.61% in the total sample; 86.95% in 2011, 83.01% in 
2012 and 84.21% in 2013. Second in degree was the Infographic Category by 12.82% in the total 
sample; 10.86% in 2011, 13.20% in 2012 and 14.03% in 2013. This means that Al-Jazeera 
somewhat depended on illustrative means in order to enrich the news elements. Photograph 
category makes up the least rate by 2.56% in the total sample; 2.17% in 2011, 3.77% in 2012 and 
1.75% in 2013. Video footages help news to convey reality more than photographs and infographs. 
Addressing feelings rather than mind is one of the means of propaganda. Infographs and statistics 
do not affect the feelings of the recipient as strongly as video footages which contain actual scenes 
















5- Displaying Voices Included in The Videos Category 
 
Table 5 
Display The Voices 
That The Videos 
Contain 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Complete Display 37 92.5 37 77.08 41 85.41 115 84.55 
Partial Display 3 7.5 7 14.58 7 14.58 17 12.5 
Incidental Display & 
Muting the Voice 
0 0 4 8.33 0 0 4 2.94 
Sum 40 100 48 100 48 100 136 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
29.41% 35.29% 35.29% 100% 
 
   Table No. 5 exposes the repetitions and rates of the category of Displaying the Voices That 
the Videos Contain. The Complete Display Category made up the following rates: 84.55% in the 
total sample; 92.5% in 2011, 77.08% in 2012 and 85.41% in 2013. Partial Display Category 
constituted the following rates: 12.5% in the total sample; 7.5% in 2011, 14.58% in 2012 and 2013. 
Incidental Display & Muting the Voice Category accounted for the least rates by 2.94% in the total 
sample; 0% in 2011, 8.33% in 2012 and 0% in 2013. Synchronization of image and sound makes 
the message more effective. When the audience sees images of bombardment and simultaneously 
listens to the sound of bombardment, they may be more influenced than seeing the images of 
bombardment without hearing to the sound of bombardment. I argue that this method is an 
important tool of exaggeration and agitation. 
 




2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Pro-Government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Anti-Government 40 100 48 100 48 100 136 100 
Neutral 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 40 100 48 100 48 100 136 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
29.41% 35.29% 35.29% 100% 
 
   Table No. 6 is specified for the repetitions and rates of Content Trend Category. The content 
of the news reports was Anti-Government by 100% throughout the three studied years. Al-




The Quantitative Analysis Results of Al-Manar Channel’s Sample 
 
   The quantitative results are divided into the sample results of the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 
in addition to the channel’s total sample.  
 





2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Channel 
Correspondents 
8 6.01 14 4.81 42 10.19 64 7.65 
Media 23 17.29 57 19.58 38 9.22 118 14.11 
News Agencies 15 11.27 24 8.24 19 4.61 58 6.93 
Official Reports & 
Data 
6 4.51 29 9.96 17 4.12 52 6.22 
Statements by 
Official Figures 
34 25.56 49 16.83 80 19.41 163 19.49 
Opposition Sources 5 3.75 55 18.90 123 29.85 183 21.88 
Eyewitnesses 40 30.07 54 18.55 77 18.68 171 20.45 
Archive 1 0.75 2 0.68 3 0.72 6 0.71 
Unidentified 
Sources 
1 0.75 7 2.40 13 3.15 21 2.51 
Sum 133 100 291 100 412 100 836 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
15.90% 34.80% 49.28% 100% 
 
   Table No. 1 exhibits the repetitions and rates of the Source Main Categories. The opposition 
sources had the highest percentage by 21.88%. Adopting the opposition sources by Al-Manar 
increased gradually from 2011 to 2013 by 3.75% in 2011, 18.90% in 2012 and 29.85% in 2013. 
The purpose of most of the contexts where Al-Manar recalled information from the opposition 
sources was emphasizing the Syrian government’s credibility concerning the criminality and 
brutality of the opposition, especially the armed one. This means proving the validity of the 
government’s propaganda through recalling the account and the documents of the government’s 
enemies.  
   Al-Manar, secondly, depended for its news on Eyewitnesses. The rates of this category are 
20.45% in the total sample, 30.07% in 2011, 18.55% in 2012 and 18.68% in 2013. A lot of the 
interviews with eyewitnesses were not done directly by Al-Manar. They were rather via the Syrian 
government’s channels. This gives the impression that Al-Manar is an extension of these channels. 
Depending on eyewitnesses can make the audience feel that the content of the news is real as 




attitudes, pain, suffering and hopes. Their simple language can affect the viewer more than the 
media discourse which is formulated in standard Arabic and in a professional, and sometimes, 
desiccated way that fails to address the viewer’s feelings.   
   Statements by Official Figures Category represented a rate of 19.49% in the total sample; 
25.56% in 2011, 16.83% in 2012 and 19.41% in 2013. The fourth in rank was the Media Category 
by 14.11% in the total sample, 17.29% in 2011, 19.58% in 2012 and 9.22% in 2013. Although Al-
Manar had reporters on the Syrian ground, the Channel Correspondents represented only 7.65% in 
the total sample, 6.01% in 2011, 4.81% in 2012 and 10.19% in 2013 because the correspondents 
increased the rate of their coverage of the government’s military activities. Al-Manar depended on 
correspondents in definite contexts such as covering the demonstrations which supported the 
regime and some government activities which aimed at treating the results of the Syrian crisis. 
These contexts were often optimistic and defensive in the face of the Syrian opposition’s 
propaganda. 
   The News Agencies Category made up the following rates: 6.93% in the total sample, 11.27% 
in 2011, 8.24% in 2012 and 4.61% in 2013. The rates of Official Reports & Data Category are: 
6.22% in the total sample, 4.51% in 2011, 9.96% in 2012 and 4.12% in 2013. Next to this category 
is Unidentified Sources whose rates are as follows: 2.51% in the total sample, 0.75% in 2011, 
2.40% in 2012 and 3.15% in2013. The archive rates accounted for the least category by 0.71% in 
the total sample, 0.75% in 2011, 0.68% in 2012 and 0.72% in 2013. Al-Manar’s reluctance to 




Table 1 – 1 
Channel 
Correspondents 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Full Presence in The 
Report 
5 62.5 8 57.14 29 69.04 42 65.62 
Partial Presence in 
The Report 
3 37.5 6 42.85 13 30.95 22 34.37 
Sum 8 100 14 100 42 100 64 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
12.5% 21.87% 65.62% 100% 
 
   This table deals with the repetitions and rates of the Channel Correspondents Category. The 
Full Presence in the Report was the highest by 65.62% in the total sample, 62.5% in2011, 57.14% 
in 2012 and 69.04% in 2013. This means that when Al-Manar depended on the correspondents, 
they covered all the details mentioned in the report. Partial Presence in the Report category made 




2013. This means that, although Al-Manar had correspondents in Syria, it depended on other 
sources to form the news structure.  
 
Table 1 – 2 
Media 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Syrian 12 52.17 47 82.45 27 71.05 86 72.88 
Arab 7 30.43 2 3.50 9 23.68 18 15.25 
International 4 17.39 8 14.03 2 5.26 14 11.86 
Sum 23 100 57 100 38 100 118 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
19.49% 48.30% 32.20% 100% 
 
   Table No. 1-2 demonstrates the repetitions and rates of Media Category where the Syrian 
media accounted for the highest rates by 72.88% in the total sample, 52.17% in 2011, 82.45% in 
2012 and 71.05% in 2013. The contexts when Al-Manar recalled information from the Syrian 
media were mostly motivated by confirming that there was a conspiracy against Syria which again 
proves that Al-Manar is an extension of the Syrian government channels. Al-Manar depended on 
the Arab media by 15.25% in the total sample, 30.43% in 2011, 3.50% in 2012 and 23.68% in 
2013.  The international media constituted the least rate by 11.86% in the total sample, 17.39% in 
2011, 14.03% in 2012 and 5.26% in 2013. Most of the contexts when Al-Manar recalled 
information from the international and Arab media aimed at confirming the government’s 
propaganda about conspiracy and terrorism.  
 
  
  This table demonstrates the repetitions and rates of the category of News Agencies. The Syrian 
Arab News Agency (SANA) made up the highest rate in the total sample by 63.79%, 93.33% in 
2011, 70.83% in 2012 and 31.57% in2013. Al-Manar depended on international agencies in 
contexts where the aim was mostly conforming the channel’s credibility through exposing 
different viewpoints or with the aim of proving the validity of the government’s propaganda 
Table 1 – 3 
News Agencies 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole 
Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Syrian 14 93.33 17 70.83 6 31.57 37 63.79 
Arab 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
International 1 6.66 7 29.16 13 68.42 21 36.20 
Sum 15 100 24 100 19 100 58 100 
The Whole Proportion of 
The Category 




through presenting information that agrees with this propaganda. Al-Manar depended on the Arab 
agencies by 0% in all the years. In this way, Al-Manar marginalized the role of the Arab agencies 
and considered SANA as a main source which represents the government’s propaganda while it 
considered the international agencies as a primary source in order to validate the credibility of the 
government’s propaganda. 
 
Table 1 – 4 
Official Reports & 
Data 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Syrian 5 83.33 15 51.72 10 58.82 30 57.69 
Arab 0 0 2 6.89 0 0 2 3.84 
International 1 16.66 12 41.37 7 41.17 20 38.46 
Sum 6 100 29 100 17 100 52 100 
The Whole Proportion of 
The Category 
11.53% 55.76% 32.69% 100% 
 
   Table No. 1-4 shows the repetitions and rates of the category of Official Reports & Data. The 
Syrian sources made up the highest rates by 57.69% in the total sample, 83.33% in 2011, 51.72% 
in 2012 and 58.82% in 2013. The international sources constituted the following rates: 38.46% in 
the total sample, 16.66% in 2011, 41.37% in 2012 and 41.17% 2013. The Arab sources accounted 
only for 3.84% in the total sample, 0% in 2011, 6.89% in 2012 and 0% in 2013. This again shows 
that Al-Manar marginalized the role of the Arab sources.  
 
Table 1 – 5 
Statements by 
Official Figures 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Syrian 28 82.35 32 65.30 69 86.25 129 79.14 
Arab 3 8.82 2 4.08 1 1.25 6 3.68 
International 3 8.82 15 30.61 10 12.5 28 17.17 
Sum 34 100 49 100 80 100 163 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
20.85% 30.06% 49.07% 100% 
 
   This table contains the repetitions and rates of the category of Statements by Official Figures. 
Also in this category, the Syrian sources made up the foremost rates by 79.14% in the total sample, 
82.35% in 2011, 65.30% in 2012 and 86.25% in 2013. The international figures represented the 
following rates: 17.17% in the total sample, 8.82% in 2011, 30.61% in 2012 and 12.5% in 2013. 
The Arab figures accounted only for 3.68% in the total sample, 8.82% in 2011, 4.08% in 2012 and 





Table 1 – 6 
Opposition Sources 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 




0 0 46 83.63 104 84.55 150 81.96 
Political & Military 
Figures 
4 80 9 16.36 19 15.44 32 17.48 
Sum 5 100 55 100 123 100 183 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
2.73% 30.05% 67.21% 100% 
 
   Table No. 1-6 shows the repetitions and rates of the category of Opposition Sources. Al-
Manar did not depend on Civilian Activists as a news source. This indicates the channel’s desire 
not to admit the existence of peaceful opposition. This category accounted only for 0.54% in the 
total sample, 20% in 2011 and 0% in 2012 and 2013. Organisations & Coordination Committees 
made up the highest rate in the total sample by 81.96%, 0% in 2011, 83.63% in 2012 and 84.55% 
in 2013. Most of the contexts in which these sources were recalled aimed at emphasizing the 
criminality and brutality of the armed opposition. Political & Military Figures constituted the 
following rates: 17.48% in the total sample, 80% in 2011, 16.36% in 2012 and 15.44% in 2013.Al-
Manar recalled the statements of these figures in several contexts the most prominent of which 
are: disparaging them and their role, showing the opposition as an unorganized movement and 
showing the leaders as outlaws and tools employed by the countries which are enemies of Syria. 
 
Table 1 – 7 
Eyewitnesses 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Identified  4 10 2 3.70 11 14.28 17 9.94 
Unidentified  36 90 52 96.29 66 85.71 154 90.05 
Sum 40 100 54 100 77 100 171 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
23.39% 31.57% 45.02% 100% 
 
   This table contains the repetitions and rates of the category of Eyewitnesses. Results exhibit 
that the channel was often uninterested in giving information about the eyewitnesses; the 
Unidentified Eyewitnesses Category represented the following rates: 90.05% in the total sample, 
90% in 2011, 96.29% in 2012 and 85.71% in 2013. Identified Eyewitnesses Category made up 




from mentioning information about the eyewitnesses may help make each one of them a public 
representative and spokesman of the Syrian people. Mentioning the information frames the identity 
of the eyewitness while avoiding that makes the eyewitness a public figure.      
 
   
 This table demonstrates the repetitions and rates of the category of Archive. Al-Manar used 
the video footages by 100% throughout the three studied years and did not use photos from the 
archive. This maintains the vitality of the news.   
 
      Table No. 1-9 shows the repetitions and rates of the category of Unidentified Sources. For 
example, Al-Manar would say: “Media stated”, “An official declared” or it would say: “According 
to reports” without giving any other information about them. Media & News Agencies accounted 
for the highest rates by 61.90% for the total sample, 100% in 2011, 57.14% in 2012 and 61.53% 
in 2013. Next is the Official Reports & Data Category where the rates are as follows: 33.33% in 
the total sample, 0% in 2011, 42.85% in 2012 and 30.76% in 2013. The category of Official 
Personalities represented the least rates by 4.76% in the total sample, 0% in 2011 and 2012 and 
7.69% in 2013. Not mentioning the source in an accurate way or mentioning it in the plural form 
such as “Agencies stated” may contribute to making the news real because several news agencies 
Table 1 – 8 
Archive 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion In 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Video 1 100 2 100 3 100 6 100 
Photograph 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 1 100 2 100 3 100 6 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
16.66% 33.33% 50% 100% 
Table 1 – 9 
Unidentified 
Sources 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Media & News 
Agencies 
1 100 4 57.14 8 61.53 13 61.90 
Official Reports & 
Data 
0 0 3 42.85 4 30.76 7 33.33 
Official 
Personalities  
0 0 0 0 1 7.69 1 4.76 
Sum 1 100 7 100 13 100 21 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 




or reports mentioned it. Not identifying the reference might also make the recipient free to imagine 
the identity of the source. 
 
2- The Source Orientation Category 
 
Table 2 
Source Trend  
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Pro-Government 111 83.45 197 67.69 242 58.73 550 65.78 
Anti-Government 14 10.52 72 24.74 144 34.95 230 27.51 
Neutral 8 6.01 22 7.56 26 6.31 56 6.69 
Sum 133 100 291 100 412 100 836 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
15.90% 34.80% 49.28% 100% 
 
   Table No. 2 exhibits the repetitions and rates of the category of Source Trend. The general 
orientation of most of the sources is the Pro-Government by 65.78% in the total sample, 83.45% 
in 2011, 67.69% in 2012 and 58.73% in 2013. The Anti-Government sources accounted for the 
27.51% in the total sample, 10.52% in 2011, 24.74% in 2012 and 34.95% in2013. The contexts 
where the Anti-Government sources were mentioned often aimed at stressing the credibility of the 
Syrian government’s propaganda. The Neutral Sources Category represented the following rates: 
6.69% in the total sample, 6.01% in 2011, 7.56% in 2012 and 6.31% in 2013. This indicates that 
the role of the neutral sources in the context of propaganda is unimportant for Al-Manar and is not 
considered an effective weapon equal to the strength of the role of opposition sources. 
 
3- The Topic Categories 
 
Table 3 – 1 
Public Movements 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Pro-Government 8 100 3 60 2 40 13 72.22 




0 0 2 40 3 60 5 27.77 
Sum 8 100 5 100 5 100 18 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 





   Table No. 3-1 includes the repetitions and rates of the category of Public Movements. Al-
Manar stressed the pro-government and pro-Assad processions which made up 72.22% in the total 
sample, 100% in 2011, 60% in 2012 and 40% in 2013. It also highlighted the movements of the 
Civilian Opposition Against Armed Opposition by 27.77% in the total sample, 0% in 2011, 40% 
in 2012 and 60% in 2013. This points out the desire of Al-Manar to show the opposition as 
belligerent and divided groups. The rates of the Anti-Government movements were 0% during the 
three studied years. Al-Manar completely denied the existence of a popular peaceful movement 
against the government and the president Assad. Denial would be considered a defensive technique 
in psychological war.  
 
 
   Table No. 3-2 shows the repetitions and rates of the Activities by The Conflicting Armed 
Sides. The category of Armed Opposition’s Activities accounted for the highest rates by 65.45% 
in the total sample, 74.69% in 2011, 64.65% in 2012 and 63.21% in 2013. The Regime’s Activities 
Category constituted the least rates by 34.54% in the total sample, 25.30% in 2011, 35.34% in 
2012 and 36.78% in 2013. This selectivity helps legalize the military reactions of the Syrian 
government as highlighting the actions of the armed groups helps to justify the government’s 
military actions so that the Syrian army seems facing armed gangs not peaceful opposition. 
 
Table 3 – 2 – 1 
Regime Activities  
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Against Civilians 0 0 0 0 1 1.04 1 0.50 
Against Militants 21 100 82 100 95 98.95 198 99.49 
Sum 21 100 82 100 96 100 199 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
10.55% 41.20% 48.24% 100% 
 
   Table No. 3-2-1 demonstrates the repetitions and rates of the Regime's Activities Category. 
Al-Manar presented the Syrian government’s military actions as ones only against armed gangs 
Table 3 – 2 
Activities by The 
Conflicting Armed 
Sides 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Regime´s Activities 21 25.30 82 35.34 96 36.78 199 34.54 
Armed Opposition´s 
Activities 
62 74.69 150 64.65 165 63.21 377 65.45 
Sum 83 100 232 100 261 100 576 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 




by the following rates: 99.49% in the total sample, 100% in 2011, 100% in 2012 and 98.95% in 
2013. Al-Manar only once mentioned an action of the government’s army against the civilians but 
the context in which this information was mentioned was reported by opponents of Assad and the 
motif behind it was disproving the opposition’s propaganda. 
 
Table 3 – 2 – 2 
Armed Opposition´s 
Activities 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Against Civilians 31 50 111 74 140 84.84 282 74.80 
Against The Regime 31 50 39 26 25 15.15 95 25.19 
Sum 62 100 150 100 165 100 377 100 
The Whole Proportion of 
The Category 
16.44% 39.78% 43.76% 100% 
 
   Table No.3-2-2 demonstrates the repetitions and rates of the Armed Opposition’s Activities 
Category. The Against Civilians Category accounted for the highest rates by 74.80% in the total 
sample, 50% in 2011, 74% in 2012 and 84.84% in 2013. The Against the Regime Category made 
up the least rates by 25.19% in the total sample, 50% in 2011, 26% in 2012 and 15.15% in 2013. 
This selectivity negates the popularity of the opposition and shows the armed people as enemies 
of the people. The contexts in which Al-Manar dealt with the activities of the armed opposition 
against the regime aimed at showing the government’s soldiers as victims of the armed people’s 
assaults or at talking about clashes between the government and the armed people and eventually 
at justifying all the military acts of the government’s army. 
 
Table 3 – 3 
The Consequences 
of The Conflict 
Between The 
Regime & The 
Opposition 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Deaths  31 60.78 61 77.21 69 74.19 161 72.19 
Wounded People 16 31.37 13 16.45 12 12.90 41 18.38 
Displacement and 
Refuge 
2 3.92 2 2.53 4 4.30 8 3.58 
Economic and 
Services Situation 
2 3.92 3 3.79 8 8.60 13 5.82 
Sum 51 100 79 100 93 100 223 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 





  Table No. 3-3 presents the repetitions and rates of the Consequences of the Conflict between 
the Regime & the Opposition. The Death Category constituted the highest rates by 72.19% in the 
total sample, 60.78% in 2011, 77.21% in 2012 and 74.19% in 2013. Secondly, Al-Manar stressed 
the Wounded People. The rates of this Category were 18.38% in the total sample, 31.37% in 2011, 
16.45% in 2012 and 12.90% in 2013. Economic and Services Situation Category made up the 
following rates: 5.82% in the total sample, 3.92 in 2011, 3.79% in 2012 and 8.60% in 2013. The 
rates of the Displacement and Refuge Category were the least by 3.58% in the total sample, 3.92% 
in 2011, 2.53% in 2012 and 4.30% in 2013. 
 
Table 3 – 3 – 1 
Deaths  
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Government´s Deaths, 
Civilian & Military 
23 74.19 36 59.01 33 47.82 92 57.14 
Opposition’s Deaths, 
Civilian & Military 
8 25.80 25 40.98 34 49.27 67 41.61 
Other Party’s Deaths 0 0 0 0 2 2.89 2 1.24 
Sum 31 100 61 100 69 100 161 100 
The Whole Proportion of 
The Category 
19.25% 37.88% 42.85% 100% 
 
   Table No. 3-3-1 shows the repetitions and rates of the Deaths Category. Government’s 
Deaths, Civilian & Military had the highest rates by 57.14% in the total sample, 74.19% in 2011, 
59.01% in 2012 and 47.82% in 2013. This indicates the desire of Al-Manar to present the 
government and its civilian and military supporters as victims; victimization discourse. However, 
the rates of the Opposition’s Deaths Civilian & Military Category were high by 41.61% in the total 
sample, 25.80% in 2011, 40.98% in 2012 and 49.27% in 2013. The contexts in which Al-Manar 
highlighted the opposition’s deaths often aimed either at proving the existence of armed people 
and eventually emphasizing the credibility of  the Syrian government’s propaganda about the truth 
that it was fighting armed groups or at raising the morale and proving that the government’s  army 
was militarily superior; heroism discourse. The Other Party’s Deaths Category constituted 1.24% 
in the total sample, 0% in 2011, and 2012 and 2.89% in 2013. Some of these dead people were 
opponents murdered by other opponents, which signifies the weakness of the opposition, others 









Table 3 – 3 – 2 
Wounded People 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Government’s 
Wounded People, 
Civilian & Military 
11 68.75 10 76.92 6 50 27 65.85 
Opposition’s 
Wounded People, 
Civilian & Military 
5 31.25 2 15.38 6 50 13 31.70 
Other Party’s 
Wounded People 
0 0 1 7.69 0 0 1 2.43 
Sum 16 100 13 100 12 100 41 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
39.02% 31.70% 29.26% 100% 
 
   Table No. 3-3-2 deals with the repetitions and rates of the Wounded People Category. Al-
Manar mainly highlighted the Government’s Wounded People, Civilian & Military by the 
following rates: 65.85% in the total sample, 68.75% in 2011, 76.92% in 2012 and 50% in 2013. 
The Opposition’s Wounded People, Civilian & Military Category included the following rates: 
31.70% in the total sample, 31.25% in 2011, 15.38% in 2012 and 50% in 2013. The Other Party’s 
Wounded People Category accounted for the least rates by 2.43% in the total sample, 0% in 2011, 
7.69% in 2012 and 0% in 2013. These wounded people were Kuwaiti officers who participated in 
the Arab League’s Observer Mission who came to Syria to study the field situation and to present 
reports about what was going on in Syria and about the opinions of the people. 
 
Table 3 – 3 – 3 
Displacement & 
Refuge  
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Internal 0 0 2 100 2 50 4 50 
Abroad 2 100 0 0 2 50 4 50 
Unspecified  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 2 100 2 100 4 100 8 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
25% 25% 50% 100% 
 
   Table No. 3-3-3 exhibits the repetitions and rates of Displacement & Refuge Category. The 
rates of internal displacement were: 50% in the total sample, 0% in 2011, 100% in 2012 and 50% 
in 2013. The rates of external refuge were as follows: 50% in the total sample, 100% in 2011, 0% 
in 2012 and 50% in 2013. The rate of Unspecified Displacement & Refuge Category was 0% in 




which Al-Manar talked about displacement and refuge are going to be studied in detail in the 
qualitative analysis of Al-Manar’s sample. 
 
Table 3 – 3 – 4 
Economic & 
Services Situation 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Good 2 100 3 100 2 25 7 53.84 
Medium 0 0 0 0 3 37.5 3 23.07 
Bad 0 0 0 0 3 37.5 3 23.07 
Sum 2 100 3 100 8 100 13 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
15.38% 23.07% 61.53% 100% 
 
   Table No. 3-3-4 includes the repetitions and rates of Economic and Services Situation 
Category. In 2011 and 2012, Al-Manar presented the situation in Syria as 100% Good. In 2013 the 
results changed so that the Good Category became 25%. The Medium Category made up 37.5%. 
The same applies to the Bad Category by 37.5%. The rates of the categories were Good by 53.84%, 
Medium by 23.07% and Bad by 23.07%. Al-Manar attempted to alleviate the effects of the events 
and the news on the recipients through resorting to the technique of euphemism. 
 




2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Video 10 76.92 30 75 71 68.26 111 70.70 
Infographic 2 15.38 9 22.5 23 22.11 34 21.65 
Photograph 1 7.69 1 2.5 10 9.61 12 7.64 
Sum 13 100 40 100 104 100 157 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
8.28% 25.47% 66.24% 100% 
 
   Table No. 4 is specified for the Visual Content Category. Al-Manar majorly depended on 
videos by 70.70% in the total sample, 76.92% in 2011, 75% in 2012 and 68.26% in 2013. The 
channel also used Infographic to build the news content. The rates of this category were 21.65% 
in the total sample, 15.38% in 2011, 22.5% in 2012 and 22.11% in 2013. The Photograph Category 
constituted 7.64% in the total sample, 7.69% in 2011, 2.5% in 2012 and 9.61 % in 2013. Videos 
make the news more realistic than photographs and infographic. One of the propaganda’s 




the feelings of the recipient as strongly as the videos which contain scenes and shots taken from 
reality and able to entice and motivate the recipient. 
5-  Displaying Voices Included in The Videos Category 
 
Table 5 
Display The Voices 
That The Videos 
Contain 
2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Complete Display 2 20 4 12.90 3 4.22 9 8.03 
Partial Display 1 10 11 35.48 12 16.90 24 21.42 
Incidental Display & 
Muting the Voice 
7 70 16 51.61 56 78.87 79 70.53 
Sum 10 100 31 100 71 100 112 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
8.92% 27.67% 63.39% 100% 
 
   Table No. 5 exposes the repetitions and rates of the category of Displaying Voices Included 
in the Videos. The Incidental Display & Muting the Voice Category made up the highest rates by 
70.53% in the total sample, 70% in 2011, 51.61% in 2012 and 78.87% in 2013. This indicates the 
desire of Al-Manar to alleviate the effects of the news on the recipient; Euphemism Technique. 
The Partial Display category constituted the following rates: 21.42% in the total sample, 10% in 
2011, 35.48% in 2012 and 16.90% in 2013. The Complete Display Category represented the least 
rates by 8.03% in the total sample, 20% in 2011, 12.90% in 2012 and 4.22% in 2013. Most of the 
contexts in which Al-Manar depended on Complete Display were those which support the 
government’s propaganda such as showing processions supporting Assad in sound and image, 
displaying the assaults held by the armed opposition against the pro-government civilians and 
military personnel, or presenting the government military acts, audio and video where the army 




















2011 2012 2013 
The Proportion in 
The Whole Sample 
Fre % Fre % Fre % Fre % 
Pro-Government 26 100 43 100 71 100 140 100 
Anti- Government 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Neutral 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sum 26 100 43 100 71 100 140 100 
The Whole 
Proportion of The 
Category 
18.57% 30.71% 50.71% 100% 
 
   Table No. 6 is specified for the repetitions and rates of the Content Trend category. The 
content of the news reports was 100% pro-government during the three studied years. Al- Manar’s 




Graphical Representation of the Analysis Results of the Whole Samples of 
the Two Channels 
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Semiotic Analysis of Al-Jazeera Channel's Sample 
 
The verbal and non-verbal signifiers have been extracted and classified in accordance with their 
topics. The first step is classifying the signifiers in the areas of the following main topics: the 
demonstrations supporting and opposing Al-Assad and the government, the image of president 
Assad as it has been presented by Al-Jazeera, the image of the government security and military 
forces, the image of the armed opposition; the conflict outcomes, and the image of ethnics and 
sects that have been highlighted by media. Next, the main topics have been divided into sub-topics. 
For instance, all the signifiers which deal with the pro-Assad processions (as a main topic) have 
been extracted, then they were pigeonholed into sub-topics such as the purpose of demonstrating, 
the slogans, the numbers of demonstrators, the places, and the Interviews with the demonstrators, 
taking into consideration the significances of age, gender, clothes and other signs. 
 
The classification can be also considered as one of the research results because each sub-
heading in the semiotic analysis represents an outcome that contains signifiers which tackle one 
topic. The interrelation between the two levels of significance, the denotative and connotative, has 
been taken into consideration. First, the analysis depends on general description where the 
signifiers are put into their general contexts, then they are studied one by one. Each signifier 
requires independent explanation; therefore, I have not put them in tabulated groups. I have, rather, 
put them in a descriptive-analytical frame to facilitate explanation and understanding. The value 
of some signifiers is connected to the historical context which they evoke, others need analyzing 
the linguistic structure, while some others derive their value from their relation to religious or 
customary values predominant in the recipient’s environment. I consider the contexts, in which 
some signs are put, signifiers in themselves. These contexts are essential to uncover the 
mechanisms of spreading propaganda and those of psychological war and manipulating the 
recipient. Therefore, it is necessary to study the contexts of mentioning the sources, those of 
sentimental enticements, those of historical recalls, those of employing the characteristics of 
Arabic language, those of adopting images, and those of spotlighting and obfuscating. The 
significances of contexts and meanings of signs help us recognize the identity of the targeted 
recipient of messages. Analyzing the significances of media personnel’s voice tone is considered 













Al-Jazeera introduced the popular movement in Syria as an uprising which is not different from 
what swept across other Arab countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, whether in mobility or in 
targets, which means that the movement aims at overthrowing the regime and that the movement 
is peaceful. Expressing that movement, the Channel employed a group of rhetorical terms: 
"Protests spark"39 A metonymy referring to the start of the uprising; the spark is the start of the 
fire outbreak. "Protests outbreak or demonstrations outbreak"40 is a metaphor that the revolution 
is so hot and scorching that it will burn the regime. "The winds of change which are striking the 
region have blown"41 is a sign that the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt have affected the Syrian 
people leading them to uprise. The blowing of winds generally has a negative meaning. The wind 
destroys. The human heart receives it with a deep psychological tremble. It carries the devastation 
that terrifies the souls. "The wind of change has blown"42, that is the popular movement is going 
to uproot the regime as the wind uproots a tree. Al-Jazeera in these examples borrowed the 
destructive side from nature (fire, windstorm) to describe an event which it considers as 
revolutionary positive. The signifiers which represent destructive factors became positive ones as 
they were linked to a “positive topic”. 
"The popular rage"43, "The growth of the popular rage"44 is a sign to the impatience of the 
people as a result of the regime's actions which has lasted for long years and has become more 
severe since the beginning of the events in 2011. "A popular revolution" (7 times), "Popular 
demonstrations" (4 times) denote that the overthrowing of the regime is the demand of all the 
Syrians. "The freedom revolution"45 is a sign that the Syrians have been fed up with the chains 
imposed by the regime and that they yearn for liberation. The term “Freedom” is considered a 
glittering generality. "A new phase of struggle"46 denotes that the popular movement is made up 
of a group of stages including demonstrating in the streets, picketing, strikes, and civil 
disobedience. 
 
   In order to describe the demonstrators, Al-Jazeera used  a group of adjectives: "the 
revolutionaries" (8 times), "the outraged" (3 times), "the activists" (93 times), "the people yearning 
                                                             
39 25 March 2011, 27 May 2011. "شرارة االحتجاجات" 
I cite in the footnotes the reports' dates only; more details about the reports are in the index that exists at the end of this chapter.  
40 03 May 2011, 14 October 2011, 05 April 2013. "اندالع االحتجاجات أو اندالع المظاهرات" 
41 25 March 2011.   "هبّت رياح التغيير التي تعصف بالمنطقة" 
42 23 March 2011. 29 March 2011. "عصفت رياح التغيير" 
43 04 June 2011, 24 July 2011. "الغضب الشعبي" 
44 24 July 2011. "تنامي الغضب الشعبي" 
45 25 October 2011, 2 November 2011.  "ثورة الحرية" 




for freedom"47, "the rebels" (41 times), "the revolutionary Syrian street"48, "the Syrian 
revolutionary youth"49. All these descriptions indirectly refer to the position of Al-Jazeera towards 
the opposition. The term “Revolutionary” or “Rebel”, apart from its lexical indications, is a 
positive signifier in the Arab culture; “Revolutionary” is an Arab name because of its important 
meaning in the Arab history.  
 
2- The Peacefulness of the Revolution 
 
The popular movement appeared on Al-Jazeera Channel as a peaceful revolution. The 
protestors are seeking a democratic change without resorting to violence. Al-Jazeera's emphasis 
on this idea has a connotation that the regime is using the guns of its soldiers in the face of peaceful 
protestors who are not armed and who do not want to use arms. The rebels stick to the peacefulness 
of their revolution (20 times). The emphasis on this peacefulness encompasses propaganda to 
confront the regime's propaganda that shows the protestors as young people who are law-breakers, 
terrorists and criminals who carry arms to terrorize the security and the civilians simultaneously.  
The revolutionaries appear during their demonstrations swearing to preserve the peacefulness 
of the revolution, which is a sign of the validity of the opponents. They swear by the Almighty 
God and those who swear have to be loyal to their commitment. 
 
   "A peaceful revolution whose stem and branches have become more massive and which 
refuses to shrink back."50 The Channel assimilated the revolution to a tree whose branches were 
soft and thin, that is it could have been killed by the weather conditions, but now it is strong and 
can never be broken, can never be beaten. In this example, we notice that Al-Jazeera borrowed a 
“peaceful being” from nature (the tree) which is contrary to the previous examples (wind and fire). 
In this way, the channel gave two contrasting mental images to the same event. On the one hand 
the revolution seems as a devastative hurricane and a burning fire, on the other hand it looks as a 
peaceful tree and a symbol of blossoming.  
 
3- The Popular Demands 
 
During the beginning of the events, that is from the middle of March and during April 2011, 
Al-Jazeera concentrated on a group of popular demands which can be summarized in social and 
political reform and improving the living standards, eliminating the phenomenon of corruption, 
media and political freedom, and ending the emergency law, Al-Jazeera introduced these demands 
as accumulated for long years, denoting that the people are exhausted with the unwillingness of 
the regime to respond. The people were for long exhausted due to the corruption which Al-Jazeera 
assimilated to cancer that should be eradicated. 
                                                             
47 04 October 2011.  "الثائرون"، "الغاضبون"، "الناشطون"، "التواقون إلى الحرية" 
48 12 September 2011. "الشارع السوري الثائر" 
49 12 September 2011.  "شباب سوريا الثائر" 




The repeal of Emergency Law was one of the demands. Al-Jazeera pointed out that many 
generations have been born and grown up under this law51.  This is an implicit message that the 
Emergency Law in Syria was not an exceptional system which the government announces in order 
to face emergent and extraordinary situations in the country or in part of it. It is rather a permanent 
system or a continual situation that imposes chains on the freedom of individuals. It allows 
assaulting them to allegedly protect the internal security. 
 
When the demands of the people had not yet suggested that the people wanted the fall of the 
regime, and when the government was sending delegations to listen to the demands of the people, 
Al-Jazeera undermined the reaction of the regime through which it was trying to show its positive 
response to the demands of the revolutionaries. Al-Jazeera rather concentrated its critical media 
discourse on the idea that the regime was too late to start the reformation indicating that the die 
was cast and that the regime could no more solve its problems in the way it did in Hama52, which 
was an implicit message that killing was the only way the regime resorted to solve its problems. 
"Some people have gone so far in their ambition that they called for the disbandment of the 
current security apparatus and restructuring it."53 This is a message through which the Channel 
wants to convey an idea that the Syrian people never dared to imagine to defy or face the Syrian 
Security, whereas now they are doing. The phrase "The current security apparatus" involves a 
sectarian sign that the majority of this Security is made up of the Alawite sect54. Therefore, the 
people want it to be restructured. 
 
Little by little the nature of the wishes of the people changed to ask for the end of the besiege 
of Daraa55  and denounce the violence of the security apparatus against the protesters. The crack 
between the people and the regime has begun to become mature in media. Late in April 2011, Al-
Jazeera concentrated on the demand of overthrowing the regime (14 times). Assuring in its 
discourse that the people would only be satisfied by the "departure of the regime" (7 times), "the 
departure of Bashar Al-Assad" (7 times).  
 
"Bringing glory back to Syria."56 This is an implicit message which suggests that the ruling 
regime has brought destruction to Syria and put an end to its dignity and high profile among 
nations. 
"Trying the president"57, "Executing the president" (4 times), two demands which Al-Jazeera 
mentioned in a way that suggested that the time of fear of Al-Assads had gone away in Syria.  
Before the popular movement, it was impossible to criticize the president or verbally degrade him. 
                                                             
51 23 March 2011. 
52 In 1982, the regime waged a military campaign against the Muslim Brothers in Hama and killed thousands of them. The regime opponents call this campaign as Hama Massacre.  
53 30 March 2011. "ذهب البعض في طموحه إلى الدعوة لحل الجهاز األمني الحالي و إعادة تشكيله" 
54 A branch of Islam, Alawi Islam, who follow the Twelver school of Shia Islam. Assad belongs to this sect. 
55 The beginning of the protesting movement was in Daraa Governorate and when these protests expanded in rang, the security forces cordoned it and besieged the city.  
56 07 December 2011. "إعادة المجد إلى سوريا" 




However, emphasizing these two demands in media is a signifier that the people want to avenge 
from the person who oppressively ruled them for long years. It is high time they had stood against 
injustice and taken revenge from him.  
 
Al-Jazeera explicitly conveyed a message to the audience that the slogans demanding 
reformation entirely disappeared from the demonstrations and that they were replaced by the 
slogans that demanded not only the fall of the president but also his execution. This urges the 
demonstrators not to accept any negotiation or debate with the regime. 
"Arming the Free Army"58 Al-Jazeera did not take a direct attitude towards this demand. That 
is, it did not use utterances suggesting that it wished this demand to be realized, but the tone of the 
media people suggested that the Channel encouraged the idea of arming the armed opposition. 
 
In 2013, the demonstrations disappeared from the screen of Al-Jazeera but the Channel assured 
that they were still occurring and that they were intermittent only due to the continual severe 
bombarding. The most prominent demands in 2013 were ending the besiege of some of the 
besieged cities by the regime's troops and allowing the humanitarian aids to enter these cities. 
 
4- The Demonstrators' Slogans 
 
"The people want freedom only"59 means that the freedom is the only demand of the people; 
any other solution is unacceptable. "We sacrifice our soul and blood for you, Daraa! "60 that is the 
people are ready to sacrifice themselves for the safety of Daraa, the city which is suffering from 
the regime's military and security men's assault. This slogan bears a sign that suggests great rebel 
and defiance against the slogan the people voluntarily or forcibly reiterated for long years: "We 
sacrifice our soul and blood for you, Hafez!", then " We sacrifice our soul and blood for you, 
Bashar!" which meant that blood and souls are sacrificed for the sake of the leader and that death 
is nothing for the sake of the safety of the leader. 
 
"Death rather than Humiliation" (6 times), which means that people prefer death to living in 
humiliation and insult. "The Syrian people can never be humiliated"61, that is Syrians do have 
dignity and pride and no force in the world can plunder their self-dignity.  
"We aren't afraid; the army is with us."62 The Channel raised this slogan to convey the message 
that the people are optimistic about the Syrian soldiers. These soldiers will by no means obey the 
orders of their commanders to shoot civilians. This slogan was highlighted when Al-Jazeera was 
propagandizing desertions from the Syrian army.  
                                                             
58 25 May 2012. "تسليح الجيش الحر" 
59 02 April 2011. Twice.  "الشعب يريد حرية و بس" 
60  02 April 2011, 03 May 2011. 3 times.  "بالروح بالدم نفديك يا درعا" 
61 27 November 2011.  "الموت و ال المذلة". "الشعب السوري ما بينذل" 




"Ours is a revolution of the young, neither fundamentalist nor terrorist."63 The Channel 
concentrated on this slogan as a defensive reaction on the regime's attack propagandizing the idea 
that there is no popular revolution. There is rather fundamentalist and terrorist movements seeking 
sabotage and disturbing the national security. 
 
"The people want the fall of the regime64" (17times). This is a slogan which intends to state that 
the will of all the Syrians is destroying and knocking the ruling authority down. "This night won't 
last forever" a slogan which contains a message of hope. No matter how long and dark the night 
is, it will be followed by the new dawn. In other words, the injustice of the regime will come to an 
end, and the sun of justice, freedom and safety will rise again. 
 
"No learning, no teaching, until the fall of the president."65 That is, the protesters will stop all 
activities and stay in the squares of demonstration until the end of the rule of the president, a 
message on the insistence on the attitude. 
 
"We aren't afraid; God is on our side"66 is an indication of faith and confidence in God. This is 
a message that implicitly bears emotional and religious Inducements. It is emotional because it 
states that the regimes crackdown is very powerful and that there is no fear despite death being 
everywhere, and religious because it spreads confidence that God supports the vulnerable who 
have confidence in Him and, therefore, they will be victorious. 
 
"Martyrs' blood can't be sold. Leave, Bashar, leave!"67 means insisting on bringing an end to 
the rule of the president Bashar. Those who were killed by the security personnel's bullets are 
considered martyrs, that is martyrs who are immortal in God's paradise. So, their blood is not 
cheap, and its price cannot be negotiating the murderer and accepting any solution but the fall of 
the regime. 
 
"You have Baathists, President! We have freedom, President! And you have Shabbiha. "68 This 
slogan has a sense of mockery. Oh President! You have a corrupt group of supporters who abuse 
the homeland. Whereas we have good free people who are able to build the country. The opposition 
wants to state that the Baath Party69 activists are only a handful of supporters who sabotage the 
country through their corruption and that the President is using non-government illegal armed 
groups (Shabbiha) in order to control the homeland under his fist.   
 
                                                             
63 28 April 2011. "ثورتنا ثورة شباب ال سلفية و ال إرهاب" 
   "الشعب يريد إسقاط النظام"  64
65 04 June 2011. "ال دراسة و ال تدريس حتى يسقط الرئيس" 
66 20 June 2011. "مو خايفين هللا معنا" 
67 07 July 2011. " دم الشهدا ما بينباع ، يا بشار اطالع اطالع" 
68 24 July 2011. "عندك بعثية ياريّ س، عنا الحرية ياريّس  و عندك شبيحة" 




"Syria wants freedom."70 Here the word 'Syria' refers, on one hand, to comprehensiveness, that 
is, all the Syrian people want to emancipate from the cuffs of the regime. On the other hand, Syria71 
appears as a chained imprisoned girl who longs for emancipation from the oppression of her jailer. 
 
"And we want rid of you, Bashar!"72, "Come on, leave, Bashar!73", "Listen to the words of the 
revolutionaries and leave, Bashar!"74 are slogans of direct defiance through which they emphasize 
that they intend to overthrow the president, that he has to listen to their demand and leave at once. 
This is a big verbal defiance which was impossible to take place before the start of the popular 
movement. Publicizing these slogans by the media suggests that the whole world should see the 
collapse of the mental image of the powerful tyrant ruler. 
 
"Victory, victory, nothing but victory."75 This is an indication of the inevitability of the victory 
of the opposition and the defeat of the regime. Victory is the aim and the end. The revolutionaries 
will not accept defeat. They will not accept any solution with the regime. 
 
5- The Islamization of the Revolution 
 
Since March 2011, the beginning of the revolutionary events in Syria, the Channel, on purpose 
or not, has given the revolution an Islamic character. Since the start, Al- Jazeera's implicit 
messages have suggested that the fight of the regime with the people has been a sectarian one.  
"The scream has risen around Al-Omari Mosque."76 What is meant by the scream is the voice 
of the frightened terrified people by the shooting of the security personnel. The mosque has been 
mentioned as a place around which the events take place. This is an implicit message that these 
oppressed people belong to the Sunni sect. "The mosque which has become the fort of the 
protesters."77 This means that the mosque is the only shelter and citadel that protects the 
demonstrators. Al-Jazeera highlighted that crowds of worshipers organize or hold pickets in the 
mosques. This means that these religious centers have turned into points for organizing and 
managing the popular movement. It also showed thousands of people demonstrating in the streets 
after Friday or Al-Taraweeh78 prayers. "From Al-Rifa'ee Mosque, the worshipers came out after 
performing Friday´s prayer."79. This statement contains a connection between performing the 
religious duty which is the prayer and coming out for the revolution against the oppressing ruler. 
It also contains another implicit message stating that the rebels are pious people who continually 
                                                             
70 04 October 2011. Twice. "سوريا بدها حرية"  
71 The word 'Syria' is feminine in Arabic Language.  
72 04 October 2011. "و بدنا نشيلك يا بشار" 
73 04 July 2011, 07 July 2011, 14 October 2011. "يا هللا إرحل يا بشار" 
74 07 November 2011. "اسمع كالم الثوار و ارحل يا بشار" 
75 03 April 2012. "النصر النصر ال شيء غيرالنصر" 
76 23 March 2011.  "تعالت الصرخة في محيط المسجد العمري" 
77 23 March 2011. "الجامع الذي بات معِقل المحتجين" 
78 A prayer performed every night during the month of Ramadan. It continues nearly until Al-Fajr prayer at dawn. 




perform their religious rites. This gives the revolution more credibility and ability of affecting the 




Demonstrations against Assad inside a mosque.80 
 
The Channel showed the rebels as pious people who were confident in God through scenes in 
which the protestors read holy verses from the holy Quran or performed prayers asking for help 
from God. It also portrayed that their only weapons were worship and prayers. This is, on the one 
hand, an indication that their only power is the help from God. On the other hand, they are not 
armed law-breakers as the Syrian government claims. One of the protestors' prayers was: "Oh 
Allah! you destroy and are not destroyed, and those whom you support will never be humiliated"81, 
a sign of their confidence in God. Nobody can humiliate them as their loyalty to God protects them 
from all evils. Moreover, Bashar Al-Assad can by no means conquer God as He destroys and 
cannot be destroyed. Al-Jazeera pointed out that reading verses from the Quran on the spirits of 
the martyrs murdered by the regime's forces makes the people feel tranquil and satisfied with God's 
predestination.  
The Channel drew the audience's attention to the verse raised by the protesters:  "If you support 
Allah, He will support you."82 This is a message from Al-Jazeera which emphasizes that the 
revolution is an aid to God and that those who aid God and the religion of God will be victorious 
by the help of God. This means that the revolution will certainly be victorious. 
 
The Channel pointed out that the celebrations of the Eid were postponed till another notice. 
Now the ritual of their daily life was assembling in the streets to reiterate the slogans of freedom 
and change. What is meant by the word Eid are Eid Al-Fitr and Eid Al-Adha83. This is a sign of 
stopping the feelings of joy and stopping this ritual (the Eid), which is closely connected to Islamic 
belief, until they have realized their aims of demonstrating. Assembling in the streets and 
                                                             
80 29 March 2011 
81 05 August 2011. "يا هللا، إنك تقضي و ال يقضى عليك، إنه ال يذل من واليت " 
82 This statement is a Quran verse, Chapter of Muhammad, verse No. 7. "إن تنصروا هللا ينصركم" 
83 Eid Al-Fitr is the first celebration day for Muslims on the first day of the month of Shawal. It occurs after the fasting month of Ramadan. Eid Al-Adha is the second celebration 
day for Muslims. It takes place on the tenth day of Zul-Hijjah. This Eid is considered an anniversary of the story of the Prophet Ibrahim, who wanted to sacrifice his son Ismail to 




reiterating the slogans of freedom has become a holy ritual that substitutes the religious ones. "The 
revolutionaries know that the street will remain their Kiblah until the day of changing the regime 
comes."84Al-Jazeera has likened the street to Kiblah85. Coming out to the street to demonstrate is 
a religious duty like Haj and like facing the Kiblah to pray. 
 
Al-Jazeera pointed out statements which the demonstrators iterated in some of their 
demonstrations. "When comes the Victory of Allah, and Conquest"86, that is to say that the fall of 
the regime and the victory of the opposition are a victory to God and His religion. Conquest has 
political, economic and psychological signs. The political ones are represented in the Muslim army 
controlling non-Islamic (disbelieving) nations and countries in order to spread Islam which is the 
pretext why occupation is called conquest. The economic signs are centered around the conqueror 
getting the spoils and Al-Jizya money87from the peoples of the countries which have been 
subjugated to Islam. As for the psychological signs, Muslims believe that the Earth shall be 
inherited by the good servants of Allah. Mentioning this verse by the demonstrators indicates that 
they feel that Syria is a non-Islamic country– as its leader belongs to the Alawite sect who are 
considered disbelievers by the opposition. Moreover, this verse indicates their wish to have Syria 
subjected to the Islamic rule and to enforce Al-Jizya system on the minorities who refuse to become 
Muslims.  
 
Al-Jazeera repeatedly showed the people shouting out: "God is the Greatest, God is the 
Greatest" in their demonstrations or saying: "O my Lord, Here I am at Your service." That is, the 
revolution is a holy movement intending to meet the call of God and to obey his orders88. 
"Our master Muhammad is our leader forever."89 This statement is one of the opposition's 
slogans which Al-Jazeera pointed out in reply to president Bashar who mocked the popular 
movement and underestimated it when he said that the revolution lacks thinkers and wondered 
where the thinker was and who knows a thinker for this revolution. He assured that revolutions 
need leaders, and wondered if anybody knew who the leader of this revolution was. The Channel 
pointed out that the leader of the revolutionaries was the Prophet Muhammad, that is, the Islamic 
message and that he would remain their leader forever. This is an alteration in the slogan which 
the Syrian people had reiterated for long years: "Forever, forever, Oh Hafez Al-Assad.90" 
 
                                                             
84 07 November 2011. "أما الثائرون فيعرفون أن الشارع سيظل قبلتهم إلى أن يأت يوم تغيير نظام الحكم" 
85 Al-Kaabah in Mecca is considered the Muslims Kiblah. They direct their faces towards it during their prayers. They circumambulate it during the Hajj. Muslims consider it the 
holiest place on Earth. 
86 Verse No.1 in the Alnasr (Victory) Chapter in the Quran. "إذا جاء نصر هللا و الفتح" 
87 Al-Jizya or the tribute is an amount of money imposed on sects which cannot be plundered like Christians and Jews and all those who are followers of a religion other than 
Islam. 
88 Linguistically, (to meet) means to respond to or answer the call or orders. "O my Lord, Here I am at your service" is a statement that the performers of Hajj reiterate. It means 
obedience, worship and following the orders of God.  
89 25 January 2013. "قائدنا لألبد سيدنا محمد" 




"We aren’t frightened of death; we are the grandchildren of Ibn Al-Waleed."91. The 
demonstrators appeared on the screen of Al-Jazeera reiterating this statement. It is an implicit 
message that they are fighting the enemy of God. They are the grandchildren of The Drawn Sword 
of God92. In other words, their revolution is one whose aim is to bring victory to the religion of 
God. Therefore, they are not afraid of death. 
 
"There is no god but God, and the martyr is God's beloved."93, "There is no god but God and 
Assad is the enemy of God"94. The demonstrators have chosen the Islamic Shahada95 : There is no 
god but God. Muhammad is the messenger of God; kept the first part, and changed the words of 
the second part to make the martyr, that is the person killed by regime, God's beloved, and to make 
Al-Assad the enemy of God. This is an indication which assures the legitimacy of fighting against 
the president as he is the enemy of God and as those who resist this regime will by no means lose 
because even if they are killed, their destination is paradise and the approval of God as they are 
martyrs. 
 
During its first months, the popular movement was linked on Al-Jazeera screen to Fridays96 and 
Friday is a sacred day for Muslims. Demonstrations were on Fridays. This is an implicit message 
that Sunnis were the nerve of this revolution. "The raging people wait for Friday after the other"97 
that is, demonstrations start every Friday after offering the prayers. 
"The same scene is repeated" (3 times), that is, the way demonstrators come out of the mosques, 
their picketing inside the mosques, and their cheers are repeated in more than one town on the 
Syrian land. This is an indication of the unity of the Syrian revolutionary scene. 
 
6- Continuation of Demonstrations 
 
Al-Jazeera showed the demonstrations as a wave of movement that never stops day and night. 
"Protests that have never stopped since Friday."98, "two weeks have elapsed while the raging 
protesters have been trying to come out in groups to the streets, the mosques and the public 
squares.", "The Syrian street is continuing the movement until the demands have been realized."99 
This continuity is an indication of steadfastness and defiance, "The protesting movement tirelessly 
                                                             
91 18 November 2011. "ما منهاب الموت، أحفاد ابن الوليد" 
92 Khalid Ibn Al-Waleed, a companion of the prophet Muhammad. He was a military Leader and the Prophet called him The Drawn Sword of Allah. He fought numerous battles 
for Islamic purposes.  
93 18 November 2011. "ال إله إإل هللا و الشهيد حبيب هللا" 
94 06 January 2012.  "ال إله إال هللا  واألسد عدو هللا" 
95 The Islamic Shahada: `There is no god but God. Muhammad is the messenger of God' is considered the first pillar of Islam. The one who does not recite it is not considered a 
Muslim. Muslims believe that one cannot become Muslim until the recitation of the Shahada. Through the recitation of the Shahada, one admits and testifies that there is no god but 
the one God and that the prophet Muhammad is a messenger sent by God to guide humanity.  
96 Friday – Al-Jumaa- is a day of great importance for Muslims. It has a special prayer. one of the Surahs of the Quran is named after it. According to the prophet's Sunna it is 
considered the master of all days.  On it, Adam was created and was entered into Paradise and sent out of it. Moreover, Judgment Day will take place only on Friday. 
97 24 July 2011. "الغاضبون ينتظرون الجمعة تلو األخرى" 
98 23 March 2011.  "احتجاجات ال تتوقف منذ يوم الجمعة" 




continues"100, that is, the regime's unresponsiveness to the demands has not lessen the vitality of 
the revolution. "The momentum of the demonstrations is spreading to link day with night over the 
whole week."101 As if the street became the house of the Syrians and all their lives became 
demonstrations. 
 
"The popular rage in Syria knows no regression"102, "Demonstrations continue"103, "The throats 
never stop"104, these are signs that Syria is echoing the shouts of the revolutionaries day and night 
with throats that never get tired or bored. "Protesting is still the language of the street."105Al-
Jazeera has likened the street to a human being who speaks a language, which is an indication that 
all the people have become one body and one spirit that speak the same language which is the 
language of the revolution against the ruling regime. 
 
7- The Geographic Comprehensiveness 
 
Al-Jazeera assured that the popular movement included all the Syrian cities, governorates, and 
even the narrow lanes in the streets. "The wind of change has shaken cities in the south, middle 
and even coast of the country."106, "the fast tempo of the protests has vertically continued marching 
ahead towards the middle of the country and has reached Homs."107The Channel portrayed the 
demonstrations like a flood flowing everywhere. It mentioned numerous names of districts, 
governorates, small towns, small villages and even such tiny countryside areas that the Syrian 
citizen might have never heard of before. It might sometimes mention 15 names of cities and 
villages non-stop. This fast and condensed account of the names of areas by Al-Jazeera's media 
personnel suggested that Syria was burning with demonstrations in every neighborhood and every 
hand span of the Syrian land. "Their shout is one and it echoed across many Syrian cities and 









                                                             
100   03 May 2011.  "دون كلل تتواصل الحركة االحتجاجية" 
101 03 May 2011. "يمتد زخم المظاهرات ليصل النهار بالليل و على مدار األسبوع"  
102 04 June 2011. "ال يعرف الغضب الشعبي في سوريا انكفاءا" 
103 04 October 2011. "تواصل التظاهر" 
104 04 October 2011. "ال تتوقف الحناجر" 
105 25 October 2011."ال يزال االحتجاج لغة الشارع" 
106 25 March 2011." رياح التغيير هّزت مدن في جنوب البالد و وسطها و حتى ساحلها" 
107 25 March 2011. "واصل زخم االحتجاجات تقدمه عموديا باتجاه وسط البالد ووصل إلى حمص" 






Demonstrations which are presented as crowded.109 
 
 
8- Sectarian Comprehensiveness  
 
Al-Jazeera reassured that those who came out into the streets represented different political, 
religious, sectarian and social spectrums. This was a reply to the regime's propaganda which 
popularized the fear of a sectarian and doctrinal separation in the country and accused the 
extremists of standing behind the events in Syria. The discourse of the Channel assured the unity 
of the Syrian people. It also assured that the revolutionaries refused any mentioning of a doctrinal 
struggle because the problem was between the people and the regime not among the different slices 
of the people. In the eyes of the revolutionaries, the regime would not hesitate to resort to all 
method through which it may drag the revolution into difficult access ways which end in sectarian 
fighting where the regime itself would take the role of the judge and the savior. The Channel 
highlighted that the revolutionaries were aware of the plans of the regime and that the revolution 
was going ahead towards the dawn of its spring even if all Arabs and West failed it110. 
 
"Freedom, freedom. Muslims, Christians, Druze and Alawites."111 In this slogan, freedom 
appears as a demand of not only the Sunni sect, but also of all the sects of the people. However, if 
we analyze the religious sects mentioned in the slogan, we find that the demonstrators have 
considered the Druze and Alawites112as non-Muslim sects which are independent from Islam. This 
reflects the fact of the way many Sunnis view the other Islamic minorities. 
                                                             
109 29 March 2011. 
110 27 September 2011.  
111 07 July 2011.  "حرية حرية ، إسالم و مسيحية و دروز وعلوية" 




9 - Revolutionary Solidarity 
 
Al-Jazeera presented the Syrian people as sentimental loyal people. "Citizens who came out in 
a solidarity procession supporting the bereaved city of Daraa"113, that is, the people of the other 
governorates sympathize with the pains of the people of Daraa. The Channel has assimilated this 
governorate to a mother crying and mourning her children who were killed. "They come out in 
solidarity with the stricken cities"114."The protests have unified the different slices of the Syrian 
society."115 That is, the revolution's aim is one and the means of expressing it are one. 
 
(4-5) 
                                    
Demonstrators stand shoulder-to-shoulder during demonstrating signifying their revolutionary collaboration.116 
   
 The Channel also portrayed that the demonstrators were carrying the wounded and go on 
demonstrating as an indication that they were loyal to each other and that they were determined to 
face the regime’s forces. 
(6) 
 
Demonstrators carry the wounded to save them.117 
 
 
                                                             
113 25 March 2011. "مواطنون خرجوا في مسيرة تضامنية مع مدينة درعا الثكلى" 
114 25 January 2013.  "يخرجون للتضامن مع المدن المنكوبة" 
115 25 March 2011. "اإلحتجاجات وّحدت مختلف شرائح المجتمع السوري" 
116  14 October 2011.  




10 – Steadfastness and Defiance 
 
   Al-Jazeera densely highlighted the popular defiance to the regime's suppression. "The 
massive deployment of the army forces could not be a protective shield that prevented the infection 
of demonstrations from spreading to some other cities."118 This is an indication that the security 
policy which the regime practiced to terrify the people could not realize its aims. The Channel 
used the word 'infection' which generally refers to the spread of diseases. However, applying it to 
the demonstrations rendered another meaning to it: the popular movement became like a plague 
that would fall onto the head of the regime and destroy it. "The wall of fear has fallen forever"119, 
"The Kingdom of Fear has fallen apart."120 This is an indication to the inability of security 
personnel to terrify the people again. In these two examples, we see that Al-Jazeera did not talk 
about dictatorship but about its result (fear). In order to overemphasize dictatorship, Al-Jazeera 
magnified the image of fear resulting from it by describing this fear as the kingdom.  
 
According to Al-Jazeera, the struggle of wills has turned into a battle of bone-breaking the field 
of which is the whole homeland. That is, the regime is standing on the lookout against the wishes 
of its people and changing Syria into a violence theater. Nevertheless, the protesters are facing the 
military operations with continual demonstrations. They are also ready to sacrifice for the sake of 
freedom. 
"In spite of the suffocating security grip"121, "In spite of the Security campaign"122, "Despite 
heavy gunfire"123, "Careless of the severe suppression, the protesting crowding which have become 
a daily routine continues"124, "Death could not deter them"125, "Demonstrations which are still 
insuppressible."126 "If killing the revolutionaries and torturing them had terrified a popular 
revolution, it would have been the Syrian revolution. But this didn't happen. When they saw that 
their silence was death, they shouted out: yes to death, no to humiliation. When they saw that their 
silence was slavery, they demanded the change of the regime"127,  "Demonstrations increase in 
spite of the siege by the regime's Shabbiha"128, "Demonstrations continue despite the security 
repression"129, "careless of death, The protests carry on despite the security repression"130, "Bullets 
                                                             
118 23 March 2011.  "االنتشار المكثف لقوات الجيش لم يكن درعا واقيا النتقال عدوى المظاهرات إلى بعض المدن األخرى" 
119 02 April 2011.  "جدار الخوف قد سقط إلى غير رجعة" 
120 20 June 2011. "تصدّعت  مملكة الخوف" 
121 10 August 2011. "رغم القبضة األمنية الخانقة" 
122 10 August 2011. "رغم الحملة األمنية" 
123 10 August 2011. "رغم إطالق النار الكثيف" 
124 14 August 2011." غير آبهة بشدة القمع تستمر التجمعات االحتجاجية التي باتت عادة يومية" 
125 10 April 2011. "لم يثنهم الموت" 
126 18 November 2011. "تظاهرات ال تزال عصية على الكبح" 
127 27 September 2011.  "لو أن ثورة شعبية أخافها قتل الثائرين و تعذيبهم لكانت الثورة السورية، لكن ذلك لم يحدث. رأوا صمتهم موتا فقالوا الموت و ال المذلة و رأوا الصمت عبودية فطالبوا بتغيير النظام" 
128 25 May 2012. "تزايد المظاهرات رغم حصار شبيحة النظام" 
129 25 May 2012. "استمرار المظاهرات رغم القمع األمني" 




could not penetrate the chest of the cohesive revolution unsupported by brothers nor by 
strangers"131. These are signifiers of the strength of the defiance. 
 
Al-Jazeera promoted that the revolution is to bear fruit sooner or later and that the demonstrators 
are getting more optimistic each time a martyr falls. They are armed by a revolutionary will which 
has not been broken by the regime's war machine to the moment. Moreover, they are determined 
to raise the freedom slogan even after its heavy bloody cost has been so clear. "A revolution which 
survives despite the attempts to bury it alive."132The Channel assimilated the regime's operations 
to 'Wa'd 133'. In other words, it likened the revolution to a newborn girl who the regime is trying to 
bury alive. This is an implicit message suggesting the brutality and savageness which the regime's 




 Demonstrators challenge the tank of the Syrian army.134 
 
11 - Human Icons 
 
In the studied sample, Al-Jazeera did not cover activities of opposition figures living in Syria 
and having a representative status. The revolution rather appeared as if it were a movement of 
young people coming out to the streets and cheering. the Channel did not highlight opposition 
thinkers or leaders organizing the movement inside.  
 
Hamza Al-Khateeb135, "That's how the boy looked like"136 an indication of how he looked like 
before murdering him. His photo is presented in a healthy state. "That's how the boy looks like 
now." His photo is represented showing him murdered, a corpse full of the effects of torture. "How 
                                                             
131 04 October 2011. "الرصاص لم يخترق صدر الثورة المتماسكة بدون دعم من الشقيق و الغريب" 
132 04 October 2011. "ثورة تحيا رغم محاوالت وئدها"  
133 Female infanticide 'Wa'd in Arabic' is burying the newborn girl alive. Arabs in Al-Jahili era before Islam used to practice it because they preferred boys and because they believed 
that girls would bring them shame and poverty. 
134  17 May 2011.  
135 A 13-year-old boy from the Governorate of Daraa. The opposition accused the security personnel of torturing and killing him because he demonstrated with a group of young 
people. The regime and its supporters refused the charge. 




can the soft bodies of kids be turned in moments into deformed corpses?".  Here is a message 
aiming at stirring up the feelings in favor of the rebels and showing the regime as a beast assaulting 
the softness of kids and throwing their rotten corpses away. 'The murderers did not devour the kid's 
liver, but they cut his genital organ out137." These sentences call historical events back138. The 
Channel has indirectly likened Hamza, the kid, to Hamza, the prophet Muhammad's uncle, and 
assimilated the regime to Hind, the liver-eater. This is an implicit message which makes the 
demonstrators righteous people and the regime evil people. "He was detained alive and killed 
because he was cheering for freedom." A message criticizing the security personnel who murdered 
a kid only because he was cheering for freedom. 
 
Hussein Al-Zubi139, a detainee who was murdered under torture. Nawaf Al-Basheer140,141 the 
Sheikh of Al-Baggara tribe has been detained by the security forces. The legal activist, Dana 
Jawabrah142, has been detained by the security forces. 
 
Ibrahim Qashoush143, who was called the nightingale of the revolution, was murdered by 
stabbing him with a knife, eradicating his throat and throwing his body away into the Orontes 
River. "The nightingale of the revolution was killed only because he sang." 144This is a message 
denoting the hatred of the regime of its opponents. The eradication of the throat indicates how 
furious the security forces were with the effects of this young man's voice and how effective his 
slogans on the revolutionary movement were: "Come on, Bashar! Leave!" This was one of 
Qashoush's slogans where he directly defies the personality of the president. 
 
Mamoun Al-Homsi145 was previously imprisoned for five years because he demanded political 
reformations. Al-Jazeera only presented some of his opinions about the incredibility of the regime 
concerning the reformations146. 
 
Muntaha Al-Atrash147, the daughter of the leader Sultan Basha Al-Atrash148, was presented by 
Al-Jazeera as the most prominent opponent of the current regime. Her opinion of the current 
situation in Syria was: "In Syria, there are no infiltrators, no conspirators nor armed criminal gangs.  
                                                             
137 27 May 2011. "لم يأكل أيّا من القتلة كبد الولد، لكنهم قطعوا عضوه التناسلي"  
138 Hind Bint Ataba was an extreme anti-Islam woman. She killed Hamza Ibn Abdul-Muttaleb, Prophet Muhammad's uncle, and ate his liver. She became a Muslim after the 
Muslims conquered and controlled Mecca.   
139  27 May 2011.  
140 The head Sheikh of Al-Baggara tribe, which is a widely spread Arab tribe stretching among Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Turkey. It is considered the largest Syrian tribe. This Sheikh 
was detained by the Syrian security forces.  
141 05 August 2011, 25 September 2011.  
142 03 May 2011.  
143 07 July 2011.  
144 07 July 2011. "قُتِل بلبل الثورة ألنه غنى" 
145 A member of the Syrian People's Council (Parliament). As an opponent of the Syrian regime, he was detained by the security forces.  
146  29 March 2011.  
147  04 July 2011.  
148 The general leader of the Great Syria Revolution against the French mandate in 1925. Muntaha Al-Atrash, the daughter of this leader, is a journalist and a spokeswoman of the 




The criminals and infiltrators are only the Assads."149 The discrediting of Muntaha Al-Atrash of 
the regime's propaganda has a great effect. On the one hand, its importance emerges from her being 
the daughter of the leader Sultan Basha Al-Atrash. On the other hand, she represents the Druze 
sect. This is an implicit message which suggests that the Druze, one of the minorities, are against 
the policies of the ruling regime. 
 
Ali Farzat150 is a caricaturist and a critic. According to Al-Jazeera, the Syrian state's security 
broke his fingers. This is an indication that the regime was disappointed with his hands with which 
he drew the regime and criticized it. 
 
Abu Al-Alaa Al-Mi'arri151, was one of the historical human icons which Al-Jazeera called back. 
His name was linked to the events taking place in Mi'aratul-Nu'man152. He was a Syrian poet and 
philosopher who died in 1057 AD. Al-Jazeera mentioned this historical icon in the context of its 
account of the opposing popular movement in Mi'aratul-Nu'man. Those who are in this movement 
are the grandchildren of this philosopher and poet. They are the people of his area. Furthermore, 
it mentioned this icon in the context of the news stories of the bombarding by the regime's forces 
and of their exaggeration in practicing violence and destruction. This association is a signifier that 
the regime is an enemy of thought, literature and civilization. Al-Jazeera was, simultaneously, 
trying to pushing the people of this area to continue demonstrating through their glory and the 
glorification of their history. Most of the Syrians are affected by praise and glorification. They feel 
they are heroes with a great history153. This style is important in the psychological war and the 
channel which knows the strengths and weaknesses of peoples, their psychological characteristics 
and conditions is able to mobilize these peoples and manipulate them in a way that suits the 
agendas of the policies which guide its editorial policy. 
 
12 - Regional Icons 
 
Daraa, "the cradle of the revolution"154, is an indication of the birth of the popular movement 
in Daraa. This is considered a Medal of Honor for this city which, in accordance to Al-Jazeera, 
unified the slices of the Syrian society and motivated them to follow the example of its residents 
in coming out to support it. 
 
As for Damascus, the Channel concentrated on many parts of the city like Al-Marja, Kafr Sousa 
and Al-Meedan, that is, the center of the capital, Damascus. This gives an impression that the fall 
of the regime is close. The same applies to the suburbs of the capital. Al-Jazeera tried to drum into 
                                                             
149 04 July 2011. "ال مندسين و ال متآمرين و ال عصابات إجرامية مسلحة في سورية، إنما المجرمون و المندسون هم آل األسد" 
150  04 October 2011.  
151  04 July 2011.  
152 It is located south of Idleb; a Governorate in the north of Syria. 
153 This description emerges from the observations of the researcher and her communication with the slices of the Syrian people for long years.  




the audience the idea that the demonstrators are densely creeping from Damascus suburbs into the 
capital. This is a mental image that makes the receiver feel that the regime is besieged and that it 
is about to fall. "in the capital's suburbs, the voice of defiance is rising up."155 
 
Homs is the capital of the revolution156. This is an indication of the importance of the 
revolutionary movement in this city and of its effect on the rest of the Syrian regions. As for 
Aleppo, Al-Jazeera clarified how important it would be for the demonstrations to reach this 
governorate as it is the second most important governorate in Syria after Damascus. According to 
Al-Jazeera, the alignment of Aleppo with the revolutionary activity is crucial to deciding the fate 
of the Syrian regime.  
 
"Hama is in the heart."157, "The name of Hama has been linked in the Syrian conscience to what 
is described as the Massacre of the Century."158, "Hama has become a historic symbol."159Al-
Jazeera linked the revolution of Hama in 2011 to the events of Hama in 1982. It depended upon 
sentimental appeals pointing out that the regime had previously destroyed this city and now it was 
committing group massacres in it. The Channel did not mention any details about the 1982 
massacre. It only hinted to it.  Hinting can have many significances some of which are: 1- the 
Syrian people are the targeted audience; the channel supposes that the Syrians certainly know the 
story of the massacre. 2- the channel considers that this given piece of information is already well-
known by all the Arab audience. 3- enticing the curiosity and intelligence of the targeted audience 
and motivating them to search. 4- the ambiguity of the information is a means of agitation 
propaganda. If the recipients were lazy to search and check and if their relationship with the 
channel which they follow were strong, they would become rapidly and unconsciously affected by 
the message. In the above-mentioned example, the recipient will understand that the regime 
committed massacres without knowing where and when.   
 
Baba Amr, Bab As Sbaa, and many other parts and neighborhoods of the cities in addition to 
many towns and cities of Syria have become icons indicating the revolution comprehensiveness 
of all the cities, towns and villages of Syria. Most of the regions studied in the sample are inhabited 






                                                             
155 03 May 2011. "في ضواحي العاصمة يخرج صوت التحدي"  
156 11 December 2011, 12 June 2012. Synonymous phrases have been repeated 4 times. "حمص عاصمة الثورة" 
157  05 August 2011. "حماه في القلب" 
 "إسم حماه قد ارتبط في الوجدان السوري بما يوصف بمجزرة القرن" 158
Al-Jazeera has many times reminded the audience of the military campaign which the regime assaulted on the Muslim Brothers in 1982 when it killed many of them.  




13 – The Names of Jumaas (Fridays) and Their Signs  
The demonstrators called Fridays with different special eponyms160. Al-Jazeera highlighted 
these eponyms and densely promoted them. When the opposition were getting ready for the 
coming Friday through activities on the social networking sites, Al-Jazeera used to cover and 
popularize these activities. That is, Al-Jazeera was an important means of the opposition's for 
calling for the demonstrations and preparing for them.  
"Home Guards Friday"161, Al-Jazeera indicated that this eponym is an indication through which 
the demonstrators remind the army of their country, while besieging cities and assaulting others, 
that it has another different role from the one it is doing. The most prominent target of the message 
are the soldiers of the Syrian army in order to rebel and not to obey the orders of their military 
leaders who support the violence of the regime. 
 
"Freedom Children's Friday"162 calls for solidarity with the children who were arrested and 
tortured and some of whom were killed. It is a reminder that the regime is a children murderer. 
"Yes to death, no to humiliation Friday"163 is a reminder that the people prefer death to living under 
the mercy of a regime which humiliates and degrades them and which would not grant them an 
honorable life. "The free people of the army Friday"164 is a message of respect to the defectors 
soldiers and officers who refused to shoot the citizens. 
 
"Sheikh Saleh Al-Ali's Friday"165 is a message of sectarian indication which the opposition of 
the Sunni majority directs to the Alawite youth in an attempt to polarize them to the revolution. 
This is to remind the Alawites that a leader who belongs to them fought against the French 
oppression. He fought and strived for the sake of freedom. That is, the policy of Al-Assad, who is 
an Alawite, is entirely contrary to the policy of Sheikh Saleh Al-Ali. This is also to state the 
following message: 'Look! We are not sectarian. We rather respect the Alawite Sect and specify a 
whole day named after an Alawite leader.  
 
"High time to advance into Damascus Friday"166 denotes that the regime is going to fall this 
Friday because the revolutionaries are to control Damascus, the capital of Syria and the regime’s 
security capital as well. "Damascus! Our rendezvous is close Friday"167 This eponym appeared 
when the opposition was not able to overthrow the regime in Al-Sham. Damascus in Arabic is a 
feminine name. In this eponym- "Damascus! Our rendezvous is close."- Damascus appears as a 
                                                             
160 Friday – Al-Jumaa- is a day of great importance for Muslims. It has a special prayer. one of the Surahs of the Quran is named after it. According to the prophet's Sunna it is 
considered the master of all days.  On it, Adam was created and was entered into Paradise and sent out of it. Moreover, Judgment Day will take place only on Friday.   
161  27 May 2011. "جمعة حماة الديار" 
162  04 June 2011.  "جمعة أطفال الحرية" 
163  02 September 2011. "جمعة الموت و ال المذلة" 
164  14 October 2011.  "جمعة أحرار الجيش" 
165  18 June 2011. Saleh Al-Ali, a Sheikh from the Alawite sect. He led the revolution against the French, 1918.  
166  09 November 2012. "جمعة أوان الزحف إلى دمشق" 




female whom the revolutionaries are trying to appease her, reassuring her that they were coming 
to save her and their dating time is not far. Soon they will be victorious and set her free from the 
grip of tyranny.  
 
"Confident of Allah’s victory Friday"168 is a message of spreading hope into the opponents’ 
hearts. God is certainly to support them. It’s a must. "The No-Fly Zone Friday."169 This eponym 
has an invitation to all Arab and international authorities and institutions to prevent the regime 
from bombardment. 
 
"Free women Friday"170 is a signifier of the Syrian women, the revolution activist women, the 
mothers of martyrs and opinion prisoners. This is an indication of the appreciation of the Syrian 
street to the suffering of women because of the regime's policy. "The clarion call Friday."171 
Denotes mobilizing all the human and material forces of the opposition in order to face the regime. 
"Immediate armament Friday"172 is a message through which the opposition asks the Arab and 
international countries to provide them with arms. 
 
When the popular movement became a daily mobility which was not exclusive to Fridays, the 
opposition started to give names to other days of the week. For example, "Zainab Al-Hosny's 
Sunday"173, a woman who Al-Jazeera introduced as a victim whom the Syrian security personnel 
murdered and mutilated her body. "The Tuesday of the detainee Sheikh Nawaf Al-Basheer."174-175 
This is a sign that has an implicit hint which is discrediting the regime's propaganda that tries to 
assert the loyalty of the sheikhs of the nomadic tribes and clans to it. "A Thursday for Latakia"176 
is an indication that the revolution has reached the Syrian coast, that is, close to the villages of the 
Alawite sect to which the president belongs. So, this is a signifier that the fall of the regime is 
handy. "The Eye of the Truth Sunday."177 This day is a reminder of the photo and video 
documenters, especially, those who died during their covering of the events. It is a message of 
gratitude and appreciation to them. 
 
14- The Evenings in the Streets and Squares 
 
One of the facets of the revolution in Syria was in the form of demonstrators gathering in one 
place to sing and cheer tuned slogans in addition sometimes to folkloric Dabka – dancing – 
                                                             
168  29 June 2012. "جمعة واثقون بنصر هللا" 
169  29 October 2011. "جمعة الحظر الجوي" 
170  15 May 2011. "جمعة الحرائر" 
171  17 March 2012. "جمعة النفير" 
172  17 March 2012. "جمعة التسليح الفوري"  
173  25 September 2011. "أحد زينب الحصني" 
174 The head Sheikh of Al-Baggara tribe, which is a widely spread Arab tribe stretching among Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Turkey. It is considered the largest Syrian tribe. This Sheikh 
was detained by the Syrian security forces.  
175 25 September 2011."ثالثاء الشيخ المعتقل نواف البشير" 
176 25 September 2011. "خميس من أجل الالذقية" 




accompanied by using drums. They also used to stand shoulder to shoulder in organized rows and 
start jumping or swinging with chanting songs or slogans. 
These scenes were densely presented on Al-Jazeera screen. Covering this type of popular 
movement has a lot of significances and an ability to affect the audience. The Syrian people 
appeared strong, defying the bombardment of tanks, aircrafts, and guns with singing and dancing.   
"The people there get indulged into the chants of the revolution."178This is an indication of how 
deep the relationship between the demonstrators and singing as one of their means of expression 
is. "So, such are the revolutionaries. They cry singing or sing crying."179 This was a sentimental 
appeal through which Al-Jazeera wanted to draw the attention of the audience to the importance 
and role of singing in the revolutionary activity. Songs seemed for the opponents as a shelter where 
they can empty the charges of their grief and tragedy. "The city people sing during their 
evenings."180, "The demonstrations have changed into evenings."181 
 
"Homs has developed its own methods in facing the repression machine, the most prominent of 
which is singing in facing bullets."182 This indicates how the revolutionaries insist on the 
peacefulness of their revolution and that art can face heavy arms. This comparison shows the 
regime having the ugliest profiles of violence. It also provokes sympathy with the demonstrators 
who are unarmed and powerless. "The answer of the people to what is described as the language 




Demonstrators challenge the bombarding of the Syrian army by singing.184 
 
The content of the tuned songs and slogans was as follows: grief on those who were murdered, 
confidence in victory, mocking and disparaging the president and calling on him to step down, or 
                                                             
178 15 January 2012. "ينغمس الحاضرون بأهازيج الثورة" 
179 14 October 2011. "أولئك إذن هم الثوار، يبكون غناءا أو لعلهم يغنون بكاءا" 
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182  11 December 2011. "حمص طورت أساليبها الخاصة في مواجهة اآللة القمعية و أبرزها الغناء في مواجهة الرصاص" 
183  27 November 2011. "ردّ الناس على ما يصفونها بلغة الحديد و النار كان كالمعتاد هتافات و أناشيد " 




asserting that the Syrians were soon going to hang him and put an end to tyranny. Al-Jazeera 
considered that the tragedy in which the citizens live in did not prevent them from innovating 
mockery of the official claims about salafis – orthodox Muslims, infiltrated agents and gangs. Al-
Jazeera media personnel did not mock the regime's propaganda through presenting their own points 
of view but through dense coverage and pointing out of the demonstrators' slogans. 
 
"The darkness of the night does not prevent the infected by the hope disease from urging the 
dawn to come."185The Channel assimilates hope to a disease, a literary style which enlarges the 
volume of hope in the souls of the Syrians who have been living in darkness for long years and 
who are still calling out for the dawn of emancipation to come. This is another example where Al-
Jazeera borrows “negative” or “destructive” factors from nature in order to describe an event which 
it considers positive. 
 
"From 5 to 30 songs they produce every day, and from 5 to 30 people fall dead every day. The 
number of the songs equals the number of the killed186." Through this description, Al-Jazeera tries 
to balance between keeping to create the feelings of grief towards what happens to the 
demonstrators and pointing out their ability to defy through art.  
In these evenings, the Syrians depended on borrowing famous tunes which are favored by the 
Syrian people and applying revolutionary words to them. They also used short and simple tunes 
which can be easily memorized. These tuned slogans and songs became one of the most significant 
means of the revolutionary expression. 
 
The people there were always males. In some evenings, only few veiled women took part in 
cheering slogans only. Women do not take part in singing or dancing. The female presence in the 




The participation of women wearing the Sunni hijab in the demonstrations against Assad.187 
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15 - Symbolism of Funerals, Funeral Processions and the Prayers for the Dead 
 
Al-Jazeera prominently focused on covering the funeral processions188. It assured their 
inevitability after demonstrations, with the result that the rituals of burying the deceased became a 
daily routine. That is, the killing was still persistent. The demonstrations turned into funeral 
processions and the funeral processions into demonstrations. "The funerals were never safe from 
repression."189 "Many a victim fell down during the funeral processions with the result that the 
funerals were giving birth to other ones."190That is, the ones who carry the bodies of the deceased 
to their final stay could be carried the following day. This is an indication to the gravity of the 
regime's criminality from which nobody, alive or dead, could escape. Al-Jazeera showed the 
Syrian People as very loyal to each other. The Channel portrayed that thousands were crowding to 
have the honor of carrying the coffins of the violence victims in spite of the risk of being killed or 
detained. This means that there was a people's race as everyone wanted to participate in the burial 
service, which is a sign of strong loyalty. Despite risks, they rush to carry the martyr's body. In 





A demonstration and a funeral ceremony at the same time.191 
 
Al-Jazeera linked the thousands coming out after the Friday´s prayer to the funeral processions. 
This is a religious sign suggesting the piety and strong belief of those who took part in the burial 
services. This has an implicit significance that the believing people were confronting the firing of 
the disbelieving regime. The media concentration on these signifiers can mobilize the people in a 
sectarian manner. The Channel showed the opponents performing the funeral processions after the 
Eid – religious Festival – Prayers. Linking killing to Eid suggests that the regime assaulted the 
                                                             
188  The funeral procession, that is, the service and rituals of accompanying the body of the dead person to its final stay. Muslims have special rituals. A number of men carry the 
coffin while the others walk cheering: 'there is no God but God. Muhammad is the messenger of God.'  
189  25 November 2011. "فالجنازات لم تسلم يوما من القمع" 
190  25 November 2011. "كم من ضحية سقطت أثناء التشييع حتى أضحت الجنائز تلد جنائز" 




symbolism of the Islamic religious occasions and festivals. It also suggests the participants in the 
processions are performing the holy duty of Salat – prayer, that is, they are obeying God. This is 
another implicit indication that the conflict is between the believers – the opposition, and the 
disbelievers – all the pro-regime people. 
 
The rituals of the prayers for the dead were also shown on Al-Jazeera screen, where the outraged 
men appear carrying the coffins or burying the bodies in the graves while cheering 'Allah is the 
Greatest.' or shouting out for the murdered martyr 'We kneel only to God.'  This is an implicit 
massage directed to the regime telling it that the demonstrators will not be subjugated to any power 
in the world. It is a defiance message to the security forces who, according to Al-Jazeera, tried to 




The demonstrators bury the boy who was killed during a demonstration against Assad.192 
 
16 – The Numbers of the Demonstrators 
 
   On one hand, Al-Jazeera resorted to generalization: "The Syrians came out" (15 times), "the 
people of the area demonstrated"193, "The Syrian People" (6 times), "Crowded demonstrations"194. 
These phrases signified the superiority of the anti-regime sections. They also implicitly indicated 
to non-recognizing the pro-regime sections. On the other hand, the Channel frequently used 
definite numbers. For example, it used 'hundreds' to express the number of the praying people who 
came out from a mosque, 'thousands' to describe a demonstration in a small village, and 'a hundred 




                                                             
192  25 November 2011.   
193  25 March 2011, 29 March 2011. Synonyms have been repeated 24 times. "أهالي المنطقة تظاهروا" 
194  Four times and synonymous phrases have been repeated 14 times. "مظاهرات حاشدة" 
195  'The Orontes Square' or 'The Martyrs Square' as the opponents call it. This square also witnessed a military campaign assaulted by the regime forces against the 'Muslim Brothers' 








Demonstrations which are presented as crowded.196 
(13) 
 
Demonstrations which are presented as crowded.197 
 
17 – The Age and Gender Categories of the Participants 
 
   The most prominent participants were of the young male category. The female presence was 
very accidental. The women who appeared were veiled, which is a message that implicitly denotes 
that the revolution was Sunni. The obvious absence of women from the squares reminded of the 
rituals of the Sunnis who do not allow women to take part in mixed activities with the males. Most 
of the photos of women were taken from the back so that they could not show the women's faces. 
This has the same religious sign: the revolution is that of conservative Muslims.  
 
Women also appear saying prayers against198 the president. "May Allah take you, Bashar!"199 
that is, they wish the president would be dead. "Freedom forever, forcibly, Oh Assad."200 Which 
means that they were certainly going to win their freedom. The word 'forever' is repeatedly 
                                                             
196  30 March 2011.  
197  07 November 2011.  
198  Muslims believe in saying prayers against the oppressor as God responds to the prayers of the oppressed. The prayers of a woman against the oppressor have a greater effect on 
the receiver than the man's. She is a weaker creature than the man in accordance with the Islamic creed.  
199  04 March 2012.  "هللا ياخدك يا بشار" 




mentioned in their slogans as a reply, which might be subconscious, to old slogans the people used 
to reiterate: 'Forever, O Hafez Al-Assad!' and 'Our leader forever is Hafez Al-Assad.' The slogan: 
"Come on Bashar, Leave!" (6 times) has a stronger effect when expressed by woman. On the one 
hand, it suggests that a woman is defying the president (the man) in a masculine society. On the 
other hand, it suggests that women have become impatient with the regime's soldiers assaulting 
their dignity and womanhood. 
 
Children's presence was also accidental but effective. We watch little kids standing and 
threatening the Assad: "We're coming, Bashar!"201 That is: Wait, and see what misfortunes we will 
bring to you! This juvenile defiance has a great effect, especially when Al-Jazeera mentions these 
reactions in a context directed to a regime which gives no notice to the innocence of childhood, a 
regime which kills without any exception whatsoever. 
 
18 - The Channel's Promoting of the Coming Revolutionary Activities 
 
The activists used to promote for their coming revolutionary activities through the social 
networking sites or their online sites. However, the role of Al-Jazeera was more important than 
these sites202 because the Syrian people, especially the opponents, used to permanently watch the 
Channel around the clock. Al-Jazeera used to point out the times and locations of the coming 
activities "It is expected that Damascus is going to witness demonstrations which activists 
considered as crucial in directing the process of the Syrian revolution."203 Not only did Al-Jazeera 
point out the timings and locations of the coming events, but also pointed out their importance. 
These were implicit messages the aim of which was to mobilize the street and encourage the 
opposing Syrian people to demonstrate. 
 
19 - Documentation of Videos 
 
The videos of the activists are considered the one of the most significant sources of Al-Jazeera. 
A short time after the start of the popular movement, the demonstrating youth became aware of 
the importance of the video documentation. They used to publish their videos without captions 
mentioning the settings of the events. So, the pro-regime channels exploited this shortcoming and 
promoted that those demonstrations had not taken place in Syria and that the videos were media 
fabrications. After that the opposing youth began to mention the dates and the places of their 
activities. Al-Jazeera respected these documentations and nearly always pointed them out. For 
instance, we saw the demonstration and heard a young man mentioning the date and the place: 
"Damascus city, the first day of Eid Al-Fitr", "Idleb city, 11 September 2011"; or the demonstrators 
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would write the date and place of the demonstration on a piece of paper and put it in front of the 
mobile camera so that the audience could see it. 
 
20 - Interviews 
 
In the studied sample, the interviews with the demonstrators were very rare. This suggests that 
individual opinions were not of interest for the channel. Therefore, the revolution appeared as if it 
were the voice of unified people. A revolution which is cohesive and non- individualist.  
In 2011, Al-Jazeera was not able to send its correspondents to cover the demonstrations. 
However, even after it could have amateur correspondents in 2012, it did not give attention to the 
individual opinions of the demonstrators. 
 
21- Additional Remarks on the Photos Which Deal with the Opposing Demonstrations 
 
The demonstrations pictures varied. Some were diurnal, others were at nocturnal. Some 




Night demonstrations described as crowded. The visual content is not clear but the narration guides the 
recipient's perception of the image.204 
 
Sometimes the cadre was narrow, that is, the outer frame (The place of the event) was omitted, 
only showing the demonstrators. This technique suggests that the number of the demonstrators is 
large.  
 
Sometimes the news story dealing with the theme of the demonstrations was accompanied by 
pictures of empty or dark places, that is, pictures having no clear content, which did not show any 
demonstrations. Simultaneously, we hear people's frightened screams at the time of 
demonstrations or hear cheers and slogans. Why did Al-Jazeera use that type of pictures which 
was accompanied by screams which provoked the receiver's feelings when the internet was full of 
videos which contained clearly delineated demonstrations? I suppose that this type allows the 
                                                             




receiver to concentrate more on the screams. Eventually, the screams would be more effective and 
the effect of the cheers would be doubled. Moreover, the pictures which lack a clear content 
unleash the imagination of the audience. Subconsciously, the mind would fill the picture with the 
content convenient to the receiver's psychological condition.  
 
The demonstrations which took place in the mosques were of the most important contents of 
the pictures on Al-Jazeera screen. 
 
What is called 'flying demonstrations' appeared in Syria. They are short-time demonstrations 
which might not exceed one or a few minutes because of the severe security measures. The youth 
who were afraid of the brutality of the regime's forces used to arrange to come out for a very short 
time so that they could be able of cheering against the regime and Assad and of taking pictures 
and videos then sharing them on the internet. Al-Jazeera adopted this type of videos where we can 
see few legs running quickly at night. Nevertheless, the Channel commented saying that a crowded 
demonstration came out today. That is, the pictures were not compatible with the nature of the 
news story. This kind of video may have significant psychological influence as the viewer sees 
only few legs running fast to avoid bullets and hears scared voices while the images tremble 
because the photographer is running; the viewer -particularly Syrian- may feel himself running 




Al-Jazeera frequently transmitted shaky, and sometimes unclear, images but the news story guides the recipient's 
perception of the image.205 
 
Al-Jazeera, in a way or another, helped to legalize the assault of the demonstrators on the state's 
centers such as the 'Forensic Palace'. It portrayed them as people mad with corruption and 
requesting reformation. That is, there was an actual excuse which motivated them to perform such 
assaults. Therefore, the pictures of the spoilers seemed acceptable. 
 
 
                                                             








The demonstrators destroy the government vehicles and attack the Justice Palace in Daraa. The news context 
does not make the recipient feel that it is wrong to assault the public property.206 
 
 
How Did Al-Jazeera Cover the Pro-regime Popular Movement? 
 
At the time when all the pro-regime channels were assuring and showing pictures to prove the 
large size of the human massing which organized processions all over Syria, all over the 
governorates, cities and villages to support the president Assad and the reformations, Al-Jazeera 
did not pay any attention to these processions. In the studied sample, it talked about them four 
times in a brief and rapid manner. Moreover, the contexts in which these processions were handled 
made this popular movement seem ridiculous, fabricated by the Syrian government and entirely 
unimportant. For example, Al-Jazeera used to allocate a full report to the anti-regime popular 
movement. It showed the demonstrators running away from the security personnel's bullets. It let 
us listen to the sounds of heavy firing and see feet running rapidly due to fear and horror. Then in 
the last ten seconds of the report, the Channel would mention that many governorates witnessed 
pro-regime demonstrations.  
 
The ridiculousness of these pro-regime demonstrations also appeared through Al-Jazeera's 
selectivity of pictures that contained very few numbers of supporters cheering with voices which 
did not seem that strong. Also, when Al-Jazeera showed pictures of a demonstration207containing 
enormous numbers of Al-Assad supporters, this was put in a news context which tried to prove 
that these demonstrations were only a reaction to the widespread expansion of the opposing 
demonstrations, and, eventually, a proof that the regime lost the initiative. The regime could no 
more control the situation inside the country. 
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Al-Jazeera very poorly covered the viewpoints of the pro-regime Syrians. After that, it totally 
absented them and made the Syrian street look as if it were entirely in the opposition side. As if 
all the Syrian people turned into an angry opposition which wanted the fall of the regime. 
 
The very brief coverage of the supporting popular movement was in the months of March and 
April 2011. Nevertheless, the target of this coverage was not highlighting the popular backing and 
support of the regime. The target was, rather, drawing the Arabic and international attention to the 
fact that the protests divided the Syrian street into two parts. One which opposed to the policies of 
the government and demanded reformations which would regain the role of the civil society, and 
another that supported the regime and whose camp did not stand doing nothing but organized pro-
regime demonstrations whose organizers marched the streets of the capital and several other 
governorate centers. Thus, Syria entered a stage which might impose the mobility of international 
society as the bloody results of this division would be immense and disastrous208.   
 
"And the arguments which followed the pro-Assad processions in different parts of Syria were 
not vacant of suspicions which were reiterated by opponents inside and outside the country stating 
that the regime might substitute the Emergency Law with another equally bad one."209The 
extremely brief mention of the pro-Assad popular movement can be observed. There is only one 
sentence in the report. Why did the Channel link the popular processions to the opposition's 
suspicions about substituting the Emergency Law with a worse one?  In the beginning, Al-Jazeera 
tried to point its credibility out through transmitting all the details of the Syrian crisis. Therefore, 
it mentioned the pro-Assad popular movement. However, because its editorial policy was against 
the Syrian regime's policy, and because it always tried to portray the regime as a thug, criminal 
one which could not be trusted, it had to link supporting the regime by some categories of the 
people to the opponents' suspicions in regime's credibility in order to sabotage the importance and 
the role of the supporting movement in the receiver's mind. In reply to the channels that showed 
the movement which supported Al-Assad and the reforms as one of popular majority, Al-Jazeera 
tried to assure that the solid ground on which the Syrian leadership stood was not a popular one. It 
was, rather, the control of this leadership on the military and security institutions which made it 
stay in charge of everything and withstand the opposing popular movement. 
 
On one single occasion, Al-Jazeera presented the viewpoint of the citizens who supported the 
Syrian government concerning the opposing movement. They pointed out that the continuation of 
the demonstrators rushing into the streets was inexcusable even after the authorities had responded 
to most of their demands and promised to perform more reformations. This continuation would 
open the way to the enemies of Syria to raise sedition among the citizens210. This single 
presentation suggested how stupid these supporters were to obey and believe the regime's lies since 
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presenting these ideas had been preceded or was followed by pictures asserting that the regime 
was killing the demonstrators, murdering the innocent and torturing all those who criticized it. 
This means that the response of the government was phantasmal and that the reformations were 
merely invalid media propaganda.  
 
Al-Jazeera showed a single slogan which was adopted by the supporters of the regime "God, 
Syria, and Bashar only."211 The significance of this slogan varies according to the Channel which 
points it out. If it was shown on a pro-Assad screen, it would mean that the people would not agree 
to any president other than Bashar. However, on Al-Jazeera channel it suggested the authority of 
the single individual, the system of the single individual, and the subjugation of the people to the 
will of a single individual.  
 
Analyzing the Image of the President and the Ruling Regime as Presented 
by Al-Jazeera 
 
What Did the Image of the President Assad Look Like on Al-Jazeera 
Screen? 
 
In 2011, Al-Jazeera mentioned many times that Al-Assad inherited the presidency from his 
father, and that the total period of their rule together extended for more than 4 decades. This 
reminder signifies the Al-Assads monopoly of the ruling authority. 
 
In the studied sample, Al-Jazeera never allocated full reports of the Assad's declarations or 
activities. It rather sometimes mentioned him accidentally, which can be an implicit sign of the 
underestimation of Al-Assad´s personality. On other occasions, mentioning Al-Assad took a tiny 
part of the report. All in all, the personality of Al-Assad was not an important news topic in Al-
Jazeera's reports. It rather substituted mentioning the president with the personalization of the 
regime: "Al-Assad's regime" (14 times), "Al-Assad's government"212. That is, the personality of 
the president was present and absent at the same time. It was implicitly present every time the 
mention of the regime was linked to Al-Assad's name. 
 
For long years, the Syrian mass media used to create a mental image which portrayed Al-Assad 
as a strong, intelligent, wise, militant and prestigious person. This was done through focusing on 
his personality, declarations and activities. When Al-Jazeera disregards the role of this president. 
That is, when it does not specify full reports talking about his activities, and simultaneously 
portrays the government as one controlled by a single individual, it produces a new mental image 
the content of which is as follows: The system in Syria is controlled by one person who is not 
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worthy of the post of presidency, a foolish, suppressive, bloodthirsty person who does not know 
how to deal with crises. 
 
"And now, as he delegates his counselors and agents to break good news to the people telling 
them about some things he intends to do, he  reminds us with this approach of his original 
profession as an ophthalmologist who used to try lenses of various dimensions and sizes before he 
eventually decided which one was the best to rectify the eyesight. However, because what is 
required, as the protestors state, is changing the reality not rectifying the way of looking at it, the 
protestors declared continuing picketing."213This paragraph was mentioned in the context of Al-
Jazeera's account of the president sending delegations to listen to the demands of the people and 
to break the good news of implementing a group of reformations in the near future. The Channel 
disparaged the personality of Al-Assad and his way of dealing with the crisis as he behaved like 
an ophthalmologist who tries different lenses before he knows which is suitable for the patient's 
condition. This is a signifier of the uselessness of the regime's response to the popular demands. 
So, the only solution in Syria is to continue the uprising until the regime falls. The demand of the 
masses is changing the state of affairs, not correcting the way of looking at it.  
 
Hinting implicitly that the dignity of the president was injured, Al-Jazeera reported that the 
opponents demanded that Al-Assad should either choose the democratic change which pleases the 
people, or the history would condemn him as a dictator who encountered the wishes of the people. 
They also reminded him of the destiny of the Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and the 
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak214. Before the crisis, nobody dared to talk this way about Al-
Assad or the government. Now they were threatening the president or trying to frighten him. They 
were defying him in public. Their fear disappeared and their weakness vanished. That was what 
Al-Jazeera's messages trying to prove. 
 
Criticizing Al-Assad by Al-Jazeera was not always verbal. It was also done through the tone of 
the media personnel. For instance, Al-Jazeera may report Al-Assad stating that the reforms were 
delayed by the routine and carelessness and that the delay was due to understanding priorities as 
the country suffered from a lot of regional and international pressures215. If these statements were 
presented on a pro-regime channel, they would mean that the Syrian government was a resistant 
one against the Israeli occupation and that it was exposed to international pressures and economic 
besiege because of its stance in supporting the Palestinian people. However, on Al-Jazeera's 
screen, these ideas had another meaning. They were transmitted in a tone suggesting implicit 
mocking of this propaganda of the regime's. The government was making fun of the people through 
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بمهنته األولى كطبيب عيون إعتاد أن يجرب عدسات كثيرة و مختلفة األبعاد و المقاسات قبل أن يقرر في األخير أيا منها تصلح  "و إذ يوفد اليوم مستشاريه وأعوانه ليبشروا الناس ببعض مما يعتزم القيام به، فإن هذا المنهج يعيد التفكير
 ."لتصحيح النظر.  و ألن المطلوب على ما يقول المحتجون هو تغير الواقع ال تصحيح النظر إليه، أعلن محتجون مواصلة اإلعتصام
214  28 April 2011.  




popularizing these ideas in order to be an excuse for the mistakes and the corruption which prevails 
in the Syrian state's structure.  
"Al-Assad's legitimacy has nearly ended"216, " Al-Assad has no legitimacy"217, These phrases 
indicate that Al-Assad was no more the president of Syria. No negotiations should be held with 
him. The legitimate substitute whom the people would elect should be chosen and appointed by 
the people. "The president Assad is facing a real dilemma."218This is a significance of the 
president's weakness and of his inability to manage the Syrian crisis. This is also a significance of 
the narrow choices he has. His only option is to quit the authority. "The Syrian president tells his 
visitors that the Syrian crisis which Syria is undergoing is over. The opponents reply that it will be 
over only after he has left."219 
 
"The Syrian president repudiates these military forces. The Lieutenant General Bashar Al-
Assad, the Supreme Commander of the Army and Armed Forces says that these forces are not his. 
He is not responsible for the repression and the mistakes which the officials are making."220These 
are statements which hide grievous criticism and have implicit ridicule of the president's 
personality. Al-Jazeera reminds that Al-Assad is the Lieutenant General, the Supreme Commander 
of the Army and Armed Forces. That is, he is the leader without whose knowledge and orders 
nothing should happen. But he is a leader who skips responsibility. Moreover, he considers the 
mistakes as individual ones which do not represent the regime. They do not represent the orders 
of this leader.   
 
The revolution, for the president Assad, is a universal conspiracy. It is one which lacks thinkers 
and real leaders. This was how Al-Jazeera highlighted the attitudes of Assad towards the opposing 
popular movement. 
 
The Channel's correspondents conducted interviews with civilians who assured their dislike of 
Al-Assad. They expressed their wrath with his policy towards the crisis. A civilian man from 
Aleppo said: "Nobody likes him one per cent. I wished to see anybody who praised him. When 
someone loses control over their minds, they start killing their families. That's what this man is 
doing. May Allah save us from him! Allah is sufficient for me, Most Excellent is He in whom I 
trust."221This is an unequivocal assurance of the hatred of the Syrian president by all the people's 
categories. He is an insane person who has lost control over his mind and that's why killing the 
people has become not only normal but also necessary in order to keep his throne safe. The civilian 
also resorts to God and asks Him to put an end to Al-Assad. 'Allah is sufficient for us, Most 
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Excellent is He in whom we trust' is a signifier that people depend on God and trust His justice. 




The man expresses the hatred of the people to Assad.222 
 
 
The Regime's Image 
 
In the studied news reports, Al-Jazeera absolutely concentrated on the regime's security and 
military actions, whereas the political activities or the activities related to ministries or the dialogue 
conferences were absent. 
 
1 – Special Names for the Regime and Its Forces 
 
Al-Jazeera linked the Syrian government, the security forces, the army, the official civilian and 
military posts etc. to the personality of the president or to his family. It portrayed that everything 
was governed and controlled by him. "Al-Assad's regime" (14 times), "Al-Assads' regime" (twice), 
" Al-Assad's battalions" (3 times), "Al-Assad's government"223, these are signifiers of how 
enormous the hegemony of the individual or the sect is. It is an absolute dictatorship as this ruling 
individual has the power to burn and destroy everything for the sake of his safety and that of the 
minority he belongs to. These descriptions help to demonize the Syrian government and to destroy 
the mental image of having a state in Syria. That is, there is no state. There is rather a regime 
subjugated to a tyrant individual who spreads fear and terror and employs a group of pro-regime 
supporters, who come from a religious background, to seize Syria.  
 
Al-Jazeera's selectivity of the names of the military divisions of the regime also helped to infix 
this idea. For example, the Channel used to concentrate on the Fourth Armored Division224 and 
add that it is led by the Brigadier General Maher Al-Assad who is the brother of the Syrian 
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president. This highlighting has two significances. The first is that the regime is using the strongest 
military divisions to fight his people. The second is that the Syrian army is a family institution 
whose task is the protection of the president and his family and to confront the people who refuse 
to be subjugated to this family. 
 
Al-Jazeera highlighted the term 'Shabbiha' (41 times) which was applied to the forces which 
were active on military and security tasks in favor of the regime. This word is a significance that 
the regime is using illegal armed groups who serve an individual or a sect. It is a significance that 
this rule is a bully bizarre one who uses gangs like the Mafia who terrify and blackmail the Syrian 
people and practice the dirtiest and filthiest sorts of pressure so that they might yield to the will of 
the ruler. 
 
"The gangs of the tyrant Bashar Al-Assad"225, "The Al-Assad gangs"226, "The blundering 
thugs."227 The concept of 'gangs' indicates small groups of law-breakers who assault people and 
plunder their properties and spread terror in the society. Therefore, people hate them. The channel's 
portraying the army and security personnel this way is meant to mobilize the society against them. 
Al-Jazeera concurrently mentioned the terms of "the security", "the army", "pro-Assad 
militias".  This is an implicit message the purpose of which is to make all the state's security and 
military bodies seem fully engaged in suppressing the people. They all work hand in hand to kill 
the citizens. The army bombard while the security detain. Shabiha hang while the militias plunder 
the properties. All these things happen simultaneously. 
 
Al-Jazeera employed terms such as 'the regime's forces' (63 times), 'Al-Assad's forces' (3 times), 
'forces' (3 times) which include the security sector, the army and all the other armed categories. 
This signifies the unity of all the sectors around one aim which killing the armless citizens.  
 
2 – Descriptions of the Security Activities 
 
Al-Jazeera repeatedly mentioned a group of terms and phrases in describing the regime's 
military and security actions. These are the most prominent of them: "The military campaign" (7 
times) that is the army is performing organized military operations against innocent, armless 
people. This is an implicit message through which Al-Jazeera tries to state that military campaigns 
are usually performed against an enemy. But in the case of the Syrians, these campaigns are rather 
operations against oppressed people. "The spread of the security campaigns"228, "The violent 
security campaign"229 are significances of the regime's practices of murder, detainment, frightfully 
and savagely assaulting of homes. They are also indications of the collapse of the moral systems 
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in the security sector as the role of security personnel has changed from protecting the citizens to 
assaulting them.  
"A large-scale incursion"230 that is, the entrance of the security forces by coercion and 
oppression. This is an implicit message the purpose of which is denying the legitimacy of the 
regime's actions. It is a reply to the propaganda of confronting armed groups which try to destroy 
the country. "Military escalation"231 which signifies that the regime has increased the doses of its 
bombardment and assault of the civil areas. During the escalation, the numbers of victims, the 
injured and destroyed houses rise. Fear and horror prevail everywhere, in addition to the paralysis 
of the public life and institutional interruption. Escalation is a hint of the increase of the criminality 
of the armed forces. 
 
"The bullets of the security guns"232 is a phrase mentioned by Al-Jazeera while talking about 
the deceased. For example, they were killed by the bullets of the security guns. The Channel also 
mentions this phrase while talking about the demonstrators: 'they are confronting the bullets of the 
security guns'. This phrase has an implicit indication that the bullets of the security are supposed 
to spread a feeling of safety and reassurance as one of the duties of the security is to protect the 
people, but the function of the security sector is deformed in the Syrian situation.  
 
"The repression machine"233 is a significance that the members of the army and the security are 
tools in the regime's hand which it uses to abolish the popular ambitions. 
"A number of tanks is heading towards center of the city."234 Al-Jazeera wanted to suggest to 
the audience that the regime has put its killing tools near the public services centers which usually 
exist in the city centers. The normal position of tanks is on the fronts to confront the enemy of the 
country. However, the Syrian army has changed its direction towards the lawns of the parks, the 
pavements and public squares of the cities. 
 
"The flow of tanks and personnel carriers"235 that is, the fast and dense deployment like water 
flowing everywhere with no way of stopping it. This is a metaphor of the regime's large-scale 
military operations. In this example, Al-Jazeera has borrowed a “positive” element from nature 
(flow, fertility) to describe an event which it considers negative. 
 
"The positioning of a convoy of tanks"236 suggests the surveillance of the regime's forces of 
their enemy, the demonstrators, like a predator observing its prey from a remote place. "The 
regime's tanks have been moving since dawn"237an image which suggests that the army is 
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deploying its forces while the people are deeply sleeping or while the peaceful families are 
watching all this deployment fearfully. This is a significance that the regime's forces are 
mercilessly brutalizing the people. 
 
"A noticeable development in the course of the fire ball that rolled from Daraa to various areas 
of the country."238 A figurative image in which Al-Jazeera has likened the snow ball which starts 
small and then, when it rolls, it gets bigger and bigger, to a fire ball, which indicates that the 
repression of the regime did not stop in the first governorate which rebelled against it. The 
repression rather spread to all the parts of Syria. 
 
"The scenes of killing are still going on"239, "The continuity of bloodshed"240, "The military 
campaign on cities and towns have been going on non-stop"241. These are to say that the regime 
keeps shedding the blood of its people without any restraint. 
"The hell of the army's operations."242 Here, Al-Jazeera likened the regime's military activities 
to Hell to signify how hard the unbearable agony is. Fire is burning the people from all sides. "A 
day featured as bloody"243 is a signifier that the regime is committing crimes. "Bloody repression" 
that killing is the method the regime uses to keep the people away from its desires. It has no 
peaceful solutions as its only language is that of fire and iron, according to the channel244. 
 
When it described the regime's actions, Al-Jazeera depended on exaggeration and 
magnification. "Extreme use of power"245, "extreme violence"246, "a regime which has crossed all 
redlines in repressing its people"247, "the authority has gone far and deep into the security 
solution"248, "the violence wheel is running fast"249, "a military campaign which is the most violent 
for months in order to intrude a part of the town"250, "the densification of the bombardment by the 
regime's forces"251, "the destructive force of bombardment."252 
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"Scenes of violence"253, "Bombarding increases the gloominess of the Syrian scene"254. These 
metaphors state that Syria has turned into a theater or a movie prevailed by the scenes of criminality 
and horror. The Channel also repeated phrases: "The scene is played again"255, "The same scene 
is replayed."256 Repetition here means that the same thing is happening several times either in the 
same region or in others. 
 
"The regime is committing crimes against humanity257" (4 times), "It is violating the laws and 
the human rights258" (5 times), "Its actions are close to be described as genocide, but nothing has 
changed"259. These statements have an implicit objection to the attitude of the other countries for 
not resorting to radical solutions to put an end to the ruling regime. The regime is fighting "a full-
scale war against the people"260, "a persistence to kill"261 persistence means committing all forms 
of violence and terrifying. This is a significance that the regime is firmly pursuing its criminal 
behavior. "The bombardment increases the blackness of the Syrian Scene"262 is a message full of 
darkness in which Syria seems gloomy and lifeless. 
 
2 -1 – The Regime's Reaction to the Demonstrations 
 
The Channel stated that "The regime's forces tried to extinguish the protests with force"263 or " 
tried to extinguish the revolution"264. This is an indication that the popular movement is like the 
fire which can burn the regime and destroy it. Therefore, it employs all its energy to put it out. 
This mental image would be considered a violent one; the regime’s fire extinguishes that of the 
opposition. This is not logical, but the channel adopted this imagery in order to emphasize the 
severity of the Syrian situation.  
 
"Confronting the demonstrators with bullets and bombs."265 On the one hand, this is a 
significance of the peacefulness of the revolution. On the other hand, it indicates that the regime 
is shedding the blood of the armless demonstrators. "The determination to repress the peaceful 
protests"266 that is, the methods of handling the demonstrations by the Syrian forces have not 
changed. They still apply the policy of killing and detainment. 
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A Syrian army tank is heading to face the demonstrators.267 
(19) 
 
The soldiers of the Syrian army go into the fields in order to suppress the demonstrators.268 
 
The regime is still executing large-scale and arbitrary campaigns against the demonstrators and 
activists, assaulting and humiliating them. It is still murdering the detainees and burning the 
lodgings of the demonstrators and the families of the activists in order to defeat the popular 
movement. This is an indication that the regime is applying all forms of pressure on the people so 




The security forces seem brutal during their torturing the demonstrators in the street.269 
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The security forces run over the demonstrators and torture them in a brutal way.270  
 
"The regime forces are trying to bury the protests alive"271 is a significance that the regime is a 
macho father who belongs to the classical (Jahili) age, burying a little newborn girl – the revolution 
– alive272.  
The army and security forces humiliate the citizens who went out demonstrating. Then they 
popularize the videos of this humiliation on a large scale. This is a signifier the purpose of which 
is criticizing the regime soldiers who boast of humiliating the people and publish visual folders on 
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2 – 2 – The Regime's Actions Against the Civilians 
 
It murders women, children, and unarmed civilians. It commits massacres, breaks into houses, 
and assaults civilians. the Channel frequently used the verb "assault" without giving details about 
the mechanism and the nature of this assault. This generalization allows the human imagination to 
draw different mental pictures about the mis-governance of this regime. "The forces don't respect 
the elders nor the inviolability of the private homes."274That is, the soldiers don't have any moral 
control.  "Shabbiha destroy the doors of a number of shops in order to force the people to open 
them."275 This is a signifier that the regime is practicing violence against those who keep striking, 
and a significance that it is afraid of the economic collapse.  
 
According to Al-Jazeera, the regime is besieging the cities and the villages, and continues with 
its suffocating and severe besiege, preventing the relief organizations from entering and providing 
aids. It is cutting out the medicines and food aids on the various areas.  It also prevents providing 
the bakeries with flour.  
"The regime continues bombarding"276, "dense bombardment" (4 times), "The army has 
intensified bombarding"277, "The bombarding is renewed"278, phrases indicate that the rockets and 
bombs are 'falling' cats and dogs from the sky of Syria. "The regime assaults the cities to prevent 
civilians from being displaced"279 is an indication of the increase of the regime's brutality; not only 
does it kill the demonstrators but also the displacement-seekers. "Revenge actions against those 
who stay in their lodgings"280 that is, against those who had not been displaced yet. This is a 
significance that the soldiers are killing all the Syrians without exception, whether or not for cause. 
The regime conducts death sentences by the firing squads, burns the people alive, burns homes 
and robs villages. This means that the army violates the trust given to it as its duty is protecting 
the people's property. But in fact, it plunders and robs them. "The soldiers seize the displaced 
people's homes."281 
 
"Random firing"282 is a phrase which provokes horror and worry as people cannot expect where 
bullets may come from and when they might die. "The fire of shelling devours the buildings."283 
This is a metonymy of the hunger of the fire, that is, the hunger of the regime and its desire to 
destroy everything. The burnt and destroyed buildings seem like food for the brutal soldiers. 
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"Field liquidations and executions" (8 times) is a significance of committing crime openly and 
in public before the very eyes of the people.  This means that the regime on purpose intends to 
terrify the people more and more, or it is not ashamed of its actions so it practices them in public. 
"Slaughtering the civilians with knives" (4 times) is a signifier of savageness and sadism. The 
regime does not quench its thirst by using modern weapons like bullets which can kill from remote 
places. It also commits ancient methods of killing such as slaughter which enable the murderer of 
hearing the moaning of their victim and of seeing their blood and conceiving their pain. "Mutilation 
of bodies" (7 times) an indication that the killing does not feed the soldiers appetites; therefore, 
they resort to cutting the bodies of the killed people apart and to maiming them. This is a metonymy 
of the intensive criminality. 
"A chemical tragedy the description of whose brutality ran out of all possible expressions"284an 
indication of the regime's use of chemical bombs against the civilians. Al-Jazeera indicated the 
inability of language to describe this action. It did not explicitly mention the subject (regime) but 




The security forces’ killing of the civilians and mutilating their dead bodies.285 
 
"The regime bombs the places in which there is not any armed person" (54 times), an implicit 
message the purpose of which is to refute the veracity of the regime's propaganda about its 
confronting armed people who are destroying the country. Al-Jazeera's reports also contained 
interviews with civilians explaining how the regime bombards them although they are not armed. 
"The violence of the bombardment of the regular Syrian forces increases day by day."286 Al-
Jazeera did not mention the reasons of increasing the rate of this bombardment like, for example, 
the increase of the power of the armed opposition. It rather only referred to the regime's dense 
bombardment, which suggests for the audience that all the attacks of the Syrian army are against 
weak and powerless civilians.  
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 Al-Jazeera portrayed that the regime callously bombards to retrieve a region.  This indicates 
that the army has lost balance because of the accumulated losses. "This tank has stopped and, 
through the movement of its turret, it seems clearly that it is seeking a new target where it can send 
the missiles fed in it. It's searching again."287This literary style is a simile that portrays the tank 
like a beast waiting, and the opponents like the prey. 
 
In accordance to Al-Jazeera's coverage, the regime bombs and burns agricultural lands, and sets 
fire to the forests. This is a signifier that nothing on the Syrian land is safe from the regime's 
barbarian policy. The regime seems as if it were trying to destroy the opposition with all its power 
even if it had to burn every hand span of Syria. "It is bombarding the castles"288 is a signifier of 
underestimating the historical ruins, and a significance that the regime is not interested in heritage 
monuments. It is ready to destroy everything where the opposition forces might be entrenched. 
 
"It cuts off all the means of communication289" (5 times),"Jamming all the devices of 
communication"290, an indication that the regime isolates the Syrians from the interior and exterior 
communications. The regime fears that the means of communication may help in organizing the 
opposition activities and in coordination among its fractions.  
"It assaults and bombs hospitals" (3 times) is a signifier of a high criminal rate and a low ethical 
rate. The regular soldiers bomb the centers which treat the injured and the sick, and kill the doctors.  
 
   The channel stated 12 times that the Syrian army is air raiding the bakeries and that   causing 
the starvation of the people is one of the regime's war instruments. The regular forces bombard the 
people with rockets while the people are in the queue waiting for their turn to get their bread. This 
is a significance that encompasses a sentimental appeal in favor of the opposing armless people 
who wait in front of the bakeries for long hours seeking the loaf of bread. Al-Jazeera assured that 
targeting bakeries was not done by chance or by mistake. It was, rather, premeditated and 
purposeful.  
 
"The regime bombards olive press plants."291 This indicates that the regime bombs the local 
food sources. It is fighting the people by targeting the sources of their livelihood, disparaging their 
lives. "It knocks schools down" (5 times) is a signifier that the regular forces bombard the 
education centers, intellectually stagnating the people, depriving the children from their right to 
learn, and destroying the intellectual infrastructure as well. 
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"Shabbiha wreak havoc on the city"292 is an indication of the lowness and degradation of the 
ruling regime. Illegal armed forces are killing, threatening, and blackmailing people in order to 
realize the aims of the Syrian leadership. According to this statement, the regime does not only use 
the army soldiers and the security personnel in order to terrify the people, but it also resorts to 
employing corrupt gangs which devastate all the places they enter.  
 
Al-Jazeera used the word 'continue'. For example, "The regime's forces continue bombarding" 
or "The army continues detaining" (19 times). This shows that the violence uninterruptedly 
endures. The audience may feel that Syria is burning with the fires of the Syrian army 24/24 hours.  
The Channel indicated that the regime arrested people who belonged to Arab and western 
nationalities most of whom are journalists. This is, on one hand, an indication of the censorship 
the Syrian security imposes on media, and of having no exceptions in applying the repressing 
security policy on the other hand. That is, the regime arrests all those who oppose its opinions and 
attitudes even if they did not belong to the Syrian nationality.    
 
On Al-Jazeera's screen, the regime is accused of committing mass murder operations. This is 
through its coverage of news handling finding mass graves. This news suggests that the murderer 
hid the bodies of his victims in order to conceal the evidence of his crimes. It also suggests 
disparaging the value of the human being. The scene of the accumulated bodies suggests that the 




Discovering a mass grave committed by the regime.293 
 
"The regime enshrines the security disorder"294 is a significance that the prevailing chaos in 
Syria is planned by the regime which uses it as pretext to justify its military actions against the 
civilians.  
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"Executing dissidents, demonstrators, civilians" (10 times). Death penalty had been officially 
cancelled in Syria as it was in different countries. The channel's use of the term 'execute' indicates 
its desire to present an image of a regime which immediately kills its opinion opponents using 
illegal methods.  
The regime uses the Cultural Centers as detention places and security centers. This is a 
significance that the regular prisons are full of detainees. Therefore, the security personnel need 
more and more centers for repressing the people. 
 
The dramatizing policy with which Al-Jazeera covered the Syrian crisis included anticipation 
of events and fear-mongering towards what was going to happen next. It tried to arouse fear against 
entering new areas by the army, against a massacre, a chemical bombing, rapes, assaults, etc. This 
way of portraying things makes the audience feel that death is inevitably on the way. At the same 
time, Al-Jazeera reported that the Syrians wished that these fears would not become true. For 
example, the Channel may talk of the likelihood of a chemical attack performed by the regime's 
forces. Then adds talking that the Syrian people hope that the regime will not perform that chemical 
adventure whose disastrous results may exceed all limits295.This style provokes fear, horror, watch, 
and stress so much as it will lead the people to believe that the regime is going to perform a new 
criminal action. When Al-Jazeera states that "The Syrians hope that this disaster may not take 
place"296, "Syrians hope that the regime would not use the chemical weapon"297 and "The Syrians 
are waiting for a miracle that changes the situation of their country and rids them of what they 
suffer from."298 
 
 The Syrian citizen may subconsciously feel that the news represents them, represents their 
wishes and their fears. So, the news is true and should be believed. Sowing fear was not only 
confined to the Syrian interior, but Al-Jazeera also indicated that the conflict area was going to 
expand to reach the neighboring countries. The developments of the crisis in Syria indicate that it 
was likely to turn into a regional crisis. This proactive approach has started since the first months 
of the crisis in 2011 when the armed conflict did not begin strongly. 
 
3- Linking the Actions of the Regime's Forces to Religious Icons  
 
Al-Jazeera's coverage is full of messages suggesting that the regime is the enemy of Islam. The 
regular forces besiege, assault, bomb and destroy the mosques. That is, the regime is the enemy of 
God. Muslims believe that mosques are the homes of God on earth. "The regime bombards the 
minarets."299 Minarets are an important religious Islamic symbol. Through it, the muezzin calls to 
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prayer. That is, they do the task of summoning Muslims to perform Salat Al-Jama'ah 
(congregational prayer). 
 
The regime destroys the historical libraries of the mosques. These libraries contain valuable old 
historical Islamic books and scripts which include the city's history over the ages. This is a signifier 
of a barbaric regime, which does not respect history and tries to destroy the Muslim Sunni's 
reference books, which in turn enshrines the religious illiteracy. "Now the mosque is receiving the 
regime's rockets instead of worshippers."300, "Minarets are being destroyed but the sound of Adhan 
– calling for prayers – does not stop, and the loudspeakers are being substituted by the throats in 
the destroyed mosques in Syria during a month when mosques have been crowded by 
worshippers."301, "Syria has been famous all over the Arab and Islamic worlds for having a lot of 
minarets and mosques. The paradox is that it is today famous for the number of destroyed mosques; 
by Assad regime, which has exceeded 1450 ones."302, "All this damage in the Omayyad Mosque 
was not a result of an earthquake. It was, rather, a result of rockets which targeted an old 
civilization which dates back to hundreds of years."303, "The regular forces mined the mosque and 
withdrew."304 These are signifiers which indicate the extreme hatred and scorn of the regular forces 
towards the religious Islamic symbols. They not only bomb the mosques, but also mine them when 
they have to withdraw. This news coverage can have inflammatory and provocative impact on the 
feelings of the Muslims who cherish their religion and consequently leads them to defend it 
through protecting their worship places. 
 
The regime's forces assault and kill the mosques' religious ministers (Khatib) and the 
worshippers. They slaughter mosques' Imams with knives. This means that the soldiers commit 
the most awful barbaric and aggressive methods of murder. 
On Al-Jazeera screen, the regime destroys, starves people, murders in the holy month of 
Ramadan – the fasting month, on Al-Qadr Night – the Night of Power, on festivals and religious 
occasions. "Escalation of attacks in the month of Ramadan"305 is a significance of the armed forces 
carelessness towards the holiness of the month of Ramadan. The soldiers even increase the severity 
of their violence and murder. "Killing on Al-Qadr Night inside the mosques"306 is a signifier of the 
persistence of the regime in the desecration of the Islamic religious occasions with nothing to deter 
it from committing murder. 
 
"The regime forces forcibly entered the mosque and assaulted its Imam, Sheikh Osama Al-
Rifaie on Al-Qadr Night"307, this statement and others like it can mobilize the Muslims more and 
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302  14 July 2013."أنها تشتهر اليوم بأعداد المساجد التي دمرها نظام األسد و التي تتجاوز 1450 مسجد   "اشتهرت سوريا بكثرة مآذنها و مساجدها على مستوى العالمين العربي و اإلسالمي و المفارقة 
303  14 July 2013. "لم يلحق كل هذا الخراب بمسجد بني أمية جراء الزلزال بل كان بسبب صواريخ طالت حضارة تعود لمئات السنين  " 
304  11 December 2013. "القوات النظامية لغمت المسجد ثم انسحبت" 
305  14 August 2011, 27 August 2011. "تصعيد الهجوم بشهر رمضان" 
306  27 August 2011. "القتل في ليلة القدر داخل المساجد" 




more against the regime. They can also fuel the sectarian hatred between the Sunni Muslims and 
the other sects whose people support the regime. These statements assure that the regime is the 
enemy of God in three ways. First, it entered the mosque, the home of God, forcibly. Secondly, it 
assaulted the Imam, Al-Rifai, who is one of the greatest Muslim Sunni Damascene scholars. 
Thirdly, this was on Al-Qadr Night, the blessed and holy night for Muslims. The regime kills 
people on Fridays and after performing Jumaa prayer. This is an indication that the disbelieving 
regime kills the opposing Muslims, the pious worshippers. 
 
Al-Jazeera showed that despite the destruction and devastation which was done to most of the 
mosques, some Syrians did not show passivity towards performing their prayers in the mosques 
even if they did not exceed the number of the fingers of one hand. This is a significance that of the 
Syrians' loyalty to the duties of Islam, one of which is the perseverance on prayers.  
Al-Jazeera stated that the regime burns the Qurans. That is, it burns the holy book, the book of 
God. In a video, a young man appears carrying a burnt Quran: "Do you see, O world, O Arabs, O 
Muslims? These are Qurans, O Arabs, O world! Where are you, Muslims! Where are you? "308 
That is, O Muslims! Look how the enemy of Allah has burnt the Muslims' holy book. This is a 
sentimental appeal the aim of which is fueling the feelings of Muslims and making them take 
practical steps to put an end to the ruling regime. One repeatedly hears men shouting out ' Allah is 
the Greatest!' after the regime's forces bombard a place, especially mosques. 
 
In a video309, we can see the regime's soldiers climbing the wall of a building in order to forcibly 
enter it. We hear the voice of a young girl reading the Quran, which is a habit Muslims practice to 
protect themselves. They believe that if they read some verses from the Quran, God protects them 
and keeps them away from all evils. This video can provoke the feelings of the Islamic community, 
especially due to the trembling voice of the girl, which suggests that the regime's soldiers are going 




The security forces assault houses by jumping over the walls.310 
                                                             
308  29 December 2012. "شايفين يا عالم شايفين يا عرب يا إسالم، مصاحف، يا عرب يا عالم مصاحف هي و لك وينكن أنتو يا مسلمين وينكن" 
309  26 July 2011.  





Al-Jazeera mentioned historical icons related to the regions where the events took place. For 
instance, in Homs, the Channel recurrently pointed out the relation of this city to the shrine and 
the mosque of Khalid Ibn Al-Waleed, the prophet Muhammad's companion who was never 
defeated in a battle throughout the Islamic conquests. It employed this icon in a context which 
suggests that the regime targeted the religious Islamic symbols; exclusively, the Sunni ones, of 
course.  Al-Jazeera also employed it in a context suggesting that the citizens were the children and 
grandchildren of this hero. So, this is a significance of the necessity of not submitting to the 
authority of the regime. That is, they should resemble this leader. They should not give up; either 
victory or martyrdom. 
 
It was noticed in all the reports that the regime's soldiers spoke the accent of the people of the 
coast or mountains311. This is an implicit indication that the soldiers of the Syrian army are 
Alawites, a minority army which confronts people most of whom belong to the Sunni majority. 
The accent alone is not enough. It does not alone point out the barbarism of the Alawite sect. 
Therefore, the Channel depended on the selectivity of the pictures. The regime's soldiers appeared 
hitting harshly and saying filthy words to the detainees calling them the names of animals: "Speak! 
You, dog."312, "Come on. Bark!"313, "Come on. Bray like a donkey!"314.  Even when they 
investigated a detainee, their loud voices and their tone suggested their disrespect of the people. 
They also suggest the lack of moral codes which control the investigation and maintain the dignity 
of the detainees. The effect of this sort of videos is tremendous when the detainee is a mosque's 
Imam, which is a signifier that the symbols of the Sunni sect are disparaged and humiliated.  
 
(26-27) 
                                 
The security forces’ humiliation of the detainees.315 
 
                                                             
311  The accents in Syria differ from a province to another, a city to another and a village to another. Most of the Alawites live on the coast or the mountains. They use the thick and 
strong accents of these regions.  
312  20 June 2011, 27 November 2011. "احكي وال كلب" 
313  27 November 2011. "عوي وال" 
314  27 November 2011. "شهنق متل الحمار يال وال" 




According to Al-Jazeera, the regime destroys the churches and does not respect the religious 
symbols. However, the channel's mention of the churches was accidental. Its concentration on the 
Islamic symbols was much more frequent. Pointing out the assault of the different religious 
symbols is an implicit message which indicates that the regime is the enemy of all religions. It is 
an extremist secular regime so all the parties should stand steadfastly against it. 
 
4- The Images which Deal with the Regular Military Activity 
 
There is an additional factor which contributed to exaggerating the image of the regime as a 
beast. Besides Al-Jazeera's selectivity of the vocabulary and the media personnel's voice tone, the 
images taken by the mobile phones had an immense role in giving an impression on the gravityof 
the situation in Syria. Most of these images were absolutely misty and blurred. Vibrating images 
where the activist moves violently from one shot to the other, quickly and sharply moving the 
camera angle from left to right or up and down. This helps to create a mental image of unrest, 




During suppressing the demonstrations, the security forces seem more like gangs than government forces.316 
 
Some images were utterly dark. Sometimes we hear the activist’s voice documenting the setting 
of the video or telling how far the people were horrified by the regime’s forces. In fact, the darkness 
of these images dramatically suggests that the regime’s soldiers are similar to a beast waiting for 
the people. This beast might suddenly appear at any time to devour these civilians. Selecting videos 
like these by the Channel shows its intention of demonizing the regime and reassuring the 





                                                             








An image which is void of a clear content and the news text is about the assaults of the security forces on the 
people.317 
 
The images that cover the activities of the regime’s soldiers are diversified.  Sometimes they 
are shown carrying guns and machine-guns, waiting for the movements of the demonstrators or 
civilians, ready to shoot them. Sometimes they are shown hooded, an implicit significance that 
they are unofficial military forces (Shabbiha), arresting and murdering people in the streets and 
torturing the detainees. Moreover, they are shown treading and humiliating the detainees by 




The security forces run over the demonstrators. The shaky images may increase the effect of the content on the 
recipient.318 
 
Veiled women wearing hijab appeared trying to save a detainee from the hands of the security 
personnel. The videos also included images of soldiers forcibly entering the homes or deployed in 
an area so as to perform a military action. All these images were taken by the mobile phone 
cameras. The photographers were opponents who zoomed them in, which made the images more 
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fearful as the vibration rate was doubled. Other photographers were regime supporters or regular 
soldiers, which suggests the fact that these soldiers were boasting of what they did against the 
people. 
 
While the regime was sending tanks and armored vehicles to the governorates and cities of 
Syria, the civilians used to take photos and videos of them by their mobile phone cameras from 
their private cars. The communication technology was the most important factor of transmitting 
the internal events out into the external world. Many channels adopted the videos of the Syrians 
as the only source which told the world about what was taking place on the Syrian land. 
There were a variety of the images of tanks. Sometimes we would see them during firing 
through the turrets. On other occasions, we would see them running to be redeployed in other 
places. The Syrians' stealthy photographing of these tanks helped demonize the regime's forces. 
The videos were so misty and vibrating that the tanks seemed extremely horrible. The audience 




Taking a remote picture of a Syrian army’s tank with a mobile phone lens.319 
 
Images of the regime's helicopters and aircrafts appeared either when they were only flying or 
when they were bombarding the parts of the cities. Other images were also taken where one can 
see the rocket falling down then hitting the target and exploding causing enormous smoke. These 
shots showed how the people prepared their cameras waiting for the rockets and the artillery 
missiles in order to catch another evidence which showed the Syrian government's crimes against 







                                                             







The Syrian army’s aircrafts bombard the civilians.320 
 
Many of the studied reports started with the sounds of gun and artillery firing. Images 
suggesting destruction and devastation were attached to these reports. Then the news stories 
started. This method suggests that the images are talking and that the crimes of the regime can 
never be denied. It also prepares the audience's mind to accept all the points which the report is 
going to handle later. This is because the simple audience whose experience lacks the way to verify 
the source and the origin of the image will certainly believe that the Channel is stating the facts as 
they really happened. They can hear the bombardment with their own ears and see the devastation 
with their own eyes. 
Many of the videos which deal with the regime's activity do not include images of soldiers, 
tanks, helicopters or aircrafts. These contents were substituted by something else which is the 
smoke which comes up after the bombardment. Smoke has become a signifier and a symbol. It 
denotes the regime's military operations. Seeing smoke is enough to make us understand that the 
regime's forces are bombarding. Moreover, the impact of smoke increases when it is linked to 




The smoke is an indication of the regime’s bombardment / Smoke is a substitute of the images of the Syrian 
army soldiers.321 
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Linking the smoke resulting from the Syrian army’s bombard to the minaret.322 
 
The devastation on Al-Jazeera's screen was enormous: destroyed homes, burned cars, smoke 
coming up everywhere due to bombing. This devastation is frequently connected to the regime's 
bombing and aggression. That is, Al-Jazeera never referred to the conflict between the government 
forces and the armed opposition as a reason for this devastation. This helped keep the image of the 
armed opposition clean; its soldiers never destroy or kill the people. They only accurately target 
the regime in order not to hurt the civilians.  
 
In many of the studied reports, the time interval between the camera shot and the other was 
short and fast. This rhythm does not allow the recipient's mind any time to concentrate on a certain 
point. It rather may create a situation of tension inside the audience that makes them project their 
feelings and emotions on the events. That is, this tension will motivate them to think that the 
situation is disastrous in reality. 
In many images, the content was not clear. For instance, we might only see dark images and 
hear the sound of shooting, or watch images of houses or of a road. These images were taken by a 
shaking mobile phone in the hands of a man who was running. We only hear the gasping of this 
man or the sound of feet moving fast. These images do not have a clear content but spur the 
imagination of the recipient who might imagine that the security personnel are chasing the 
photographer in order to kill him, or that the mobile owner is running so that he could closely take 
the images of the events, or that the mobile holder is stealthily taking the images which led him 
not to focus on a clear target. 
This selectivity also clarifies how the Channel builds its news up and affects the audience 
through depending on images which have no direct sense. the Channel is the one which creates 





                                                             




5 – The Regime's Actions Against the Free Army and the Armed Factions 
 
Al-Jazeera did not concentrate on the regime's actions against the armed opposition. 
Syntactically speaking, it hardly used sentences in which the regime is a 'subject' against an 'object' 
– the opposition. For example, the forces of the army and the security raided the armed opposition 
centers or destroyed its positions.  Al-Jazeera employed terms such as "battles" and "clashes" to 
express the regime's fighting with the armed opposition. These terms dwarf the regular army and 
portrays it as equivalent in power to the opposition army as the word battles does not linguistically 
mean the presence of one 'subject' but two or more. 
 
6 – The Regime's Propaganda 
 
Especially in 2011, Al-Jazeera recalled the pillars of the regime's propaganda. It introduced the 
factors of the propaganda for many purposes: firstly, proving its credibility, that is, its news 
contains the attitudes and opinions of the different parties of the conflict. Secondly, directly or 
indirectly mocking the Syrian government. Thirdly, discrediting the governmental propaganda 
explicitly or implicitly (hinting), and proving the innocence of the opposition of the charges which 
the regime makes against it. 
 
Al-Jazeera employed words and statements that aroused doubt in the credibility of the regime 
and the Syrian media. "Damascus charges what it describes as armed gangs"323. Al-Jazeera did not 
state that Damascus charged armed gangs. The Channel rather used the term "what it describes as" 
armed gangs. This is a significance that the term "armed gangs" is doubtful as governments usually 
give names which serve the goals of their propaganda. "The alleged gang", "The alleged terrorists" 
(7 times) are a hint that these gangs are only a lie created by the regime. "The authorities continue 
their talk of armed gangs"324, "The authority's media continued saying"325, "The authorities repeat 
taking about assumed  armed people"326, "The authority people repeat their words and tirelessly 
talk about chasing the armed gangs which terrified the people327" that is, without getting tired or 
bored the regime is disparaging the minds of people. In the Arab culture, the term “tirelessly” is 
sometimes used to express displeasure and to disprove the speaker.  
 
The most prominent pillars of the regime's propaganda Al-Jazeera recalled were: Armed gang 
stand behind the events, the gangs are financed by regional and international parties and the armed 
gangs store the arms and ammunitions inside the mosque. The regime was trying to justify its 
raiding of the mosques through this propaganda, yet Al-Jazeera assured that the mosques had no 
weapons and that the demonstrations were hundred per cent peaceful. 
                                                             
323 23 March 2011, 29 March 2011. Synonyms have been repeated 64 times. "تتهم دمشق ما تصفها بعصابات مسلحة" 
324 29 March 2011. "تواصل السلطات حديثها عن عصابات مسلحة" 
325  11 April 2011. "واصلت وسائل إعالم السلطة قولها" 
326  11 April 2011. "تكرر السلطات الحديث عن مسلحين مُفترضين" 




"Armed gangs availed the opportunity of the arising disorder and shot the two parties aiming at 
creating a sectarian strife"328. Al-Jazeera's journalists used to talk in a tone suggesting disparaging 
this propaganda as if they were trying to say: 'What is the purpose of the opposition to create a 
sectarian strife?' 
 
"It's a great conspiracy where the sectarian strife has been mixed with the reformation demands 
and the daily needs of people"329, "The authority's media continued assuring the story of infiltrated 
conspirators who work to implement external conspiracies and shoot both the protestors and the 
authority men"330, "The regime's media machine tirelessly goes on reiterating the same repeated 
account of an external conspiracy and terrorist armed gangs which horrify the citizens and try to 
abort the reformation process that will make Syria a model of democracy in the region"331, Al-
Jazeera's journalists tried to prove the Syrian Government's incredibility with a sarcastic style that 
leads one to feel their disgust of the elements of the government propaganda. This appears through 
the selectivity of the vocabulary items and the voice tone which are accompanied by images that 
extremely contradict the propaganda of the Syrian authorities. 
"They are not armed gangs as the regime's account states. They are rather soldiers who defected 
their country's army when it decided to direct its weapons towards the armless citizens."332This is 
an explicit discrediting of the regime propaganda. 
 
The Channel recalled terms that have been used by the official Syrian media: "Tranquility 
prevails in the country"333, "Normal life prevailed all over the governorates"334, however, no 
sooner did Al-Jazeera do that than it followed up with the counter propaganda accompanied by 
cheers or by the voices of people terrified by the sound of firing. The Channel denied and 
discredited the withdrawal of the army after it accomplished its tasks as the official Syrian media 
stated. 
 
A pillar of the regime's propaganda was its performing of reformations on all levels. The 
Channel was always careful to throw doubt on the government's promises and the alleged 
reformations. "As for the government's old and renewed account of a political reformation, it 
remains mere promises looking for a way to be implemented."335 This is a significance that this 
government promised to perform reformations years ago but did not implement anything. It is still 
lying and anesthetizing the people's anger with words rather than deeds. The national dialogue was 
a suggestion of the regime's in 2011. The government took care to listen to the demands, criticisms 
                                                             
328  29 March 2011. "عصابات مسلحة انتهزت فرصة الفوضى الناشئة لتطلق النار على الطرفين سعيا إلى زرع فتنة طائفية" 
329  30 March 2011. "هي مؤامرة كبرى جرى فيها خلط الفتنة مع مطالب اإلصالح و احتياجات الناس اليومية" 
330  11 April 2011."واصلت وسائل إعالم السلطة تأكيد قصة المندسين المتآمرين الذين يعملون لتنفيذ مؤمرات خارجية و يطلقون النار على المحتجين و رجال السلطة سواء بسواء"  
331  14 October 2011. 
تواصل آلة إعالم السلطة دون كلل أوملل ترديد الرواية المتكررة عن مؤامرة خارجية و عصابات إرهابية مسلحة تروع المواطنين و تحاول إجهاض عملية اإلصالح التي ستجعل سورية نموذجا للديقراطية في المنطقة" "  
332  25 November 2011. "ليسوا عصابات مسلحة على ما تذهب إليه رواية النظام بل جنود انشقوا عن جيش بالدهم الوطني منذ قرر توجيه أسلحته نحو المدنيين العزل " 
333  02 April 2011. "هدوء يعم البالد" 
334  02 April 2011. "حياة طبيعية كانت تسود المحافظات" 




and viewpoints of the people. It promised to perform changes that will meet the people's ambitions, 
then started performing constitutional and legal amendments during the first months of the crisis 
in 2011. However, Al-Jazeera devoted itself to abort this dialogue. It assured the necessity of 
excluding the idea of negotiating the current authority as it is politically and ethically disqualified 
to lead the country. The Channel extremely disparaged the government's reformations. It assured 
that the people have no desire whatsoever to dialogue with the murderer. Their only wish is 
overthrowing the ruling regime. So how will they dialogue with the one who daily raises the 
volume of his depression? Who will the regime dialogue with if all its opponents are either outside 
the country or inside the regime's prisons? Can any promised reformation be straightforward side 
by side with a continuous violation of the simplest human rights in Syria? In order to undermine 
the credibility of the government's promises, Al-Jazeera mobilized an enormous number of the 
opponents' viewpoints and attitudes. Al-Jazeera's media staff rarely uncovered their own opinions. 
This style makes the Channel innocent of any charges of being aligned. Rather, it appears as if it 
were just conveying the opponents' viewpoints. 
 
In the context of its coverage of the reformations, Al-Jazeera reported declarations and 
viewpoints of Syrian officials. This reporting gives the impression of its neutralism and objectivity, 
but through analyzing the context of these declarations, the officials seem naïve and stupid 
disparaging the minds of the people. For instance, the report presents images of victims, funerals, 
mass graves and severe bombardment accompanied by screams of terrified people running away 
from the regime's brutality. Then a Syrian official appears to talk about forming committees for 
studying the Emergency-Law, the Parties Law, and the Media Law, or about forming a statistics 
committee for the census of the Kurds in northern Syria. In this way, the Channel does not need to 
verbally disparage or make fun of the government's promises. This style could have an immense 
psychological impact on the recipient; the Syrian audience may be filled with hatred towards the 
government and the officials. The recipient may be filled with wrath and have a feeling of 
disability. He/she may be charged with a “negative energy” against the regime. This energy may 
only be discharged by verbal or non-verbal violence. If the channel's media personnel had frankly 
and directly said that the Syrian officials were liars and hypocrites who were killing the people 
and not performing any reformations, the recipient might not have been as much angry as when 
they use the indirect and provoking style. The direct and straightforward style could be considered 
one of the means of discharging the suppressed energy of the opponent people against the regime. 
The indirect style, on the other hand, increases pressure and could lead to an “emotional 
explosion”. However, to ensure the validity of this idea, it is necessary to adopt different methods 
that enable us to know the recipient´s reaction toward the explicit and implicit messages. 
 
There are other examples about the synchronization between officials' declarations and images 
that contradict the content of those declarations. The presidential adviser assured in many reports 




not to shoot the citizens. At the same time, we heard the shooting of a gun or a machine gun 
accompanied by the images of the feet of horrified people running away. 
At the time when Al-Jazeera mentioned that the Syrian government issued laws which were 
compatible with the reformation policy like the abolition of the Emergency-Law, it used to show 
images of soldiers rampaging the buildings and trying to forcibly enter the homes. 
 
The Channel criticized the mechanism of the official Syrian media, especially during its 
coverage of explosions which the regime charged terrorists of performing. Al-Jazeera hinted that 
those explosions were done by the regime. For example, Al-Jazeera reported the Syrian Space 
Channel's security analysis of the results of an explosion ten minutes after it took place. The result 
of the report was that extremist terrorists committed this act. Al-Jazeera hinted through its coverage 
that, on one hand, the Syrian media was lying and that, on the other hand, the regime was the one 
responsible for that explosion. Otherwise, how could the Syrian Security personnel decide who 
the doer was within ten minutes? Then Al-Jazeera recalled statements the opposition issued 
denying its responsibility for the explosions. This indicates that Al-Jazeera seeks the acquittal of 
the opposition of the charges which the Syrian authorities attribute to it. "This time, the government 
channel coolly handled the two explosions. It did not hastily announce how they happened whether 
by mined cars or suicide bombers as it used to do."336Through these expressions, Al-Jazeera 
intends to indicate that the Syrian Space Channel took into consideration Al-Jazeera's previous 
criticism of its speed in deciding the data of those explosions and the identity of the person who 
implemented them. "Why does terrorism hit the regions most involved in the revolution?"337, this 
is an implicit message the aim of which is irrevocably discrediting the regime. That is, the 
opposition can by no means perform explosions in the areas where its supporters and children live. 
 
As for the explosions which hit the security and government centers, Al-Jazeera also threw 
doubt on the regime's propaganda which charged the terrorists of committing them. The Channel 
employed hinting expressions: "The alleged terrorist guerilla came uncovering itself in the heart 
of Damascus, a fortified castle of the regime's."338This is an implicit message; how could these 
terrorist groups enter strongly guarded security areas known for being impossible to be assaulted? 
"Then, Al-Qaeda Organization is moving freely across the borders targeting the Syrian security 
forts leading the conspiracy against Al-Assad's regime in agreement with the United States which 
is chasing it."339This is an explicit direct sarcasm of the regime's propaganda concerning Al-
Qaeda's targeting of government centers. 
 
Al-Jazeera indicated that the insecurity entirely served the regime. It was able to justify 
continuing the bombardment and the military operations against the civilians under the pretext that 
it was fighting the armed terrorists who were assaulting the people and the public property. "The 
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337  06 January 2012.  "لماذا يضرب اإلرهاب أكثر المناطق انخراطا بالثورة؟" 
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disc of targeting Syria due to its resistant and reluctant stance is being replayed, as if the Syrian 
people, by attaining their freedom and having the opportunity of choosing their leadership 
democratically, would elect those who would make them surrender to their enemies who occupy 
their land."340 This is a significance suggesting the discontent of Al-Jazeera with the regime's 
propaganda's repetition of the regime's role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also suggests that Al-
Jazeera tried to portray the opposition as a national one whose foremost enemy is Israel, and that 
it will not yield or negotiate with the Israeli aggression which occupies its land. The opposition 
will rather fight it. One of the most eminent pillars of the regime's propaganda on Al-Jazeera's 
screen was the role of the Muslim Brothers Party and the other fundamentalist organizations in 
ravaging the country and shaking its security and stability.   
"The infiltrated people", "Those who try to destabilize Syria", "Those who are involved in the 
famous universal conspiracy."341 (64 times) All these phrases, used by pro-regime media, were 
stated on Al-Jazeera in an ironic discrediting tone. 
 
The Syrian media always criticized the pro-opposition media describing them as the stations of 
calumny, incitement and fabrication which direct continuous propaganda in order to undermine 
the stability of Syria and the security of its citizens. Al-Jazeera recalled these media attitudes and 
presented them in a sarcastic way. When the Syrian Space Channel was denying the news about 
discovering a mass grave and charging the incitement stations of lying, Al-Jazeera was confidently 
showing the charges directed to it by the Syrian Space Channel accompanied by images of a mass 
grave and decayed bodies. 
 
During covering the massacres which were a result of the chemical weapon, many official 
Syrian statements denying this news were declared. Al-Jazeera recalled these televised statements, 
the statement of the General Leadership of the Army and the Armed Forces: "The Leadership 
assures that these allegations are null in every detail. They are totally invalid and fall under the 
dirty media war led by some countries."342Al-Jazeera attached images of chemical victims to this 
statement. The Channel did not verbally discredit the regime's propaganda but presented images 
which were utterly contradictory to the statement.  
 
The Syrian government television tried to prove that the people come out of the mosques 
cheering to the life of the president and swear at the armed gangs. Al-Jazeera recalled this type of 
news coverage and commented on it. For instance, "Soldiers, a photographer and Shabbiha, and 
everything is ready in front of the Damascene Al-Qaboon Mosque."343 This is an implicit message 
which means that the Syrian security personnel have prepared everything. They have brought the 
photographers and the soldiers with their guns and lined in front of the mosque. So, when the 
worshippers came out, they were afraid and compulsorily started cheering to Al-Assad. 
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While the pro-regime channels were promoting the phrase: 'It's over', an indication that the 
crisis has finished, Al-Jazeera was promoting the anger of the Syrian street with this phrase344. The 
Channel was disparaging the pro-regime media as well as the officials who are unable to see the 
truth. The crisis, according to Al-Jazeera, has not ended and will not end before Al-Assad has 
stepped down and before the regime has been thrown down. 
 
Al-Jazeera discredited the regime's propaganda which stated that 'the people asked the army to 
interfere in their regions in order to protect them from the armed terrorist groups', and that 'the 
army has purified the cities from the armed gangs and regained security and tranquility.' Al-Jazeera 
denied the credibility of the governmental information through asking why haven't the refugees 
come back to these regions so long as they have become secure as the regime states? 
 
As usual, the pro-regime channels used to charge the armed terrorists, the lawbreakers, the 
extremists of committing the explosions in Syria. Al-Jazeera used to convey the propagandas of 
both conflicting parties in Syria every time an explosion takes place. It wanted to prove its 
credibility. At the same time, the Channel tried to maintain the mental image that the regime was 
behind these explosions in order to charge the opposition. Then, Al-Jazeera adopted two methods 
to realize this aim: the media personnel used a tone which suggested that the regime was 
responsible for all the criminal scenes in Syria, or they presented information about the explosion 
site, the surrounding areas, the security intensification, preventing all people from entering except 
on basis of a security permission, and the control cameras on all sides of the site etc. The aim of 
this information is indirectly assuring that the regime, not the opposition, was the doer.  Al-Jazeera 
repeatedly indicated that the explosions took place before important events such as international 
conferences, the Arab committees entering into Syria, or discussing the UN Resolutions and so on. 
This is a significance that the regime devises these events in order to urge the Arab and 
international officials to make decisions which serve its interests. 
 
Al-Jazeera so much targeted the regime that it sometimes took no notice of the human being as 
it should do when it came to covering the explosions. When an explosion took place, the Channel 
did not concentrate on the human situation such as the dead or the injured. It rather concentrated 
more on proving the responsibility of the regime for the explosion. The victims seemed during the 
explosions as if they were of no interest. This gives the impression that the Channel trading in the 
identity of the victims. What is meant here is that when the victims were opponent civilians who 
were killed as a result of the regime's bombing, Al-Jazeera would greatly show them. However, 
the explosion victims were unidentified people who do not have a completely clear political 
identity; they could be pro or ant-regime, or maybe neutral. In this case, the Channel did not give 
priority to talking about the victims. It rather wholly tried to discredit the regime's propaganda. 
 
                                                             




In one of the videos345which covered an explosion, Al-Jazeera reported scenes from a pro-
regime channel. These scenes showed a veiled woman speaking loudly. She was screaming out of 
fear and agony: "So, this is their freedom, that's what their freedom is like.346" These phrases 
indicate that the people are against the opposition. They do not support its slogans about freedom; 
the opposition performs explosions and murders innocent people. On the face of it, the recipient 
may wonder: Does Al-Jazeera want to say that the pro-regime people are right to stand against the 
opposition and to reject its behavior? Has Al-Jazeera started to feel that the armed people are the 
ones who stand behind these crimes? But no; Al-Jazeera actually showed these scenes to reassure 
that the regime commits the crimes to make the people afraid, pressured and confused. The regime 
is leading the people to choose between security or freedom. That is, the regime led them to believe 
that there are armed gangs which want to murder them. Therefore, the citizen has no choice but to 
agree to their protection by the government forces and to stop supporting the revolutionary 
movement. 
 
"And as for its347 lens, it wandered after a few minutes in the site of the two explosions to show 
the work of the bulldozers and vehicles removing the remnants while the dead bodies were 
scattered everywhere. The barriers and obstacles are removed away from the crime scene to give 
way to the government correspondent who moves around the victims' body parts picking some of 
them up."348 The Syrian media looks in this comment like the spoiled child who the regime allows 
to cover events like these while other media are prevented from doing so. This exclusivity and 
limiting of media coverage to the Syrian media suggests that the regime is being targeted by the 
armed groups. Therefore, Al-Jazeera has spotlighted the mechanism of the Syrian media and 
disparaged it in order to discredit the government and its propaganda.  
 
Al-Jazeera employed a variety of methods to discredit the regime's propaganda. Firstly, it 
employed a sarcastic or rejecting voice tone. For example, the Channel resorted to this method 
when it used to report the propaganda which assured that there were armed terrorists who terrified 
the people and removed their property. Secondly, ordering the propagandas inside the news 
account; that is, Al-Jazeera used to mention the regime's propaganda first then crushes it with the 
opposition's one which was presented in a voice tone that suggests the credibility of the latter. 
Thirdly, the images talk. For instance, the Channel used to present a video where the Syrian 
officials deny that a massacre had happened. At the same time, it showed images of a large number 
of victims. This method is very impressive since the refusal of the regime's propaganda is not 
verbal but through images. The image says to the regime: "You are a liar." 
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There are other elements of the regime's propaganda: the military end game, the regime's army 
is advancing after killing some of the terrorists, Syria's chemical weapon was a response to Israel's 
possession of nuclear weapons. It is not directed towards the interior use, and Syria knows that the 
chemical weapon is going to be a pretext for external interference as what happened in Iraq. 
 
"The military end game that Al-Assad is trying to realize is one which he has been unable to 
end till now. That's what the facts of the field and the blood-soaked revolution's diary 
assure."349The Channel disparages the regime's propaganda related to the military activity which 
is going to resolve the conflict in favor of the Syrian army. Al-Jazeera tried to create a situation of 
equilibrium between two images. The first one portrays the regime as a brutal one, armed with the 
heaviest weapons, bombarding every single patch of the Syrian land. The second shows the 
regime's inability to realize a military victory. This equilibrium aims to mobilize the Syrian, Arab 
and international public opinion against the regime. At the same time, it helps to boost the morale 
of the armed opposition and the opponent civilians as well. 
 
7– The Regime's Weapons as They Appeared on Al-Jazeera Channel 
 
Taking into consideration that the Channel never reported the armed opposition's losses, nor 
the regime's victories in confronting this opposition, it is necessary to notice that mentioning the 
weapons the regime's forces use suggests that they are absolutely using them against the unarmed, 
peaceful, civilian people, not against the armed gangs. 
 
According to Al-Jazeera, the regime did not save any means to use, starting with tear gases, 
boiling water and acid in order to deter the demonstrators, and ending with the chemical weapon. 
"The barrel bombs remain one of a huge arsenal the Syrian regime continued using to bombard the 
cities and towns."350, "The only difference between a weapon and another is only the rate of 
devastation and the number of victims and homeless."351 
 
The Channel adopted various methods of showing the weapon types the regime uses. The first 
one is generalization. For example, "The regime's war machine"352, "The regime is using all kinds 
of weapons"353 are phrases which the Channel used to assure that the Syrian army is killing the 
people with all methods. 
The second method is the partial identification. For instance, "The regime's bombs" (3 times), 
"The regime's rockets" (16 times), the weapon is a bomb or a rocket but it is partial identification. 
The Channel does not exactly identify which type of bombs or rockets they are. "Military vehicles" 
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(9 Times) is a land weapon, a partial identification. "The security bullets" (12 times) is also a 
partial identification. the Channel does not tell if it is guns, machine guns, or pistols bullets. 
The third method is macro identification of the type and name of the weapon like; mortars354, 
MIG-21 aircrafts (4 times).  
The fourth method is not mentioning weapons at all. This method unleashes the imagination of 
the recipient. For example, "The regime’s forces have started targeting a town since morning"355.  
In modern wars, all types of essential weapons - on land, at sea and in air – function as an 
integrated system that confronts the enemy. In the battles in Syria, land and air forces were 
employed more than the naval ones. This is because most or the majority of the battlefields lie in 
the interior away from the coast356. Al-Jazeera mentioned that the Navy are participating in the 
war against the armless Syrian people. This suggests that the Syrian people are between the jaws 
of the carnivorous regime. The armed forces are shooting and bombing the civilians from land, air 
and sea. So, this is a horrible situation which requires an Arab and international movement to save 
this victimized people. Spotlighting the Navy is an additional signifier which proves that the Syrian 
coast has entered the line of events and the revolution. So, it forms a great danger on the safety of 
the ruling regime as a large part of the Alawite sect lives in the villages and towns of the Syrian 
coast. 
The regime's use of the Navy is a significance of its great fear of the popular movement in the 
coastal regions. This movement may overthrow it and even tragically claim the lives of the civilian 
pro-regime Alawites in addition to the lives of the regime's soldiers. 
 
'The Barrel Bombs' (3 times) is a signifier of large indiscriminate destruction because they are 
considered as an undirected weapon; "The death barrels are cheap, severely destructive, 
indiscriminately directed and harvest lives in tens."357 
'The Fighter Jets'358 is a term which suggests that the regime is using the most modern lethal 
weapons – the Air Force – against the civilians. Most of the aircrafts used in the Syrian battles are 
fighter jets like MIG 21 and MIG 23.  
'The Rocket Launchers' (6 times) are a weapon that ensures a high firing density which helps 
the Land Forces during their assaulting of the enemy's areas. Al-Jazeera largely pointed out this 
type of weapons. Its aim was overemphasizing the image of the brutal regime, the destructive lethal 
incendiary beast.  
 
'The Cluster Bombs' (4 times) are employed to attack a variety of targets such as armored 
vehicle and individuals. They can also start fires.  
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'The Vacuum Bombs'359 are a weapon employed for the underground targets such as shelters, 
storehouses, and tunnels as the classical weapons are unable to penetrate these places. It is notable 
here to remind that Al-Jazeera's news accounts did not mention that the regime used these weapons 
against the armed opposition. That is why it seemed to be using them against the armless people. 
 
'The phosphorus Bombs'360 are a weapon that burns the human body so that only the bones 
remain. Inhaling this weapon for a short or a long time has destructive effects on the human health. 
Highlighting this weapon is a signifier that the regime uses internationally prohibited weapons. It 
is also a significance that life in Syria has become nearly impossible as bombs burn all human or 
non-human lives. 
 
'Internationally prohibited chemical weapons'361 is a significance that the regime wants to 
entirely wipe out the people as the chemical weapons are a type of mass destruction weapons that 
wipe out all living things and pollute the natural environment. 
 
'Surface-to-surface missiles' (4 times) which are a devastating weapon that enables the military 
forces to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy. This indicates the regime's fear and its 
inability to face the opposition armed gangs, which in turn is a significance of the regime's brutality 
in murdering the people. 
 
 8 - Regional Signifiers 
 
Al-Jazeera used different methods in presenting the names of the regions where the regime 
performed its military activities. First, many times it listed the names of a large number of regions 
which may have reached twenty from all over Syria in a fast rhythm which suggested that the 
regime's campaigns were like the torrent which carried away everything in its course; that Syria 
was burning with the fires of bombardment; and that the prisons everywhere in the country were 
crowded. This method makes all the governorates, towns, villages and quarters of the country 
important regional icons. Second, the Channel adopted the method of generalization and not 
mentioning the names of any region. For example, "One city after the other under the firing of the 
regime's army"362, "Military campaigns from the east to the north and center of Syria"363. Such 
phrases set the imagination of the recipient free. This imagination is affected by the individual 
experience, the political, social and religious affiliation. So, if the recipient were an extremist anti-
regime person, he/she would imagine that all the regions of Syria are exposed to assaults by the 
government forces. However, if the recipient were pro-regime, he/she might think that the regular 
military forces are fighting the terrorists in many regions of Syria. What is meant here is that the 
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affiliation of the recipient mentally re-portrays the events regardless of the channel's intention and 
aim of using certain expressions. 
 
 The third method was handling the events in few regions. The fourth method which Al-Jazeera 
adopted in presenting the number of regions was concentrating on one region and highlighting it 
as a symbol of challenging the blood-stained policy of the regime: Homs, "The revolution's 
capital"364, "Homs which discovered the meaning of patience in facing the oppressing 
governor."365According to the opposition, Homs was nominated as the revolution's capital because 
it challenged the weapons of the Syrian army and the security peacefully and for a long time, and 
because the regime's forces practiced the ugliest types of bombardment and repression on it.  
 
Hama, "In the Syrian conscience it has been connected to what is called the Century's 
Massacre."366 367 This is an implicit message which means that the city of Hama – most of its 
inhabitants belong to the Sunni sect - suffered from the regime's crimes years ago, and now it is 
again suffering from its bombardment and murder. The symbolism of this region is very important 
since it is able to stir up the feelings of the Sunni sect against the regular forces as well as all its 
supporters in the society. 
 
Deir-Ezzour, according to Al-Jazeera, the specialty of Deir-Ezzour makes things more 
complicated. This is a hint to the situation of the clans and their attitude which is an implicit 
message through which the Channel wanted to present the clans as opponents of the regime 
contrary to the regime's propaganda that strongly show the loyalty of the clans and their sheikhs 
to the regime. Al-Jazeera indicated that governorates like Deir-Ezzour and Daraa form what is 
called the human store of the recruited soldiers. the Channel wanted to state indirectly that the 
regime's bombardment of these regions is a significance of its weakness and losing control on 
things as most of the soldiers of the Syrian army defectors and joined the armed opposition. It 
should be, mentioned here that the majority of the inhabitants of these regions are Sunnis. This is 
a hint that the soldiers who belong to the Sunni sect are dissenting to fight against the regular army 
forces (Alawites). 
 
The coastal city of Latakia, the importance of this region arises from its being in the vicinity of 
the pro-regime Alawite villages. This icon is also a significance that the Alawite regime murders 
only the Sunnis. It bombards the Sunni sect, the inhabitants of the city, while the Alawites enjoy 
security and peace in the surrounding villages. 
Al-Raml Quarter in Latakia, this quarter is inhabited by Palestinian refugees. Al-Jazeera 
reported that it was targeted by warships and naval vessels. This is a significance that the 
Palestinians are opponents of the regime's policy and that the regime is killing them with very 
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heavy weapons. This is a message which tries to rebut the government propaganda which presents 
Palestinians as supporters of the Syrian policy. 
 
According to the channel, many quarters have become symbols of suffering. Many quarters 
have emerged as symbols of enduring the regime's criminality such as Bab-Sbaa and Baba-Amr in 
Homs. 
Daraa, it is one of the southern Syrian governorates. Al-Jazeera highlighted it as an 
uncontrollable governorate despite the violent military campaigns against it.  
Damascus Suburb, the Channel repeatedly highlighted this governorate. It surrounds Damascus 
and has a great effect on the regime. Highlighting the military activity in Damascus Suburb is 
considered an implicit message which suggests that the regime's army is very afraid of the increase 
of the opposition's power. Therefore, it condenses its campaigns on this governorate. 
 
Damascus, Al-Jazeera assured that the capital is not far from what is going on in Syria and that 
the assault and detainment campaigns are still recorded in many quarters. These are messages 
which aim to refute the regime's propaganda about tranquility and security which prevail in the 
capital and that the Damascene people support the regime. Al-Jazeera concentrated on showing 
the military actions against the Imams of the mosques in Damascus as the city is a religious capital 
of the Sunni Muslims as well. 
"The cities are exhausted by continuous bombardment."368The Channel assimilated the cities 
and governorates to women who were tired and exhausted by the regime's assaults369. 
 
9 – The Channel's Criticism of the Regime 
 
It was proved that Al-Jazeera criticized sometimes directly (explicit method), other times 
indirectly (implicit method). The most prominent criticisms which were directed to the Syrian 
government were as follows: 
The regime does not keep all the promises it makes to many international parties. This indicates 
the incredibility of the Syrian authorities towards the international society. "The authorities insist 
on the security policy as a single option in handling the crisis"370 is a criticism that aims at assuring 
the bankruptcy of the government. It is poor since it does not have any solutions and killing is its 
only method. "The regime is not ready to any serious procedure to resolve the crisis"371 is a 
significance of the carelessness of the regime towards the situation and suffering of the people. 
"There are no exceptions in the policy of repressing the demonstrators by the security forces"372 
that is nobody is safe from the aggressiveness of the security forces which kill the kids, the women, 
the elders, the sick and so on. "The soldiers perform campaigns against those whose loyalty to the 
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regime is doubtful"373 is a criticism which shows a severe and extremely tough dictatorship whose 
forces spread everywhere detaining and murdering everyone who does not support its policy.  
 
Al-Jazeera criticized the Syrian army, stating that it deviated away from its essential task which 
is protecting the people to the protection of the regime. "The dogma of the Syrian army has changed 
so greatly that the demonstrators have become the first enemy of the assumed home guards. The 
tank which had mistaken its Israeli enemy that has been occupying the Golan Heights374 for over 
40 years found in the flesh of the Syrians a compensation for that of the enemies and started killing 
unrestrainedly."375This is a criticism that discredits the regime's propaganda which shows that the 
Syrian army is resistant and anti-Israel and that it is the only Arab army which preserves the dignity 
of the Arab nation a large number of whose rulers has yielded to the Zionist will. Al-Jazeera tried 
to state that the regime's tanks are killing the people but leave the occupier in the Syrian Golan 
Heights for more than 40 years. The Channel likened the tank to a hungry beast which cannot eat 
the Israeli enemy. Therefore, it looked for a substitute to silence its hunger and the Syrian flesh 
was that substitute. 
In this context, Al-Jazeera adopted videos uploaded on the internet where some citizens criticize 
the coming of a large number of tanks to the governorate of Daraa, which lies on the borders with 
the Golan Heights. A Syrian said: "This army is fighting its people instead of fighting Israel."376  
Recalling this may have a great effect on the recipient. First of all, because of the Syrian accent, 
when the Syrians hear the discourse of a Syrian talking in their accent criticizing the army, they 
might be more affected than when they hear Al-Jazeera's comments in classical Arabic on the same 
subject. Secondly, discrediting the regime's propaganda by a Syrian layman about opposing Israel 
means that the people are aware of its lies and that the people's fear, obedience and subjugation 
have gone away forever.  
 
Al-Jazeera criticized and disparaged the Syrian army by giving it positive attributes such as the 
national army and the home guards: "Citizens are killed by their national army"377, "The home 
guards destroyed the houses of the citizens."378 These attributes are paradoxes; it is supposed that 
the army should protect the people but here it is killing and destroying. "As the Golan Heights will 
remain in the heart of Syria, one third of the Syrian army has gathered in Daraa."379 This is the 
method of vilifying through praise. Verbally these attributes are considered positive of the Syrian 
army, but this praise is severe defaming. What is meant here is that the regime left the Golan 
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Heights occupied for many years and remained motionless without trying to free it but when the 
people rebelled, a large number of the army headed to defeat and crush the civilian citizens. 
In the context of inciting the soldiers of the Syrian army to dissent and join the armed factions, 
Al-Jazeera recalled an important historical icon, Youssef Al-Azmah, the Damascene Minister of 
Defense, who fought the army of the French colonization until he was "martyred" in 1920 AD380. 
The Channel reminded the soldiers of the Syrian army that Youssef Al-Azmah was one of the 
founders of this army whose main task is defending the homeland. This is a hint that the army, 
because of defending Al-Assad, has lost its most important pillars and changed into militias 
fighting for a criminal. The army has changed into criminal, usurper and robber. Therefore, the 
soldiers should retrieve their military ethics through dissent and fighting for the opponent popular 
movement. 
 
The regime called some of its military operations 'The military game end'. The pro-regime 
channels did not stop glorifying this military activity. Al-Jazeera counter-reacted aiming at 
derogating this action of the regime's. "The military game end which caused the death of thousands 
and the Syrian people are still daily harvesting its blood-stained effects"381is a message which 
means that the enemy of the army are the innocent armless people, not the armed gangs. 
The Channel highlighted the cost of the war, the amount of money the regime spends on 
murdering its people. Billions of dollars are being spent on the soldiers, the bullets, the bombs, the 
barrel bombs, the fuel and so on. Al-Jazeera indicated that this money came from the pockets of 
the Syrian people then came back to them in a different way. That is, the regime is using the state's 
funds to destroy those who give that money to the state. The people grant their money to be killed 
with it. 
 
Al-Jazeera criticized the Syrian army personnel's sarcasm of the opponents' dead bodies: "And 
if the schadenfreude of death reaches a horrific degree.382" That is, the filthiness of the soldiers' 
behaviors towards the bodies is indescribable. Then Al-Jazeera criticized the Syrian media's denial 
of these crimes: "Maybe these crimes took place in India or any other country or religion where 
the provisions require an end of the dead other than burying them."383This is an indication that the 
regime's soldiers are burning the bodies, mutilating them and chopping them into pieces. The 
Indians burn the bodies of their dead and other cultures practice different rituals during burying 
the dead. Through these statements, Al-Jazeera disparaged the Syrian media which always denied 
the credibility of these videos. The Channel tried to state: 'these videos did not come to us from 
other countries like India. These are Syrian soldiers who do not respect the dead.' In one of these 
videos384, a group of Syrian soldiers talk to each other and photograph the opponents' bodies. One 
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of the soldiers says: "Honoring the dead is burning them."385This is a significance of the immorality 
of the regime's soldiers on one hand and can be considered as an explicit sarcasm of the Islamic 
category:' Honoring the dead is burying them'. 
 
Al-Jazeera also criticized the declarations of the Syrian government figures. For example,386 
Walid Al-Muallem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the tanks did not go to Hama; 
they were going to Idleb via Hama. Al-Jazeera's media personnel commented on this declaration 
in an ironical tone saying: "As if Idleb were not Syrian and what may happen in it may not 
consequently happen in Hama."387 
 
The criticisms which were directed to the regime's policy were full of sentimental appeals in 
favor of the civilians. "The bread loaf has become one of the regime's methods of hurting the 
Syrians especially in the regions which are considered revolution incubators. So, as winter is 
approaching, starving might be more painful for the civilians."388The main target of this comment 
is criticizing the actions of the regime's forces, while the difficulties which the citizens suffer from 
are considered a secondary aim or element of the comment. The task of this secondary element is 
magnifying the negative image of the regime. "Some people in Syria suggest their own equation: 
water for loyalty."389This was a comment on a video which showed the Syrian army's soldiers 
trying to humiliate some detainees who want to get some water. The regime's soldiers required the 
detainees to cheer for Al-Assad or glorify his personality or they will not get water. Al-Jazeera 
wanted to tell the world: 'Look! Al-Assad imposes himself on the people; either they glorify him 
or they will die of hunger and thirst.  
"The Presidential Palace, Mount Qassioun and Abaseen Square390have become symbols of 
death in the eyes of many Syrians who wait for even a miracle that might change the conditions of 
their country and save them from what they suffer from."391 The main target of this comment is 
criticizing the Syrian forces. the Channel used the method of the sentimental appeal in favor of the 
people in order to support this target. 
 
Al-Jazeera criticized the regime's propaganda that there was a universal conspiracy which 
targeted the strength and sovereignty of Syria. The Channel ridiculed the idea that what was going 
on in Syria was a universal war. So, it many times explicitly or implicitly assured that what was 
going on on the Syrian land was a popular revolution the aim of which was disposing of the 
dictatorship of the ruling regime. 
                                                             
 "إكرام الميت حرقه" 385
The original Islamic statement is: 'Honoring the dead is burying them.' That is, it is the duty of people to bury the dead as quickly as possible, which is a sign of respect of the dead 
body.  
386 07 July 2011.  
 "كأن إدلب ليست سورية و ما يصح فيها تاليا ال يصح في حماه" 387
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390 Areas in which the regime is based. They are located in the capital, Damascus.  





Al-Jazeera tried to propitiate the Arab and international opinion in favor of the Syrian civilians 
who were suffering from the regime's repression. It used to conclude a lot of reports with comments 
which indicated that the Syrian people were directing a message to the human conscience to pay 
attention to its cause. 
 
10 – The Regime's Weakness 
 
In its comments on the news, Al-Jazeera employed phrases which hinted to the regime's 
weakness and fear. These comments highlight the subjectivity of the channel. "Seeking challenge 
and the safety of the current regime, Damascus sent an official delegation to listen to the demands 
of the angry people of the city which is 120 km away from the capital."392Al-Jazeera transmitted 
such statements when the government was sending delegations to talk directly to the people in the 
governorates of Daraa and Damascus Suburb. The Channel wanted to disparage these activities 
and to throw doubt on their credibility as the regime is afraid of stepping down and that is why it 
started to show good conduct towards the citizens. Al-Jazeera concentrated on mentioning the 
distances between the cities and the capital. For example, 'in the city which is 120 km or 50 km 
away from the capital', which is a significance of the close distance between the tension and 
popular movement centers and the regime's security and military ones. So, the regime's positive 
initiatives are only a result of its fear of being uprooted by the winds of the revolution. 
 
Al-Jazeera drew the attention to the role of the media in obliging the Syrian leadership to listen 
to the popular demands. "Under the media buzz of the protests, the Syrian leadership moved and 
declared raising the salaries and pointed out that a decision has been made to end the emergency 
situation and that laws to decree political and media freedoms are being discussed."393 This is an 
implicit indication to the importance of the media's role. The modern communication methods 
have dwarfed the role of the censorship which the regime imposes on media in Syria. It can't 
control the news any longer. The people are transmitting images taken by the mobile phone 
cameras and most of the television channels, especially Al-Jazeera, are repeatedly showing them 
day and night. 
 
According to Al-Jazeera, "the regime is moving strongly and racing with time in its attack on 
many cities after it felt that they began to get out of control."394 This idea can make the anti-regime 
Syrian recipient feel strong and unafraid because the Channel portrays the military action as a 
reaction emerging from the fear of falling down. That is, the people are very strong and will 
achieve victory and that is why the army is performing dense operations. 'The regime is racing 
with time in its attack.' That is, it is trying to impose its control on the regions before the protests 
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get wider in them. At the same time, the Channel showed the Syrian people careless of the severity 
of repression. They continue gathering for protests which have become a daily routine. "The 
military operations have not been able to restrain the freedom-seeking demonstrators yet."395, "For 
months the authorities have been vainly trying to extinguish the freedom revolution."396These 
statements are loaded with disparaging the efforts of the regime's forces which are trying to 
extinguish the fire – i.e. the revolution –in vain and with no result. "It seems that the security forces 
have failed in putting an end to the demonstrations."397, "The military game end has failed to tame 
the revolting cities."398This is a metaphor where the revolution is like a wild unbridled horse which 
the regime cannot calm and control in order to be able to eventually ride it; that is to make use of 
it and put it at its service. 
 
According to Al-Jazeera, the regime is afraid of more defections from the army. It is afraid of 
the fact that the rebel movement might get wider inside the Syrian army. Al-Jazeera concentrated 
on the regime's fear of defections. In its reports, it presented recordings publicized on the internet 
showing defecting soldiers and officers who assured their dissent in a tone suggesting that the 
regime is collapsing, dissolved, weak and frightened. On the channel, the dissidents are from 
different military ranks varying from privates to sergeants reaching up to lieutenant colonels, 
colonels and brigadiers. This is a signifier that the dissension is from all military and security 
categories. The Channel pointed out that the people supported and respected the defecting soldiers 
and officers.  
Al-Jazeera promoted joining the free army by hundreds of military personnel, soldiers and 
officers. On its screen, defections were not exclusive to military and security members. They also 
included media personnel, chief officers, judges, the Prime Minister Riyad Hijab. This means that 
all the laborers categories revolted against the government.  
 
In accordance to Al-Jazeera, the regime found difficulty in mobilizing its strongly loyal forces 
as these forces can't be deployed all over Syria. This is an implicit message suggesting that the 
regime's soldiers belong to the Alawite sect. they are strongly loyal to Al-Assad because of their 
common sectarian affiliation. "The loyalty of some soldiers to Al-Assad may not be sufficient to 
lengthen the reign's period for more decades."399 This is a significance of the few numbers of the 
soldiers who are loyal to Al-Assad as the Alawite sect is considered one of the Syrian minorities. 
"The fragility of the repressive regimes is only uncovered when it surprises the world when they 
fall for reasons not expected by anyone."400 This is an implicit annunciation that the end of the 
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regime is very close. It may take place at any time and the world will be soon surprised by the end 
of this reign. 
 
Al-Jazeera mentioned that the death of some chief officers – i.e. high-ranked ones such as 
colonels, brigadiers and major generals - was a result of a conflict inside the Syrian military 
institution. This is an implicit message whose purpose is discrediting the regime's propaganda 
which presents these officers as martyrs murdered by the criminal armed gangs. The Channel 
assured that there were deep splits within the decision-making circle, which is a significance that 
there are conflicts inside Al-Assad family and conflicts between this family and the chief Alawite 
officers. That is, the common sectarian affiliation is no longer a strength factor of the regime's.  
 
11 – Who Is Fighting alongside the Regular Forces? 
 
In 2013, Al-Jazeera pointed out the groups which shared and supported the regime armed 
forces: Lebanese Hezbollah, Iranian soldiers and officers, Iraqi militants and Russian combatants. 
The Channel mainly concentrated on Hezbollah's activities. On one hand, it tried to portray it 
as a party which assaulted, tried to seize the Syrian regions, bombed the Syrians and reinforced its 
positions to support the regular forces. On the other hand, however, Al-Jazeera portrayed it as a 
weak party which received the blows of the armed opposition without being able to encounter 
them. On Al-Jazeera's screen, the opposition armed combatants seemed stronger than those of 
Hezbollah. They bombed and seized the party's positions in the Lebanese and Syrian lands, killed 
its militant members, destroyed its cars, and insisted to continue until victory. The Channel's 
correspondents interviewed the opposition militants who talked in a tone that suggested confidence 
in victory. They assured that beating Hezbollah is only a matter of time. 
Al-Jazeera also adopted videos transmitted on the internet by the free army in order to show 
their military operations against Hezbollah's positions. This channel has changed into a media 
marketer of the opposition's media. 
Al-Jazeera intimidated from Hezbollah's capture of cities. This intimidation may be considered 
as an incitement of the Syrians to join the armed opposition factions in order to defend the 
homeland as Hezbollah may control Syrian regions which will eventually lead to the regime's 
victory.   
 
In addition to Hezbollah, the Iraqi Liwa' Abu Al-Fadl Al-Abbas401 supports the regime 
militarily. Hezbollah and this Liwa' interfere into many Syrian regions with the pretext of 
protecting and defending the religious tombs and Aal Al-Bayt's402 holy shrines like the holy shrines 
of Al Sayyidah Zaynab and Al Sayyidah Ruqayyah403. Al-Jazeera's purpose of mentioning all these 
details is assuring the regime and its supporters' sectarianism. The Shiite minority is trying to 
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govern the Sunni majority. The same thing applies to Al-Jazeera's coverage of the Iranian military 
participation in favor of the regime. 
 
The Channel popularized the fear of dividing Syria on a sectarian basis if this alliance which 
contains Hezbollah, Iran and the regime won. This intimidation may inflame and strengthen hatred 
and feeds the civil war with sectarian poison.  
Al-Jazeera also drew the attention to the participation of Hezbollah, Iran and the Iraqi 
combatants in many Syrian cities, which even have no religious Shiite shrines. This is an implicit 
significance that the value of protecting the regime by these forces on any patch of the Syrian land 
is considered for them like the protection of the Shiite shrines. That is, defending the regime has 
become a religious responsibility as it is the only Arab regime which can preserve the Shiite sect 
and allows its spread. 
 
In accordance to Al-Jazeera, there are Operation Rooms supervised by Iranian officers. These 
officers manage the battles in many cities. The Syrian regular soldiers receive the orders from them 
and execute these orders. According to a video404, the Syrian officers cannot even give leaves to 
the soldiers. Everything, big or small, is in the hands of the Iranian officers. This is a significance 
of Al-Assad's compliance to Iran. He is a leader of a corrupt and weak regime but the Iranian 
support keeps his government alive. This is also a significance that Iran is using Al-Assad, on basis 




An Iranian officer manages the military operations in Syria and a Syrian soldier requests a leave from him.405 
 
Al-Jazeera mentioned that there were Russian combatants fighting on the side of the regular 
forces on the Syrian land. The Channel specified a whole report406on the Russian Slavic legion. It 
presented this legion as a private military security company founded by professionals and reserve 
officers. This company recruits previous Russian officers and soldiers to work in protection tasks, 
securing the vital sites and freeing the hostages. However, these soldiers went outside the 
framework of their tasks and began fighting to support the regular forces in Syria. All this 
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happened after they got permission from the Russian government. This is a signifier of the Russian 
desire of Al-Assad's victory as the mutual interests make Russia send its soldiers to participate in 
killing the Syrians. 
 
The Image of The Armed Opposition on Al-Jazeera Channel 
 
1 – The Story of the Free Army as presented on Al-Jazeera Channel during the stage of 
the formation of the armed opposition 
 
"Armed with weapons that can be easily carried, and with firm determination in the face of 
repression and murder, these young people get ready to defend the Syrian activists who are trying 
to bring the regime down."407The voice tone of the media personnel suggests glorifying the 
insistence of the Free Army soldiers on defending the peaceful demonstrators and facing the 
regime's terrorism despite the lack of the necessary military equipment. That is, this media 





Free Syrian Army members are presented as heroes on Al-Jazeera’s screen.408 
 
"They are not armed gangs, as the story of the regime states. They are, rather, soldiers who have 
dissented their country's national army since it decided to direct the firing of its weapons towards 
the armless civilians."409 Through these statements, Al-Jazeera explicitly discredited the regime's 
propaganda which charges gangs funded by several countries of being responsible for the security 
turbulence in Syria. The Channel assured that the elements of FSA (the Free Syrian Army) are 
Syrian soldiers who did not accept the Syrian army's assaults on the citizens. 
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"These soldiers, like thousands others, dissented the Arab Syrian army they refused to obey 
their leaders' orders to shoot the demonstrators. How could they do that while they are supposedly 
the protectors of the homeland and the people? The reluctance of some of them to kill the civilians 
cost them their lives. Others decided to face the Shabbiha and to dissent for the sake of the 
revolution of freedom."410This is a significance through which the Channel wanted to assure the 
large number of defectors and the inevitability of dissension. For it, this is the only logical result 
and the reaction which every soldier had to do. "How could they do that while they are supposedly 
the protectors of the homeland?" The purpose of this question is confirming that the function of 
the army is protecting Syria, not killing the people. If the commands of the leaders were not in 




Free Syrian Army members are presented as heroes on Al-Jazeera’s screen.411 
 
In accordance with Al-Jazeera's discourse, the anti-regime soldiers are destined either to be 
murdered by the regime or to dissent and confront it. This is a significant style of psychological 
war. This media discourse makes the soldier's imagination narrow and framed. He has only two 
choices: either death or fighting against the murderous regime. He cannot dissent and live a normal 
civic peaceful life as the army and security personnel are to search and chase him and eventually 
kill him. Therefore, joining the armed opposition after defection is inevitable. This is an implicit 
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Declaring defection from the Syrian army.412 
 
"They know well that the regime is trying to drive them to the militarization of the revolution 
and eventually turn it into a civil war. Therefore, they say that the peacefulness of the revolution 
is essential for its victory. However, simultaneously, they should prevent Shabbiha and the security 
forces from targeting the demonstrations and funeral processions of those who were murdered by 
the security forces."413This is a message through which Al-Jazeera shows the soldiers' awareness 
and discernment of the regime's plans. At the same time, it is an implicit accusation of the Syrian 
government for trying to end the peacefulness of the revolution as this serves the regime's 
propaganda about fighting against destructive armed gangs. Al-Jazeera limited the task of the FSA 
to defense rather than attack. Its task is "retorting to Shabbiha and security forces" and not allowing 
them to assault the citizens and the demonstrators. This popularization of limiting the task of FSA 
to defense was prominent in 2011 and the first months of 2012. 
 
Al-Jazeera linked the rituals of the funeral processions to the activities of the armed opposition. 
This means that the FSA soldiers protect the people taking part in the procession. They make sure 
that the route of the procession of the victims' bodies is secure, they monitor the movements of the 
security forces, and keep on the alert to confront any assault against the participants in the 
procession. On the one hand, these are signifiers that sentimentally appeal to the recipient in favor 
of the civilians who are incapable of completing the burial due to the regime's brutality. On the 
other hand, they create the popular confidence in the tasks of the armed opposition. Linking the 
activities of the armed opposition to the rituals of the funeral processions and death makes the 
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2 –Descriptions and Names of the Opposition 
 
The descriptions of the armed opposition were negative only when the Channel recalled the 
regime's propaganda: 'Armed gangs', 'terrorist groups', 'vandals' and 'infiltrated elements'414. 
However, simultaneously, Al-Jazeera's media personnel recalled these descriptions in a tone that 
suggested their disagreement to them. It also suggested that they believed that there was an 
honorable opposition the goal of which was bringing the regime down and protecting the people.  
 
Al-Jazeera gave the title of "revolutionaries" and "the Syrian revolutionaries"415 (41 times) to 
all the opposition combatants whether Syrians, those of Al-Nusra Front, or even those of ISIS (Iraq 
and Syria Islamic State). This is an implicit admission that they were not armed law breakers or 
terrorists as the regime's propaganda presented them. 
 
"FSA" (105 times), "the opposition forces" (7 times) are titles which suggest that all the fighters 
in all the Syrian governorates and cities are fighting under one flag which is that of FSA. Al-
Jazeera helped fix this mental image. When the soldiers started to dissent the regular army, they 
called themselves FSA. They were not a cohesive organization with a clear structure. However, 
Al-Jazeera promoted this title so much that a large part of the Syrian people believed that, during 
a few days or months, a massive army that is as strong as the regime's army was formed416, an 
army which spread over every hand span of the Syrian land.  
 
Al-Jazeera popularized the opposition's brigades, battalions, platoons and squads through 
showing their statements which they had uploaded on the internet to declare their formation or 
achievements. Advertising the formation of new military units such as squads or brigades has a 
significance of how widespread the armed opposition is and of the availability of the combatant 
human cadre. A lot of these battalions and squads’ names reflect their Islamic affiliation. Khalid 
Ibn Al-Waleed Brigade417 is a signifier that their example is the Islamic leader Khalid Ibn Al-
Waleed (a Sunni icon)418, which is another implicit significance that suggests confidence in victory 
on the regime's army as KhalidIbn Al-Waleed was never defeated. Al-Farouq Battalion419 was 
named after Omar Ibn Al-Khattab, the second Islamic Caliph who has a prominent position for the 
Sunni Muslims. Al-Furqan Battalion420 – i.e. the Quran Battalion – is a signifier that the fight 
against the regime is a heavenly duty and prescription. The Capital Martyrs Battalion421 is a 
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significance that the death of the opponents during the struggle is certainly to grant them Paradise 
as they will not be dead, they will, rather, be alive under the care of Allah. Another faction is the 
Battalions of Islam Brigade422. All these names helped Islamize the armed opposition, and may 
have strongly helped to mobilize the people in Syria against the regime. 
 
"The Revolutionary Military Council"423, "the Common Leadership of FSA", "many battalions 
under the Revolutionary Military Council"424 are names which signify the organizational situation 
of the opposition. These descriptions show the opposition as a well-built structure under a common 
leadership, not individual squads which fight without planning. 
Some of the names of the battalions were after the regions as a significance of the fighters' 
affiliation and love of their cities. These names are considered as an explicit declaration that these 
regions are opponents to the regime. 
 
3 – How Did Al-Jazeera Cover the activities of The Armed Opposition? 
 
3.1 – Popularization; Promotion 
 
The Channel popularized FSA through assuring that thousands of civilians joined the armed 
struggle to support this army425. In 2011, Al-Jazeera reiterated emphasizing that no day passed in 
Syria without showing a recorded material or a video attributed to defectors from the regular army 
of various ranks, numbers and regions. The Channel promoted the brigades and battalions which 
were admitting volunteers. It tried to create a mental image which suggested that the people 
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     3.2 – Detailing the Activities of the Armed 
 
The Channel employed phrases which suggested its concern in the details of the activities of 
the Armed opposition soldiers: where they hid, where they organized their plans, how they 
managed their battles against the regime and so on. For this type of statements, the media personnel 
of Al-Jazeera used a voice tone that suggested the fear and horror the regime forces created. In the 
meantime, this suggested the greatness of FSA whose individuals worked together to protect the 
country from the tyranny of the regime's dictatorship. "They make many houses as shelters and 
hides, and in these houses, they prepare plans to defend themselves and the demonstrators."427This 
is a significance of the secrecy of the armed movements and of their defiance of the brutality of 
the regime's forces despite all difficulties. 
 
"On the front lines of the city, the FSA combatants seem cautious when they enter these 
buildings. They patrol the front lines, touring sites which had witnessed violent combats to make 
sure that no government forces have advanced."428This is a narrative style in a voice tone that 
suggests caution and anxiety about the fall of sudden missiles. It also suggests the control of FSA 
on new regions. This method also points out Al-Jazeera's aligned attitude with the opposition 
forces. 
Al-Jazeera paid attention to the FSA training sessions: where the soldiers trained, what sort of 
weapons they used in these training sessions, how they distributed the tasks among each other. 
Some fighters spread inside the city while others improvised explosive devices. Al-Jazeera's 
videos displayed the opponent opposition during training. It also showed the skills of street wars 
which the soldiers had. All this was presented in a voice tone which suggested their firmness and 




Al-Jazeera’s journalist with the opposition armed people during their training.429 
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3.3 – The Weakness of the Armed Factions 
 
Many times, FSA appeared on Al-Jazeera's screen as a weak army which did not have sufficient 
skills in using the weapons like the anti-tank missiles. The Channel also concentrated on the fact 
that the FSA soldiers lacked offensive weapons and that even their defensive weapons were 
inclusive to military rifles, while the regime's forces used all types of armament. The voice tone 
of the journalists tried to entice the recipient in favor of these soldiers who, despite their military 
inexperience, struggled and resisted the regime's violence. 
Al-Jazeera reiterated that FSA was fighting without an air coverage which protected it from the 
repeated and continuous bombardment of the regime's forces and that bringing closure to the 
battles was conditional upon the arrival of the heavy weapons to FSA. This is an implicit summon 
to providing FSA with armament. In summoning to arming the opposition, the Channel depended 




The opposition armed people in a news context which shows them as heroes who are capable of challenging the 
regime despite the limited equipment.430 
 
3.4 – The Strength of the Armed Factions 
 
In 2012, while the official Syrian media was popularizing a propaganda stating that the military 
closure started, Al-Jazeera pointed out the opposition's anti-propaganda which stated that its 
soldiers started severe battles against the regime's forces in order to bring closure. Under this 
propaganda, the Channel concentrated on pointing out the field successes of the opposition such 
as capturing armored personnel carriers and military vehicles after a severe fight against Al-Assad 
battalions. Al-Jazeera depended on magnifying the image of the battles fought by the opposition: 
"Severe fight"431, "Violent battles"432 (13 times) and so on. This helps present the opponents as 
heroes, who are patient and strong. Simultaneously, the Channel described the Syrian army as "Al-
Assad battalions", "Shabbiha' and 'Al-Assad gangs". This is a message which suggests that the 
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opposition has a high legitimacy as it fights against a tyrant, not against a legitimate army which 




The opposition during facing the Syrian army.433 
 
"A real war field, but not on the borders, takes place in the depths of the old quarters in Douma; 
in Damascus Suburb."434This is a message through which Al-Jazeera wanted to magnify the 
military events for two purposes. The first one was showing the opposition as a strong army 
encountering a regular army armed with the strongest equipment. The second purpose was 
disparaging the regime which fought battles inside the country, in the quarters of Damascus 
Suburb, whereas, in the meantime, its forces surrendered to the Israeli occupation. The army does 
not go to the front line to defend the Golan Heights. It, rather, kills its people. 
"It's clear that they have more equipment than FSA, but the latter states that it won't surrender. 
It is, rather, getting ready for a long and hard battle."435This is a message whose aim is lifting the 
morale of the armed opposition and raising the confidence of the civilian opposition in it. This is 
also a significance that the regime has more equipment but the FSA excels it in intention and 
determination. "The revolutionaries believe that their steadfast stance for two years is a balance 
kept in their account for a battle the winning of which is said to require one hour's patience."436This 
is a message motivating the anti-regime people to carry on with encounter. Describing the 
opponent army, Al-Jazeera concentrated on terms such as 'patience, steadfastness, not surrender, 
armed with faith.' This vocabulary plays the role of doses which the Channel administrates in order 
to inspire hope in the opposition soldiers and their civilian supporters. The soldiers are steadfast 
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The low view helps show the opposition armed people as heroes.437 
 
In 2013, Al-Jazeera pointed out the strengths more than the weaknesses of the armed opposition. 
"In the horizon, one of the regime army's helicopters appears. The eyes monitor it without 
bothering that much. They attribute this to the fact that the Front has got anti-aircraft artillery 
which is able to dispose of the helicopter."438 This is a message which shows that Al-Nusra Front 
is self-confident; it has weapons, a strong-armed opposition which is indifferent about the regime's 
military strength. This is one of Al-Jazeera's methods in the psychological war. It portrays the 
regime's army like a beast against the civilians only while the Channel dwarfs its forces when it 
talks about the army's struggle against the soldiers of the armed opposition.  
"A siege on Aleppo airport where the fighters of the FSA employed what they have of weapons 
in order to paralyze these aircrafts which remained motionless on the ground without being able 
to move as they are within the range of the weapons of FSA."439The Channel portrayed the aircrafts 
like a human being who may be paralyzed. This is a mental image which shows the regime's 
military capabilities as weak ones which are crushed by the opposition's army which is getting 
stronger day by day.  
3.5 –Opposition Actions as Presented by Al-Jazeera 
 
Al-Jazeera showed that the opposition's military actions targeted the regime's military and 
security forces and headquarters only. This is a significance that the opposition is innocent of the 
charges which the regime directs to it: assaulting the civilian citizens and murdering them, robbing 
and destroying their properties, displacing them, and so on. In accordance to Al-Jazeera, the 
number of demonstrators increased due to their feeling that FSA was protecting them from the 
bullets of the regime's security and military forces. This is an indication of the responsibility the 
armed opposition has, which is namely the protection of the opponent civilians.  
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The achievements of FSA and the different opposition battalions ranged from small ones such 
as capturing some armored vehicles and armored personnel carriers to those that can change the 
Syrian map such as capturing entire regions and very important strategic military positions. 
The Channel employed two methods in presenting the achievements of the armed opposition. 
The first one was the general description where Al-Jazeera did not accurately define the nature of 
these achievements. For example, "FSA inflicted the regime tremendous losses in several 
regions."440 This method unleashes the imagination of the recipient. The second method was 
specific identification where the Channel gives full or nearly full details of the achievements of 
the opposition: "They controlled the Signals and Electronic Battalion."441  
 
"The seizure of many government buildings including Cultural Centers"442 is a significance that 
the regime has lost control over the government institutions and the infrastructure. 
The Channel signposted the significance of the achievements of the armed opposition through 
concentrating on the quality of the targets attacked by the soldiers of the opposition. For example, 
"FSA attacks the greatest military base"443, "FSA announces the destruction of an air missile 
battalion"444, "FSA controls the air defense battalion."445 This is an indication of the opposition's 
offensive stance and the regime's defensive one. This style was most recurrently employed in 2013. 
Al-Jazeera moved from the stage of popularizing the necessity of arming the armed opposition to 
the stage of raising the morale and the concentration on the strengths of this opposition.  
 
The regime seemed as if it were targeted in all its military formations. The armed are targeting 
the most important military sites like the sites of the air force. They attack battalions of different 
specializations. For instance, Al-Jazeera mentioned that FSA controlled a main headquarter used 
by the regime for jamming space channels which transmitted the news of the Syrian revolution. 
This is a significance that the regime is trying to hide its crimes through jamming the media. It is 
also a signifier of the importance of the mass media for the armed opposition, as media is one of 
the most important means of its victory. "At the recent time, FSA has controlled most of the 
military battalions in Damascus Suburb and on the circumference of Damascus International 
Airport."446 This is a significance of the opposition's seizure of the capital, Damascus, the regime's 
most important fortress. It is also a signifier that the regime's defensive lines have fallen apart as 
Damascus Suburb which represents a defensive line that surrounds Damascus has fallen in the 
opposition's control. The same applies to Damascus International Airport, the largest and most 
important Syrian airport, which is 25 km away from the capital. It is considered a significant 
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defensive line and a main base of providing the regime's forces with the aids coming by air in 
addition to its vital strategic position for those who control it. 
 
The Channel rendered that FSA is trying to demilitarize the regime's army of all types of 
weapons. Therefore, it was trying to destroy them when it failed to capture them. It is notable that 
the concentration of the Channel on targeting the civil and military airports in several areas by the 
opposition was great. This is a signifier of FSA's determination and desire to destroy the air bases 
of the regime's army which are employed in bombarding the civilians. This is also a significance 
of the strength of FSA that realized qualitative military leaps which will end in victory. FSA 
captures anti-aircraft missiles, consequently, it can shoot the regime's aircrafts down and the 
regime will no longer be able to confront the opposition's forces easily. 
 
"FSA controls half the city or more"447, "It controls the border areas."448 This indicates that the 
geographical areas FSA controls are larger than those controlled by the regime. FSA controls 
important roads which connect the Syrian governorates, entire cities and vital positions. Al-Jazeera 
always indicated the strategic importance of every city that falls under the control of the armed 
opposition. 
Releasing the civilian detainees and armed captives were also part of the tasks of the armed 
opposition which Al-Jazeera handled. This is a significance that the duty of FSA is protecting the 
civilians and defending them in addition to freeing the captives, which is also a message directed 
to the Syrian people the implication of which means that FSA is trustworthy. It never leaves its 
captives trapped by the regime. It, rather, sacrifices its soul for the sake of the civilian citizens. 
 
"FSA kills elements from Hezbollah"449, "It destroys their cars and military vehicles"450, "It 
confronts infiltration attempts into the Syrian land by Hezbollah."451 These are indications of the 
presence of Hezbollah's forces in the Syrian struggle against the opposition forces. They are also 
signifiers of the competence of the revolutionaries in confronting not only the regime's forces but 
also its allies of Hezbollah who defeated Israel in the war of 2006452. This is a fierce enemy, but 
the opposition forces were able to defeat it on the Syrian arena. This coverage of the victories of 
the opposition can be considered as a message directed to the supporting countries stating that the 
opposition is worthy of being depended upon. 
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The defensive status of the armed forces was never absent even during the period when Al-
Jazeera tried to greatly point out the strength of this opposition in 2013. "FSA deterred incursion 
attempt"453, "The Free Syrian Army’s battalions have faced several attacks"454.  
 
3.6 – Battles and Their Significations 
 
The Channel did not point out the regime's military initiatives against the armed opposition 
such as 'the regime forces attack the strongholds of the armed forces and bombard their centers'. 
These actions were rarely mentioned in the studied reports and this gave an impression of the 
inability of the regime's army to confront the opposition's battalions. Simultaneously, this absence 
may make the recipient feel that all the regime's violent actions were against armless people. In 
comparison, Al-Jazeera did not intensively mention the initiatives of the armed opposition against 
the regime forces especially in 2011 and 2012. The Channel did not mention that the opposition 
forces attack regime's positions or detain regime's soldiers. This style kept the regime's image as a 
tyrant beast which confronted the peaceful people's will, killing, bombarding and destroying with 
no reason. 
 
Al-Jazeera employed different terms to substitute the explicit mention of both the regime's and 
the opposition's initiatives: "violent clashes" and "violent battles" (13 times), "fierce fight"455. This 
vocabulary on the face of it suggests that the opposition forces encounter the regime forces only, 
so its weapons were never directed towards the civilians as the regime claims. Secondly, it suggests 
that the two military powers are equal. Thirdly, it suggests the two situations of attack and defense, 
forwarding and regression for both parties. No party outdoes the other in the word 'clash'. The 
mention of the military initiative of a party means an offensive situation of this party. Al-Jazeera 
did not employ this method in 2011 and the first half of 2012. However, in 2013 Al-Jazeera 
condensed pointing out the opposition's initiatives such as attacking military airports, controlling 
important positions and capturing regime's military equipment. This coverage moved the 
opposition's situation from the case of moving between defense and attack to that of attack and it, 
consequently, seemed stronger, more steadfast and more confident of victory. 
 
   Al-Jazeera described the battles as "fierce and violent" (13 times) and "the most violent for 
months."456 It labeled them as continuous and perseverant: "Daily clashes"457, "sequential battles 
for over a month"458, "Battles have continued for the third day in a row"459, "continuous battles" 
                                                             
453  17 October 2013. "الحر تصدى لمحاولة اقتحام"  
454  21 February 2013. "تصدت كتائب الحر لعدة هجمات" 
455  02 February 2012. "منازلة شديدة" 
456  08 October 2012.  "األعنف منذ شهور" 
457  14 April 2013.  "اشتباكات يومية" 
458  08 October 2012. "معارك مستمرة منذ أكثر من شهر" 




(8 times), "clashes are the title of the Syrian scene"460, "the situation is still ablaze"461 and so on. 
This portraying suggests that the regime is neither capable of bringing a closure to the battles, nor 
of controlling or retrieving the regions. At the same time, it suggests the strength of the armed 
opposition, since despite the few equipment and weapons, the soldiers keep clashing with the 
regime's forces and deter their progress. This is an indication of the armed opposition's endurance; 
even if the battles continued for a long time, they would never yield or surrender. 
 
Al-Jazeera promoted the names which the armed opposition gave to the battles. "Battle of 
Releasing Captives"462 which is a signifier of the loyalty and fidelity of the opposition soldiers to 
each other. They did not nor will let down their comrades who the regime forces detained. So, they 
are to confront the depression and brutality in order to release these captives. "Al-Qadisiyah 
Battle"463 whose name has an important significance because Muslims had given this name to one 
of their battles against the Persians in 636 AD. This battle was in the context of the Islamic 
conquests464.The armed opposition revived the name and gave it to one of their battles against the 
regime. This is an implicit indication which again assures that the opposition soldiers are fighting 
the enemies of Allah, the disbelievers, so as to spread the religion of Allah and impose Islam again.  
"The We-Are-Coming Battle"465 is a signifier of the opposition's confidence in victory. It is a 
name that is employed in psychological war as it is directed to the regime's soldiers so as to 
discourage them and make them feel that the opposition soldiers are going to crush them soon. 
"The Earthquake Battle"466 is a two-sided signifier. First, it is a metonymy of the strength of the 
coming opposition's attack. They are like an earthquake which will destroy the pillars of the 
regime. Second, it has a religious significance; 'The Earthquake' chapter in the Quran is chapter 99 
and the number of its verses is 8. This chapter talks about the horrors of the Judgment Day and 
how things will be then. The earth will be shaken with an earthquake and tremble. Everything on 
it will fall down, the mountains will fall apart, and man will be stunned and afraid. Then man will 
be judged and shown the results of his deeds in front of God. Whoever did good will go to paradise 
and whoever did evil will go to hell. The opposition soldiers' adoption of this name – the 
Earthquake Battle – indicates their confidence that paradise will be theirs and that they are the 
pious slaves of Allah who will not be afraid of the horrors of the Judgment Day because they are 
applying the religion of Allah and supporting Allah through their struggle against the disbelieving 
tyranny – Al-Assad. 
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3.7 – Islamization of Armed Opposition 
 
A collection of details gave the Syrian revolution an Islamic character. Nearly no report was 
free of the soldiers' cheers: "God is the Greatest, God is the Greatest". They cheered 'God is the 
greatest' during most of their movements: when they fired with mortars or mechanical guns, when 
they moved from a place to another, when they saw the results of the air bombardment, when they 
stood in front of cameras with their guns, and so on. Al-Jazeera media personnel pointed out these 
cheers in several parts of the report. Sometimes in the introduction before starting the media 
account, we hear 'God is the Greatest'. Sometimes, the journalist pauses and gives way to these 
cheers. Other times, the report is concluded with cheers of 'God is the Greatest'. These cheers have 
an implicit significance which means that the opposition soldiers are performing Jihad against the 




The opposition armed people badge their foreheads with Islamic slogans.467 
 
The names the opposition chose for many operations and battles had an Islamic characteristic. 
Al-Jazeera pointed out these names. For instance, "The battle of victory from God and near 
conquest"468 was for freeing certain regions. It indicates the opposition's military war against the 
regime is a religious duty and that their victory is certain because they are fighting the enemy of 
Allah in the way of Allah. The purpose of the conquest or conquests was obliging the polytheist 
disbelieving countries to have faith in Islam.  "The Earthquake Battle"469, in addition to the Islamic 
signifier, has a prodigious, horrifying characteristic through resembling the battles of the factions 
to the earthquake which will turn the earth upside down and throw down the regime's strongest 
military sites or those which mostly deter the advance of the revolutionaries.  
 
The most prominent slogan of the opposition was: "Our leader forever is our master 
Muhammad"470 a significance that the soldiers obey the orders of Islam in their war against the 
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regime and that the leader of their revolution is the prophet Muhammad. This makes them seem 
pious believers, loyal to the Islamic doctrine and defending it. This message can polarize a large 
number of Muslims.  
 
"God's soldiers passed here"471 is a slogan which Al-Jazeera pointed out many times. This 
statement was usually handwritten on the walls by the opposition soldiers when they captured 
regime's centers, especially security and military ones. This slogan is considered a defiance to the 
soldiers of the regime's Syrian army. "Al-Assad's soldiers passed here" was the statement that the 
regime's soldiers left behind them as a fingerprint written on the walls of some regions where they 
gained victory. The contrast here is between the soldiers of Allah and those of Al-Assad. The 
regime's soldiers are affiliated to a repressive human being whom they defend. However, the 
opposition militants are affiliated only to Allah. They are the soldiers of God, the only God. This 
is an indication of the inevitability of their victory because in the end Allah will certainly be 
victorious. 
 
The opposition soldiers used 8 times phrases that showed their faith and gratitude to God for 
the advances and victories they realized: 'Praise be to Allah, we have freed a region', 'with the help 
of Allah, the siege of the airport has been achieved' and so on. These phrases again prove that the 
war is between the pious Muslims and a repressive, disbelieving and polytheist regime.  
 
3.8 – Al-Nusra Front 
 
When the pro-regime channels were trying to present Al-Nusra Front as a terrorist organization, 
which horrified people, sent human bombers who bombed themselves in the civilian areas, Al-
Jazeera was trying to portray this front in a different way. The Channel called the elements of this 
Front “revolutionaries”. It showed that the majority of the elements were Syrians and that Al-Nusra 
also contained a number of foreigners whom it called migrants from different Arab and Islamic 
countries. Al-Jazeera highlighted the two categories of this front: the Muhajireen and the Ansar472. 
This is a significance of resembling them to the companions of the prophet, and that the struggle 
is between the men of Islam, the soldiers of Allah and a disbelieving polytheist regime. This idea 
can polarize the extremists and incite them either to join the revolution's armed factions or to 
support the armed in all ways as the Ansar did to the Muhajireen who migrated with the prophet 
Muhammad to bring victory to Islam. 
 
"Al-Nusra front are men who came to support the vulnerable in Syria after they had been let 
down by all the world."473This is a message the purpose of which is polishing the image of this 
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organization and presenting it as the savior who is to support the Syrian people whom all countries 




The soldiers of Jabhat Al-Nusra seem as heroes who are saviors of the people.474 
 
Al-Jazeera correspondents very closely accompanied the militants of Al-Nusra Front. 
According to these correspondents, the battles of these militants took place in very close distances 
from the regime's soldiers. The Channel covered the activities of the soldiers against the regime's 
forces in a way that suggested their credibility and genuineness towards the Syrian people.  
   Al-Jazeera had interviews field leaders from Al-Nusra Front. They talked in a confident and 
strong tone about their siege of important regions, regime centers and military airports. They talked 
about their performing an air and land siege. This is a signifier of their military power which equals 
the regime's and overcomes it.  
Through these interviews, Al-Nusra leaders were able to promote their goal which is summed 
up as follows: establishing an Islamic state which is based on Shurah (i.e. a consultative council) 
and where justice and benevolence prevail.    
 
3.9 – Opposition Weapons as They Appeared on Al-Jazeera Screen 
 
At the beginnings of the formation of the armed opposition, Al-Jazeera recurrently assured that 
they had only light weapons which could confront tanks, artilleries and missiles. Mortars, machine 
guns and mines (12 times) were of the most prominent oppositions weapons according to Al-
Jazeera presentation. "Locally made missiles"475 is an indication of the hard work of the armed 
opposition and their insistence on defying the regime's heavy weapons even if by explosive devices 
or missiles which are not as strong as the regime's.  
In the first half of 2012, Al-Jazeera's discourse became this way: the availability of weapons is 
no longer an obstacle as the smuggled ones have become available and easy to buy from corrupt 
officers. This is an indication of the disloyalty of the regime's Syrian army soldiers and officers 
and of the persistence of the armed opposition on the military confrontation. Despite their poverty, 
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the opponent soldiers on their own account buy weapons by which they will end the regime and 
dispose of its darkness. Simultaneously, the channel's discourse included hints of the necessity of 
financing and arming the opposition with heavy weapons. 
 
In the second half of 2012, the channel's discourse started to change. It moved from the stage 
of the opposition's urgent need for being armed to the stage of raising the morale through assuring 
that the opposition are using heavy weapons. It is worth mentioning that the Channel did not 
accurately refer to the sources of these weapons. In addition, Al-Jazeera obfuscated the sources of 
providing the armed opposition with money, machines, vehicles and modern 4-wheel-drive cars. 
The same applies to providing field emergency devices and medicines and so on. The Channel did 
not also mention the sources of providing the opposition with reconnaissance and intelligence 
information about the movements and positions of the regime and its adjuvant forces. 
"Faisal 1, Missile made by Al-Nusra Front. Its range is 8 km"476 is a signifier of Al-Nusra's 
possession of the technical and material ability to make weapons. The name 'Faisal 1'has an 
implicit significance which indicates that it is the first type of a series that will be produced 
respectively. Also, this name is indirectly connected to the names of some Saudi princes and kings. 
Moreover, the word Faisal' in Arabic means 'the sword', 'the ruler' or 'the one who judges right 
from wrong'. This is a significance that Al-Nusra Front is the symbol of justice, which is part of 
its propaganda. It introduced itself as the one which will apply the justice and benevolence among 
the citizens on basis of the Muslim Sharia again.   
Missiles whose range is 1200 meters, in addition to anti-aircraft weapons, AA 23477. In 
accordance to Al-Jazeera, these weapons form the second striking force which Al-Nusra Front has. 
This is a significance of the military force which this front has.  
 
3.10 – Israeli Fears 
 
Al-Jazeera indirectly indicated to the Israeli fears from the armed opposition. "The Israeli army 
sent fortifications to Al-Maaber region and the settlers were ordered not to approach the borders. 
The developments of Al-Qunetirah happened simultaneously with advances of FSA in Daraa Al-
Balad."478This is a message which contains two pivots. First, Al-Jazeera indirectly hinted that Al-
Assad is an ally of Israel. When the Syrian regime controlled the frontal city of Daraa, Israel did 
not have any worries. The second pivot is that Al-Jazeera hinted that the real enemy of Israel was 
the Syrian armed opposition. When this opposition controlled Daraa, Israel was afraid and started 
to solidify its forces on the borders. This message of Al-Jazeera is an attempt to disparage the 
regime's propaganda about its resistance and solid stance against the Zionist enemy. 
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3.11 – Declarations of Armed Opposition Officers and Soldiers 
 
In 2011, Al-Jazeera did not send its correspondents to cover the events on the Syrian land. It, 
rather, adopted exclusive recordings prepared by opponent amateurs. These recordings contained 
interviews with the soldiers of FSA. They declared that they were military personnel who dissented 
from the "corrupt regime"479 who detained and killed people only because they demanded freedom. 
They said that they were struggling against oppression and oppressors, and that they were 
defending their civil brothers. They also confirmed that the regime's forces killed everyone who 
did not obey the orders requiring them to detain and kill the citizens, and that a lot of their 
companions who were soldiers in the regime's army were killed because they refused to yield to 
the brutality of the regime. They used phrases that could inflame the Syrian people against the 
army in addition to inciting the soldiers to defect. For example, they mentioned that they saw 
thousands of dead bodies of soldiers murdered by the regime piled in the mortuaries of one 
hospital. The aim of this message is magnifying the rate of danger around the Syrian soldiers. It is 
a message which is able to stimulate many regular soldiers to dissent in fear for their life. 
 
A young man from FSA states: "Our goal is protecting our people, our families from Al-Assad's 
battalions. If we died here, we know that we are martyrs; we died for a cause, for our people as we 
are defending our people. But if we died while in Al-Assad's battalions, then we would die for the 
sake of a traitor."480This is a message that portrays the FSA men as honorable ones who sacrifice 
their lives for the sake of the people, which is a significance of altruism. These statements show 
that these soldiers were between two choices both of which were death; either death in the way of 
the people or death in the way of Al-Assad, whom the opponent soldier calls 'traitor'. However, 
the soldiers of FSA chose death in the way of the people because if they died, they would be 
considered by God as martyrs, and martyrs have important benefits in the Hereafter on basis of the 
religion of Islam. 
 
In 2012, the structure of the prominent declarations of FSA in interviews changed. After it was 
self-introducing in 2011, it became a presentation of achievements and gains they achieve such as 
capturing the regime army's equipment and ammunition, freeing checkpoints and regions, killing 
Shabbiha and so on. In their interviews, the officers and soldiers explained their field stance like 
reinforcing their positions, their deployment in cities, their control of the movements of the regular 
army and so on. They assured that they were working for protecting the citizens. This notion is 
one of the most important opponent propaganda which continued from 2011 to 2013. 
Reassuring people and promising them of victory also were of the most noticeable messages 
which FSA officers wanted to convey. Mostafa Al-Sheikh the commander of the military council 
said: "God will, we are all going to celebrate in Damascus. We are going to punish all these 
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murderers under your control. Inshallah – God will- very soon the flags of victory will be raised 
on Qassioun and here in Atareb and shortly in Aleppo."481The goal of this message is raising the 
morale of the opponent Syrian people and giving hope and confidence that victory is very close. 
This officer either spontaneously or intently used the phrase 'inshallah' which is an indication of 
believing in the destiny of God. Such phrases can affect the Muslim recipients, especially when 
the speaker is an officer in the army. These massages can polarize the Muslims to the armed 
opposition whose officers show their belief in the in God and His destiny. In this declaration, 
Mostafa Al-Sheikh also assured that the people are to judge and punish the criminals. This is an 
implicit message which means that FSA does not monopolize victory and that all the categories of 
the people are to fulfill their desire of revenge and to share the punishment of the strayed ruler and 
his corrupt supporters. 
 
In 2013, during the interviews, the opposition leaders and soldiers' tone had a sense of firmness 
and confidence. It is true that Al-Jazeera started to concentrate more on the strengths of the 
opposition than the weaknesses like lacking the weapons and training. However, these weaknesses 
did not entirely disappear from the declarations of some soldiers. The armed opposition, sometimes 
indirectly other times directly, declared the necessity of supporting it with heavy weapons.  
Some FSA soldiers said that their optimism got larger every time one of them was martyred. 
They did not get sad because he died but only because they would miss him. His death was a boon 
since he was a martyr; that is, his destiny is paradise. These messages provoked racing to get the 
honor of martyrdom. 
 
The interviews with the opposition soldiers were held either by civilian activists who worked 
for the opposition centers or by amateur journalists whom Al-Jazeera authorized as correspondents 
for it to send it exclusive recordings, or by professional journalists whom the Channel sent and 
whose presence was noticeable in 2013.  
Al-Jazeera pointed out the allegiance of the civilians to FSA through interviews with Syrian 
citizens who expressed the importance of this army and the role it plays in protecting the people 
and in the victory of the revolution. One of the civilians addressed FSA: "Keep staying here! Even 
if our houses were destroyed and our children were killed, don't withdraw! One word, no other 
choice: if the Free Army withdrew, we would be more and more destroyed."482 This is a message 
that shows limitless popular confidence in FSA. Even if all civilians died and everything was 
destroyed, the FSA should stay in that area because it is the only protector. 
 
In 2013, Al-Jazeera's correspondents interviewed the leaders of the Islamic State in Syria and 
Iraq (ISIS). These leaders talked about the nature of the brigades, operation rooms and the 
coordination mechanism between them. They talked about their operations against the regular 
forces. Moreover, through these interviews, they sent defiance messages to the regime. These 
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leaders highlighted the participation of Iran and Hezbollah in the Syrian crisis.  They said that Iran 
and Hezbollah: "Came to train the Shabbiha, to train the people on killing the children and on 
bombardment"483 this is a significance of the need of the regime's soldiers to the support of Iran 
and Hezbollah because they do not have the sufficient combat capabilities to confront the armed 
opposition. This is also a significance that Iran and Hezbollah are criminals who murder the Syrian 
people. 
 
The phrases of ISIS leaders were full of criticism and mockery of the regime's adjuvant forces. 
For instance, instead of saying Hezbollah (in Arabic: The Party of Allah) they used the name 
Hezbollat (in Arabic: The Party of Lat,) or they called it the Party of the Devil. They employed the 
name of Lat, which is an old pre-Islamic pagan goddess. ISIS leaders criticized the pro-regime 
citizens of all categories, civilian and military, and gave them sarcastic names one of which was: 
"The regime's tails"484.  
 
Al-Jazeera recalled recordings which included the statements of the armed opposition where it 
negated charges directed against it by the regime such as committing massacres, murdering 
civilians and using the chemical weapon. "FSA issued a statement in which it negated any relation 
of it to what was said to be fabricated explosions the goal of which is misleading the international 
supervisors and justifying the fall of the local currency."485This is hinting that the regime is the 
one which plans and executes these explosions in order to charge the armed opposition of it and 
justify the regime's military actions. The FSA officers refuted their ownership of chemical 
weapons. They said that even if they had had it, they would utterly have refused to use it in 
principle. Al-Jazeera repeatedly and concurrently promoted these ideas as messages which 
implicitly assured that the real chemical weapons user was the regime's army. 
 
The opposition used the network to spread recordings through which it showed the fulfilled or 
coming military actions such as: "We declare freeing Homs checkpoint"486, "We declare the start 
of the battle Victory from God"487.  Al-Jazeera popularized such operations through continuous 
transmission of these recordings and proclamations which it considered them important news 
sources. 
 
3.12 – Geography of Armed Opposition's Activities 
 
Al-Jazeera mentioned, during its coverage of the opposition's military activities, the names of 
governorates, cities, military positions and important centers in Damascus, Damascus Suburb, 
Aleppo, Idleb, the bordering areas, the military airports, and so on. These are indications of the 
                                                             
483  09 September 2013. "جاؤوا ليدربوا الشبيحة، جاؤوا ليدربوا الناس على قتل األطفال، جاؤوا ليدربوا الناس على القصف" 
484  02 July 2013. "أذناب النظام" 
485  30 April 2012. "أصدر الجيش الحر بيانا نفى فيه أي عالقة له بما قال أنها تفجيرات مفتعلة و هدفها تضليل المراقبين الدوليين و تبرير انهيار العملة المحلية" 
486  02 February 2012.  "نعلن عن تحرير حاجز حمص" 




importance of the opposition's achievements on one hand, and of the collapse of the regime's 
control on the most important cities and positions on the other. This method is an important one in 
the psychological war. Al-Jazeera rarely mentioned a large number of regions at a time during 
covering the armed opposition's actions. The Channel used this style more frequently when it 
covered the regime's actions in order to magnifying the rate of criminality the regime's forces 
practiced. 
 
3.13 – Human Icons 
 
In the studied sample, the channel's highlighting of the armed opposition's leaders and soldiers 
was restricted to transmitting their recordings which were uploaded on the network or conducting 
field interviews with them by Al-Jazeera's amateur and professional correspondents. That is, the 
highlighting was restricted to mentioning their viewpoints on what was taking place and on giving 
information about military field events. Al-Jazeera did not highlight these characters as individual 
cases; that is, it did not talk at all about their lives or their heroism. This is a style that suggests the 
equality of the value of the roles between officers and officers, officers and soldiers, and soldiers 
and soldiers. Everybody is working for one goal which is ending the regime regardless of the 
military rank. All are heroes, all are one hand.  
 
3.14 – Al-Jazeera Media Personnel's Attitudes Towards the Opposition 
 
"FSA told us", "The soldiers informed us" are phrases that suggest close and strong relation 
between Al-Jazeera and the armed opposition. The soldiers trust this channel and allow it to 
accompany them. They give it important details about the recent developments in the battle fields. 
For example, the journalist says: "From here, we will move with these militants from the distance 
of 600 m which separates us from the regime forces to get to 200 m away from them, where the 
first clash lines are, and where the forces of the regime army are positioned near Abbaseen Square. 
On the way, we will have to be adjacent to them as a mistake could be deadly because the regime's 
snipers do not hesitate to target any moving object. There is Qassioun Mountain overlooking us 
clearly."488The correspondent was moving side by side with the opponent fighters. His feeling of 
reassurance with them has an implicit message which means that they are truthful to the people, 
not criminal gangs as the regime claims. Their task is protecting the people from this regime which 
shoots whosoever and whatsoever it sees. In the above stated recording, the correspondent assured 
the necessity of his being close to the opposition militants, which is a significance that the one who 
follows them is protected and safe. "A mistake could be deadly" is an indication that the journalist 
should obey the instructions of FSA or the regime would kill him if he was a short distance away 
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متر، هناك خطوط االشتباك ااألولى، حيث تتواجد قوات الجيش النظامي قرب ساحة العباسين. في الطريق يجب محاذاتهم فقد يكون  200م فاصلة بيننا و بين الجيش النظامي لتصل إلى  600"من هنا سننتقل مع هؤالء المقاتلين من مسافة 




from the soldiers. These phrases highlight Al-Jazeera's attitude towards the fighting parties: full 










The female journalist accompanies the opposition armed people. The confidence of the female in the armed 
people increases the influential capacity of the message.490 
 
During the field coverage of the battles, Al-Jazeera correspondents recurrently stated that the 
clashes were taking place on short distances, which is a signifier that suggests the importance of 
Al-Jazeera's media coverage. Its journalists and correspondents are exposed to danger and death 
at any moment. This is a style which creates the feelings of fear, worry and horror in the recipient 
who is concerned about the Syrian events. The voice tone accompanied with the images puts the 
narrow distance between the two antagonists forward; death is everywhere, destruction has become 
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3.15 – Additional Remarks about the Images Dealing with the Armed Opposition's 
Activities 
 
Some of the soldiers' activities were inside houses. There they prepared the weapons (the rifles 
and the machine guns) while they were talking to Al-Jazeera correspondent. This kind of shots can 
indirectly show a situation of relaxation and confidence between the journalist and the soldiers. 
The same thing applies to covering the training sessions and activities of these soldiers on the 
battlefield. This coverage suggests media adoption of the opposition by the correspondent. 
 
The armed opposition uniform was always dark in color, mainly black. The effect of these 
colors on the recipient differs in accordance with the alignment of this recipient. If the audience 
was a supporter of the armed opposition, they would feel that the black is a symbol of power, 
firmness and self-confidence. But, if the recipient was an opponent of this opposition, they would 




The opposition armed people. The veiled faces on Al-Jazeera’s screen are a symbol of revolution and heroism.491 
 
Al-Jazeera positively popularized videos uploaded on the network by the armed opposition. 
The armed soldiers stand in a line in front of the camera, hooded, carrying weapons and cheering: 
God is the Greatest. Or, they put bands on which 'God is the Greatest' was written round their 
foreheads. Al-Jazeera highlighted the armed soldiers carrying Al-Qaeda flag, black colored, with 
the phrase 'There is no God but God' written in white in the middle. The viewers' impression of 
these scenes differs on basis of their dogmas. That is, if they were supporters of the regime, they 
would feel that these armed people are murderers, with fearful faces. They would consider them 
law-breakers who deserve killing because they kill the people. The slogan ' God is the Greatest' 
would change into a symbol of murder and terrorism in the minds of these viewers. On the 
contrary, the pro-opposition recipients would see these armed people as heroes working in secret 
and with accuracy; therefore, they hide their faces. They would consider that they support the 
religion of Allah, and that God blesses all their steps and actions against the disbelieving regime. 
                                                             





The images which showed the opponents carrying mechanical guns sitting in cars moving from 
a place to another were repeatedly presented. The soldiers appeared in other images shooting with 
rifles and mechanical guns. They fired mortars and seized regime's equipment and centers. They 
were also shown training and persevering to develop their combat skills. 
In addition to media correspondents’ coverage, the soldiers themselves were correspondents 
and film information sources. That is, the soldiers documented their military war actions in full 
details. 
 
3.16 – The Non-Traditional Spoils of Warfare 
 
Previously, the war spoils were traditional such as weapons and ammunition. Now, due to the 
communication revolution, especially the availability of the communication techniques 
everywhere, cell phones have become of the most important booties. The media war may be more 
important than weapon war. The cell phones contain images, videos, documents and files that can 
uncover the enemy movements and activities. During the Syrian crisis, the importance of these 
prizes of war (cell phones and other modern communication techniques) is notably clear. The 
armed opposition seizes these means and transmits everything it finds of images and data. The 
same thing applies to the regular Syrian army and the allied forces. They transmit everything they 
find of data on the cell phones of those who were arrested, died or ran away. This is how the regime 
forces could prove the participation of extremist Muslims who came from many countries to fight 
in Syria. Also, this is how the opposition proved that Hezbollah and others were fighting on the 
side of the regime. 
 
The Consequences of the Syrian Crisis as Presented by Al-Jazeera 
 
Al-Jazeera resorted to magnification and horrification. The image of Syria on its screen was 
full of blood, destruction, devastation, fear, horror, and almost complete absence of food and 
normal life resources. This presentation was always exhibited in an anti-regime context. That is, 
the Syrian government was the cause of all what happened. 
"The human suffering" (7 times), "The sad events" (6 times), "the tragedy", "The human 
situation is disastrous"492 (4 times) were terms Al-Jazeera used to briefly express all the 
consequences of the conflict. The term 'tragedy' was mentioned in contexts which, for example, 
expressed the degree of the regime's bombardment consequences as well as 'the victims, the 




                                                             




1 – The Killed People 
 
Al-Jazeera gave the names "the murdered" (78 times), and "the victims" (32times)493 to those 
who died because of the regime's military actions. Most of them were civilians. The word 
"murdered" is a neutral term which, in other words, only refers to those who die by another person 
regardless of the fact whether the murdered is innocent or guilty. However, the word 'victims' has 
an implicit attitude. It indicates that the civilians or the opposition's dead persons are innocent, 
assaulted ones who died in an unjust manner. The word 'martyr' was employed once when the 
demonstrators expressed their compliments to the son of their city, Al-Jazeera's correspondent, the 
martyr Mohammad Masalmah494. This is a significance of the people's respect of the role of the 
media activists thanks to whom the events were transmitted to the world. Another indication that 
Al-Jazeera considered its amateur correspondent's death as martyrdom. In other words, the 
Channel adopted a religious attitude in categorizing the deaths of its correspondents. However, as 
for the rest of the Syrian death cases, this religious categorization was completely absent. 
 
"The murder scenes remain ahead."495 The repetition of this statement turned Syria into a stage 
which contains continuous, uninterrupted scenes that are full of blood. This is a significance of 
how enormous and horrible the consequences are. "The bloodshed," (4 times), and "Bloodshed 
goes on"496 are a metonymy that the death of the civilians by the regime continues. Al-Jazeera 
employed these phrases when it dealt with the situation of the killed people in general and without 
mentioning any details about the numbers or the names. This generalization suggests that all the 
Syrian people are one body which continues bleeding non-stop. Or it puts forward that the numbers 
of the murdered people are going up.  
 
"Among the body parts and the rubble of destruction one truth, with which all the Syrians agree, 
shines: the Syrians have a daily appointment with death. Those who escape the bombardment fall 
as victims of an explosion."497This is a significance of the presence of death everywhere; it is 
always there and unavoidable. It is the inevitable consequence for the armless people. "Cities never 
stopped burying their murdered persons."498 This statement was reiterated; it is a significance of 
the reproduction of death, that death is endless, that the one who takes part in accompanying the 
dead person's body today might himself be carried to his last home 'grave' tomorrow. "No day 
passes without the fall of more murdered people."499The Channel always directly and explicitly 
recalled that the numbers of murdered and injured people were enormously increasing day by day. 
                                                             
 "القتلى" و "الضحايا"   493
494 25 January 2013. 
Mohammad Masalmah is a Syrian young man from the governorate of Daraa. He was an activist whom the crisis turned into a media person. Then he became a correspondent of Al-
Jazeera. He died by the Syrian security forces.  
495  25 March 2013.  "مشاهد القتل ال تزال ماثلة" 
496  25 September 2011, 22 February 2013.   "يتواصل نزيف الدم" 
497 10 May 2012. "من بين أشالء القتلة و ركام الدمار تسطع حقيقة واحدة يتفق عليها جميع السوريين و هي أنهم باتوا على موعد يومي مع الموت، من ينجو من القصف يقع ضحية تفجير" 
498 14 June 2012.  "لم تفرغ المدن من دفن قتالها" 




This information was exposed in a dramatic style in a voice tone which could charge the recipient 
with so much terror and tension that the Syrians seemed to sleep and wake up every day on new 
massacres. "They always have an appointment with death"500 
(49) 
 
A murdered person during the demonstrations against Assad.501 
 
Al-Jazeera's discourse suggests that the dead bodies are piled everywhere: in the homes, in the 
streets, in the fields, cut with knives, thrown in the rivers or in public areas, and amassed in the 
hospitals. The Channel drew the attention of the recipient to the situation of the corpses. For 
example, corpses with cut out organs, extracted or crushed genitals, deformed dead bodies, bowels 
torn to pieces. The dead bodies of the murdered people were pulled from under the rubble; some 
of them were parts of the body which were cut to pieces. These are signifiers of the abnormal 
brutality and inhumaneness which characterize the regime, its soldiers and henchmen. "The owners 
of the homes are motionless corpses under the rubble."502, "The dead bodies of hundreds of people, 
men and women, old and young, were heaped woundless and bloodless in such a way that they 




Dead bodies heaped up in an undistinguishable way.504 
 
                                                             
500 10 May 2012. "إنهم دوما على موعد مع الموت" 
501  15 May 2011.  
502  21 January 2013.  "أصحاب المنازل جثث هامدة تحت الركام" 
503  21 August 2013. "تراكمت جثث المئات من الناس رجاال و نساءا شيوخا و أطفاال بال جروح و ال نزف حتى بدو و كأنهم نيام" 




Al-Jazeera mentioned the difficulty of presenting a lot of images which it had. It stated that 
these images were horrifying and painful; therefore, it was necessary for it to screen out and 
obscure some of them so that the viewers may be able to bear the sight of the human death in its 




Killing children and mutating their dead bodies by the Syrian security personnel.505 
 
Women and kids were of the most important means of proving the criminality and brutality of 
the ruling regime. The Channel portrayed that the armed forces target the women and children so 
much that they form a large rate of those who were murdered. 
Pursuant to Al-Jazeera, the Syrian citizens suffer the loss of their closest relatives: siblings, 
parents, and so on. "Siblings and friends still fall murdered by the bullets of their supposed 
protectors."506This is a significance of how immense the disaster and the agony are, as death 
continues to wipe relatives out. Death is leaving the man alone without his family and friends. 
"This lady comes out from under the rubble of her home, but other members of her family are 
picked out as motionless dead bodies."507 
 
Al-Jazeera tried to attract the emotions of the viewer towards the civilians and the opposition. 
To achieve this goal, it employed the specific news concerning the murdered and the wounded. 
"This man, who passed away, was attempting to take out what he could of the belongings of his 
family. Now, the breadwinner and the belongings had gone away while Douma remained moaning 
under bombardment like a lot of the other quarters of the city."508These statements are loaded with 
emotional appeal; the man was not a combatant; he was only a civilian who was trying to provide 
his family by fetching them what he could from their home which they unwillingly had to depart. 
However, he eventually lost his life as well as the belongings. Then, the Channel likened the city 
of Douma to a woman who cries, moans and sighs in agony. 
                                                             
505 27 May 2011.  
506 14 October 2011. "إخوة و أصدقاء ما انفكوا يتساقطون قتال برصاص حماتهم المفترضين" 
507 21 March 2013. "تخرج هذه السيدة من تحت أنقاض مسكنها لكن آخرين من عائلتها يخرجون جثث هامدة" 




Al-Jazeera restated the idea of "blood mingled with bread"509 (7 times) as a significance the aim 
of which is not only criticizing the regime's behavior but also stirring the feelings in favor of the 
civilians who needed the bread which was not abundantly available. They stand in long queues for 
hours and hours, then the regime cold-bloodedly bombards them. Blood mingled with bread is a 
signifier of how colossal are the disasters which the people suffer from are. 
 
In one of the videos, a man addresses his little boy who died as a result of the chemical attack: 
"Wake up, son! Wake up, wake up, son! Yea, wake up, son and say: Oh God!"510 Then, the 
journalist comments on this scene: "Did he say: Oh, God? Did he really wake up? Or, query, did 
he pass away as other hundreds passed away and as the hope of millions of people in this spot of 
the universe of the possibility of saving them passed away?"511 This is a literary style which aims 
to affect the feelings of the recipient. The tone of the journalist expresses a sharp distress, piercing 
sadness, hopelessness of any international movement which can save the Syrian people. "They 
encounter a cold sever suffocating inevitable death."512 
 
As for mentioning the numbers of the victims, Al-Jazeera adopted a variety of methods. 
Sometimes, the Channel mentioned the names of one or two victims from the public and 
concentrated on the details of their funeral processions or the reasons why they were killed. On 
the one hand, this method makes the murdered persons as media icons who will eventually change 
into popular symbols. On the other hand, this method is considered as an attempt of pointing out 
the channel's credibility. The recipient may feel that Al-Jazeera is presenting accurate details about 
the names, place of residence, relatives of the victims and so on. 
In the second method, the Channel wouldn't state names or numbers: "Homs city had funeral 
processions for its murdered people."513 This method lets the imagination of the recipient free. 
Some may imagine that the numbers of the murdered are in hundreds. Others may think that they 
are in thousands. 
In the third method, the Channel stated the number of the murdered within one day or one week 
in a specific area: "A hundred were murdered yesterday." This method conveys magnification and 








                                                             
 "امتزاج الخبز بالدم"  509
 " قوم بابا قوم، قوم بابا قوم، أي قوم قول يارب" 510
511 22 August 2013."هل قال يارب؟ هل قام فعال؟ أم تراه مات كما مات مئات سواه و كما مات معهم أمل ماليين البشر في هذه البقعة من العالم بإمكانية انقاذهم" 
512 22 August 2013. "يصارعون موتا خانقا باردا قاسيا ال انفكاك منه" 






Dead bodies heaped up in an undistinguishable way.514 
 
In the fourth method, Al-Jazeera recalled statistics of the murdered as from the start of the crisis 
until the date of the report, the statistics of victims who fell within several months: 'tens of 
thousands', 'hundreds of thousands,' etc. 
 
According to the channel, the civilians are being killed before they break their fast in Ramadan. 
This picture gives death a more important meaning. It is a significance that those who are killed 
are pious people, who persevere on the Islamic duties. They fast in Ramadan and perform prayers. 
While they are getting ready to break the fast – that is, they haven't eaten yet after fasting for a 
whole day – the regime's forces bombard them. These formulations of the news can inflame all 
Muslims, especially those who stick to performing all the religious duties. 
Al-Jazeera portrayed the Syrian men crying. This presentation is quite important; because, 
according to the Syrian conventions and traditions, it is not easy for a man to cry. Crying is a 
womanly attribute of expressing feelings. A man who cries is a weak one and he is likened to 
women and disparaged. "When the catastrophe is disastrous, men become incapable of holding 
their tears back."515 is an implicit message which means that the violence and brutality of the 
regime are indescribable. Even men who never cry even in the most difficult circumstances and 




According to Al-Jazeera the crying of men is an evidence of the seriousness of the situation in Syria.516 
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515  12 September 2012.  "حين يكون المصاب جلال ال يتمكن الرجال من حبس دموعهم" 





In accordance to Al-Jazeera, insistence on life confronts death; despite all the agonies, the 
Syrians are coping with their circumstances filled with the hope of victory. The Channel showed 
images of elders and youngsters raising the signs of victory in spite of the destruction surrounding 
them from all sides, which is a significance of strong defiance. The Channel pointed out the 
people's patience and their challenge of the regime's dictatorship through linking the funeral 
processions to the slogans of the protestors. For instance, in a lot of images, the men reiterate near 
the cemetery: "God is the Greatest! We kneel only to God."517 That is, whatever the regime does, 
it will never succeed in humiliating the people. Kneeling518in Islam signifies the obedience of the 
slave – man – to God, the Greatest, and the Highest. "God is the Greatest! We kneel only to God" 
is a signifier that the people utterly refuse to bow and accept humiliation from the enemy of God. 
The reports involved interviews with people who escaped death or people who lost their 
relatives. The tones of their voices were full of grief and dismay. 
 
The Channel frequently pointed out the images of the coffins carried on the shoulders of people 
heading towards the cemetery during the funeral processions. Several times the faces of the dead 
in the coffins carried on the shoulders were uncovered so that the viewer could see them. Other 
times these faces were completely shrouded. The same applies to the dead bodies laid on the 
ground with a lot of men lining opposite them to perform the Prayer For The Dead519before burying 
them. In general, Muslims do not prefer uncovering the face of the dead. So, the whole body is 
usually covered with the shroud. However, the images which contain corpses with uncovered faces 
may signify that the deceased passed away smiling or happy and contented; that is, the merciful 
angels took his soul to the immortal paradise of God. The images which show the faces of the dead 
tranquil and contented rather than fearful have a significance for Muslims520: the happiness and 
contentedness on the face of the dead show that the dead sees the angels carrying them lovingly 
and pleasurably. On the contrary, the one who dies afraid of the Death Angel, which is a 
significance that he is not a pious person, will be tortured by the angels in the grave and eventually 
go to hell. This will show on their frowning worried face. That is the way the face looks may 
suggest the destiny of the dead521.Therefore, when the demonstrators uncover the faces of the 
young men, who died during demonstrating or bombarding, and display them as graceful and 
tranquil faces, not as fearful ones, is an evidence that they are martyrs whom the angels carried 
tenderly and took them to the vicinity of God and to His Heavens. 
                                                             
517  22 February 2013.  "هللا أكبر، ال نركع إال هلل" 
518  Bowing – Rukou' – is a prescribed part of the Islamic prayer. The praying person stands up and bows their back with their hands on their knees. This is an indication of man's 
submissiveness in front the greatness of God.  
519  This is a prayer which is served by Muslims before burying the dead. It has no Bowing – Rukou' – or prostrating –Sujud. It consists of four Takbirs i.e. saying the phrase (God 
is the Greatest). It is performed in order to ask mercy and supplication for the deceased. The purpose of it is also remindin g the people alive of their inevitable destiny (Death).  
520  There is disagreement among the Muslim scholars concerning the significance of the way the dead person's face looks. Here, we are not discussing the controversy of those 
scholars. We are rather talking about the prevailing popular dogma among the Muslims in Syria. The researcher has for long years been in contact with different slices of the Syrian 
people and closely observed these popular dogmas which were taken from religious dogmas.  
521  Many Muslims also believe that the situation of the health affects the way the dead person's face looks. However, here we are discussing the religious signifier (which is common 







Highlighting the dead person’s face during the funeral.522 
 
Most of the images of the dead were taken by the cell phone camera. Most of the times. The 
activists intently resorted to the closely-focused shots of the corpses which were full of the traces 
of torture and blood. These images seem narrow because they are too close. This creates a case of 
shortness of breath for the viewer as the details of the tortured body occupy the screen and fill the 
eye of the viewer with the aspects of death and physiological deformations. 
(55) 
 
Killing civilians and mutating their dead bodies by the Syrian security personnel.523 
 
2 – The Wounded People 
 
Pursuant to Al-Jazeera, there are no normal treatment conditions for the wounded. The regime 
bombs the hospitals, so they resort to field hospitals which might be in houses or in places far from 
bombarding. These hospitals had very simple equipment and they were supervised by opponent 
people. The Channel focused on the over-crowdedness of the rooms with the sick people. The 
images were painful as the injured seemed in an inhuman condition. They were deprived from 
their rights of treatment. The way the news of treating the wounded provokes anxiousness, fear 
and disgust due to the absence of the least degree of human rights. 
 
The images of the injured kids were one of the most important methods of portraying the actual 
situation of the Syrian crisis and of magnifying the regime's crimes. Al-Jazeera presented images 
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of children who were exposed to a chemical attack. One of them was a little girl into whose lungs 
and head the chemical gas in-leaked. Under hallucination, she discovered that she was alive. In a 
trembling voice, she started saying: "I'm alive! I'm alive!". A man replied: "Yeah, baby, you're 
alive"524. The repetition of this phrase by the little girl while she was unconscious is a significance 
that the people strongly hold on to life despite all the sufferings. She wants to make sure that she 
is still alive; she wants to live. 
 
The images of young men carrying the wounded and trying to save their lives after they were 
shot by the bullets and the bombing of the regime's forces were repeatedly shown on Al-Jazeera's 
screen.  
The rhythm of the images was fast and short suggesting a situation of confusion and fear in 
addition to the cohesion and unity of the people; the young men save each other despite all the 
suppression and killing the regime practices on them. 
 
3 – Human and Service Consequences 
 
Discussing the consequences will be presented in two sections: the first, as they were mentioned 
by the Syrian citizens. The second, as they were mentioned in the news stories and the comments 
of the journalists. 
 
Section One: 
During the coverage of the crisis consequences in 2012 and 2013, the correspondents of Al-
Jazeera, condensed their meetings with the civilian citizens who talked about their suffering and 
needs. This method made the consequences seem, most importantly, quoted directly from what the 
people themselves said, not through a dry news story. The effect of this method is stronger as the 
people's body language, the tone of their voices and their local dialects all increase the degree of 
the message's impact. 
All the women were wearing hijab or niqab. All of them were anti-regime. This is a signifier 
that the Islamic Sunni sect is the greatest enemy of the regime, and an indication that this sect 
which represents the huge majority in Syria opposes the regime and wants to eradicate it. This 
implicitly means that the regime is against the popular will and that it represents a religious 
minority which it protects and for whose safety it is destroying and burning Syria. 
 
The people's interviews expressed all the details of the difficulties of life: communication 
disconnections, water and power supply cut off; the unavailability of methane gas, diesel, and fuels 
(when they are available, they are extremely expensive) and the unavailability of heating materials 
and food stuff.  The women said that their children were hungry and that they could not cook. The 
women's expressions were simple, and the effect of this simplicity on the Arab recipient could be 
                                                             





greater as they could convey feelings rather than thoughts. "We use shoes in order to cook and 
heat ourselves. You can see with your own eyes how we are burning the doors of our rooms. We 
broke then into pieces so as to burn them under the food pot."525 This is a significance the hunger 
and cold fire devours all the items of the citizens: the shoes, the wood of the house doors, the wood 




The woman uses door wood for heating and cooking.526 
 
The kids line in long queues shouting: "We want diesel! We want diesel!"527 which signifies 





Kids wait for their turn to get oil.529  
 
The lack of medicines or their expensive prices was one of the most important contents of the 
interviews. Al-Jazeera pointed out the complaints of the citizens who charged Al-Assad of cutting 
the medicine off as a punishment for their opposition to him. The Channel showed the people as 
one hand and one heart; in solidarity they collected the medicine from their homes and donated it 
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to those who needed it among them. In this context, the collaboration and sympathy of the people's 
categories towards each other against the aggressiveness of the regime also appeared, especially 
in the absence of the humanitarian aids which, even if they existed, would not suffice to feed a 
person. The citizens gathered the aids, food and clothes, and distributed them among the needy. 
According to civilians, not only did the regime forces cut off the supplies but they also robbed the 
contents of the villages and cities; they stole the people's items and objects. 
 
The women stressed the necessity of the arrival of the humanitarian aids or death would be the 
destiny of all people. "May God fail you, Bashar! You burned our homes, you burned our 
food530."These phrases were reiterated by a veiled little girl, which is a significance of hunger and 
homelessness. The tone of her voice suggests that the oppressed531 is praying to God against the 
oppressor. The regime's weapons destroyed the children's homes and made them homeless; they 
remained with no food nor clothes. However, they have big hope in God and He will certainly 
judge the tyrant oppressor. The sayings and prayers of children have a deep psychological impact 
on the recipient. 
 
Assuring the savageness and brutality of the soldiers of the regime, the citizens talked about 
bombarding the fields, the olive presses, the poultry farms, and all resources of income by the 
airplanes. They also talked about the disastrous consequences of the regime's siege. A veiled old 
woman said: "May Allah comfort and relieve us! The siege has exhausted and slaughtered us; 
nothing to eat, nothing to drink. We're looking around for plants to eat."532  This is an indication 
that people are now looking everywhere for any kind of grass or plants which a human being does 
not usually eat to kill their hunger before hunger kills them. A young woman wearing a hijab said: 
"Oh, Arab nation! Oh, Islamic nation! Oh, Bashar Al-Assad! Spray the chemical on us and let us 
die of hunger collectively and quickly, rather than letting us die of humiliation slowly."533 These 
phrases were an objection to the siege by the regime. They indicate that the people prefer dying 
even by the ugliest weapons – the chemicals – to living a humiliating degrading life.  Some men 
expressed how severe hunger and humiliation were by saying that they shared the livestock their 
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The suffering of animals and poultry because of the siege of the Syrian army.534 
 
The citizens expressed that the degree of suffering deteriorated in Ramadan. They said that 
some men and young men (the gallant) did all they could in order to smuggle some food and give 
it to the people who suffered from the siege. 
Some men and young men said that they were the only people who remained in the town and 
that their families left to become displaced. They talked about the details of their lives under the 
siege and the unavailability of food stuff.  "Me and a few young men are here managing things. 
We’re the only ones who remained in the quarter. We managed things with some kerosene. We 
are managing things and cook by ourselves. Nobody remained except me and a few guys."535This 
discourse sentimentally appeals to the Syria people; generally speaking, the Syrian man does not 
cook; cooking and home management are generally the work of women. Women can understand 
the suffering of the men who lost their families and became obliged to practice the chores which 
are usually the specialization of women, especially in the religiously uptight environment. Also, 
men consider that it is a big tragedy for a man to have to cook.  
 
"All this is because of Bashar"536, "Bashar is cutting off medicine from us"537, "Bashar deprived 
us of fertilizers"538 were phrases reiterated by Syrian men. These are direct charges against the 
personality of the president. These statements might look normal and simple, but, in fact, they 
convey important signifiers. Before the Syrian crisis, the Syrian citizen never dared to say the 
name of the president this way and disparagingly. Nobody used to mention the name of Al-Assad 
without one of his titles: the president, the leader, the Boss, and so on. When these citizens were 
interviewed by Al-Jazeera, they had in mind that the Syrian security is able of recognizing them 
and eventually chasing them. However, they did not care and confronted this president through the 
media. They mentioned his first name only – Bashar – to express that they disrespect him. Their 
way suggests that they were confident that Al-Assad was not going to be their president any longer 
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and that the revolution will certainly be victorious. If they had had the least doubt about victory, 
they would not have appeared on media or defied and disparaged the president. 
 
Section Two; News narration and journalists' comments which handled the consequences of 
the conflict: 
Magnification was the most prominent characteristic of the news account. Even the voice tone 
of the journalists was employed to serve this magnification; it could be slow suggesting stillness, 
death, devastation, hunger, thirst, fear, and so on; it could be fast suggesting danger to everybody 
and every place, as if nothing would be safe from bombarding; or it could be medium combining 
simultaneously between the death of the normal life and danger. 
 
The most noticeable points which the Channel concentrated on in covering the crisis were as 
follows:  
Hunger: Al-Jazeera mentioned that a lot of the regions which were considered food sources for 
Syria and for the neighboring countries as well suffer from a catastrophic famine. "Long lines 
waiting for the loaf of bread in a country which has boasted food self-sufficiency for a long 
time."539 By this comment the Channel meant to criticize the regime because the Syrian 
government always showed off that Syria enjoyed self-sufficiency whereas the army is depriving 
the people the loaf of bread now. According to Al-Jazeera, the starvation policy is more painful 
for the civilians, especially in winter. The following phrases were repeatedly stated: "Bread was 
mixed with blood"540, "Bread immersed in blood"541, "The queues for bread turned into blood 
queues"542, "In Homs, bread has another taste"543.  Bread is a symbol of life and blood is a symbol 
of death so that the mental image becomes “mixing life with death”. "How big the need of the 
Syrians for a loaf of bread these days is! The lines get longer and longer in order to win it. However, 
only in Syria, waiting in front of the bakeries is a risk which costs the people their lives"544, this is 
a sentimental appeal in favor of the civilians in order to criminalize the regime. This method 
achieves two goals with “one stroke”.  
It was not enough for Al-Jazeera to talk about the hunger of human beings. It talked about the 
situation of the animals and birds as well. The birds are also hungry and the livestock suffer from 
a severe lack of food. "Everybody is suffering the danger of famine, some young civilian activists 
who remained inside the city, lest they would be arrested, cook food and present it to many 
militants to break the fast because many of these militants are not good at cooking and this is the 
first time they are away from their relatives."545 These statements contain several signifieds: the 
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solidarity between the armless and armed opponents. The perseverance of the opponents on 
practicing the Islamic religious prescriptions (fasting) in spite of the siege. In accordance with the 
Syrian traditions, when a man has to cook, it means that the female is absent from his life and that 
a change has taken place in his masculine characteristics because, generally speaking, cooking is 
not an attribute or a task of men. These are women's tasks (a man should devote his abilities to 




Because of the difficulty of the situation, men themselves had to cook.546 
 
Epidemics: diseases spread among people, especially children. Even some old diseases were 
back again. The garbage piles were everywhere. The government never cared for the citizens, so 
some young men from the city cleaned the towns and cities, which is a significance that the Syrian 
youth bear the responsibility.  
 
The lack or absence of the essential needs of life: the news account called a lot of the people's 
needs. 'the children lack the least needs of life, especially food and clothes', 'unavailability of water 
and when available, it is contaminated', 'the people gather the rain water then use it', 'power cut-
offs'. Pursuant to Al-Jazeera correspondents, volunteers try to maintain the power system which is 
intently neglected by the official authorities. This is a significance that the people depend on 
themselves and the regime has absolutely ignored them. Another thing is the 'Absence of fuels'. 
Al-Jazeera showed that the farmers who are known for their love of the land are now cutting the 
trees and using them in heating and cooking. This is an indication of the severe suffering from 
hunger and cold. It is also a significance of the collapse of the agricultural sector. Al-Jazeera 
assured that the gardens and forests have become treeless, which is an indication to the immense 
need. If the fuel were available, it would be for prices that the citizens cannot afford as the 
purchasing power has enormously deteriorated because the government has raised the prices.  
 
The influence of the siege on agriculture: here is a signifier that the regime is fighting the people 
through destroying the agricultural crops.  
                                                             




The collapse of education: many schools were knocked down. Some of them were turned into 
shelters and others into field hospitals. This is a significance that the generations have been 
educationally destroyed.  
Stopping the medical sector: the hospitals have been knocked down. The medical crews have 
immigrated or left their jobs fearing the regime's bombing.  
 
Knocking down homes, mosques, hospitals, schools, and so on: on Al- Jazeera's screen, cities 
looked war-stricken and deserted, with destroyed buildings. The Channel employed expressions 
which support the effect of the images. For example, "The city is rubble over rubble"547, 
"Destruction is everywhere"548, "Grave devastation" (4 times), "Complete quarters are 
destroyed"549. "Despite the destruction and devastation which happened to the most of the 
mosques, some Syrians did not show laziness in performing prayers in them, even if they did not 
exceed the number of the fingers of one hand."550 This is a significance of religious commitment 
and obeying the divine orders which prescribe prayers on Muslims. This is a new assurance that 
the regime is the enemy of God, the enemy of Islam. 
 
Stopping tourism and deterioration of economy: unemployment rates have raised. Hundreds of 
business workshops have stopped. Factories were closed. The Syrian economy has fallen into a 
coma. The exchange of the Syrian currency has deteriorated. An accelerated erosion of the state's 
revenues has taken place. 
According to Al-Jazeera, the tragedy is unimaginable. A whole generation is under the threat 
of being lost and psychologically deformed. The kids have been exposed to psychological shocks 
from the horror of what they saw and heard; their families, neighbors and friends were murdered.  
Everybody in Syria suffers loss. There is no home where a member of it did not die 
The Channel did not mention the riots done by people who made use of the state of instability 
and who did not politically belong to any category like the thieves and the murderers. The only 
killer was the regime. The purpose of this news selectivity is drawing the attention to the 
governmental criminality. 
Many times, Al-Jazeera mentioned that the slices of the society are optimistic. Despite the 
suffering, siege, death and destruction, the hope of the Syrians is still alive. Syria will be better in 
the future; that is, after disposing of the rule of the present regime. 
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4 – Displacement and Asylum 
Al-Jazeera's coverage of the displaced and refugees varied between statistical presentation and 
sentimental appeals. 
The statistical presentation was in different methods: Firstly, mentioning the number of the 
refugees and displaced as from the beginning of the crisis to the date of the presented news story. 
This is a method which reminds the recipient of the increase of the numbers of those who were 
obliged to leave their country. This method introduces a panoramic statistical image of asylum. 
Secondly, the coverage of the numbers of the people fleeing certain regions during a specific length 
of time which could be some weeks or months.  Al-Jazeera employed this method when it wanted 
to magnify events which took place over a specific period of time. For instance, in order to prove 
the upsurge of the regime's bombing on the city over the period of two months, the Channel 
introduced numbers which pointed out the displacement of all the civic people from these regions. 
Thirdly, the Channel used the statistics of one or two days. This method was employed in the 
context of the events which were more prominent and effective than others; an example of this is 
when the regime's forces intensively bombed a certain region with all types of weapons over one 
day. Fourthly, the Channel talked about refugees in general. It did not specify figures or numbers. 
This method leaves the imagination of the recipient widely free. Fifthly, recalling the numbers of 
the refugees in every neighboring country. For instance, 465 thousand in Lebanon, 75 thousand in 
Jordan. Sixthly, the magnification method which is based on mentioning the numbers without 
direct specification: 'a quarter of Syria's population have become displaced or refugees', 'over a 
quarter of Syria's population had to leave their homes', 'Millions of the Syrian people can't find a 
shelter and have become forced to move' . 
The studied reports discussed the situation of the refugees inside Syria and in the neighboring 
countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The Channel never mentioned the affairs of the 
Syrian refugees in the western countries. 
Al-Jazeera shed light on the suffering of the internally displaced people and the refugees 
outside: 'the difficulty of securing subsistence needs', 'the difficulty of finding a shelter inside 
Syria', 'the Syrians turned the mosques, the schools and even the public parks into displacement 
centers', 'the citizens run away from death to death' which is, on the one hand, a significance that 
the regime chases them and bombs them wherever they are. It is, on the other hand, a significance 
of tragic suffering and inhuman conditions which they have to bear and be patient with. The reports 
handled the difficulty of securing camps and tents outside the country and the fact that even if they 
were secured, they would not realize the least human level. They would not protect from heat or 
cold. The Channel also discussed the problems of raping women and girls and forcing them to be 
married, the deprivation from education, the lack of food and water and the spread of diseases. 




homeless, besieged and hungry in torn tents where the wind blows and where handicapped and 
wounded women and children live under the lowest level of subsistence and health services."551 
The Channel mentioned that the majority of the displaced and refugees were women and 
children. This helps to point out how oppressed the Syrian people are, as Arabs are more affected 
by issues concerning women and children who are considered weak creatures.  
(60-61) 
 
Displaced people most of them are women and kids.552 
 
The refugee children.553 
 
"What do the Syrians possess when their country becomes too small to have them in it and 
when the circles of bullets, guns, tanks and missiles surround them? What can they do when their 
homes become within the list of the daily bombardment by the regime's tanks, planes and rocket 
launchers."554 According to Al-Jazeera, asylum and displacement often result from the regime's 
activities such as bombing, besieging and assaults. The Channel seldom considered the armed 
conflict between the regime and the armed opposition a cause of the displacement of the people. 
The Channel never mentioned other causes such as the presence of armed gangs which did not 
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belong to any trend. These gangs which made use of the situation of instability in order to rob, 
murder and seize the property of the people. People escaped for fear of the regime's injustice on 
them, and in search for security and food which were no more available in Syria because of the 
siege.  
"Not many of the city population remained. Most of them left without luggage.  Some of them 
might have taken out what they could from under the rubble."555This is a significance of the loss 
of the people of everything; the people were forced to move leaving their homes. They were not 
even able to take anything of their belongings because everything was destroyed; everything was 
under the rubble of devastation. "The Syrian escapes a type of death to face another away from a 
destroyed home, a family who were absented by death and comrades who dispersed over the 
borders of the homeland"556 This is a signifier of the immense suffering of the Syrian citizen, first 
because of the regime's violence, and secondly because of the difficulties of the asylum and its 
tragic conditions. All this was mingled with a psychological situation full of sadness and sorrow 
because the homes were destroyed, the family and relatives died, and the friends departed and were 
dispersed with no hope to meet them and share sorrow with them.  
 
Al-Jazeera stated that the escape of the refugees from death does not mean that they would live 
a decent life; suffering surrounds them everywhere. In addition, the numbers of the deserters are 
continuously increasing. This flow is going to make their situation worse because the neighboring 




The refugee women and the children in the camps.557 
 
During the coverage of the subject of the refugees, the Channel portrayed the Syrian people as 
cooperative, supportive and loyal to each other. The citizens welcome the emigrants who come 
from other governorates and towns, serve food, present clothes to them and share their homes with 
them. "Even old clothes which protect them from the cold of winter at a time when there is no 
heating except through the regime's fires."558 This is an indication that the people help each other 
even through donating old things. Another signifier is how greatly the people suffer from the cold 
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as there is no means of heating, while the only source of heating is the fires of the forces of the 
Syrian army. This is a depiction that proves the degree of the horrific suffering of the Syrian 
people. "This woman spent the whole night waiting for her turn to buy bread for her children and 
for those emigrants whom she calls guests."559 This is a significance, on the one hand, of the 
difficulty of securing a living, and of the collaboration of the citizens, on the other. "This 
crowdedness is not because life is normal. It is rather because Al-Raqqa holds more than a million 
and three hundred thousand displaced people from all the Syrian governorates in it. This is not a 
demonstration; it is rather queues of thousands waiting at the doors of the bakeries."560 
 
Al-Jazeera selected images where the children and women line in front of the camera looking 
in a way which suggests the misery they are suffering from. The images of the asylum and 
displacement kids pointed out their dirty clothes, their uncombed dust-stuffed hair and their crying 
of severe grief and hunger.  
(63) 
 
The women and children refugees. The women are wearing the Sunni hijab.561 
 
Al-Jazeera drew the attention to the effect of the climatic difficulties on the situation of the 
emigrants inside Syria and the refugees outside it. In this context, the Channel criticized the Arab 
and international countries which remained motionless although they can see in the images the 
enormous degree of humiliation to which the displaced Syrians are exposed. Al-Jazeera also 
presented the attitudes of the Syrian people who were disgusted by the Arab and international 
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The suffering of the women refugees.562 
 
The desire of the Syrians to get back to their cities as soon as possible in addition to their 
insistence and defying Al-Assad's tyranny were very clear. This defiance has greater impact when 
expressed by young men and young children who, for example, cheer: "Bye, bye, Bashar! Good 
night!"563 which is an indication that the time of the president is over, and that a new dawn is soon 
to come out. In this example, we see how children have used a phrase whose literal meaning is 
positive “i.e. Good night”, but the literal meaning has changed into negative because the addressee 
is Assad. Wishing good night has become a significance of the end of the reign of the president 
because his night has come and night is a symbol of slumber and motionlessness.  
 
Covering the Situation of Minorities in Syria 
 
The Channel's mentioning of the situation of the ethnic and religious minorities was quite rare. 
Therefore, the popular movement seemed as one which represented the religious majority, i.e. the 
Sunni sect564. 
Three minorities were mentioned: the Palestinians, the Christians and the Kurds. As for the 
Palestinians, Al-Jazeera portrayed this minority as one which is very opponent of the regime. It 
added that the forces of the Arab Syrian army detain, kill and besiege the Palestinians and apply 
the starvation policy on them. This picture is very important as the regime always tried to present 
itself as a hero who defended the Palestinian cause, protected the Palestinians in Syria, and granted 
them rights which were equal to those of the Syrian citizens. The channels which support the 
Syrian government conveyed the Palestinian points of view which supported the policies of Al-
Assad and the regime. However, Al-Jazeera launched a counter attack to deracinate these ideas. It 
portrayed the regime as a traitor and an agent of Israel. 'Al-Assad is the only one who is able to 
control the borders with Israel' i.e. he is protecting Israel from the Arab people's fury and anger as 
the Syrians and Palestinians want to go into occupied Palestine in order to retrieve it after they 
expel the Israelis from it. That is, the people want to free Palestine while Al-Assad is preventing 
them to do that. According to Al-Jazeera, the regime uses the Palestinians as a trump card, in which 
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he deals to take popular roots. The Channel tended to mobilize the Palestinian people against Al-
Assad and his government through historical recalls which point out the enmity and fight between 
Yasser Arafat and Al-Assads. 
 
Al-Jazeera specified only one report in which it talked about the Christian minority. In addition, 
it incidentally talked about the Armenians, Syriac and Chaldeans. The purpose of the report565was 
showing the regime's hostility towards these minorities. The regime's military policy forced them 
to move and leave their areas. Al-Jazeera's correspondent interviewed a Christian citizen who 
assured that the different sects have for a long time been co-existing together and that they have 
been sharing each other their joy and sadness. The implicit purpose of this message is discrediting 
the regime's propaganda about the sectarianism of the opposition and its crimes against the 
minorities on a sectarian and doctrine basis. 
 
The Channel pointed out the division of the Kurdish stance towards the Syrian crisis. On Syrian 
land, the she-correspondent of Al-Jazeera said: "At the firing line, stands a Kurdish young man 
with his rifle directed towards the sons of his minority which was divided into supporters of the 
regime and others who supported the Syrian revolution."566This is a significance of the disastrous 
consequences to which the policy of the ruling regime has led. Because Al-Assad did not step 
down, the brothers started killing each other as their attitudes were divided between supporters and 
opponents of the Syrian government. "The Kurds who joined FSA state that the regime played on 
sectarian chord so that the brothers separated between supporters and opponents of the Syrian 
revolution."567This is an indication that the regime makes use of tearing the constituents of the 
people and of widening the cracks between the same sect or ethnicity, i.e. the regime applies the 
'divide and conquer' policy. 
 
Al-Jazeera presented the Kurdish fighters as heroes who are loyal to Syria. They joined their 
Arab brothers to fight under the flag of FSA. Abu Muhammad, the media spokesman of the 
Kurdish Revolutionary Council, addressed Al-Jazeera's correspondent on the battlefield: "We 
work for the unity of Syria only. We want to prove that the Kurds are patriotic. They are not less 
patriotic than any other component of the Syrian people."568The Channel showed images of the 
Kurds carrying their guns countering the regime's forces and the Kurds who martially support these 
forces. A Kurdish militant states: "I have decided to stand to the side of our brothers, the Arabs, in 
the Syrian revolution because we made sure that they were right, but some Kurds betrayed 
this."569This is a significance that the pro-regime Kurds support oppression, support the one who 
assaults the right of the people. This message is, also, an invitation to all the Kurds to join the 
opponents because those who support the regime are traitors and treacherous. This notion is 
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566 10 June 2013. "شاب كردي يقف على خط النار، يصوب بندقيته باتجاه أبناء أقليته التي انقسمت بين موالين للنظام و آخرين مع الثورة السورية" 
567 10 June 2013. "يقول األكراد الذين انخرطوا في صفوف الجيش السوري الحر بأن النظام قد لعب على وتر الطائفية فتفرق األخوة ما بين مؤيد للثورة السورية و معترض عليها " 
568 10 June 2013. "نحن منعمل فقط من أجل وحدة سوريا، و لنثبت أن األكراد وطنيون و ال يقلون وطنية عن أي مكّون آخر من الشعب السوري" 




assured by a declaration by a Kurdish official though which he expresses the betrayal of some 
Kurds who promised to fight the regime and participate in besieging it. On the contrary, they took 
the side of Syrian army.  They assaulted and murdered the citizens, even the Kurds570. In order to 
polarize the pro-regime Kurds, Al-Jazeera indicated that the aim of the anti-regime Kurdish 
combatants is not murdering their brothers, Kurds or Arabs; it is rather facing the regime's 
repression. 
 
The Effect of Censorship on the News Coverage; How Was This Subject 
Addressed in Al-Jazeera's Reports? 
 
In 2011, Al-Jazeera handled the effect of the control imposed on the media by the Syrian 
government on the news coverage. "Until now, there are no images of the tanks in the streets of 
Banyas or any other Syrian city, which is a lack of the news components. This is, of course, 
explained by the forcible absenting of the mass media571", "but the news story remained lacking 
or rather absent as far as most of its headlines and details are concerned. This is due to closing the 
doors of the country in the face of the mass media and to the inability of any person to get well-
founded news from Daraa."572The purposes of addressing this subject are: first, justifying the field 
absence of Al-Jazeera, justifying the inability of the Channel to cover the events on the Syrian 
land; second, magnifying the suffering of the Syrian people. The Syrians appear to be imprisoned, 
unable to convey their voice and the images of their agony to the world.  
 
"The media blackout", "The blackout imposed by the authorities." (7 times) This term was 
repeated many times. It has an implicit indication that suggests the fear of the regime of uncovering 
its crimes towards the armless citizens by the world. Simultaneously, it suggests the blackout the 
people live in. This blackout surrounds them everywhere and the regime, the beast, devours this 
people with no one whosoever seeing or hearing how this devouring is done. 
 
Al-Jazeera pointed out the importance of the modern means of communication in breaking the 
chains of control. With the communication revolution, the pro-regime media cannot disparage the 
people's minds and ignore the repression imposed on the revolutionaries. The modern means of 
communication and changing the ordinary citizen into an immediate correspondent who directly 
transmits what is taking place on land obliged the regime to declare some reformations and to 
expel a group of the corrupt officers and officials. Pursuant to Al-Jazeera, the images are portraying 
what is going on non-stop. The citizen has become a documenter of events, depicting the bomb 
falling next to him, photographing the soldiers who assault, murder and bomb. "From a remote 
place, the cell phone camera depicts the security forces who tried to extinguish the protests by 
                                                             
570 10 June 2013.  
571 11 April 2011. "ليس ثمة صور إلى اآلن للدبابات في شوارع مدينة بانياس، أو سواها في المدن السورية. وذلك نقص عن عناصر الخبر يفسره بالطبع تغييب وسائل اإلعالم قسرا" 




force."573This is a significance suggesting that the citizen takes the images stealthily lest the 
security forces should discover and arrest him. "A lens of an activist escaped an artillery bombing 
which was too close to it."574 We notice that the Channel did not state that one of the activists 
escaped because his escape as a human being was not the most important event for this news 
coverage. The purpose was drawing the attention of the viewer to the importance of the role of the 
modern media; as the mobile phone cameras are the most significant witness of the regime's 
crimes.  
The cell phone cameras were the main source of Al-Jazeera's news. This led some channels to 
criticize the mechanism of Al-Jazeera which adopted videos the credibility of which cannot be 
verified. Al-Jazeera replied to these criticisms indirectly: "With preventing the mass media and the 
regional and international rights organizations from accessing Daraa and verify the witnesses’ 
accounts or the government's denial, the image remains the only one which can be seen by the 
world. After that, it's up to the viewer to believe it or doubt and deny it."575 What is meant by the 
image which can be seen by the world the videos of opponents who use cell phone cameras to 
cover the daily events. Through these phrases Al-Jazeera tried, in a disgusted tone, to justify the 
use of these videos. It tried to say 'What to do?'. What can we do if the regime does not allow us 
to cover the events and does not allow anyone to access the conflict regions? Only the image 
depicted by the mobile phone can convey what is taking place on field. If you want, believe it or 
discredit it; this is the only source we have. 
 
Additional Signifiers of the Type and Rhythm of the Media Personnel's 
voice 
 
The voice rhythm of Al-Jazeera's personnel varied among the fast, the medium and the slow.  
The rhythm differed in accordance to the subject dealt with. When the Channel covered the 
opposing popular movement which spread all over Syria, the rhythm was fast suggesting that these 
demonstrations were like wildfire that cannot be extinguished. This method can be useful in the 
psychological war. On the one hand, it makes the regime's soldiers feel that the strength of the 
opposition is growing day by day and that it has become impossible to think of eradicating it. On 
the other hand, this method gives the demonstrators doses of confidence, encouragement and 
urging on perseverance.  
 
The medium voice rhythm was employed during the coverage of the popular movement to 
suggest the steadiness of the demonstration pace. As if this activity had been a daily activity that 
                                                             
573 23 March 2011. "عن بعد، ترصد كاميرا هاتف النقال قوات األمن و التي حاولت بالقوة إخماد احتجاجات" 
574 18 June 2013. "نجت عدسة أحد الناشطين من قصف مدفعي كان قريبا جدا منها" 
575 17 May 2011. 





would stop only when the regime had fallen and Al-Assad had departed. Al-Jazeera never 
employed the slow voice rhythm during the demonstrations´ coverage. 
The fast voice rhythm adopted during presenting information about the regime and its activities 
suggests that the bullets, missiles and bombs fall cats and dogs. This rhythm transmits fear and 
horror. It makes the viewer hold breathing, sigh with anxiety, and feel unstable. The Syrian viewers 
might feel that the regime's forces could assault their house at any moment and that the bombs 
could soon fall on them. 
 
The medium voice rhythm suggests that the Syrian, Arab and world peoples got used to the 
assaults of the regime's forces as they have become daily activities which the regime never stops 
doing. It also suggests the only solution the Syrian government resorts to in order to solve the 
Syrian crisis is assaults and bombardment. The medium rhythm creates a fixed image of the regime 
in the mind of the recipient and presents this image as an absolute reality. When the spectators see 
and hear negative information about the regime at a medium – average – rhythm every day, this 
method may make them think that this information seems as if it were undeniable absolute truth. 
Al-Jazeera's journalists never employed the slow tone rhythm when covering the regime's forces 
actions.  
 
The slow rhythm of the voice was apparently clear during covering the crisis consequences. 
That is, when handling the topics of asylum, emigration, devastation, death, suffering and people's 
human needs. This approach suggests the stillness of life, tranquility and the smell of blood. It also 
suggests the death of activities, and of areas whose inhabitants deserted them, especially when this 
rhythm is accompanied by images of the destroyed houses, cemeteries and corpses. 
 
During the narrative account, feminine voices could be more effective than masculine ones, 
especially when the she-journalist talks with a voice tone that suggests her sympathizing with the 
people and indignation of the regime's repressive policy. During covering the consequences of the 
crisis, the feminine voice tone charges the recipient with additional emotions to the benefit of the 
Syrian people. The topic itself can charge the spectator with sentiment; however, the womanly 
tone remains the symbol of tenderness, uprising against repression, soft defiance and angry 
femininity. The difference between the manly and womanly voices loads the media message with 








The Index for Chapter 6 
 
Al-Jazeera´s Random Sample  
Report Title in Arabic Report Title in English Report Date Link Internet 
اقتحام األمن السوري المسجد العمري 
 في مدينة درعا
 
The Syrian security 
personnel break into Al-Omari 










قتلى وجرحى برصاص األمن 
 السوري
Injured and murdered 
people by the bullets of the 







تخوف سوري من تبديل الطوارئ 
 بمكافحة اإلرهاب
Syrian fears of substituting 










المعارضة تشكك في جدية وعود 
 الحكومة السورية
The opposition doubts the 









 Demonstrations in several مظاهرات في عدة مدن وقرى سورية







نشر عدد من الدبابات في مدينة 
 بانياس
The deployment of a 









 The development of the تطور أحداث المشهد الثوري السوري









 The developments of the تطورات الوضع اإلنساني في سوريا







السلطات السورية تعتقل مئات 
 الناشطين
The Syrian authorities 







نزوح عائالت سورية من تلكلخ إلى 
 لبنان
Syrian families migrate 








العثورعلى مقبرة جماعية لعدد من 
 الرفأت في درعا
Discovering a mass grave of 









 Terrifying images of torture صور مروعة آلثار تعذيب في سوريا







مئِة الِف شخص شاركوا في حماة 
 تشييع قتلى الجمعة
One hundred thousand 
people took part in a funeral 
procession for Friday murdered 








 Syria: the refugees, a سوريا: الالجئون...مأساة تتعاظم







 Expansion of martial توسع العمليات العسكرية السورية







الوضع اإلنساني في ظل التظاهرات 
 السورية
The humanitarian situation 












Report Title in Arabic Report Title in English Report Date Link Internet 
 Breaking into homes and a اقتحام منازل وحملة اعتقاالت بحماة








 Demonstrations in many مظاهرات بعدة مدن تضاماً مع حماة







تنوع اساليب اإلحتجاجات المطالبة 
 بالحرية في سوريا
Diversification of protest 
methods which demand 









مشروع قانون يسمح باالحزاب 
 السياسية في سوريا
A bill proposed to allow 








تدفق الدبابات والناقالت إلى دير 
 الزور شرقي سوريا
Flow of tanks and soldier 
carriers to Deir Ezzor in the 









إصرار بشار على قمع اإلحتجاجات 
 السلمية
Bashar insistence on 









سالح البحرية يدخل الحرب ضد 
 الشعب السوري األعزل
Navy Force enters the war 










األمن السوري يقتحم مسجد الرفاعي 
 في دمشق
The Syrian security 
personnel break into Al-Rifaie 








إعتقاالت عشية جمعة" الموت وال 
 المذلة"
Detentions on the eve of 








استمرار اإلحتجاجات المطالبة برحيل 
 النظام في سوريا
Protests demanding the 











 The profile of the Syrian مظهر الشارع السوري في ظل الثورة







ثوار سوريا : الثورة ماضية 
 ومنتصرة
The Syrian revolutionaries: 









قتلى في اشتباك بين الجيش ومنشقين 
 سوريين
Casualties in a clash 
















األمن السوري يقتحم المستشفيات 
 ويعذب الجرحى
The Syrian security 
personnel break into hospitals 









اتساع ظاهرة التمرد داخل الجيش 
 السوري
The rebellion phenomenon 









 The forces of the army and قوات الجيش والشبيحة تقتحم حمص










Report Title in Arabic Report Title in English Report Date Link Internet 
استمرار المظاهرات في سورية رغم 
 القمع الدموي
Demonstrations continue in 










آخر المستجدات على األراضي 
 السورية










معارك عنيفة بين الجيش السوري 
 ومنشقين
Violent battles between the 




تفجيرين إنتحاريين يستهدفان مقّرين 
 أمنيين بدمشق
Two suicide bombings 





جمعة الزحف إلى ساحات الحرية 
 بسوريا
"Advancing into the 





عشرات القتلى والجرحى في تفجير 
 بحي الميدان
Tens of murdered and 
injured people by an explosion 




ثورة الجيش السوري الحر ضد نظام 
 بشار
The revolution of the Free 





التجمعات الجماهيرية المساندة للثورة 
 السورية










استيالء الجيش الحرعلى آليات 
 عسكرية في سوريا
The Free Syrian Army 





 Two explosions in military تفجيرين بمواقع عسكرية في حلب




 Thousands of Syrians تظاهر آالف السوريين بحي المزة








معانأة أهالي حماة جراء حصار 
 الجيش السوري
The people of Hama suffer 
















عمليات الجيش السوري الحر بقلب 
 دمشق
The operations of the Free 















تأثر السياحة والزراعة بالحصار في 
 سوريا
The impact of the blockade 











Report Title in Arabic Report Title in English Report Date Link Internet 
معاناة النازحين عن األحياء 
 المتضررة في حمص
Suffering of the people who 
migrated from the damaged 








تطورات الثورة السورية في ظل 
 القصف والدمار
The developments of the 
Syrian revolution under the 








أزمة إنسانية يعاني منها ريف محافظة 
 إدلب
A humanitarian crisis from 
which the countryside of the 








قتلى وجرحى في تفجيرات وتواصل 
 للثورة بسوريا
Murdered and injured 
people by explosions while the 










الجيش السوري الحر يحاول التمركز 
 في حمص
The Free Syrian Army 








 The effects of the twin آثار التفجير المزدوج في دمشق







تزايد المظاهرات رغم حصار شبيحة 
 النظام السوري
The increase of 
demonstrations despite the 










نفقات الجيش السوري في قمع 
 االحتجاجات
The expenditure of the 









تحذيرات من استمرار نزوح آالف 
 السوريين
Warnings against the 
continuation of the migration of 















اشتباكات بسوريا بين الجيشين الحر 
 والنظامي
Clashes between the Free 








مظاهرات في جمعة واثقون بنصر هللا 
 في سوريا
Demonstrations on "We Are 









معارك عنيفة ضحيتها الشعب 
 السوري
Violent battles the victim of 








مجزرة جديدة في قرية التريْمسة في 
 ريف حماة
A new massacre in Treimsa 








الالجئون السوريون في تضاعف 
 مستمر
The numbers of Syrian 







انفجار مقر مكتب األمن القومي 
 السوري
Exploding the headquarters 
of the Syrian National Security 
Bureau. 
18/07/2012 
http: //www.aljazeera.net/programs/newsreports/2012 /7/18 /%D8%A7%D9%86%D9% 81%D8%AC%D8%A 7%D8%B1-
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%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%82%D9%88%D 9%85%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D 8%B3%D9% 88%D8%B1%D 9%8A  
 
الجيش السوري الحر يهاجم أكبر 
 قاعدة عسكريـة
The Free Syrian Army 












Report Title in Arabic Report Title in English Report Date Link Internet 
خفايا ومالبسات مجزرة الحولة في 
 حمص
Mysteries and concomitants 








انفجار كبير يهز وسط العاصمة 
 السورية دمشق
A large explosion shakes 









مخاوف استخدام النظام السوري 
 للسالح الكيميائي أو نقله
Fears of the Syrian regime's 


















أوضاع سكان المناطق التي تتعرض 
 لقصف النظام بحلب
The situations of the people 
in the areas which are exposed 









الحر يعلن تدمير كتيبة صواريخ 
 كوبرا
The Free Syrian Army 
declares destroying an amount 








مجزرة النظام السوري في الحجر 
 األسود ومخيم واليرموك
The Syrian regime's 
massacre in Al-Hajar Al-Aswad 










 Field executions in إعدامات ميدانية في دمشق وحلب






اشتباكات بين الجيشين الحر والنظامي 
 بمعرة النعمان
Clashes between the Free 











أزمة الوقود وقارورات الغاز في 
 حلب
The fuel and gas cylinders 







النظام السوري يستهدف خبز 
 المواطنين
The Syrian regime attacks 







خطر القنابل العنقودية غير المنفجرة 
 في ريف إدلب
The danger of the 

















التحديات التي يواجهها مزارعو 
 الزيتون بسوريا
The challenges which the 









سيطرة الجيش السوري الحر على 
 المواقع العسكرية
The control of the Free 








تحول طوابير الخبز إلى طوابير 
 الموت في سوريا
Turning the bread queues 









الحر يسيطر على كتيبة"دفاع جوي "
 بحلب
The Free Syrian Army 
controls an "Air Defense" 


















Report Title in Arabic Report Title in English Report Date Link Internet 
معاناة المواطنين السوريين بنقص 
 مقومات الحياة
The suffering of the Syrian 










تطور نوعي في شكل االنشقاقات عن 
 نظام الرئيس السوري
A qualitative development 
in the form of dissentions from 









حضور قوي لجبهة النصرة في 
 سوريا
A strong presence of Jabhat 







مجزرة بحي الحيدرية بحلب في 
 سوريا
A massacre in Al-Haidariya 








تظاهرة في سوريا تحت شعار "قائدنا 
 "لألبد سيدنا محمد
A demonstration in Syria 
under the title "Our leader  










الثوار يسيطرون على حاجز سد 
 البعث
The revolutionaries control 







صور األوضاع اإلنسانية السيئة في 
 مدينة الرقة بسوريا
Images of the bad 
humanitarian conditions in Al-









سلسلة انفجارات تهز العاصمة 
 السورية دمشق
 
A series of explosions 








الجيش السوري الحر يسيطر على 
 مركز البحوث النووية
The Free Syrian Army 










قوات نظامية إلى حمص وتعزيز 
 لمواقع حزب هللا بالقصير
Syrian forces head to Homs 
and reinforcements of 









أكثر من مليوني طفل سوري ضحايا 
 النزاع
More than two million 









الجيش الحر يحّمل النظام مسؤولية 
 استخدام السالح الكيميائي
The Free Syrian Army holds 
the regime responsible for using 










النظام يستهدف الكنائس وأحياء 
 المسيحيين بدير الزور
The regime attacks the 
churches and the Christians 









ثوار سوريا يسيطرون على كتيبة 
 صيانـة الصواريـخ بدرعا
The Syrian revolutionaries 
seize the battalion of missiles 










ربع سكان سوريا أصبحوا نازحين أو 
 الجئين
A quarter of the Syrian 
population have become 








اشتباكات بين معارضين سوريين 
 وعناصر من حزب هللا
Clashes between Syrian 













Report Title in Arabic Report Title in English Report Date Link Internet 
مواجهات بين الجيش الحر وعناصر 
 من حزب هللا بالقصير
Confrontations between the 
Free Syrian Army and 










قوات النظام السوري تقصف القصير 
 براجمات الصواريخ
The Syrian regime's forces 










الجيش الحر يقتل عناصر من حزب 
 هللا بريف القصير
The Free Syrian Army 
murders personnel from 








مظاهرات حلب في جمعة "استقالل 
 القرار السوري"
Aleppo's demonstrations on 
"The Independence of the 









أماكن انتشار المقاتلين األجانب 
 المساندين للنظام السوري
The deployment positions of 
the foreign fighters who support 










الجيش الحر يؤكد سيطرته على مدينة 
 القنيطرة
The Free Syrian Army 

















قوات من حزب هللا تحاول اقتحام بلدة 
 الذيابية
Forces from Hezbollah 









الجيش الحر يقصف محيط مطار 
 حلب تمهيدا القتحامه
The Free Syrian Army 
bombs the surroundings of 
Aleppo Airport in preparation 








مقاتلو دولة اإلسالم يعززون مواقعهم 
 بحلب
ISIS fighters reinforce their 








 The mosques of Syria مساجد سوريا بين التدمير والتخريب








الزبداني تعاني من انقطاع الكهرباء 
 والماء وشح الغذاء
Al-Zabadani suffers from 
power and water cut-out and 









 Military recruitment camps معسكرات للتجنيد تابعة للجيش الحر








المعارضة السورية تستولي على 
 مستودعات للصواريخ
The Syrian opposition 









النظام يهاجم عدرا ودوما بريف 
 دمشق بأسلحة كيميائية
The regime attacks Adra 
and Douma in Damascus 









المعارضة: 1300 قتيل بهجوم 
 كيمياوي بسوريا
Opposition: 1300 killed by a 











Report Title in Arabic Report Title in English Report Date Link Internet 
 A massacre with the مجزرة بالسالح الكيمياوي بسوريا







 An increase in the numbers تزايد أعداد الالجئين السوريين







مقاتلون إيرانيون إلى جانب النظام 
 السوري










اشتباكات بين الحر والنظامي بحي 
 جوبر بدمشق
Clashes between the Free 
Syrian Army and the regime's 









أحد الناجين يروي مجزرة الغوطة 
 الكيميائية
A survivor narrates the story 









مقتل 40 جنديا نظاميا في حي برزة 
 بدمشق
40 regime's soldiers 








قوات المعارضة السورية تبدأ معركة 
 سمتها "الزلزلة"
The Syrian opposition 
forces start a battle which it 









مقتل العشرات من حزب هللا جنوب 
 دمشق
The murder of tens from 







استمرار االشتباكات عنوان المشهد 
 السوري
The continuation of the 


















أسلحة حارقة للنظام السوري توقع 
 عشرات الضحايا
Syrian regime's burning 









مقاتلون روس في سوريا لدعم قوات 
 األسد
Russian combatants in Syria 
in support of the Al-Assad's 
forces. 
18/11/2013 
http: //www.aljazeera.net/programs/newsreports/2013 /11/18/%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%AA%D9%84%D 9%88%D9%86-
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%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B3%D8%AF 
 
نقص المواد الغذائية والطبية بالغوطة 
 الشرقية
The lack of food and 










قوات النظام تسيطر على النبك بريف 
 دمشق
The regime's forces control 








 Spotting the scenes of رصد مشاهد دمار المسجد األموي








البراميل المتفجرة تودي بحياة مئات 
 السوريين
Explosive barrels kill 









ضحايا سوء التغذية ونقص العالج 
 بمخيم اليرموك
The victims of malnutrition 



















Semiotic Analysis of Al-Manar Channel’s Sample 
 
The verbal and non-verbal signifiers have been extracted and classified in accordance with their 
topics. The first step is classifying the signifiers in the areas of the following main topics: the 
demonstrations supporting and opposing Al-Assad and the government, the image of president 
Assad as it has been presented by Al-Manar, the image of the government security and military 
forces, the image of the armed opposition, the conflict outcomes, and the image of ethnics and 
sects that have been highlighted by media. Next, the main topics have been divided into sub-topics. 
For instance, all the signifiers which deal with the pro-Assad processions (as a main topic) have 
been extracted, then they were pigeonholed into sub-topics such as the purpose of demonstrating, 
the slogans, the numbers of demonstrators, the places, and the Interviews with the demonstrators, 
taking into consideration the significances of age, gender, clothes and other signs. 
 
The classification can be also considered as one of the research results because each sub-
heading in the semiotic analysis represents an outcome that contains signifiers which tackle one 
topic. The interrelation between the two levels of significance, the denotative and connotative, has 
been taken into consideration. First, the analysis depends on general description where the 
signifiers are put into their general contexts, then they are studied one by one. Each signifier 
requires independent explanation; therefore, I have not put them in tabulated groups. I have, rather, 
put them in a descriptive-analytical frame to facilitate explanation and understanding. The value 
of some signifiers is connected to the historical context which they evoke, others need analyzing 
the linguistic structure, while some others derive their value from their relation to religious or 
customary values predominant in the recipient’s environment. I consider the contexts, in which 
some signs are put, signifiers in themselves. These contexts are essential to uncover the 
mechanisms of spreading propaganda and those of psychological war and manipulating the 
recipient. Therefore, it is necessary to study the contexts of mentioning the sources, those of 
sentimental enticements, those of historical recalls, those of employing the characteristics of 
Arabic language, those of adopting images, and those of spotlighting and obfuscating. The 
significances of contexts and meanings of signs help us recognize the identity of the targeted 
recipient of messages. Analyzing the significances of media personnel’s voice tone is considered 












How Did Al-Manar Portray the Anti-Regime Popular Movement? 
 
On Al-Manar's screen, Syria seemed free of any peaceful anti-government popular movement. 
What is going on is a conspiracy whose financiers provide money to some lawbreakers or some 
citizens who accept to demonstrate for a bit of money. That is to say, their demonstrations are only 
a consequence of their need for money. It is by no means a true popular revolution against 
corruption and dictatorship. 
 
Al-Manar recalled news from western press which talks about fabricated reports which are 
uploaded on You Tube. They contain demonstrations in Syria, Iran and other regions. For example, 
an article appeared in the Independent under the title 'Don't Believe' where the writer states that 
once he was in the streets of Tehran, when the media transmitted reports of sudden demonstrations 
which he saw nothing of. He also said: "counterfeiting and remaking the videos took and is still 
taking place in many countries, especially Syria."576 
Not only did Al-Manar absent the popular movement but also denied it directly and totally. 
"The press is talking about the fabricated disinformation and this is confirmed by testimonies of 
the citizens who have recently come back from Turkey." 577 Denial seemed as a defensive means 
in the psychological war fought by the channel; Al-Manar does the role of the defender of the 
Syrian government through repudiating the existence of any movement against it. Depending on 
foreign sources indicates the desire of Al-Manar to prove the credibility of its refuting policy 
through presenting excerpts of western newspapers which belong to countries known to oppose 
the president Assad’s policies. 
 
In the studied sample only one piece of news suggested the existence of a popular movement 
that asks for some reformations. Even this was a declaration given by Ahmet Davutoglu, the 
Turkish foreign minister. That is, it was not a direct discourse where Al-Manar recognizes the 
existence of a popular revolution. Davutoglu's declaration stated "Syria has no choice but to do 
reforms. There is no other choice, and our Syrian brothers should start to do more reforms, put an 
end to tension, allow peaceful demonstrating, and commencing a national dialogue in order to 
solve all the problems. The Syrian People's demands must be respected and no violence must be 
exercised against them."578 In appearance the purpose of this piece of news seems a recognition of 
the existence of a legal right on the side of the people, but implicitly the target of this recalling is 
assuring that overthrowing the regime is by no means the solution of the Syrian crisis; that is to 
say, the outcome of the popular Syrian movement can never be like that witnessed by Tunisia, 
                                                             
576 27 June 2011. "إن تزييف و إعادة تصنيع األشرطة جرى و يجري في بلدان عدة ال سيما في سوريا" 
I cite in the footnotes the reports' dates only; more details about the reports are in the index that exists at the end of this chapter.   
577 27 June 2011. "تتحدُّث الصحف األجنبية عن التضليل اإلعالمي المفتعل، يتالقى هذا مع شهادات المواطنين الذين عادوا حديثا من تركيا" 
578 03 July 2011. 
ي لحسم كافة ت، و وضع حد للتوتر، و السماح بالتظاهرات السلمية، و عقد حوار وطني قومال خيار لدى سورية سوى القيام باإلصالحات، ال يوجد أي خيار آخر، و ال بد أن يقوم إخواننا السوريون باتخاذ خطوات لمزيد من اإلصالحا" 




Egypt and Libya during the Arab Spring (overthrowing the regimes). Rather, the solution of the 
Syrian crisis lies in meeting the people's wishes of reform. Davutoglu used the term "our Syrian 
brothers" referring to the Syrian authorities. Those days the Syrian-Turkish relationships were so 
strong that Davutoglu described them as brotherly bonded (one family). Recalling this expression 
by Al -Manar reflects its desire to emphasize the legality of the Syrian government in the eyes of 
Turkey. 
 
By the end of 2012, some terms were employed: 'opponent demonstrations' and 'anti-regime 
demonstrators'. However, these were mentioned in the context of the civil opponents' protests 
against the activities of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), the opponent of the regime. In plain English, 
the opposition is demonstrating against itself. These terms were literally taken from AFP; i.e., they 
were not those of Al-Manar. We notice that Al-Manar made few concessions using terms which it 
would rather not use in order to report news that may boost the morale of the pro-government 
people through depicting the opposition as a disjointed and belligerent one; the peaceful opponents 
are rebelling against the armed ones. " The Agency stated that the opponent demonstrators 'against 
the regime' have asked for 'the purgation of the FSA' and 'the revolution' in the first so clear 
criticisms on the part of demonstrators against the FSA, which fights against the regime and which 
is accused of violations against civilians."579 I suppose that the literal meaning of the phrase “the 
anti-Syrian regime demonstrators” changes in the mind of the recipient due to the context to 
become “the unarmed opposition”. This is because the mind of the recipient is in this case directed 
to the idea rather than the literal meaning. This may uncover another means of manipulating the 
mind conception of the meanings of the verbal signifiers.  
 
   The slogans of the civilian opposition against the armed opposition were: "FSA is a thief. 
"580"The people want to reform FSA."581 "The people want to evict the armed men."582 Indications 
of the immorality of the armed opposition and of the people’s rejection of the practices of this 
opposition. 
The channel showed that there was a popular resentment against Jabhat Al-Nusra which 
assaulted the religious symbols and allowed the strangers to interfere in the affairs of the Syrian. 
Its members also assaulted the Syrians even if they were opponents of the regime583. Here, Al-
Manar has admitted the existence of opponents of the regime; it gave up the complete denial in 




                                                             
579 30 November 2012. 
 في أول انتقادات بهذا الوضوح من متظاهرين للجيش الحر الذي يقاتل ضد النظام ويُؤخذ عليه انتهاكات ضد المدنيين".  `الثورة`و `بتطهير الجيش الحر`طالبوا  `للنظام السوري`"وقالت الوكالة أن المتظاهرين المعارضين 
580 30 November 2012.  "الجيش الحر حرامي" 
581 30 November 2012. "الشعب يريد إصالح الجيش الحر"  
582 16 December 2012.    "الشعب يريد طرد المسلحين" 




How did Al-Manar Cover the Pro-Regime Popular Movement? 
 
1. Factional and Geographic Comprehensiveness 
 
Al-Manar notably tried to reassure the loyalty of the different slices of the Syrian People to the 
Syrian government under the leadership of the president Bashar Al-Assad. To attain this goal, the 
channel adopted and reiterated a variety of expressions: "popular demonstrations"584 which is a 
significance that the pro-regime movement represents the opinion of the majority of the Syrian 
society. "Syria wraps around Al-Assad"585, the word Syria is feminine in Arabic. The channel 
likened Syria to a woman who incubates and supports the policy of the president. This is a 
significance of love between the people and the president. Here, the word Syria also signifies the 
united opinion of the Syrian people; all the people approach the axis – the president – and get 
attracted to it. 
 
To emphasize the popularity of Assad and his government, Al-Manar adopted metaphors which 
reflect the positive side of nature; that which is full of fertility and optimism such as “spectrum” 
and “flow”. "Processions which included all the spectrums of the Syrian society. "586 The word 
“spectrums” in this example attempts to draw an optimistic, colorful and brilliant side of the 
situation in Syria. "The citizens from all the slices of the society flowed into the squares and the 
streets leading to these squares in Damascus and the other governorates."587 In this quotation, the 
Syrians seem like the flowing river which reflects the fertility and beauty of nature and the squares 
and streets look like the banks. The frame of optimism is another means which Al-Manar adopted 
in the context of its defensive policy of the Syrian government.  
 
The extensive and wide popular support of the government and the president was the most 
prominent pillar of the regime's propaganda which Al-Manar reported and promoted. 
Al-Manar portrayed that the processions prevail all over the Syrian governorates and cities 
without exception. This makes of every region, city and governorate an icon that carries various 
significances. For example, some of them suggest the loyalty of the religious majority (the Sunni 
sect) to the regime like Aleppo and Hama, some signify the loyalty of the Druze sect like Suwaida 






                                                             
584 29 March 2011. "مظاهرات شعبية" 
585 15 November 2011.  "سوريا تلتف حول األسد" 
586 29 March 2011.  "مسيرات شملت أطياف المجتمع السوري" 








Emphasizing the popularity of president Assad through presenting pictures full of his supporters588. 
 
 
2. The Number of Demonstrators 
 
Many times, Al-Manar did not mention definite numbers and figures of the demonstrators. It 
rather used some phrases to express the magnitude of the popular support of the government: 
"crowded demonstrations"589(4 times), "mass Mobilization"590, "large processions"591, "enormous 
crowds"592 (5 times), "popular processions593". This method gives the recipient the freedom to 
imagine the number. Frequently, these phrases are accompanied by images full of enthusiastic 
supporters during the processions. This helps reinforce the mental image which shows the 
enormousness of the popular support and loyalty to the regime. 
"Immense crowds flowed"594, Al-Manar likened the pro-government processions to the flood 
or the river that flows, which is a significance of the profuseness of the demonstrators on the one 
hand and of their strong enthusiasm and desire to confront all those who antagonize their 









                                                             
588 21 June 2011. 
 "تظاهرات حاشدة" 589
590 30 October 2011. "الحشد الجماهيري" 
591 03 July 2011.  "مسيرات كبيرة" 
 "حشود غفيرة" 592
593 29 March 2011. "مسيرات شعبية" 







The enthusiasm of Assad supporters and their large numbers.595 
 
   "Millions of demonstrators" (6 times), this term was used to express pro-regime processions 
which took place everywhere in Syria or in many governorates. " Tens or hundreds of thousands" 
(4 times), these figures were employed to express the numbers of the participants in a procession 
which took place in one place like Damascus the capital, Deir Ezzor, or Homs as it is illogical to 
allegedly claim that a million demonstrated in a city whose population does not exceed thousands.   
 
3. The Purpose of Demonstrating  
 
On Al-Manar's screen, the purpose of demonstrations was not to demand anything. This gives 
an impression that the people were satisfied and that they did not object to the ruling regime's 
policies. 
 
The channel reiterated a variety of the demonstrating purposes: "the people flowed expressing 
faithfulness to their homeland and their refusal of any attempt to incite discord which targets the 
pattern of coexistence among the citizens of the one united homeland."596 Al-Manar did not use 
the phrase: faithfulness to the regime or to the government. It rather employed the term: 
"faithfulness to homeland". This dyes the pro-regime popular movement with a national color and 
raises the aims from being for defending the government institutions to become for defending the 
state's prestige, defending the homeland. 
 
Refusing the attempts of transmitting chaos (fitna) by the Syrians means the popular refusal of 
any opposing movement because this will lead to weakening the national unity and arousing hatred 
on sectarian and doctrinal grounds. It is noticed that Al-Manar aroused the fears against sectarian 
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and factional fitna as from the first days of the crisis. This suggests that the Syrian community 
lives in religious security and peace under the ruling regime and that the opposing movement is 
based on expiatory (takfiri) grounds and aims at growing hatred among the citizens "This 
procession is held in the context of answering attempts that aim to strike the stability and co-
existential harmony." 597In plain English, a secret beneficiary is making use of the situation of 
destabilization in Syria and the people reject any attempt that targets security and stability under 
revolutionary labels such as the Arab Spring, the Syrian Revolution, the Arab Awakening and 
others. 
 
"Backing or supporting the reform process." "Backing, supporting the reform program." (13 
times)598. This purpose was densely reiterated always followed by the phrase "under the leadership 
of President Al-Assad." This is an implicit message that the solution of the Syrian crisis can never 
be through Al-Assad's stepping down. The solution is reform completion under his supervision 
and leadership. Moreover, Al-Manar's phrases suggest that the reform program was not born with 
the crisis. It is, rather, an old active one through which the authorities have been trying to put an 
end to corruption and improve living conditions on all levels. The channel employed the term 
'Comprehensive reform.'  
Reassuring that the reform program started before the crisis suggests that Al-Manar does not 
want to show the weakness of the regime. That is, meeting the demands of the opponents was not 
due to fear of falling down, but the government responded to that in accordance with a reform plan 
which had been in action and which was executed before the crisis. 
  
"Backing the president Al-Assad"599 (17 times) is one of the most prominent purposes of 
demonstrating. This is a signifier of the inevitability of the desire of the people to keep Al-Assad 
in power as the president of the Syrian State. 
"The Syrians have said their word: Yes to a strong, united and intact Syria. Yes to the president 
Bashar, who is leading Syria to the better."600 The journalist did not say: 'the Syrian demonstrators.' 
He just said: 'The Syrians'. This suggests that all the Syrian people without exception support the 
government and the president. "The Syrians said their word" is a significance of the steadiness of 
the supporters and the inevitability of their absolute support of Al-Assad. In this quotation, Al-
Manar employed the influential force of customs and traditions. In Syria, if someone wants to 
emphasize the steadfastness of their position, they say: “I have said my word”. This means that 
they will by no means withdraw the decision they have made. This shows another tool Al-Manar 
used in the context of its defensive policy of president Assad. 
 
                                                             
597 29 March 2011. "تأتي هذه المسيرة ردا على محاوالت لضرب االستقرار والتعايش السلمي" 
 "دعما أو تأييدا لمسيرة اإلصالح" و "دعما أو تأييدا لبرنامج اإلصالح" 598
 "دعما/تأييدا للرئيس األسد" 599




Demonstrating " to condemn the conspiracy and to refuse external interference of all kinds." 
(18 times)601 Demonstrating "to support the steady stance of Syria and to confront the campaigns 
of deformation that try to hurt the unity and stability of Syria."602 These are signifiers of the Syrian 
people's awareness that there is an international conspiracy which tries to eradicate the Syrian State 
that is resisting and confronting Israel and all the countries which try to dominate the peoples and 
their resources. 
 
"Holding on to Syria's national approach"603 is a significance of the Syrians' support to the 
policies of the Syrian resistant government which stands in the face of occupation and of their 
backing the policy that aims at the unity of the Arab nation. "The Syrians who took part in the 
demonstration assured that fitna will not affect them and that they will stay under the Syrian flag 
refusing the abuse of the security of the homeland."604 This is a significance of the strong bond 
between the government and the people (they will stay under the Syrian flag), and a signifier of a 
high morale on the part of the regime supporters. 
 
Demonstrating "to reassure the national unity" (5 times) is a significance of the full refusal of 
the opposition's practices which try to tear the Syrian society on doctrinal and sectarian bases. 
"The gathering of the Syrians around their national army"605 is an indication of the loyalty of 
the Syrian people to the Syrian armed forces (The Homeland Protectors). These are the forces 
which protect the citizens and foster peace on the Syrian land. "The crowded people in Damascus 
and other cities complimented the Syrian army which represents the safety valve, the unity and the 
national sovereignty for them."606 
 
Demonstrating "to refuse the resolutions of the Arab League."607 The Syrian people were very 
angry with the resolutions of the Arab League against the Syrian State (the regime). The women's 
anger with the Arab attitudes appeared prominently. The ladies condemned manliness and 
immorality608. That is to say, all the Arab countries failed Syria which was exposed to a universal 
conspiracy. This is a significance of the disloyalty of some Arabs to Syria through yielding to 
foreign countries (the enemies of Syria). In this context, Al-Manar covered the activities of some 
Lebanese ladies who came to Syria to back the Syrians. These women expressed the awareness of 
the Syrian women who understood the targets of the conspiracy and discovered the game. 
Therefore, they went down the streets to refuse all the attempts which lead their country to 
bloodshed, destruction and fitna609.  
                                                             
 "استنكارا للمؤامرة و رفضا لكل التدخالت الخارجية" 601
602 03 July 2011."دعما لمواقف سوريا الثابتة و التصدي لحمالت التشوية التي تحاول النيل من وحدة سوريا و استقرارها"  
603 03 July 2011.  "التمسك بنهج سوري الوطني و القومي" 
604 15 June 2011."وأكد السوريون المشاركون في التظاهرة أن الفتنة لن تنال منهم، وأنهم سيبقون تحت راية العلم السوري، رافضين العبث بأمن الوطن"  
605 30 October 2011.  "التفاف السوريين حول جيشهم الوطني" 
606 21 June 2011."المحتشدون في دمشق و غيرها، حيّيوا الجيش السوري الذي يشكل صّمام األمان و الوحدة و السيادة الوطنية بالنسبة لهم" 
607 15 November 2011, 27 November 2011.  "رفضا لقرارات الجامعة العربية" 
608 15 November 2011.  





Al-Manar indicated that many of the activists on the network sites, societies and institutions in 
the private sector are those who called for demonstrating and supporting the president. This is an 
implicit message the aim of which is disparaging the opposition's propaganda stating that the 
regime obliged the people to participate in pro-regime processions; i.e. the regime forces the 
students, the employees, the workers and so on to take part in processions replying to the opposing 
demonstrations. 
 
In 2013 the purposes of demonstrating were totally different. Condemning the universal 
conspiracy, supporting the president and the reforms were no longer the slogans of the processions. 
The only aim was supporting the Syrian army and its operations against the armed people. This 
does not negate the implicit backing of the president but the editorial policy of Al-Manar together 
with the pro-regime channels avoided talking about the president personally. They avoided 
showing the popular support of Al-Assad (avoiding the personalization of the crisis). 
 
Restricting the demonstration purposes to the people's support of the army gives the crisis a 
national characteristic. The army soldiers who protect the homeland are the sons of the people. 
They are the Syrian youth and men who encounter the mercenaries. This means that the civilians 
demonstrate in order to express their gratitude to the sons of their home who die in the cause of 
protecting them. They demonstrate to raise the morale of the soldiers and to say that the people 
back the Syrian army, the army of the homeland. The target of focusing on this purpose is 
confronting opposition's propaganda stating that the Syrian army kills the civilians. 
 
4. The Slogans 
 
"We sacrifice our soul and blood for you, Bashar!"610 i.e., the Syrian citizens are ready to 
sacrifice themselves for the leader, for the president. This is a significance of how deep their loyalty 
to Al-Assad is. 
"God, Syria, and Bashar only"611 means that three axes can never be bargained: God (faith), 
Syria (the homeland), and Bashar (the resistant leader). "Only" means that the Syrian people have 
decided their choices; the people will not accept anything that contradicts these three axes. 
"God is with you. The people are with you"612, i.e., Al-Assad gains the unanimous backing and 
the Godly support. Consequently, the one who is granted victory by God can be beaten by no one. 
This slogan also means that Al-Assad gains the people's support. This is a signifier of the legality 
of Al-Assad's rule and policy on religious grounds (God is with him) and on popular grounds (the 
people are with him). This slogan can be considered as a confrontation of the opposition which 
                                                             
610 21 June 2011.  "بالروح، بالدم نفديك يا بشار" 
611 30 October 2011.  "هللا، سوريا، بشار و بس" 




considers Al-Assad as an enemy of God, an unbeliever whom fighting against is a must in order 
to bring victory to God's religion (Islam). 
 
"Syria is protected by God"613 is a significance of the confidence in victory because Syria – i.e. 
the government and the people – are haloed by God's protection. Therefore, the terrorist groups 
cannot gain victory.  
 
"One, one, one; the Syrian people are one"614 an indication that all the different ethnic, religious, 
political and social groups of the people stand hand in hand with the government and the president 
against the terrorists and the conspiracy. 
"God may compliment the army."615 The people are praying to God to bless the armed forces 
which protect Syria. The voice tone of the demonstrators suggests absolute pride and 
contentedness with the Syrian army's operations. 
"Our people are stronger than their armies"616 means that the foreign, especially the western 
armies which called to the necessity of military interference in Syria in order to overthrow the 
regime can never beat the Syrian people because they believe in their cause, in their government, 
in their leader and in gaining victory on the conspiracy. 
 
5. The Interviews 
 
The correspondents of Al-Manar seemed enthusiastic during covering the pro-government 
popular movement. The tone of their voices suggests great contentment and happiness due to their 




The journalist is involved among Assad supporters and enthusiastic towards the event617. 
 
                                                             
613 30 October 2011.  "سوريا هللا حاميها" 
614 21 June 2011.   "واحد واحد واحد، الشعب السوري واحد" 
615  21 June 2011, 23 January 2013, 15 February 2013, 05 April 2013.  "هللا محيّي الجيش" 
616 20 January 2012.  "شعبنا أقوى من جيوشهم" 




Al-Manar's sample contained interviews with the female and male demonstrators from various 
age groups. Al-Manar's correspondents and the demonstrators interacted as if they all were one 
hand gathered around one target (the media and the people are one hand in the face of the enemies 
of Syria). The majority of the women were wearing hijabs, which is a significance that their loyal 




Assad supporting woman wearing the Sunni hijab618. 
 
Here are declarations of some women: "I'll say to all the Syrian people, to every mother, every 
child, and to every saboteur: 'For the sake of Allah, I kiss your hands and feet, don't make us cry! 
Syria is beautiful. Don't destroy it."619 This is a pleading message to all those who demonstrate or 
want to demonstrate against the regime so that they may stop their activities. The phrase: "I kiss 
your hands and feet"620 was used to express how immense the pleading was so that the opponents 
may not cause instability in Syria. 
 
"Their conspiracies fell down on the shoes of the Syrian people."621 This is a significance of the 
inevitability of the certain failure of the conspiracy owing to the awareness of the Syrian people. 
Here, the Syrian people’s shoes seem of higher rank than the conspiracy. In many Arab countries, 
when one wants to show the weakness of the opponent, one describes them as someone falling 
down under the feet or the shoe. 
 
"We sacrifice ourselves for the army. Our hearts were torn for those who were torn."622 This 
means that, the people were very sad for the death of the soldiers of the Syrian army who were 
killed by the armed groups and whose bodies were torn to pieces. "We demonstrate because we 
love the president. Bashar is a red line and the Syrian people are a red line. The conspiracy is big, 
                                                             
618 21 June 2011. 
619 21 June 2011. "ب، مشان هللا، أبوس إيديك و إجريك، ال تبكونا، سوريا حلوة ال تخربوها  "بدي قول للشعب السوري كلياته، لكل أم، لكل ولد، لكل ُمخّرِ
620 A Syrian expression used to indicate a large extent of beseeching.  
621 21 June 2011. "سقطت مؤامرتن على أحذية الشعب السوري" 




but we'd like to tell them that the Syrian people are greater than any conspiracy."623The first 
purpose of this message is answering the opposing propaganda stating that the regime forces the 
people to go out demonstrating in order to prove the masses support for him, "We demonstrate 
because we love the president." The president and the people are red lines that must not be crossed. 
These phrases have a threatening character towards all those who might think of fighting against 
Al-Assad and the people who believe in the credibility of the regime concerning the resistance of 
the Zionist occupation. Linking between threatening (red line) and the existence of a conspiracy 
suggests that the power which the regime supporters have emerges from their belief in the fact that 
this regime is exposed to a plot which tries to eradicate it due to its important role in the Arab and 
international arenas and suggests that the fall of the conspiracy is connected to the awareness of 
the Syrian people who support their government and its policy.  
  
"We see that they say that we are against the president. Watch and observe on your own! We 
love the president."624The purpose of this message is clear and explicit: challenging and 
confronting the opponent propaganda which claims that the people hate Al-Assad and want to get 
rid of him. 
"No force can oblige me to come and cheer for the president, for Bashar Al-Assad, except my 
love of my homeland."625 That is, the opposition is lying when it says that the regime forces people 
to demonstrate in support of the president. "Love of homeland is what drags me to come here." 
She is cheering to Al-Assad because she loves her homeland. This is an implicit indication that the 
president is the symbol of the homeland, of Syria. "Let them come and see this popular wedding 
party. This is the national procession for the president. Let them come and see the truth."626 These 
statements suggest that the president is the groom and Syria is the bride. These processions turned 
into merry-making rituals similar to the wedding rituals: singing, dancing and so on. This woman 
is inviting the anti-regime channels to come and see things in reality, to see how the Syrians love 
their leader, their homeland, through backing the protector of the homeland (Al-Assad). Assad 
being the bridegroom and Syria the bride in a society which is still patriarchal to a great extent 
means that Assad is the protector and the fosterer of Syria. Moreover, if the “bridegroom” was 
endangered, the female would collapse. What is meant here is that the stability of the female (Syria) 
is linked to the existence and strength of the male (Assad). 
 
"We say to his Excellency the president: 'We are proud of you. You are the crown of our heads. 
You raise our heads among Arabs and the whole world. We have been breast-fed Arab Nationalism 
as infants."627  This is a significance that Al-Assad's political stances, especially concerning the 
Arab-Israeli conflict and his noncompliance to the western orders, made the Syrian people feel 
proud among the other Arab peoples some of whose rulers yielded to the Israeli and American 
                                                             
623 21 June 2011. "نحن منطلع ألنه منحب الرئيس، و بشار األسد خط أحمر، و الشعب السوري خط أحمر، و المؤامرة كبيرة بس منحب نقلن كمان الشعب السوري أكبر من أي مؤامرة " 
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625 30 October 2011. "مافي قوة بتجبرني أجي أهتف للرئيس، لبشار األسد، غير حب الوطن" 
626 30 October 2011. "خليهن يجو يشوفو هالعرس الشعبي، هي المسيرة الوطنية للرئيس، خليهن يجو يشوفو الحقيقة" 




hegemony on the Arab region. "We have been breast-fed Arab Nationalism" is an indication that 
the principles which the ruling regime upholds flow in the blood of the Syrian people. The most 
prominent among these principles is believing in the existence of an Arab Homeland, an Arab 
nationalism that should be protected from all kinds of external aggression. 
 
"I compliment all the martyrs of Syria and may Allah compliment the Arab Syrian army."628The 
content of the citizens' discourse in 2013 was different. Talking about the army and the victims of 
the terrorist groups’ practices became the most important content.  "We will remain standstill thank 
to our army, our valiant soldiers and our heroes."629 This is a signifier of the entire confidence in 
the victory of the army. This woman has employed the first-person pronoun: 'we, our army, our 
valiant soldiers, our heroes'. She did not say 'army, valiant soldiers, heroes'. This suggests a strong, 
intimate bond between the people and the soldiers of the army.  
 
"May Allah compliment the Syrian army and bring them back to their families in the best of 
shape and health. We are worth nothing without them."630 The girl is praying to God that the 
soldiers of the Syrian army may not be hurt and may be destined to join their families back again. 
Then she assures that the citizens cannot live safely and securely without the protection of the 
army "We are worth nothing without them."631 
(5) 
 
To indicate the popularity of the Syrian army, Al-Manar presents images of kids and adults with the soldiers 
and officers of the army632. 
 
Some women expressed their displeasure with the opponents who demonstrate violently and 
asked them to stop disturbing the Syrians. 
 
                                                             
628 15 February 2013."أنا بحيّي كل شهداء سوريا، و هللا محيي الجيش العربي السوري" 
629 15 February 2013. "رح نضل صامدين بجيشنا القوي و بأبطالنا و ببواسلنا" 
630 15 February 2013. "هللا يحيي الجيش السوري و يرجعن ألهلن سالمين غانمين يارب، و نحن من دونن ما منسوا شي أبدا" 
631 A Syrian expression which is used to indicate the importance of something or somebody.  




Here are the statements of some of the Syrian youth and men: "We are here to support the 
president, the nerve of the country."633 This is an indication of the importance of Al-Assad whom 
this young man likened to the importance of the nerves to the human body. 
"As long as America and Israel hate Bashar Al-Assad, we will keep loving him."634 This is an 
implicit signifier that Al-Assad is the symbol of the right while America and Israel are symbols of 
evil. America and Israel's hatred of Al-Assad is considered an honour to this president because the 
evil hates the right. Therefore, the people will love the president so long as the evil forces in the 
world hate him.  
 
"We have all come here to express our love and loyalty to this country and to the leader of this 
country. We are all one hand and will not allow anyone to interfere in our affairs."635 This is a 
significance that demonstrating aims at confronting all those who try to separate the slices of the 
Syrian community and destroy the security in Syria. 
"The national cohesion is the strongest rock on which all conspiracies fall apart." 636 In plain 
English, the countries which try to sabotage Syria will never succeed as long as the people are one 
hand. These statements suggest that the opposition is not only an enemy of the regime but also of 
the people. "Certainly, the army is the protection of the homeland. Never think that the strangers 
may protect your homeland! The army is the one who protects your homeland."637 This is a 
significance that the Syrian people refuse the armed groups who came into Syria with the pretext 
of supporting the oppressed people who are exposed to the assaults of the regime's forces.  
 
The Syrian President and Regime as Presented by Al-Manar 
 
How Was the Image of President AL-Assad introduced on Al-Manar's 
Screen? 
 
In the studied sample, Al-Manar did not allocate full reports talking about the personality of 
president Al-Assad or his deeds. However, Al-Assad's name was mentioned in some contexts the 
most prominent of which are: the popular support through the processions, the statements of the 
citizens supporting the president, and the declarations of the Syrian officers and soldiers. This 
shows the positive points of the president as expressed by the people and the homeland protectors 
(the army and the security personnel). As if Al-Manar were trying to say: 'Look! This is Al-Assad 
whose actions you condemn. Behold! The people are with him, the soldiers are with him. 
Everybody loves and supports him. Avoiding to personalize the Syrian crisis by Al-Manar, i.e. to 
                                                             
633 29 March 2011. "إننا هنا لتأييد الرئيس السوري عصب البالد" 
634 21 June 2011. "طالما أمريكا و إسرائيل بتكره بشار األسد نحن منضل منحبو" 
635 21 June 2011. "جينا كلنا لنعبر عن حبنا و والئنا لهذا البلد و لقائد هذا البلد، و نحن كلنا إيد وحدة و الرح نخلي حدا يتدّخل فينا" 
636 30 October 2011. "اللحمة الوطنية هي الصخرة األقوى التي تتكسر عليها كل المؤمرات" 





associate it to the personality of president Al-Assad, suggests that the channel wants to blast the 
mental image which the opposing channels introduce about the ruling dictator. 
 
The Regime's Image 
 
Covering the regime's actions. Al-Manar depended on the direct explicit method. Figurative 
language, metaphor and metonymy were accidental. The attitudes of Al-Manar's media personnel 
which supported the regime's policy and operations appeared through several methods: the news 
cadre selectivity and the persons they interview, the voice tone, accompanying the army in its 




Al-Manar did not employ the term "regime" to talk about the Syrian government or the 
government military forces. This term only appeared in quotations Al-Manar recalled from anti 
Syrian government sources. This suggests that the term "regime" is considered a negative 
description of the government which the opposing channels employ so that the state may seem 
ruled by a gang whose apex controls all the security, military and administrative structures. Al-
Manar tried to sustain the image which shows the Syrian state as one of sovereignty and dignity. 
Therefore, the channel used the terms: "the Syrian authorities" (12 times) and "the Syrian 
government" (16 times). 
 
Al-Manar never used the terms: "the government army", "the regime's army" or "Al-Assad's 
army". It rather employed "the Syrian army" (144 times) or "the Arab Syrian army" (14 times). 
This is a significance that this army is the army of the homeland, all the people, an Arab nationalist 
army which champions the cause of all the Arab nation. Al-Manar used the word: "the army" (124 
times), which is an implicit message the purpose of which is the absolute denial of the existence 
of any other army. All those who face the Syrian army are only criminal gangs. In spite of the 
appearance of the opposing FSA and recognizing it by many Arab and international actors, Al-
Manar did not give the name of 'army' except to the Syrian army. 
 
"The security forces", "order-keeping forces", "Police forces", "Engineering personnel in the 
Syrian army". Al-Manar showed the activities of these actors within positive contexts, which 
suggests that they constitutionally practice their assigned tasks: Keeping the public security, 
suppression of offences, and protecting the public state institutions. While the other channels tried 
to show these actors as predators, Al-Manar used to present them in a way that shows the Syrian 






2. Justifying the Security and Military Movements of the Regime’s Forces; Propaganda 
and Counter Propaganda 
 
In 2011, Al-Manar tried to justify the movements of the Syrian army in a direct way. It used 
explicit phrases. The voice tone of the media personnel emphasized the legality of all the actions 
of the government. For example: "A few days after some regions of Idleb in the west of Syria 
spiraled out of control as a result of a movement led by armed groups, units of the Syrian army 
started a security operation in this governorate."638 “After blocking the roads, a military asset was 
assigned with the task of heading to the aforementioned region to put an end to the crimes of those 
armed groups and prevent them from cutting off the international highway again."639 This is a 
direct discourse the purpose of which is justifying the military actions as the Syrian army does its 
operations in order to restore some regions which had been controlled by armed groups. It is worth 
mentioning that the discourse of Al-Manar in 2011 contained information about the victories 
gained by the armed opposition like controlling some regions only in the context of justifying the 
government military actions, i.e. this military action seems to take place as a reaction to .the actions 
of the armed gangs; the terrorists controlled regions so the Syrian army had to use weapons to 
protect themselves and the citizens. This justification is important in the context of large Arab and 
international media campaigns which stressed the illegality of the Syrian army's movements. 
  
"Sources assure that what is going on in Aleppo is a military operation through which the Syrian 
army tries to expel the armed gangs from the quarters of the city after they wreaked havoc and 
destruction in it."640  This is a significance that there is a legal justification for the movements of 
the Syrian army. Employing the phrase "expel the armed gangs" may arouse questions: where are 
they going to be expelled? To other Syrian regions? If it were so, this means that the movements 
of the army would be in vain as the gangs would cause chaos in other regions. On the other hand, 
if they were expelled across the Syrian borders, this means that other countries would pay the price 
because the Syrian forces would be unable to tackle the crisis in a responsible and accurate way. 
However, it could mean that Al-Manar is sending implicit messages about the involvement of 
some countries in sending mercenary militants to fight in Syria. So, expelling them to the countries 
which support and finance them would be a legal task on which the Syrian army could not be 
criticized. 
 
The year 2013 witnessed the entrance of large numbers of the armed people who came from 
different Arab and foreign countries. Consequently, employing the verb 'expel' has a significance 
that suggests the inevitability and necessity of confronting the mercenaries and sending them out 
of Syria via the countries which allowed them to enter like Turkey. 
 
                                                             
638 10 June 2011. "المناطق في محافظة إدلب شمال غرب سوريا عن السيطرة بفعل حركة تقودها مجموعات مسلحة، شرعت وحدات من الجيش السوري بعملية أمنية في هذه المحافظة  "بعد أيام قليلة على خروج بعض 
639 18 April 2011. "بعد قطع الطرقات تم تكليف قطعة عسكرية من وحدات الجيش مهمة التحرك إلى المنطقة المذكورة لوضع حد لجرائم تلك المجموعات اإلجرامية المسلحة و لمنعها من تكرار قطع الطريق الدولي" 




"The Syrian army is accomplishing its operations heading to reclaim the geography it lost and 
planning to proceed deeper to deter the armed gangs and expel them towards the Turkish 
borders."641 In this quotation, expelling the armed gangs towards the Turkish borders does not 
mean involving other countries in the Syrian crisis by the Syrian army. It rather indicates that 
Turkey is the one which opened its doors to those armed people, received them, financed them, 
and sent them to Syria. Therefore, they should go back to where they came from. 
 
As from the first month of the crisis, Al-Manar promoted the government propaganda which 
assured the existence of fundamental extremist (Salafist) organizations which intended to establish 
Salafi Islamic emirates and that the Syrian government would resolutely confront and chase those 
terrorists wherever they were until it eliminated all forms of armed rebellion. The opposing 
channels used to make fun of this propaganda while Al-Manar strongly adopted it. In 2012, the 
extremist organizations began to show themselves and boast of their operations. The question that 
arises is: were really there Salafist groups which intended to establish emirates or did this 
propaganda helped to direct the minds of the opponents and incite them to change into religious 
extremism? 
 
Al-Manar repeatedly reported the regime's propaganda that the purpose of security-keeping 
personnel was the keenness on the safety of the citizens and the properties, that the Syrian forces 
respond positively to the appeals for help which they receive from the people, and that the 
supervisors of the operation hope to accomplish it within a few hours so that the citizens can come 
back to their cities. These are signifiers that the military forces are loyal to the people and that they 




Elements of the Syrian army in a news context which highlights them as heroes and protectors of the 
people642. 
 
The propaganda that the Syrian forces will withdraw in case the armed people withdraw, and 
that the Syrian army left the regions back to their barracks after they accomplished their task of 
controlling security and chasing the terrorist groups was repeatedly mentioned.  This is an implicit 
                                                             
641 06 August 2013.  "الجيش السوري يستكمل عملياته العسكرية متوجها إلستعادة ما خسره من جغرافيا و موجها أنظاره للتقدم أكثر لردع المسلحين و طردهم نحو الحدود التركية " 
 




significance that the purpose of the military deployment was not extinguishing the civil revolution, 
but was only eliminating the terrorists.  
 
"Syrian military sources assured us that with the departure of the Syrian army from Hama, the 
other military units get ready to depart from the cities after the elimination of the armed groups 
has been accomplished."643 These statements contain a group of indications: First of all, a 
significance that reflects the confidence of the army in Al-Manar's correspondents who are capable 
of communicating directly with the military actors with no control or restrictions "sources assured 
us". Secondly, a signifier which suggests that the entrance of the army into the governorate of 
Hama was stirred by eliminating the terrorist groups not by committing massacres as a group of 
the opponent channels claimed, Thirdly, assuring the credibility of regime's propaganda about 




The army returns to its barracks after bringing security and safety back644. 
 
"Stopping these missiles or restricting them is dependent on the advances of the Syrian army 
into the circumference of the capital; the more the losses of the armed groups in the direct battles 
are, the larger the numbers of missiles they shoot."645 In other words, the terrorist groups more 
densely shot their missiles on the civilians in Damascus whenever they felt that their collapse in 
the face of the Syrian army was close. So, the only solution to get rid of terrorism is military action. 
This message is a defensive reply to those who criticize the martial actions of the regime.  
 
Al-Manar promoted the battles the regime intended to perform like "the decisive battle"646, "the 
army units are getting ready to launch a martial operation."647 This forerunner reflects the regime's 
and the pro-regime's channels desire to introduce mental message showing that it has not fallen 
yet and that it is on its way to fight decisive battles, victorious ones. 
 
 
                                                             
643 11 August 2011. "مصادر عسكرية سورية أكدت لنا أنه مع خروج الجيش من حماه تستعد باقي الوحدات العسكرية للخروج من المدن بعد أن يتم القضاء على المجموعات المسلحة" 
644 11 August 2011.  
645 13 November 2013. "إيقاف هذه القذائف أو الحد منها بات مرهونا بتقدم الجيش السوري في محيط العاصمة، فالمسلحون باتوا يصعّدون من أعداد قذائفهم كلما إزدادت خسائرهم في المعارك المباشرة" 
646 08 August 2012.  "معركة الحسم" 








The moment of the army’s victory and its control on an area648. 
 
"The Syrian army sticks to international truces and commitments."649 The implicit target of this 
propaganda is retorting to the counter propaganda about the regime's non-commitment to truces 
and non-implementing international covenants. 
"The General Leadership of the Army and the Armed Forces is committed to tackle the 
violations, to retort to the sources of firing, to counter the terrorist gangs, and to chase their 
remnants"650 indicates that it is necessary for the Syrian forces to use weapons and violate truces 
because of the assaults which the opposition performs; i.e., the opposition is the one who violates 
the conditions of the truces. 
During covering the news which talk about massacres, Al-Manar frequently adopted the 
discourse of the official Syrian media aiming at disparaging the opponent advertising stating that 
the government forces committed those massacres. Al-Manar repeatedly recalled videos from the 
Syrian Space Channel showing the army, the doctors and a crew of Syrian government officials 
on the scene of the massacre. This showing up is an implicit significance that the regime is innocent 
from these charges.   
 
While a group of the Arab channels were talking about the opposition's control on important 
regions of Syria, Al-Manar retorted that what was happening was a tactical withdrawal of the 
Syrian army waiting for reinforcements. The channel could never absolutely disaffirm as the 
communication techniques does not allow it to go far absenting the facts. However, it tried to 
lighten the effect of the heavy losses so that it could keep the high morale. 
 
"We sacrifice our soul and blood for you, Syria!"651 This slogan appeared in 2013 on the tongues 
of some government soldiers. This slogan amended from the original one" With soul and blood, 
we protect you, Bashar!" which totally disappeared from the slogans of the Syrian soldiers. This 
                                                             
648 11 August 2011 
649 26 October 2012. "الجيش السوري يلتزم بالهدنة و العهود الدولية" 
650 26 September 2012. "القيادة العامة للجيش و القوات المسلحة تلتزم بالتعامل مع الخروقات و الرد على مصادر النيران و التصدي للمجموعات اإلرهابية المسلحة و مالحقة فلولها" 




is an implicit message which means that the army personnel are loyal to the homeland not to an 
individual ruler. This indicates that the soldiers and the pro-regime channels have been affected 
by the opponent propaganda which presents the soldiers of the Syrian army as gangs which respond 
to the orders of the ruling dictator and back him on a sectarian and interest basis. 
 
Al-Manar denied that any dissensions happened, but even this denial did not take enough space 
in its reports. It was an accidental presentation. This suggests that the channel tried to avoid any 
subject that could weaken the morale. 
The channel did not very much recall the armed opposition's propaganda directly and explicitly. 
It was an accidental recall. However, it always confronted the bases of this propaganda implicitly. 
 
Al-Manar depended on the sources of the opposition in many cases. The main target of the 
channel was assuring its news through recalling the news mentioned by the sources of the enemy. 
For example, Al-Manar talks about Syrian army advances in its fight against the armed gangs. 
Then it assures the authenticity of this news through reporting news from the opponent UK-based 
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), which assures that the Syrian army called in 
martial reinforcements and performed vast displacement operations so could control regions. 
'Performing vast displacement operations' is a signifier of the immorality and criminality of the 
regime towards the civilians, However, Al-Manar's recalling of these signifiers gives them totally 
different significances; id est, the vast displacement campaigns become a significance that the 
armed forces could eradicate the terrorists. 
 
Al-Manar featured the regime's propaganda about the Israeli American satisfaction with the 
Syrian crisis. The purpose of this recall is assuring the regime's resistance of the Israeli Zionist 
enemy and indicating that what is taking place in Syria is not a popular revolution. It is rather a 
conspiracy the target of which is abolishing the Syrian state which never kneeled nor yielded 
despite all sorts of pressures.  
 
3. Uncovering the media disinformation 
 
Al-Manar disproved a lot of news which different mass media reported showing the Syrian 
regime as mistaken and committing crimes against the people. It is worth mentioning here that Al-
Manar most frequently depended on the Syrian channels as main sources in its policy of 
uncovering the media disinformation. For instance, Al-Manar reported news from the Syrian Space 
Channel that the Syrian media searched, examined and refuted the news which talks about Syrian 
army personnel killing a citizen due to his participation in demonstrations652.Then, the Syrian 
Space Channel interviewed the same person who negated the news assuring that he is still alive 
and assuring his loyalty to the Syrian government through his reaction and the tone of his voice. 
His wife also expressed her respect and loyalty to the army through the phrase: "The army is us 
                                                             




and ours. It is the son of the people."653 This phrase is a significance that it impossible for the army 
to kill the sons of its homeland. The soldiers are Syrian citizens, not strangers, so they cannot kill 
citizens.  
 
Another example on uncovering the media disinformation is about the corpses of army 
personnel who were said to be killed because they did not obey the orders asking them to oppress 
the popular movements654. Reporting from the Syrian Space Channel, Al-Manar presented an 
interview with armed people who were seized by the Syrian security personnel. One of them 
declared that someone asked them to kill the security personnel, take photos of the corpses and 
bury them in mass graves. The purpose of this action is sending videos to space channels in order 
to deform the image of the Syrian regime. Another armed person declared that there were actors 
who used to ask them to take images of the demonstrations. Then they presented these 
demonstrations on television screens in a completely different way. The image became abundant 
with signs, participants, and voices and screams of terrified people655. 
 
"The army concentrates its strikes on a geographically limited grouping of the armed people. 
However, some media machines which are in conformity with these groups tried to magnify the 
event while the actual state of the field gives different details."656 sometimes Al-Manar explicitly 
disproved the media which supported the armed opposition.  The phrase: "the actual state of the 
field gives different details" is an implicit significance that Al-Manar has a high credibility because 
its news are based on information coming from the field while the other channels use unreliable 
sources.  
 
Al-Manar negated and disproved the news of Al-Jazeera channel through depending on Syrian 
internal sources as the officials and eye witnesses. These are some of the descriptions  Al-Manar 
employed against Al-Jazeera channel: "untrue news", "slandering and lying", "absolutely false 
news", " aiming at inciting and provoking the citizens", "in the frame of the large conspiracy on 
Syria the managers of which are trying to provoke the international society against Syria.", "aims 
at fomenting  confusion and chaos"657. According to Al-Manar, the Syrian army is too humble to 
advertise its achievements and victories against the armed gangs. Whereas other mass media does 
not stop talking about assumed achievements which the armed gangs realize and which could 
change the facts on the ground.658 Al-Manar’s emphasis on the humbleness of the Syrian army in 
declaring its achievements reflects Al-Manar’s desire to emphasize the strength of the Syrian state 
and its dispensing with propaganda and exaggerated glorification. 
                                                             
 "الجيش منّا و فينا، ابن الشعب"  653
654 20 June 2011.  
655 20 June 2011. 
656 06 August 2013.  "تتركز ضربات الجيش نحو تكتل محدود للمسلحين من الناحية الجغرافية، لكن ماكينات إعالم تنسجم مع هذه المجموعات عملت على تضخيم ما يجري، بينما واقع الميدان ينبأ بتفاصيل مختلفة " 
657 29 October 2011.  
تأتي في إطار المؤامرة الكبرى على سوريا و التي يسعى مدبروها إلى إثارة المجتمع الدولي ضد سورية"، "تهدف إلى إثارة البلبلة و  المواطنين و إثارتهم"، ""أخبار كاذبة"، "أخبار الصحة لها على اإلطالق"، "تهدف إلى تحريض 
  الفوضى".





4. Features of Weakness 
 
During 2011 and the first half of 2012. Al-Manar adopted the same method as that of the official 
Syrian television (the Syrian Space Channel). This method tried to present the Syrian officers and 
soldiers as victims in addition to presenting the government organizational structure, with all its 
martial and civil sectors, as a target of terrorist groups which try to destroy it so as to weaken the 
Syrian state. 
So, the Syrian government, the officers and soldiers, appeared as victims on Al-Manar's screen. 
The channel intensified its coverage of the burial ceremonies of the officers and soldiers who had 
been killed by the armed opposition. This coverage can be considered as a retort to the opposition's 
propaganda which shows the regime's forces as beasts which assault the unarmed people. 
 
"And the statement of the Ministry of Interior was issued after the martyrdom of a brigadier 
general in the Syrian army, his two sons and his nephew by the bullets of these gangs in the city 
of Homs. Not only did these gangs kill the brigadier general, his two sons and his nephew, but 
they also performed harming to their dead bodies in a way that their limbs were cut off and their 
faces were deformed."659 This is an implicit significance that the officers and their families are 
being unjustifiably exposed to being killed. That is, the officers are murdered out of work and out 
of battlefield. These phrases also have an emotional enticement as the officers are not only killed, 
but their bodies are also cut off and deformed, which is a signifier of the sadism of the armed 
people who target the Syrian Government forces.  
This type of discourse was mostly apparent in the first half of 2011; i.e. the FSA was not formed 
yet. In other words, Al-Manar assured the existence of armed groups before the FSA appeared, 
albeit many Arab and international actors consider FSA the first opposing armed organization in 
Syria. This coverage shows the desire of the channel to acquit the Syrian government forces of the 
charges directed against them, and its desire to concentrate on the victim's role in order to create a 
justification for the government martial actions. 
 
"Syria has held burial processions of a number of military officers who were killed by unknown 
armed people during travelling to and from work."660  The word 'Syria' is feminine in Arabic. Syria 
has been likened to a girl who performed the burial rituals of the officers. This metaphor serves as 
an emotional enticement in the favor of the soldiers of the government forces. Syria seems like the 
girl or the bereaved mother for losing her sons. The phrase: "Syria has held burial processions" 
also has another signifier: the people are one body, one hand. The misfortune, sadness and pain of 
the citizens are one. This is also an indication that the relationship of the people and the government 
forces is a durable and solid one. The phrase: "during travelling to and from work" indicates that 
                                                             
659 19 April 2011.  
في مدينة حمص، إذ لم تكتف هذه العصابات بقتل العميد وولداه وإبن أخيه بل عمدت أيضاً للتنكيل بجثثهم فقّطعت أوصالهم   وولديه وإبن شقيقه برصاص عصابات مسلحةوجاء بيان الداخلية السورية بعد استشهاد عميد في الجيش السوري "
 وشّوهت وجوههم".




the channel always tries to assure the innocence of the Security and military forces. The officers 
were not in the battlefield and they were not at work; they were on their way home after work. 
This is an implicit significance that there is really no legal justification for killing these officers.  
"The order-keeping forces were exposed to shooting during doing their national duty and some of 
them were injured."661 It is a legitimization of actions; a signifier of that the task of these forces is 
protecting the homeland from saboteurs. The soldiers are victims, not killers and their lives are 
exposed to danger in the cause of keeping security and safety.  
 
The channel depicted the Syrians as standing together with the security and military forces and 
with the president Al-Assad.  It intensified the coverage of funeral processions of the officers and 
soldiers and talked about them in a clear explicit language free from figurative expressions. For 
instance, "The funeral processions took place in many Syrian governorates", "The participants in 
the funeral procession carried the pictures of the president Bashar Al-Assad and the Syrian flags", 
"The Syrians held funeral processions for the martyred officers"662 these are direct signifiers of the 
Syrian people's support for the security and military forces and of their sadness for their death. 
 
The channel reiterated that the police forces do not carry any weapons, but they only perform 
order-keeping. Through this presentation it, notably, could not escape the fact of the deployment 
of the Syrian soldiers on the Syrian land (it admitted that these forces were deployed in order to 
keep security). It could not also absolutely deny this fact. Therefore, it tried to assure not using 
weapons by the police forces, disregarding that the recipient might ask how these forces kept 
security in hot, tense and disordered regions without using weapons. With the purpose of 
reassuring that the security and military forces are victims, Al-Manar highlighted the news of the 
massacres and mass graves, and presented pictures and videos of accumulated, heaped up dead 
bodies which suggest that the armed people murdered huge numbers of the Syrian soldiers and 




The army opens a mass grave committed by the armed gangs663. 
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Covering the massacres and mass graves in Syria was radically different in accordance with the 
predispositions of the channels. The victims of all the massacres on Al-Manar's screen were Syrian 
soldiers or civilians murdered by terrorists. 
Stressing the image of the government and its soldiers as victims was important in 2011. It 
played the role of propagandistic defense in the face of the attack of a big number of channels on 
the Syrian regime. Al-Manar and the Syrian pro-regime channels' method was able to affect a slice 
of the Syrian and Arab people664. It managed to persuade them that the Syrian forces were innocent 
and that they did not commit any massacres against the civilians. In the first half of 2012, the 
channel continued to show the Syrian forces as a victim, but also as a hero and a hunter capable of 
confronting the armed people's assaults. In other words, Al-Manar balanced between the image of 
the victim and that of the hunter. Later, the media behavior of Al-Manar began to change because 
continuing with highlighting the image of the victim may lead to weakening the morale of the 
Syrian soldiers and the regime supporters as well. Al-Manar changed its method of dealing with 
the news concerning the murdered soldiers. Highlighting them as weak peaceful icons was no 
longer important. On the contrary, their death should be depicted as an honor and a victory. The 
funeral procession became like a wedding party with the murdered officer or soldier as the 
bridegroom whose family boasts his death in the cause of the homeland. This mechanism reflects 
one of the methods which Al-Manar employed in the psychological war during covering the Syrian 
crisis. 
 
5. Features of Strength 
 
Al-Manar presented the Syrian forces as a strong and cohesive structure. The channel did not 
mention any weak point concerning the army or the security forces. It completely absented the 
dissensions as well as the mistakes the soldiers committed against the Syrian people such as 
murder, robbery, etc. Only one piece of news665 was found in the research sample which deals in 
short with the government's forming of a committee assigned to investigate the events which took 
place in the city of Daraa, the city where the opposing popular movement was launched and where 
a number of citizens and children were killed.  The channel mentioned that the Syrian government 
was going to punish all those who have been responsible for committing any harm in those events. 
This is a signifier of the uprightness of the Syrian regime and its refusal of any mistake against the 
people. The image of the Syrian army was ideal as a perseverant and sacrificing one in the cause 
of the homeland and citizens. 
 
Al-Manar repeatedly portrayed that the army has re-established the control of the state's 
authority over the city, the army strengthens its control over some regions, and that during hours, 
the army managed to exercise firm and full control. These are significances of the steadiness of 
                                                             
664 The researcher's notice when existing on the ground in Syria, and also through following up the social communication media noticed that the comments of the people suggest 
affectivity and believing.  




the government forces in the face of the armed people, and of the ability of the army to protect the 
Syrian land and keep it under its leadership. "The Syrian army continues its deployment", "Units 
of the army have continued proceeding forward"666. These are implicit signifiers that the 
deployment of the army is a source of security and quietude. This verbal narration is supported by 
the voice tone of the media personnel which suggests implicit glorification of the Syrian military 
forces. "Continuing the martial operation"667 is an indication of the fixedness and insistence of the 
government military forces. It suggests the quantitative and qualitative power of the armed 





Showing pictures of the Syrian army’s tanks during a talk about its progress668. 
 
"The course of the events which redraws the field scene in Syria gets day by day in favor of 
bringing stability back in the disturbed areas."669 This is a significance that there is an interrelation 
between the existence of the army and re-stabilization.  
"Little by little, the achievement in Baba Amr will be uncovered. It will have field consequences 
concerning accelerating the conflict settlement in other areas."670 By the time the opponents of the 
regime's policy were depicting the war in Baba Amr Quarter in Homs as one between the people's 
will and the criminal dictatorship, Al-Manar channel was boasting the regime's martial operations 
and describing them as an achievement and an ability to settle the conflict.  
 
Al-Manar legalized the security settlement of the conflict and considered it the most important 
way of dealing with the crisis. It linked between the ability of the security personnel and the army 
to martially settle the conflict on the one hand, and realizing the aspirations of the Syrian people 
for reform on the other. 
Al-Manar repeatedly promoted the security, martial settlement and escalation which is a 
signifier that the Syrian state has its grip over the situation. 
                                                             
666 03 July 2011.  "الجيش السوري يتابع إنتشاره"،" وحدات من الجيش تابعت تقدمها" 
667 06 August 2013.  "استمرار العملية العسكرية" 
668 10 June 2011. 
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The terms of settlement and escalation have been used by the opposing media to indicate the 
savageness and brutality of this regime. However, the significance of these terms has radically 
differed on Al-Manar's screen. This means that terminology differs in accordance with the sender 
and the means.  
 
On 18 July 2012, an explosion took place in the Syrian National Security building. 
Consequently, many high-ranking Syrian officers were killed. The channels opposing the Syrian 
government tried to magnify the result of this event and its influence on the regime's structure 
suggesting that the regime was about to fall and that its end was a matter of a time that does not 
exceed hours. Al-Manar retorted to this media presentation by stating that "The Syrian military 
and security organs have received a fatal blow. Yet, taking a holistic view at their structure 
uncovers that it is wider and more comprehensive than the National Security concerning the 
centers and the roles and their distribution."671 Al-Manar did not deny the importance of this event, 
but at the same time explicitly showed the regime as a structure which cannot be easily weakened. 
The way Al-Manar covered the explosion of the National Security building also has an implicit 
message which assures that the Syrian government was exposed to assaults; so, the security 
personnel and the army have the right to move martially in order to protect the state and the people. 
"The field advance of the Syrian army does not stop"672 and "The achievements of the Syrian 
army continue."673 These phrases aim to disprove the opposition’s propaganda about the falling of 
many areas under the control of the militants. These verbal items were supported by images of 
Syrian soldiers raising the Syrian flags in every area they have under their control eliminating all 
the armed opposition groups. 
"And the armed groups in Sbeina were eradicated. During the past few days, their fortifications 
could not succeed in standing still in front of the advance of the Syrian army units674", "The 
fortifications of the armed groups could not stop the advances of the Syrian army. The windows 
of the homes turned into barricades and screens."675 
This form of discourse emerged in 2013 when showing the government forces as victims came 
to an end and presenting them as steadfast heroes dominated instead. 
 
6. The Actions of the Regime's Forces 
 
6.1.  Against the Armed Factions 
 
As the channel does not admit the legality of the armed opposition, and rather consider it 
vandalistic terrorist groups, all the actions of the government forces seemed as heroism and 
achievements. They also seemed as a natural right of the security and military forces. So, Al-Manar 
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673 13 October 2013, 17 November 2013. "تستمر إنجازات الجيش السوري" 
674 17 November 2013. "و قضي أمر المجموعات المسلحة في السبينة، لم تفلح تحصيناتهم على مدار األيام الماضية في الصمود أمام تقدم وحدات الجيش السوري" 




legalized all the security and martial actions of the regime and considered them as reactions the 
purpose of which is confronting the actions of the saboteurs.  
 
In 2011, Al-Manar often employed words signifying that the attitude of the government is a 
defensive one: "The military units confronted armed groups"676, "The army confronted the attack 
of the armed people" (9 times), "The security forces tried to deter the terrorists."677 In 2012, Al-
Manar's discourse balanced between the two cases of defense and attack: "The Syrian army started 
its land attack on Aleppo."678, "The army strangleholds on the armed people" (8 times), "The 
Syrian forces deter the attack of the terrorist groups."679, "The army destroyed centers of the 
terrorists."680 However, in 2013, the offensive nature dominated the actions of the regime against 
the armed people. 
 
Al-Manar did not use the method of exaggeration during presenting the regime's actions against 
the armed opposition. This helps to give an impression of the power of the Syrian state and to 
dwarf the power of the armed groups. In other words, the Syrian forces seem to control the 
situation, and all what they do seems as a normal and simple thing in comparison with their holistic 
capability. For example: "Syria seized a cargo of weapons"681, "the armed forces arrested a group 
of the wanted fugitives"682 (6 times), "The army captured amounts of weapons and munitions"683 
(20 times), "The engineering units dismantled booby traps and explosive devices"684 (15 times), 
"Confiscation of a car which contained armed people."685 This sort of phrases suggests that the 
size of the martial crisis is smaller than what is depicted by the anti-regime channels and that what 
is happening on the ground is only a group of normal daily events; a group of lawbreakers are 
trying to devastate the country and the military and security forces are confronting them.   
In the studied sample, the discourse of Al-Manar was characterized by repetition. The channel 
echoed the same phrases in describing the regime's actions. "The Syrian army is chasing the armed 
terrorist groups"686 (26 times) is a significance that the actions of the government forces are a duty 
that must be performed as chasing criminals is one of the top tasks of the security personnel. 
 
"The security forces proceed to chase the terrorists" and "The forces of the Arab Syrian army 
are still chasing the remnants of the armed groups"687 (15 times) are signifiers of continuing the 
martial action. The purpose of these significances is, on one hand, justifying the regime's continual 
                                                             
676 19 April 2011. "تصدت الوحدات العسكرية لمجموعات مسلحة" 
677 18 April 2011."الجيش صد هجوما للمسلحين"، "قوات األمن حاولت ردع اإلرهابين" 
678 08 August 2012. "الجيش السوري بدأ هجومه البري على حلب" 
679 23 December 2012.  "الجيش يضيق الخناق على المسلحين"، " القوات السورية تصد هجوم المجموعات اإلرهابية" 
680 29 September 2012. "الجيش دّمر مراكز لإلرهابيين" 
681 12 October 2011. "سوريا أوقفت شحنة أسلحة" 
 "القوات المسلحة ألقت القبض على مجموعة من المطلوبين الفارين من العدالة" 682
 "الجيش استولى على كميات من األسلحة و الذخائر" 683
 "وحدات الهندسة فككت متفجرات و عبوات ناسفة" 684
685 12 October 2011.  "مصادرة سيارة كان يستقلها المسلحون" 
 "الجيش السوري يالحق المجموعات اإلرهابية المسلحة"  686




deployment of its forces and confronting the channels which criticize the continuity of bombarding 
the civilians by the regime's forces on the other hand.  
"The army eliminated a number of the armed people", "The security personnel kill armed 
people"688 (40 times). Al-Manar turned the murder operations carried out by the army into heroism. 
"The army seized large amounts of weapons and ammunition"689 (20 times) is a signifier the 
aim of which is proving that the armed people have a lot of weapons. Consequently, proving that 
the news stating that the armed people are killing the police and security forces are true, and not 
lies. This is also a signifier that the army has the right to confront groups which use the weapons 
illegally to terrify the people. 
 
"The Syrian forces stopped two cars carrying weapons, explosives and nocturnal binoculars. 
After examining the seized items, their source turned out to be Israel; they contained Israeli-made 
Uzi machine guns which came from Lebanon"690, "Syria seized a weapons cargo whose source is 
Israel."691 These are significances that the war on the regime is in the interest of Israel which 
supports the armed opposition with weapons. In many cases the channel substituted the terms: 
army, security and armed forces with the word 'Syria'; "Syria seized a weapons cargo"692, "Syria 
found centers for manufacturing weapons"693 and so on. This verbal selectivity– 'Syria' – implicitly 
suggests that the army and the security personnel are not sectarian militias or gangs as many 
opposing channels used to promote. Rather, the Syrian state is the one which is fighting groups of 
lawbreakers or gangs and militias which consist of mercenaries. "The security forces seized two 
ready-to-use car bombs"694, "the engineering units dismantled explosive devices"695 (15 times). 
These phrases suggest that the Syrian army and security personnel are on the alert, spreading 
everywhere in order to provide security and safety to the people. During the Syrian crisis, there 
were many explosions which caused a state of fear and terror for the Syrians. The statements Al-
Manar adopted, in this concern, create a mental image of the enormous efforts exerted by the 
security personnel to avoid more explosions to happen.  
 
"The Syrian forces raided the dens of the armed people"696 (5 times). The word 'den' suggests 
that the armed opposition is nothing more than gangs because in Arabic it stands for suspect caves, 
bases, haunts or dwellings where lawbreakers reside. The word 'den' is used for animal habitats as 
well. So, the channel indirectly likens the armed opposition to animals. Despite the several 
meanings of the word “den”, the socially common meaning of the word is the animal’s habitat. I 
                                                             
 "قضى الجيش على عدد من المسلحين"، "األمن يقتل مسلحين" 688
 "الجيش استولى على كميات كبيرة من األسلحة و الذخائر المتنوعة" 689
690 12 October 2011.  
 و تشمل رشاشات من نوع عوزي اإلسرائيلي و هي قادمة من لبنان". القوات السورية أوقفت سيارتين محملتين بالسالح و المتفجرات و المناظير الليلية، و بعد الكشف عن المضبوطات تبين أن مصدرها إسرائيل "
691 12 October 2011, 29 October 2011. "سورية أوقفت شحنة أسلحة مصدرها إسرائيل" 
692 12 October 2011.  "سورية أوقفت شحنة أسلحة" 
693 26 August 2012.  "سوريا عثرت على مراكز تصنيع أسلحة" 
694 04 September 2012. "قوات األمن ضبطت سيارتين مفخختين معدتين للتفجير" 
 "وحدات الهندسة فككت عبوات ناسفة"  695




think that employing the socially prevailing meaning of words would be an important tool in the 
psychological war. 
 
Al-Manar portrayed that the security forces discovered a factory for manufacturing explosive 
devices or bases of the armed people under the ground. This depicting suggests that the security 
forces spread, chase and eliminate the armed people everywhere even meters under the ground. 
"The army sterilized regions of the armed people"697 (7 times). The verb 'sterilize' is one of the 
most prominent verbs Al-Manar adopted to describe the government actions towards the 
opposition. This is a metonymy that the armed people are germs, impure and filthy and that the 
army's task is purifying the country from their impurity and corruption. "And in Damascus, the 
army was able, with the support of the people, to sterilize Alhajar Alaswad."698This is a signifier 
of the collaboration between the army and the people and unanimity of views about the impurity 
of the armed opposition. 
 
"Strangle-holding on the armed people"699 (8 times), is an indication of the Syrian army's efforts 
to prevent all kinds of supply from reaching the armed opposition. The purpose of this significance 
is retorting to the propaganda that shows that the regime besieging the unarmed civilians; that is, 
the implicit intention is stating that the regime is besieging the armed people in order to eliminate 
them, not besieging the unarmed people. To support this idea, Al-Manar many times mentioned 
that the government forces are lifting the blockade of the cities, which means that it is the armed 
people who are besieging the civilians and assaulting them.  
 
"Qualitative operation"700, "Clean operation"701, "Quick operation"702. Al-Manar employed 
these phrases to indicate that the armed forces try hard to avoid harming the civilians or destroying 
the buildings during their chasing of the armed people and raiding their bases.  
During 2011 and 2012, Al-Manar rarely used words which indicate that the regime bombards 
with canons or missiles. It concentrated more on words of lesser magnitude such as: raided, 
arrested, confiscated weapons, stopped the infiltration of terrorists, and so on. "Under chasing the 
armed groups, the Syrian army launched deliberate airstrikes on the centers of the militants in Ras 
Alain."703 The channel employed the phrase: "deliberate airstrikes."704 which is an implicit 
signifier that the army does not bombard the civilians. 
 
In the second half of 2012 and in 2013, the word “bombing” was mentioned, but in a context 
through which the channel tried to show the superiority of the Syrian army over the armed people, 
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698 28 July 2012. "و في دمشق تمكن الجيش السوري بمساندة األهالي من تطهير الحجر األسود" 
 "تضييق الخناق على المسلحين"  699
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especially in the second half of that year – id est, after the appearance of the Islamic State in Syria 
and Iraq (ISIS). "Days of massive bombing on the gunmen705", "The army bombards the terrorists' 
strongholds"706, "The army bombards for the fourth day in a row."707 
 
The news discourse changed in 2013, especially in the second half. In 2011 and 2012, the 
general description of the martial activities, away from mentioning the details, was the general 
characteristic of the discourse. For instance, "the army chased the remnants of the militants"708, 
"The armed forces have clashed with the terrorist groups"709 (7 times). In 2013, however, the 
discourse included further war details; it contained details of the mechanism of the Syrian armed 
forces: "In a quick operation, and from many axes, the Syrian army entered it opening gaps in the 
front lines of the armed groups"710, "The second stage was entering and penetrating the elite units 
of the Syrian army's infantry which controlled and firmly held those blocks and buildings. The 
most prominent axes of clash were from the direction of Daraa road, the railway and Albuwaida 
town south of Sbeina, but the most violent one was near the glass factory"711, "military sources 
told Al-Manar channel that the Syrian army concentrates its operations on closing all the gaps in 
the broad squares which lead to the depth of Damascus Suburb; reinforcing, thereby, the advance 
of its forces and cutting off the ways of communication between the armed groups."712 
This change of discourse reflects Al-Manar's editorial policy's keeping pace with the reality in 
the war field in Syria; since after Al-Nusra Front and ISIS entered the battle field, Al-Manar and 
the pro-regime channels had to change their discourse to become a warlike one and an extension 
of the martial weapons. 
 
"Thwarting attempted infiltration of terrorists into the Syrian land"713 (9 times) is one of the 
most prominent actions of the regime in 2013. This is a signifier that Syria is violated by 
mercenaries who come from all over the world to fight the Syrian state. Meanwhile, many channels 
used to refuse and did not admit the existence of militants who came from outside Syria to combat 
against the regime714. Therefore, this piece of news appeared repeatedly and frequently as an 
attempt to assure the regime's propaganda stating that the armed opposition is not nationalist. In 
other words, the opposition is not Syrian but mercenaries executing agendas within a universal 
conspiracy. 
                                                             
705 08 August 2012. "أيام من القصف المكثف على المسلحين" 
706 08 August 2012, 07 November 2013.  "الجيش يقصف معاقل اإلرهابيين" 
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712 02 September 2013. 
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 "إحباط محاوالت تسلّل اإلرهابين إلى األراضي السورية" 713





After every victory of the Syrian government army and its retrieving some regions, Al-Manar 
used to highlight the soldiers' activities in the retrieved regions such as demining operations, 
disabling bombs, combing buildings, searching and examining for remnants of the armed 
opposition who either were killed during the battles or ran away to other places. This presentation 
suggests how heavy the responsibility of the Syrian forces is; their task is not only restricted to 
fighting the militants, but they also take all necessary steps so as to ensure the safety of the civilian 
citizens.  
"The engineering personnel in the Syrian army discovered explosive materials inside the tea 
and food packs. The armed people emptied them and filled them with explosive materials which 
can kill a person and cause substantial material damage in a place when pulled or pressed."715 
 
Al-Manar's methods varied concerning presenting the numbers and the identities of those whom 
the government arrested or killed. The channel mostly talked in general without mentioning the 
names of the armed people. However, sometimes it mentioned details of the detainees or killed 
ones, their names, their residence places and so on. This method is useful when the mentioned 
persons play an important role on the ground. It is also useful in showing the credibility of the 
channel as the recipients feel that they are given definite names, which may make it possible to 
make sure of the credibility of information. As for the numbers of the murdered and detainees, Al-
Manar mostly did not mention them: "The army killed a number of militants"716 (40 times). This 
method leaves the recipient's imagination free. The pro-regime person may feel or hopes that the 
number of the murdered gunmen is big. Other times, Al-Manar mentioned a definite number of 
those who were detained or murdered. From 2011 to the middle of 2012, the numbers of murdered 
militants were not as big as they were mentioned on the screens of other channels – those which 
portrayed that the Syrian army daily kills hundreds of opponents whether they are armed or 
civilians. Al-Manar may mention that the army murdered one or two gunmen. The number might 
rise to five or a little more. This method helps to make the crisis of lesser magnitude and make the 
recipient feel that the situation is under the control of the Syrian state. 
 
However, in the second half of 2012 and during 2013, the numbers of the murdered rose. Al-
Manar may declare that the outcome of one day's murdered people reached tens of militants. This 
indicates that the channel is no more careful to lessen the magnitude of the number of the murdered 
opponents. Declaring the number of these murdered is important for the psychological war at that 
time. In addition, Al-Manar highlighted the coming of thousands of takfiri mercenaries to fight in 
Syria. So, daring to mention large numbers of the armed murdered people no longer causes 
embarrassment for the channel and the Syrian regime. 
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Concerning the numbers of the detainees, Al-Manar adopted one method which is talking about 
those who were being arrested during one day. "The army seized 146 combatants"717, "The security 
personnel chased the terrorists and detained a number of them"718 i.e. Al-Manar did not mention 
the total number of the detainees nor did it mention the number during a time interval which could 
be two or three months from the beginning of the crisis till the date of the studied report; the 
channel never mentioned how many militants the Syrian prisons keep. This method suggests that 
the armed forces are doing their duty by detaining the gunmen; eventually, this approach helps 
raise the morale of the pro-regime people. This method also retorts to the magnifying method 
which the opponent channels employ through mentioning huge numbers of the detained opponents. 
 
As for the consequences of the regime's actions against the armed opposition, Al-Manar many 
times left the recipient's imagination free. Strictly speaking, it did not mention the exact losses of 
the armed people, but assured its huge magnitude. "The armed forces caused the combatants heavy 
losses", "The army caused heavy losses"719 (15 times). 
The images of the government soldiers were mostly taken by media personnel, whether those 
of Al-Manar or those of the pro-regime Syrian channels. These images were mostly clear; the cadre 
moves comfortably and calmly (not shaken), accompanied by the voice tones of the media 
personnel which suggest that things were still under control. 
 
6.2. The Clashes 
 
Concerning the clashes between the regime's forces and the armed opposition, Al-Manar 
adopted several methods for selecting its words and forming its sentences. First, the regime should 
be the subject of the sentence: "The army clashed with the armed group"720(8 times), "The armed 
forces engaged in battles with the militants"721 (7 times), "The specialized authorities clashed with 
a group of the terrorist people"722 (4 times). This method suggests that all things are still under the 
control of the Syrian government. It also implicitly suggests the martial superiority of the regime 
over the opposition. 
Second, selecting phrases which suggest that the regime and the armed opposition are subjects 
of the sentence: "Violent battles are taking place"723, "Clashes happened"724 (6 times), 
"Exchanging firing"725 (4 times), "An armed clash took place"726 (4 times). During narrating these 
phrases, Al-Manar's media personnel used a voice tone which suggests that the armed opposition 
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is not as strong as the Syrian army. This supports sustaining raising the morale of the soldiers and 
the pro-regime civilians. At the same time, these phrases are useful for giving the justification for 
the regime's martial actions; the armed opposition engages into battles with the regime and murders 
its personnel, so the military forces have to persevere martially until they completely eliminate 
saboteurs. 
 
"Violent clashes are taking place in the quarters of Aleppo in a decisive battle to retrieve what 
the armed groups seized"727. This method mitigates of the fall of some regions under the 
opposition's control. So, when Al-Manar says: "a decisive battle to retrieve what the armed groups 
seized"728, the recipients' minds would move towards the offensive characteristic of the regime 
forces' actions more than moving towards the opposition's victories 'seizing regions'. This may 
lead to a feeling of a close victory of the regime's forces. 
 
The voice tone of the media personnel supports the verbal structure to give an impression of a 
close victory. "The field data indicate the close declaration of controlling Saif AlDawla 
Quarter"729, "The Syrian army gains more regions from the militants."730 This verbal structure 
absents the truth of the armed opposition's control on these regions previously – i.e. retrieving 
some regions by the Syrian army implicitly means that it previously lost them. This method is 
useful as a means of the psychological war in order to sustain high morale. 
 
"Violent battles are taking place, but the army is realizing advances."731 Many times, Al-Manar 
linked the retrieval of some regions by the government forces and continuing the clashes with the 
armed people. This method creates a balance between raising the morale and not denying the 
existence of militants whom the Syrian state has to eliminate. In other words, this method balances 
between the regime supporters' emotion which is in need of self-confidence and the feeling of the 
ability of gaining victory on the one hand, and the mind and logic of these supporters who live the 
reality of the crisis and suffer from its difficulties on the other hand. In plain English, the 
exaggeration in introducing the achievements of the army might lead to losing the confidence of 
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The Syrian army’s tanks during a talk about its progress in the battles. Due to the news context, the tank 
seems as a symbol of safety.732 
 
"Clashes took place between the regime's forces and an armed group who assaulted civilians 
and private properties." 733 The channel always linked between the battles and the assaults of the 
militants. This shows that the regime's motive to fight battles is protecting the civilians. This sort 
of sentence shows the desire of Al-Manar to face the opposition's propaganda about the assaults 
of the government forces on the unarmed citizens. It introduces the regime as the hero who frees 
the detainees from the grip of the armed terrorists.  
Third, the gunmen should be the subject of the sentence: "A group of terrorists clashed with the 
order-keeping personnel."734 Al-Manar adopted this method when it wanted to introduce the 
government forces as a victim. 
 
6.3. The Attitudes of Al-Manar's Media Personnel towards the Actions of the Regime 
against the Armed Opposition 
 
In addition to the news selectivity, there are other ways which show the attitudes of Al-Manar's 
journalists towards the government martial movements. Some words (verbs) indicate the channel's 
satisfaction and relief about all the movements of the Syrian army: succeeded, was able, could, 
advanced, attained, freed.  
The second way: the journalist accompanies the army in many details during and after the 
battles – after the army retrieves regions. The journalist gets involved among the government 
fighters, covers their martial activities and explains the events in a voice tone which is confident 






                                                             
732  10 June 2011 
733 23 December 2012. "اشتباكات دارت بين القوات النظامية ومجموعة مسلحة إعتدت على مدنيين وممتلكات خاصة" 






Al-Manar’s correspondents are engaged with the soldiers of the Syrian army.735 
 
"Freeing the regions"736 (5 times), this phrase implicitly signifies that the armed opposition is 
considered an occupation. This means that, there is a connection between the characteristics of the 
opposition and those of Israel, which is considered a brutal occupier who must be eliminated to 
free Palestine and the Golan Heights from it. This linkage makes of the regime's activities against 
the armed people freeing and heroic deeds. Murdering, bombarding and all means of warfare 
become not only justified, but also preferred. 
"Meanwhile, the army forces are deployed towards another region, and we can see some regions 
being secured. We face some armed groups which were hiding in a number of regions."737 The 
journalists used the pronoun 'We' while they were accompanying the Syrian soldiers –We face, 
We find, We see. This is a significance of the unity of goals and attitudes of the Syrian army and 
Al-Manar channel. It is also a signifier that the activity of Al-Manar's media men is an extension 
of the Syrian martial activity; through them, the world can see a different image of what is going 




Al-Manar’s correspondent with a Syrian army personnel watching the events with the binoculars.738 
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No signs of fear of the gunmen appeared on the faces of Al-Manar's media personnel during 
accompanying the government soldiers in the battles. This is an implicit message suggesting 
absolute confidence of victory, and of the power of the army and its ability to deal with the terrorist 
groups. This is also a message that the Syrian armed forces and Al-Manar's media men are right 
and that they are struggling in the cause of the homeland and the people. 
The voice tones of the correspondents suggest steadiness. In most times they did not talk quickly 
even in the battlefields. This is an important method to sustain the high morale of the recipient. 
When they talked quickly and enthusiastically, it was for assuring the army's victories.  
 
"Al-Manar is in the Syrian village of Rabla in the suburb of Alquseir"739, "Al-Manar's camera 
goes along with the Syrian army in Darayya in Damascus Suburb740", "Al-Manar's camera is in 
the heart of the city of Darayya in Damascus Suburb"741,  "Al-Manar enters the hiding places of 
the armed people in Alquseir"742 These are implicit messages which mean that Al-Manar's news 
are from the ground, from the field (credibility) and that the control of the Syrian army on the 
regions is a fact; it is not a lie as the opposing channels allege. 
 
(14) 
    
The journalist investigates the places and leftovers of the opposition after their leaving the place as a result 
of the Syrian army’s control on it.743 
 
Al-Manar's correspondents did not glorify the regime or its martial activities with direct words 
or characteristics. For example: the heroic army, the militant, the brave, the great, the steadfast. 
They rather employed implicit glorification through talking about: the difficulty of fighting battles 
in the narrow lanes, the positioning of the armed people everywhere even under the ground and in 
tunnels, the spread of many explosive devices and to-be-used bombs, and so on. The goal of this 
presentation is glorifying the Syrian army's steadfastness and its ability to tackle the war in such 
an accurate way that it can avoid causing any injuries on the side of the civilians. At the same time, 
it can eliminate the terrorists and free the lands. 
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Another way of indirect glorification of the Syrian army is as follows: the journalist 
accompanies the soldiers and officers after their freeing of an area, and talks only about the armed 
people: the sites from which they ran away, the explosive devices they left, the tunnels which they 
booby-trapped, their slogans which filled the walls and which have takfiri significances, the 
manual manufactures of weapons, and so on. This suggests that the Syrian government army is 
greater than being praised directly with words. The army does not care for glorification and praise. 
It is devoted for protecting the people and its goal is not boasting of the achievements. This method 
draws the attention of the recipient to the danger of the armed groups, and, eventually, assuring 
that there is a real justification for all the government martial activities. With this method, Al-
Manar confronts all the channels which portray the Syrian army as a murderer of the people. 
 
Here are some excerpts of the correspondents' comments during accompanying the soldiers of 
the Syrian army: "We are advancing further in the quarters. Here, the devastation talks about the 
battles among the houses and the walls. It is the day of roving among the centers of the armed 
groups. This is a center for manufacturing the explosive devices, and these are detonators and 
equipment which their owners left behind hastily after the army entered the area."744 
"Military sources assured Al-Manar that large numbers of armed groups and Al-Nusra front are 
being besieged in Albahdaliya area and there are calls for surrender as the military ring is tight, 
the strikes are dense and the armed people's losses are very heavy there. Striking their centers and 
leadership led them to become dispersed and lost."745 
"And in order to document the practices of the armed groups in the area, Al-Manar's camera 
accompanied the Syrian army and roved the factories of tractors, cables and batteries which 
witnessed systematic destruction; the machines and equipment were stolen by the armed 
people."746 
"And moving into the tense quarters in Deir Ezzor, the finger never leaves the trigger in facing 
the armed groups the majority of whom belong to organizations which are Al-Qaida affiliated as 
the signs which they left behind them show. Al-Manar's camera accompanied the military units 
during their advance towards the strongholds of the armed people on more than one axis among 
which an operation of breaking into a building where the so-called Jundulaziz Battalion 
entrenched. According to the accompanying sources, the advance of the army is opening the way 
to send the armed people away."747 
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"The high fighting abilities of the Syrian army."748 This is a direct description of the army's 
power. This type of praise was not an apparent characteristic of Al-Manar's discourse. 
 
7. The Weapons Used by the Government Forces 
 
In 2011 and 2012, Al-Manar accidentally mentioned the sort of weapons. This happened within 
contexts that contain implicit goals and signifiers. For example, the channel mentions that the army 
sent helicopters to evacuate the injured or to save the besieged police personnel, which is an 
indirect signification that the army does not use its helicopters to bombard the Syrian people. 
Rather, they are victims of the militants. Al-Manar may also state that the tanks and the soldier 
carriers have gone back to the barracks, which is a significance of the end of martial activity and 
of the credibility of the army which has taken its weapons back immediately after the end of its 
tasks. "The Syrian forces employ the helicopters to monitor the locations of the armed people"749 
is a significance of the limitedness of the goals of the Syrian army in using the Air Force. This 
Force is only used for monitoring the locations of the terrorist groups, not for bombarding. 
 
The army's weapons were also mentioned in quotations from the opposition sources. As when 
a leader of the opposition admits the advance of units of the government army and the deployment 
of tanks and snipers to prevent reinforcements from reaching the gunmen. The purpose of 
mentioning the weapons is not the weapons themselves. In other words, Al-Manar does not try to 
clarify the kinds of the weapons which the regime employs, but it wants to prove that the army is 
advancing, controlling, and reinforcing its forces. The effect of this information becomes stronger 
when the enemy sources state it. 
 
In 2013, Al-Manar few times mentioned the Syrian army's usage of cannons against the 
strongholds of the armed people, the regions which provide them and those where they withdraw. 
However, the channel transmitted images of the government tanks and automatic machine guns 
during the shooting operations. The Syrian military warplanes were mentioned in the context of 
the army's targeting the leaders of the armed opposition. This is an implicit massage which 
suggests that the government army is very accurate, careful and cautious not to cause the civilians 
any material or human losses. The army only targets specific points. 
Al-Manar utterly denied that the regime launched chemical missiles against its people. 
 
8. Regional Icons 
 
The numbers of the regions mentioned in the reports have different indications. Sometimes, Al-
Manar concentrated on one governorate or city and talked about security and martial events taking 
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place in it. This method narrows the crisis cadre and makes it seem restricted to limited regional 
hot points. Eventually, this method suggests to the recipient that things are still under the state's 
control. The second method is Al-Manar's mentioning of a group of governorates and cities, but 
with a medium voice rhythm which does not suggest tension and worry. Most often, a number of 
cities that does not exceed four or five was mentioned. The purpose was highlighting the victories 
of the Syrian army in many Syrian regions or showing the assaults of opposition fighters on Syrian 
citizens in different governorates. This is an implicit message which indicates that the armed 
opposition is the enemy of all the slices of the Syrian people. Mentioning many cities in the context 
of showing the military action of the Syrian Arab army suggests that Syria is still under the grip 
of the regime, and that the army is able to follow things up and control the situation from the north 
to the south of Syria and from the east to the west. 
Mentioning a group of quarters of a city or a governorate is another method Al-Manar adopted. 
For instance, Al-Manar talked about the advance of the Syrian army in the quarters of Al-Sakhour, 
Al-Sukkari, and Salahuddin in Aleppo. This method suggests that the armed Syrian forces are 
realizing many victories, but it simultaneously suggests the limitedness of the Syrian crisis in 
definite hot points, not all over the Syrian governorates as the anti-regime channels used to portray. 
"The city of Darayya in Damascus Suburb has come back to the lap of the homeland after the 
armed terrorist groups have horrified the people and committed massacres against them, and 
assaulted the public and private properties."750The word 'city' is feminine in Arabic. Al-Manar 
likened the city of Darayya to a she-baby which came back to the lap of her mother after the 
criminals had assaulted her. This is a significance of the strong tie between the people and the 
state, the citizens and the government. 
"This area is one of a group of areas which have come back to the bosom of the Syrian state 
within an ongoing martial operation of the army for retrieving the rest of the villages."751 The 
cannel likened the Syrian state to the mother who does all she can to retrieve her children. 
 
Al-Manar concentrated on mentioning the strategic importance of every area where the events 
take place, especially those which are being retrieved by the Syrian army. It is worth mentioning 
that the channel did not cite the strategic importance of the areas which the opposition seized, but 
it used to wait until the army retrieves them to talk about their importance. The channel also 
explained the importance of the areas where the government forces fought violent battles, but it 
always assured that the result would certainly be in favor of the Syrian army. This proves that Al-
Manar did its best to raise the morale of all the supporters of the regime. 
 
In the context of talking about the actions of the regime, all the areas which are cited in the 
report seem important. They can all be considered as icons which have different indications. An 
example is the city of Al-Quseir in the countryside of Homs. Al-Manar mentioned its strategic 
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importance, which is an explicit significance. However, the town of Rabla752, which is a 
dependency of the governorate of Homs, has an implicit significance which indicates that the 
Christians suffer the control of the armed groups and that the Syrian army is the savior.  
Al-Manar's sample included many Syrian governorates: Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, Lattakia, 
Deir Ezzor, Al-Raqqa and Hama and others. It also contained the names of many villages and 
small quarters, and each name has an importance and an indication. All the names are signifying 
semantic icons, but in varying degrees that is proportional to the size of the strategic importance 
of each area. Not distinguishing between the areas suggests that each hand spam of the Syrian land 
is holy and must be defended and protected. 
 
9. Interviews with the Syrian Officers and Soldiers 
 
Al-Manar's reports were rich in interviews with the government Officers and Soldiers. This 
makes it one of the distinguished channels which gets its information from sources which are not 
available for all the channels. It was not easy for the correspondents of the other television stations 
to interview officers of the Syrian army. During the interviews, the relation of Al-Manar's 
correspondents with the personnel of the Syrian army seemed firm and solid. Sometimes, Al-
Manar recalled and adopted interviews held by the Syrian space channels with the officers and 
soldiers. Thereby, Al-Manar seems as an extension of the Syrian pro-government space channels. 
 
In 2011 and the first half of 2012, the declarations of the soldiers were of a defensive 
characteristic. Their main purpose was proving the existence of terrorists who assault the state and 
citizens, and murder the soldiers. Al-Manar interviewed some wounded police and security 
personnel. They assured that they were doing their duty in sustaining security when they were shot 
from all sides by extremist terrorist people. They also assured that the terrorists were always 
cheering: 'Come to jihad!". This is an implicit message indicating that the armed opposition is a 
sectarian and takfiri one. 
 
One of the officers said: "In a short time, our armed forces were able to bring security and 
stability back. Now, once they have carried out their national task, they have gone back to their 
camps. It is a full departure of the army units from the city of Hama."753These are implicit messages 
suggesting that bringing security back does not take a long time (the army's strength) and that the 
martial operations of the armed forces is a national duty which must be maintained. The last 
significance of this declaration is confronting the opposition's propaganda about the intensification 
of the army's soldiers' deployment and about the escalation of the martial operations. Therefore, 
the officers reiterated that the military units finished their tasks and returned to their barracks. 
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A wounded soldier as a result of an explosion said: "Someone who was wearing military 
uniform came among us. We looked at him. No one of us knew him. We noticed that he was puffed 
up. We decided to check his ID card, but he suddenly detonated himself." 754This is an implicit 
message which indicates that the armed opposition people disguise themselves in the uniform of 
the government Syrian soldiers. That is to say, those whom the anti-regime channels present as 
government soldiers are in fact militants who wore the military uniform in order to accuse the 
army of murdering the people. 
 
A Syrian officer standing by the corpse of an armed opponent said: "Mostly, this suicide bomber 
is not Syrian. His features seem to show that he is an African. There were four guards who detected 
the vehicle and shot the suicide bomber, and killed him before he could detonate the explosive. 
That was around three after noon. Here is the dead body of the suicide bomber. He put an explosive 
belt and had a remote control in his hand. If the explosion had happened, it would have killed more 
than 500 people."755 This discourse is loaded with implied messages of a defensive character. They 
aim to justify the government martial operations; the army confronts terrorists who are not Syrian. 
They came to Syria to murder the Syrians and the duty of the army is to protect the people against 
these terrorists. 
 
In the second half of 2012, the declarations of the soldiers and officers began to go in another 
direction which is the balance between the roles of the victim and the hero. Showing the confidence 
of the army in itself and in its ability to control the field situation was the prominent characteristic 
in the soldiers' discourse. A soldier talked to Al-Manar's correspondent: "The armed people are 
shooting the army personnel from the heart of the quarters."756Another soldier shouted from far 
away: "There are snipers who are shooting at us now"757 which is a discourse that exposes the role 
of the victim. In the same report758, another soldier said: "The situation is under our control. 
Inshallah, things are under control. There is one sniper and when he's finished, it's over. God 
willing, the Lord of the world willing, victory is ours." This is a discourse which highlights the 
role of the heroic army which is confident of its abilities. Then another soldier shouted from a far 
place: "Come backwards! There are snipers with an RPG"759 which is, again, a discourse exposing 
the role of the victim. 
 
The justificatory characteristic dominated the declarations of the officers and soldiers during 
the second half of 2012. In other words, in order to meet the desire of the people who were terrified 
                                                             
754 27 April 2012. "إجا واحد البس عسكري فات لبيناتنا، طلعنا عليه، ما منعرفه، شفنا منفوخ، رحنا لنطلب هويته فجر حاله" 
755 12 May 2012.  
ردوه قبل أن يقوم بتفجير العبوة و ذلك قرابة الساعة الثالثة بعد الظهر. هذه جثة اإلرهابي و فأعلى األرجح اإلنتحاري ليس سوريا، و يبدو من مالمحه أنه إفريقي، كان هناك أربعة حراس اكتشفوا اآللية و أطلقوا النار على اإلنتحاري "
 شخص". 500كان يضع حزاما ناسفا و بيده جهاز تحكم و لو حصل هذا االنفجار لكان قتل أكثر من 
756 24 July 2012. "المسلحين عم يضربو من قلب الحارات على عناصر الجيش" 
 "في قناصين هأل عم يرموا علينا"  757
758 24 July 2012. "الوضع تحت سيطرتنا، بإذن هللا تحت السيطرة، في قناص بس انتهى القناص انتهت، بإذن هللا بإذن رب العالمين النصر إلنا"  




by the armed terrorist groups, units of the army raid the dens of the armed people killing a large 
number of them and get deployed in more than a region. 
Many of the declarations of the officers and soldiers were close to the dead bodies of the armed 
opponents some of which were burned, others were clear and well-featured. The government 
soldiers declared that they were corpses of gunmen from different nationalities. They were burnt 
by other combatants so that their real identity could not be discovered. These are implied messages 
whose purpose is justifying and legalizing all the regime's martial operations and also assuring the 
government propaganda stating that large numbers of mercenaries entered the Syrian land in order 
to overthrow the state which is resisting the Zionist enemy. 
One of the Syrian army personnel said: "We found a den under the ground. After examining it, 
it turned out to be a manufacture for making explosives of terrorism, murder and crime in addition 
to making explosive devices and other materials of the means of torture and crime of the gangs 
which conspire against this country."760  
The declarations of the officers also included information about the type and components of the 
weapons and ammunition which the gunmen left behind them in the areas that the Syrian army 
retrieved. They also contained information about the contents of the military sites the armed 
opponents left. 
 
The discourse content of the officers changed radically during 2013. The features of the victim 
army were thoroughly absent and the role of the hero was dominant. "We are deterring these 
cowards. We are killing these cowardice traitors and decontaminating this land from terrorism761". 
"And we won't stop striking until we recover all our lands from these armed people."762 
Even the purpose of explaining the aggressive acts of the combatants was no longer showing 
the army as a victim. It was rather keeping justifying the government martial operations and 
showing the ability of the army to gain victory against a fierce and brutal enemy. This assures the 
compatibility between the desires of Al-Manar and that of the Syrian leadership to raise the morale 
of the soldiers and the supporters of the government. The content of Al-Manar's discourse was 
compatible to that of the military leaders throughout the three years. 
An officer said: "The combatants entered these villages in general; I mean through its farms, 
orchards, houses, mosques, churches and synagogues. They have turned it into a military base. 
Moreover, they have changed this house into a field hospital. There are beds inside. There are 
shirts for them and it is a field hospital. They are changing Syria in general. Wherever they settle, 
whether in villages or orchards, they change them in spite of the civilians’ reluctance of this. They 
drive the civilians away and turn their homes into hospitals, field hospitals, and military bases. 
However, Inshallah, with the determination of the Syrian Arab army, we will not allow this to 
                                                             
760 26 August 2012.  
 ذيب و إجرام العصابات المتآمرة على هذا البلد".تفتيشه تبيّن أنه هاد عبارة عن مصنع لتصنيع عبوات اإلرهاب و القتل و اإلجرام، باإلضافة إلى أجهزة تفجير و مواد أخرى من وسائل التع عثرنا على وكر تحت األرض، من خالل"
761 06 August 2013.  "نقوم بردع هؤالء الجبناء، نقوم بقتل هؤالء الجبناء الخونة و نطّهر هذه األرض من اإلرهاب" 




happen at all."763 These are messages the aims of which are only for justification; they are not for 
arousing pity on the soldiers. 
One of the government soldiers said: "The city of Aqraba is situated in Damascus Suburb and 
lies exactly by the road of Damascus International Airport. The number of mercenaries was very 
large. Now, I can reassure you and all the families, I can tell you that from 85 to 90 percent of city 
of Aqraba is safe."764 This declaration has a group of indications. Firstly, the army has regained an 
area of big strategic importance. This city is in the vicinity of the capital, Damascus; consequently, 
guaranteeing that the regime is not going to fall. Secondly, another significance that suggests the 
solid relationship between Al-Manar's correspondents and the Syrian army. The sentence: "I can 
reassure you" indicates that the correspondent is completely involved and that he is waiting for 
good news about the victory of the Syrian army. Thirdly, there is a signifier of the strong tie 
between the people and the armed forces. The sentence: "I can reassure you and all the families" 
is a significance of the people's absolute confidence in the army. 
 
The interviews also included explanation of the details of the gunmen's plans as well as those 
of the government Syrian army. An officer stated: "Of course, the terrorists planned that the 
mercenaries of Jabhat Al-Nusra would enter the area from two axes, the first under Al Sakhour 
Bridge. The second axis, we let a part of them enter so that they might feel that they entered safely. 
We let them occupy the first building in each point. After that, we applied our plan. We besieged 
all the points they had taken up and opened fire on them from all directions."765 In 2013, revealing 
the details of the martial operations became a means of psychological war, a means of raising the 
morale, and an evidence of the desire to involve the recipients in the events taking place on the 
ground so that the picture may become clearer to them from a different corner other than that which 
the anti-regime media stations are transmitting. "Of course, the ambushes are being performed on 
many stages the most important of which is following up and monitoring. The second one is 
preparing the region where we are going to perform the ambush with many means of fire, one of 
them are the explosives, others are the methods of fire which are available to us. The third one is 
the accurate execution on the suitable time so that we can perform a full fire force attack on the 
armed people in the area."766  
 
                                                             
763 12 May 2013.  
ى قاعدة عسكرية، و أكثر شي هاد البيت محولينه إلى مشفى ميداني، في تخوت جوا، و في المسلحين دخلو هي القرى بشكل عام، يعني القرى من مزارعها، من بساتينها، من بيوتها، من مساجدها، من كنائسها، من معابدها، حولوها إل"
قاعدات عسكرية. بس نحن إن  عوا المدنيين و يحولوها لمشافي، مشفى ميداني، عم يحولوقمصان الن، و مشفى ميداني، عم يحولوا سوريا بشكل عام، وين ما عم يقعدوا بالضيع أو بساتين عم يحوال، هالشي غصب عن المدنيين، عم يطل
 شاء هللا بهمة الجيش العربي السوري مارح نسمح بهاد الشي كله".
764 23 January 2013.  
 بالمية عقربا مدينة آمنة". 90أو  85تهن أنه فيني قلك طمنك و طمن األهالي كليا مدينة عقربا هي مدينة واقعة  في ريف دمشق و محاذية تماما لطريق مطار دمشق الدولي. أعداد المرتزقة كانت كبيرة جوا. و اآلن أنا فيني"
765 22 June 2013.  
ول مبنى بكل نقطة، .. تركنا قسم منن يفوت مشان يأمنوا أنو فاتوا و خليناهن ياخدو أطبعا خطة اإلرهابين كانت دخول مرتزقة جبهة النصرة على المنطقة من محورين، محور رقم واحد هو من تحت جسر الصاخور، و المحور الثاني ."
 و بعدين قمنا بتطبيق الخطة تبعنا أنه حاصرنا كل النقاط التي أخدوها و فتحنا عليهم النار من جميع اإلتجاهات".
766 02 September 2013.  
بها بعدة وسائل نارية، منها متفجرات، منها الوسائط النارية المتوفرة بين أيدينا. ثالثا، التنفيذ الدقيق و بالوقت  طبعا الكمائن عم تكون عدة مراحل، أهم مرحلة فيها هي المتابعة و الرصد. ثانيا، تجهيز المنطقة التي سوف نقوم بالكمين"




The fighting soldiers appeared in the highest self-confidence. "We're going to face them with 
all our strength in spite of their continual futile sneaking which will certainly remain unsuccessful. 
The guys’ morale is very high. I think they'll never be able to affect our morale or anything we 
have in us."767  
 
The Syrian government army personnel used terms which indicate their trust in God, that God 
is with them and will certainly support them: "Thank God!"768, "God will victory is ours769", "God 
willing."770  The media focus on the soldiers' faith has an underlying goal which is confronting the 
opposition's propaganda that shows the Syrian armed forces as criminal, inhuman and immoral 
ones. 
 
A group of the officers attacked the channels which transmit news in favor of the gunmen. "All 
what the biased news stations transmitted about the existence of the armed groups in the area of 
Suleiman Al-Halabi is untrue. We are still here and we are on the lookout against them wherever 
they exist."771 
 
During the three years from 2011 to 2013, the content of the officers' discourse narrated many 
details of the assaults of the armed groups, yet it completely absented the fall of regions and cities 
under the control of these groups, which is a signifier of creating a balance between the emotional 
grooming and raising the morale. 
 
10. Interviews with the Syrians Existing in Syria 
 
Al-Manar's reports included a lot of interviews with the Syrian citizens who talked about their 
opinions of the regime's actions and those of its security and military forces.  
 
10.1.  The Male Citizens 
The interviews contained different age groups, young and elderly. 
During 2011 and 2012, the discourse of the male citizens pivoted around one notion: the army 
is the rescuer and savior of the people against the terrorists. "By God! Without the army, we'd have 
died. Now, you can hear and see the firing"772, "Thank God! The situation is O.K. and the army 
protected us. We were besieged in Dhibyaniya and they released us and brought us here to the 
hotel"773, "They'd have destroyed the world if the army hadn't come and protected us, by God, we'd 
                                                             
767 13 October 2013.  
 لتسلالت الفاشلة، أكيد رح تضل فاشلة، و معنويات الشباب كتير عالية، بعتقد مارح يقدرو يأثروا على معنوياتنا أو على أي شي فينا".رح نتصدالهن بكل ما نستطيع من قوة رغم استمرارن با"
768 11 August 2011.  "الحمد هلل" 
769 24 July 2012.  "بإذن هللا النصر إلنا" 
770 11 November 2013. "إن شاء هللا/ بإذن هللا" 
771 22 June 2013. "كل ما بثته المحطات اإلخبارية المغرضة عن وجود المجموعات المسلحة في منطقة سليمان الحلبي هو غير صحيح فنحن ما نزال هنا و نحن لهم بالمرصاد أينما وجدوا" 
772 24 July 2012. "و هللا لوال الجيش كنا متنا، هي أنت سمعان و شايف إطالق النار" 




have been nothing"774, "After the martial operation which the Arab Syrian army gratefully 
performed, safety and stability were back to the town of Rabla. Its residents are also doing their 
jobs again and things have become almost normal again."775. 
 
Some citizens hid their faces, they justified that behavior saying that they were afraid that the 
combatants might chase them. The tones of their voices were high and sharp suggesting agitation. 
They expressed their gratitude to the Syrian army: "In the presence of God and the army (thanks 
to God and to the army) our sons are back."776 This is a significance of the trust of the citizens in 
the protection of God and in the ethics of the Syrian army, its loyalty to its work, and its fully 
holding its national responsibilities. 
Al-Manar's highlighting of the content of this popular discourse suggests that it has been for 
two years trying to disprove the opposition's propaganda which stated that the regime was killing 
its people. 
 
The slogan: "May Allah protect the army", "May Allah compliment the army"777 (4 times) was 
a popular desire that God may bless the Syrian army and its activities. "May God bless the army 
which helped us enter here!"778 That is, we pray to God to bless this army which retrieved the 
region from the control of the terrorists and made it possible for us to return to our homes. 
 
In 2013, the discourse of the males centered on the notion of: the confidence in the victory of 
the Syrian army and its ability to face terrorism and the universal conspiracy. "It's all false 
propaganda; they won't be able to do anything so long as the Syrian army is standing fast protecting 
the country. They won't be able to stain this immaculate land."779 This is a signifier that the people 
disprove the opposition's propaganda about the victories which Arab and world channels promote. 
 
The popular discourse also indicated the confidence of the Syrians in the inability of the 
international society – which conspires against Syria – to defeat the Syrian army and people who 
resist the Israeli occupation. The conspiracy will never overcome the will of the people who are 
confident of their wise leadership – Bashar Al-Assad. 
 
10.2    Interviews with the Females 
All the women Al-Manar interviewed were wearing hijab – Sunni hijab – which is a 
significance that their attitudes represent those of the Muslim Sunni sect. The interviews contained 
different age groups. 
                                                             
774 24 July 2012. "خربوا الدنيا لوما إجا الجيش و حمانا نحن هللا وكيلك و ال شي" 
775 28 October 2012. "بعد العملية العسكرية التي نفذها الجيش العربي السوري مشكور عاد األمن و االستقرار لبلدة ربلة و عادوا سكانها لمزاولة أعمالهن و األمور عادت شبه طبيعية" 
776 13 June 2011. "بوجود هللا و بوجود الجيش رجعو والدنا" 
 "هللا يحمي الجيش"، "هللا يحيي الجيش" 777
778 23 January 2013. "هللا يحيي الجيش الي خالنا نفوت لهون" 




Women expressed their gratitude to the army which saved them from the terrorists after they 
had lived a state of immense horror. "When we heard that the army came, we thanked God; I mean 
we are safe and free from worry and we are back"780, "We are grateful to the army because it came. 
Every week, we used to live an extremely enormous state of horror. Nobody sympathized with us; 
we were afraid of even getting out of our homes"781, "By God! Thank to their protection and the 
protection of God. May God protect this country."782 Continuous mentioning of God and its 
protection of the people reflects part of the religious Islamic culture. Muslims believe that all what 
happens is an embodiment of God's will. Eventually, the survival of the people reflects God's 
desire to protect them. Permanent linking between the protection of the people by God and by the 
army, especially when mentioned by women, suggests that the citizens accept the army religiously. 
This image is a retort to what many channels promote stating that the Syrian army is a sectarian – 
Alawite – one which is discarded by the religious majority – namely, the Sunni sect. "Advance! 
May Allah protect you and bring victory to you by the honor of our master, Muhammad!"783, "May 
God protect this army!"784 These are implied messages which blast the propaganda about the 
religious rejection of the army. The Sunni sect is praying for the army to gain victory under the 
leadership of the president – the Alawite. The prayers of the women for the army to gain victory 
were reiterated.  
 
The women expressed their grief for the death of the soldiers of the Syrian army by severe 
sobbing and condemnation. They also expressed their love of president Al-Assad and their 
absolute acceptance of his personality: "There is no president like ours."785 
In 2013, the confidence of females in the victory of the army on the militants and the universal 
conspiracy was prominent. 
 
The channel showed the children cheering for the army which is a signifier of the credibility of 
the regime's propaganda concerning its protection of the civilians against the betrayal of the 
terrorists. It is also a counter propaganda against that of the opposition concerning killing the 
children by the Syrian army. 
 
The relationship of the channel's correspondents with the Syrian citizens seemed strong, mostly 
having the domestic character. These correspondents seem as if they were brothers of the Syrian 
people holding their cause in media and confronting the opponent propagandas whose goal is 
destroying the country. 
 
11. Who is Fighting by the Side of the Regime's forces? 
                                                             
780 20 June 2011. "لما سمعنا الجيش إجا قلنا الحمد هلل يعني نحن بأمان، و مطمنين و رجعنا" 
781 20 June 2011. "ممنونين من الجيش السوري إنه إجا، كنا كل جمعة نعيش بحالة رعب كبير كتير ما حدا كان يحس فينا، كنا ما نسترجي نطلع أبدا برا البيوت" 
782 24 July 2012. "و هللا بحمايتهم و بحماية هللا، هللا يحفظ هالبلد" 
783 20 September 2012. "روح هللا يحميكن و ينصركن بجاه سيدنا محمد" 
784 05 April 2013. "هللا يحمي هالجيش" 





Al-Manar did not mention anything about Iran and Hezbollah's interference in the Syrian crisis 
nor about their military participation and their support of the regime. The Syrian forces appeared 
able to manage things on their own without the need of any support or backing. 
 
In 2013, Al-Manar talked about the necessity for the Syrian citizens to form popular committees 
to defend themselves. It presented this news as a significance of the cooperation and unity of the 
people in the face of the gunmen. However, the channel ignored that this news may represent an 
insult of the Syrian army because it indirectly indicates the inability of this army to protect all the 
people. "For self-defense and in order to defend their honor, the people formed popular committees 
to secure their villages and defend them. Their youths carried weapons as there was no substitute 
for them to ensure protection against the assaults of the armed people."786 
 




Al-Manar adopted the same labels which the pro-regime Syrian channels employed for the 
opposition armed people: gunmen (260 times), armed groups (198 times), criminal armed gangs 
(13 times), terrorist groups (75 times), salafi organizations (6 times), takfiri groups787 (12 times), 
extremist groups (6 times), suicide bombers (9 times)788. These labels show the opposition as rogue 
elements against the state and people without dressing it a robe of prestige. This means that, Al-
Manar did not label the armed opposition as 'army'. This method is very important in psychological 
war. Al-Manar did not pull the rogue character out of the opposition. On the contrary, it labeled it 
with names and characteristics which make the recipient feel that death is spreading everywhere 
in Syria. At the same time, Al-Manar tried to dwarf the opposition through not recognizing it as 
an army – legal organization. Sometimes, Al-Manar mentioned the names of brigades and 
battalions of the armed opposition, but only in specific contexts. For example, the death of the 
leader of a brigade, or in the context of terrorist practices such as slaughtering people with knives 
or shooting them dead. However, the most prominent contexts which included mentioning the 
names of the factions and brigades were during talking about the conflicts and the fighting between 
these groups. This means that, the contexts when Al-Manar mentioned the names of the armed 
factions and brigades mostly indicated the weakness of the opposition. 
 
The name of Al-Qaida and the groups subordinate to this organization – Jabhat Al-Nusra – have 
appeared since 2011; i.e. since the start of the crisis. The Syrian street opinion was divided between 
                                                             
786 15 April 2013. "للدفاع عن النفس و العرض شكل األهالي لجانا شعبية لتأمين قراهم و الدفاع عنها، و حمل شبانها السالح حيث لم يجدا بديال عنها لتوفير الحماية من هجمات المسلحين " 
787 37 words are synonymous with the terms: extremists and takfiris.  




believers of the existence of Al-Qaida in Syria and disbelievers who considered this as a part of 
the regime's propaganda to justify the martial brutal actions against the people789.  
The Syrian channels and Al-Manar have insisted on the participation of Al-Qaida in killing the 
people, the security personnel and the army since 2011. This was proved later. In other words, 
Jabhat Al-Nusra and elements from Al-Qaida have openly became the most prominent anti-regime 
groups since 2012. Here, the question arises: was Al-Manar promoting an illusionary government 
propaganda which turned to be a fact later? Or was Al-Qaida truly one of the other responsible 
actors for what was happening in Syria? 
 
In addition to Al-Qaida and Jabhat Al-Nusra, most of the brigades and battalions of the FSA, 
which were mentioned on Al-Manar's screen, had an Islamic – Sunni –  characteristic: Islam Army, 
Jund Allah (the Soldiers of God), Al-Farouq Battalion, Khaled Ibn Al-Walid Brigade, Ahfad al-
Rasoul Brigade  (the Brigade of the Prophet's Grandchildren). These are significations of the takfiri 
tendency and religious fanaticism of the opposition and indications that there was no true popular 
revolution which aims at freedom and reform. This movement is rather a destructive wave which 
demolishes all those who do not accept its affiliation and doctrine. 
"Most of the gunmen who attacked the villages belong to radical fundamentalist groups whose 
curriculum vitae preceded them in criminality"790, "The factions of the armed groups here are 
numerous, but their most prominent characteristic is radicalism."791  
 
2. How Did the Channel Portray the Actions of the Armed Opposition? 
 
The most remarkable labels which Al-Manar branded the armed opposition activities with were: 
"armed attacks"792, "brutal actions"793, "criminal action"794 (6 times), and "terrorist action"795 (8 
times). 
While a group of Arab channels were talking about the start of the Syrian revolution in the city 
of Daraa in March 2011, the discourse of Al-Manar was totally different: "Some infiltrating 
persons exploited the gathering of a number of citizens in the Governorate of Daraa al-Balad near 
Al-Omari Mosque on Friday afternoon, and caused chaos and riots which led to damages in the 
popular and private properties. They also damaged and burned a number of vehicles and public 
stores."796 This discourse has a refutation characteristic of that of the other channels which were 
promoting demonstrating from Al-Omari Mosque in Daraa after Al-Jumaa (Friday) prayers. Al-
                                                             
789 The researcher's notes who lived the crisis in 2011.  
790 10 August 2013. "معظم المسلحين الذين هاجموا القرى ينتمون إلى جماعات أصولية متشددة سبقتها سيرتها الذاتية باإلجرام" 
791 13 October 2013."تتعدد فصائل المجموعات المسلحة هنا لكن يغلب عليها التَّشدد"  
792 13 April 2011, 27 April 2012. "الهجمات المسلحة" 
793 08 June 2012. "أعمال وحشية" 
 "العمل اإلجرامي" 794
 "العمل اإلرهابي" 795
796 19 March 2011.  
داث فوضى وشغب ملحقين أضراراً بالممتلكات العامة والخاصة، وقاموا بتحطيم وحرق عدد وكان بعض المندسين قد استغلوا تجمع عدد من المواطنين في محافظة درعا البلد بالقرب من الجامع العمري بعد ظهر الجمعة، وعمدوا إلى إح"




Manar employed the term infiltrating persons to implicitly suggest that there were secret and 
hidden actors who managed the actions of the saboteurs who sought to create chaos and to incite 
the people against the government through committing illegal actions and attributing them to the 
Syrian security forces. 
 
2.1. The Armed Opposition Actions against the Citizens 
 
Al-Manar adopted a set of sentences describing the actions of armed groups: "Shot randomly"797 
is a signification whose implied purpose is justifying the existence of murdered civilians. 
"Horrified the citizens"798 (12 times) is an underlying signifier that the Syrians do not accept the 
opposition and the purpose is blasting the armed people's popularity which many channels 
promote. "Attacked the innocent civilians, especially women and children"799, which indicates that 
the armed groups murder the people without any reason, which is a significance of brutalism. 
"Kidnapped the civilians"800 (12 times), sometimes Al-Manar stated that the reason of kidnapping 
was the loyalty of people to the government. However, it mostly did not mention the reasons of 
kidnapping. It left the recipient free to imagine; some might imagine that the main cause is getting 
an amount of money in return for releasing the hostages; others might imagine that kidnapping has 
a sectarian basis. That is to say, all the kidnapped belong to religious minorities, especially, the 
Alawites. Imagining depends on the experience of the audience and the extent of their closeness 
and familiarity with the Syrian crisis.  
 
Concerning killing the civilians, Al-Manar depicted that the armed groups did not only kill the 
people, but they also mutilate their corpses, cut them into pieces, burn them and throw them in 
rivers and sewers of the sanitation system. "Committing a massacre against safe citizens"801 (5 
times), "Massacres against humanity"802 (13 times), "War crimes"803 (11 times), "torturing 
people"804 (10 times). These terms were used to denote the gravity of the armed opposition's 








                                                             
797 08 April 2011. "أطلقت النار عشوائيا"  
 "روعت األهالي" 798
799 23 December 2011, 08 June 2012. Synonymous sentences with this sentence were repeated 61 times.  "هاجمت المدنيين األبرياء خاصة النساء و األطفال" 
 "خطفت مدنيين" 800
 "ارتكاب مجازر بحق مواطنين آمنين" 801
 "مجازر بحق اإلنسانية" 802
 "جرائم حرب" 803






The opposition murders the civilians.805 
 
"The armed people have executed most of the hostages whose majority are women and 
children"806, "The armed groups rape girls, then kill them and throw them in rivers."807 This 
signifies the immorality of the armed opposition; according to the rules of war, captive people 
should be respected. This idea implies a sentimental enticement in favor of the people through 
mentioning the gender and age of the hostages – women and children.  
Al-Manar showed that the armed opposition was slaughtering people with knives.  It is a 
denotation of the militants' sadism whose thirst for blood is not quenched by modern arms. They, 
rather, resort to slaughtering in order to delight in the groans and the blood color of the victims. 
The idea that the militants are targeting schools and killing the pupils and teachers was repeated 
6 times. This is an implicit significance of the opposition's fighting against learning and their 
hostility of children's education on the basis of openness and accepting the other. In other words, 
the gunmen want specific schools where they teach their principles which are based on takfirism 
and hatred of the other. 
Al-Manar portrayed that the terrorist groups implanted explosive devices in front of the 
entrances of mosques so that they exploded when the prayers get out after Salat Al-Jumaa (Friday 
prayers). This is an implied message the purpose of which is the absolute negation of the 
demonstrations after Friday prayer808 and assuring that the regime does not assault the prayers. 
"The exit of the prayers from Zein Al-Abidin Mosque in Al-Midan was not normal; minutes after 
their performing Friday prayer an explosion boomed opposite the mosque."809 
 
Al-Manar also depicted that the armed groups targeted the heavily populated places, which is a 
signifier of the desire to kill a big number of civilians. It also portrayed that these groups booby-
trapped the quarters, houses, food stuff and so on, which is a denotation that death prevailed 
everywhere, death planted by the hand of treachery on every hand span of the Syrian land. "The 
armed people innovated other methods to cause a bigger damage in the residential buildings. 
                                                             
805  16 December 2012.  
806 11 October 2013. Synonymous sentences were repeated twice. "المسلحون يعدمون معظم الرهائن الذين غالبيتهم من النساء و األطفال" 
807 13 June 2011. "المجموعات المسلحة تغتصب فتيات ثم تقتلهم و ترميهم في األنهار" 
808 On the screens of the opponent channels, the year 2011was characterized by the demonstrations of the opponents after serving the Friday prayers in a lot of Syrian regions.  




Sometimes they connect the mine to a gas cylinder and when the hidden mine is trodden the gas 
cylinder explodes. Other times, they connect it to a large number of explosive devices and other 
houses. The explosive devices may also be distributed in all the rooms so that more than one house 
can be exploded. In the same way, they use the gas cylinders to smuggle drugs arms and 
munitions."810 
 
Al-Manar dared to mention a large number of murdered civilians only when it had solid 
evidence that the armed groups were responsible for the murder such as videos which show the 
murder operations or when it had declarations of officials of Human Rights Watch and so on. This 
avoidance of mentioning the numbers of victims suggests that the channel confronted the opponent 
propaganda concerning daily murders that may reach hundreds by the regime's forces.  
 
   The idea that the gunmen are killing the residents of the villages on a sectarian basis was 
repeated 10 times. This propaganda started as from the first months of the crisis and continued as 
a remarkable characteristic of Al-Manar's discourse. "Terrorism is again targeting quarters that are 
part of the randomly built areas where a lot of Alawites reside in the outskirts of Damascus. The 
purpose is, of course, provoking the sectarian strife (fitna) and deepening the social fracture in 
Syria."811This is an implied message denoting that the armed opposition fights the regime through 
assaulting the members of the Alawite sect which president Al-Assad belongs to. The opposition 
is religiously spiteful and tries to create hatred and malevolence between the Alawites and the 
Syrian Sunnis. 
 
"They violated the Christian villages, destroyed and damaged the churches, robbed the contents, 
and defiled the Christian icons according to what the area's people narrated."812This is an indication 
of the admittance of the Christian sect of the opposition's sectarianism which does not tolerate any 
religion and any worship centers except those which suit their doctrines. "ISIS raise their flags on 
Al-Raqqa's churches"813 is a significance that the revolution in Syria is one which abolishes the 
other, and eradicates all freedoms. 
 
Al-Manar recalled a video from a source of the opposition's which shows the militants boasting 
of committing massacres. A group of these militants were cheering: 'God is the greatest! God is 
the greatest!' Then one of them appears saying: "The heroes and Mujahidin of Deir Ezzor assaulted 
and burned all the homes of Shabbiha Raafidis, the apostates who sold their religion for worldly 
pleasures."814 The goal of this recall is highlighting the takfiri characteristic of the opposition 
                                                             
810 29 June 2013.  
لقارورة. و يمكن أحيانا أن يكون موصوال بعدد كبير من العبوات على اللغم المخفي تنفجر ا ابتكر المسلحون أساليب أخرى إلحداث أضرار أكبر في األبنية السكنية، فأحيانا كانوا يعملون على وصل اللغم بقارورة الغاز و عند الدوس"
 ون أسطوانات الغاز لتهريب المخدرات و األسلحة و الذخائر".الناسفة و بيوت أخرى. أو توزع العبوات الناسفة في جميع الغرف بحيث يمكن تفجير أكثر من منزل. و بالطريقة ذاتها كان المسلحون يستخدم
811 01 December 2012. "عاود اإلرهاب استهداف أحياء من العشوائيات يسكنها الكثير من أبناء الطائفة العلوية على أطراف دمشق، و القصد طبعا إثارة الفتنة الطائفية و تعميق الشرخ االجتماعي في سوريا" 
812 02 April 2013. "استباحو القرى المسيحية و هدموا و خربوا الكنسية و سرقوا المحتويات و دنسوا الرموز المسيحية بحسب رواية أهالي المنطقة" 
813 26 September 2013. "داعش ترفع رايتها على كنائس الرقة" 




which believes in jihad against all those who oppose it in opinion and doctrine and which delights 
in killing 'in the cause of God'. It also highlights the agony of the Shiites whom the takfiris call 
'Raafidis and apostates from the religion of Allah'. 
 
In the same video815one of the opposition's religious leaders boasts saying: "Today, we have 
slaughtered one of the disbelieving symbols {they killed a Shiite Imam}. We slaughtered him and 
his son as well"816. Then the cheers of the gunmen rise high: God is the greatest! God is the 
greatest! to indicate that they realized a great achievement. Al-Manar linked the sadism of the 
armed groups to the religious pretexts these groups used in order to justify their actions. 
 
In the context of highlighting the takfiri character of the opposition, Al-Manar depicted that the 
armed groups also fight and murder the moderate Sunni sect who do not obey the orders of these 
groups. The murder operations included different gender and age groups: women, kids, young 
men, men. Al-Manar presented a group of videos which show field executions by firing squads 
performed by the armed groups against citizens who disobeyed their orders. Among these were 
women wearing hijabs from the Sunni sect. The images were accompanied by sad music, the 
purpose of which was sentimentalization in favor of the tortured civilians and feeding the popular 
rejection of the militants. "Al-Raqqa and Deir Ezzor have already witnessed spectacular murder 
operations in the street which aim at horrifying the citizens who have insisted on demanding 
stopping torture, detainment and execution which are performed pursuant to vague and fast 
measures."817 
 
The channel recalled a video taken from the opposition's resources. It shows a kid using the 
sword to behead the kidnapped. The kid decapitates a man many times seen by militants chanting 
and cheering: God is the Greatest!818. This is a denotation of the murder and violence culture which 




A kid from the opposition beheads one of the Assad’s supporters.819 
                                                             
815 12 June 2013.  
 "اليوم نحرنا رمزا من رموز الكفر، نحرناه و نحرنا ولده معه" 816
817 20 June 2013. "سبق أن شهدت الرقة كذلك دير الزور عملية قتل استعراضية في الشارع بهدف ترهيب المواطنين الذين ما انفكوا يطالبون بوقف التنكيل و اإلعتقاالت و اإلعدامات التي تتم وفق إجراءات سريعة و غير واضحة" 
818 10 December 2012.   





"Then, to conclude the bloody dramatic presentation {the execution of the civilians}, the 
murderers celebrate their achievement by throwing the dead bodies of the victims into one hole 
without leaving a tombstone on the grave. There are endless stories in Syria on the ground of takfiri 
fatwas which justify these practices."820 Many times, the channel adopted the method of direct and 
explicit criticism of the opposition's actions, a criticism which denotes great discontentment with 
these behaviors. This discontentment has an implied goal which is assuring the legality of the 
regime's actions against the opposition. 
 
"Wherever the armed groups exist in Syria, the ugliest images of murder and torture spread on 
the internet; the charge is predetermined: those who are not with us are against us."821 This is a 
direct criticism of the opposition which boasts of its crimes through filming its murder operations 
and promoting them on the internet. The militants kill whosoever does not support them, which is 
an indication of the opposition's dictatorship which claims that it is fighting the regime in the cause 
of freedom. 
 
"No sooner did the Syrians enjoy Eid Al-Adha's truce than a series of sudden bloody explosions 
stunned them. These explosions increased the bleeding of the innocent people and put the Eid's 
relative joy away from their hearts, and at stake was the truce."822 This is an emotional enticement 
the aim of which is retorting to the opposition's propaganda concerning the disrespect of the 
government forces of the religious occasions. Al-Manar's defense of the civilians denotes that they 
are supporters of the regime.  Al Manar portrayed that the militants are besieging cities during the 
month of Ramadan. This is an indication of the opposition's disrespect of the holiness of the month 
of Ramadan – the Holy Month. 
"A reality where it is very easy to murder a human being without the least deliberation."823 This 
is a significance of the brutality of the militants who kill people without any reason. The implied 
purpose of this is assuring that the only murderer of the people is the armed opposition, not the 
regime. 
Al-Manar portrayed that the terrorist groups perform expulsion operations against the people, 
assault villages, attack the houses of the families and detain them, violate regions, and burn the 
commercial stores. Al-Manar's discourse contained the verbs: to attack, to assault and to violate in 
order to denote the illegality of any activity; the armed people violate assault and rob what they do 
not have a right in.    
Pursuant to Al-Manar, not only do the militants assault the citizens, but they also shoot the 
humanistic delegations from the International Red Cross and the Syrian Red Crescent to prevent 
them from evacuating the citizens from the clash regions824.  
                                                             
820 20 June 2013. "و في ختام العرض المسرحي الدامي يحتفل القتلة بإنجازهم و تُرمى جثث الضحايا في حفرة واحدة من دون ترك شاهد على القبر. قصص ال تكاد تنتهي في سوريا على خلفية فتاوي تكفيرية تبرر هذه الممارسات" 
821 14 November 2012. "أينما حلّت المجموعات المسلحة في سوريا، تنتشر على صفحات االنترنت أبشع صور التنكيل، طالما التهمة جاهزة: من ليس معنا فهو ضدنا"  
822 26 October 2012. "لم يكد يهنؤ السوريون بهدنة عيد األضحى المبارك حتى باغتتهم سلسلة تفجيرات دموية، زادت من نزيف دم األبرياء و أبعدت فرحة العيد النسبية عن قلوبهم واضعة الهدنة على المحك" 
823 20 June 2013."واقع يسهل فيه قتل اإلنسان من دون أدنى تروي" 




Al-Manar did not cite the riots which are practiced by groups which exploit the lack of stability 
and security (groups which riot without having any political orientation). This suggests that only 
the opposition is responsible for all the chaos, devastation and destruction. 
 
Under the title: "The Free Syrian Army; unlimited criminality"825, Al-Manar described the 
opposition:  
"Frankenstein remained a distinguished character in the world of horror films until what is called 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA) appeared in Syria wearing the mask of revolution under which it hid ugly 
features, an open appetite for blood, and arts in criminality which people have neither experienced in 
an Arab Spring, Autumn, nor even Winter. These arts had a variety of forms: hanging, crushing under 
the cars, shooting, slaughtering on the roads, and throwing citizens alive down from high places. These 
things usually take place in the middle of the crowds, seen by the old and the young, accompanied by 
reiterating the phrase 'Praise be to Allah!' and cheering the phrase 'God is the Greatest!' The existing 
people take their cell phones out and start video documenting these moments of criminality, revenge, 
torture and madness. All this happens under the shade of the French Mandate's flag826. Undoubtedly, it 
is a revolution that draws its breath from the blood of the innocent and lives on sectarianism. We are 
going to present a number of video footages which show the face of the Free Syrian Army that wants 
to overthrow the president Bashar Al-Assad in order to rule the country with all this unlimited brutality, 
absurdity and criminality. Remark: the footages contain very hard scenes which children and weak-
hearted people need not watch. Different liquidation operations: slaughtering a citizen on the road, 
throwing down mail workers in Aleppo from a building roof, and a brutal execution performed by a 
firing squad. If you want to ask about a new concept of freedom, you should only ask the elements of 
FSA who have their own special meaning which is the emancipation from the human, moral and 
religious rules and precepts."827 
This quotation can sum up the attitude of Al-Manar's journalists towards the armed opposition. 
For them, FSA outdid the symbols of horror. The journalists mocked the goals and practices of the 
militants (the revolutionaries) with a sad voice tone which suggests the immenseness of the 
criminality of the opposition which claims the pursuit of freedom while it practices the ugliest 







                                                             
 "الجيش السوري الحر، إجرام بال حدود" 825
826 The opponents and critics of the Syrian revolution denounce the opposition's adoption of the French mandate's flag 1920 – 1946 as the logo and flag of this revolution. They 
consider this as a bond linkage with the countries which try to dividing and destroying Syria.  
827 15 August 2012.  
ي اإلجرام لم يعهدها الناس ال في ربيع عربي المرعبة حتى ظهر ما يسمى الجيش السوري الحر في سوريا، البسا قناع الثورة، مخبئاً تحته مالمحا قبيحة وشهية مفتوحة على الدم. فنون ف األفالمظّل فرانكنشتاين شخصية مميزة في عالم "
وسط تجمعات وعلى مرأى الصغير والكبير ويرافقها الحمد  ي الطرقات، رمي المواطنين أحياء من أماكن مرتفعة،وعادة تحصل هذه األمور: الشنق، السحل بالسيارات، إطالق النار،الذبح ف وال خريف وال حتى شتاء. فنون تعددت بأشكالها
اب. ال شك بأنها ثورة تستمد أنفاسها من دماء األبرياء وتعتاش على الطائفية. وكل ذلك يحدث تحت ظّل علم اإلنتد الموجودون هواتفهم ويوثقون بالصوت والصورة لحظات اإلجرام والتشفي والتنكيل والجنون وصيحات التكبير، حيث يسحب
ع تحتوي على مشاهد قاسية جداً ليستلم الحكم بكل هذه الهمجية والعبثية واإلجرام الذي ليس له حدود. مالحظة : المقاط بالرئيس بشار األسد سنعرض عليكم عددا من مقاطع الفيديو التي تظهر وجه الجيش السوري الحر الذي يريد اإلطاحة
من سطح المبنى، إعدام بالرصاص بطريقة وحشية. إذا أردت أن تعرف أكثر عن مفهوم  تستوجب تحذير األطفال وذوي القلوب الضعيفة من مشاهدتها. عمليات تصفية مختلفة : ذبح مواطن على الطريق العام،  رمي عمال بريد في حلب










  The opposition executes people by firing squad.829  
 
2.2. The Actions of the Armed People against the Regime and its Forces 
 
As from the first days of the eruption of the popular movement, Al-Manar highlighted the 
assaults of the armed opposition against the police and order-keeping elements, and those on the 
security men and the soldiers of the Syrian army. The channel completely blasted the idea of the 
existence of peaceful opposition. 
 
Al-Manar's discourse concerning the actions of the armed opposition against the regime was a 
direct and explicit one. Imagery, metaphor and metonymy were accidental. 
"The armed groups set ambushes against the army"830 (4 times), "The armed people steal 
government vehicles"831, "The armed people attack the Syrian government forces"832, "they break 
into the official centers833", The idea that the militants are committing crimes against the security 
                                                             
828  14 November 2012.  
829  16 May 2013.  
 "المجموعات المسلحة تنصب كمائن للجيش" 830
831 09 April 2011.  "المسلحون يسرقون سيارات حكومية" 
832 13 April 2011, 27 June 2011. The synonymous sentences were repeated 48 times.  "المسلحون يشنون هجوما ضد القوى الحكومية" 




and army personnel were repeated 11 times, "Cut off the corpses of the army soldiers"834 (4 times), 
"they commit war crimes"835 (9 times). 
"The practices of murder and torture continue in Syria. The latest is the liquidation of a number 
of the soldiers of the Syrian army by militants in the governorate of Idleb in the north of the 
country."836 This is an implied message stating that those who are killed and tortured are the 
members of the Syrian army, not the anti-regime civilians. It is a message which retorts to the 
opposition's propaganda. 
"The criminals showered the overnight convoy with bullets"837is a metonymy of the density of 
firing Syrian soldiers who were in the bus; they were killed while they were off their work. 
 
Al-Manar cited all the explosions whose victims were military elements. These explosions 
targeted security and administrative centers. "Of course, the scenes express the gravity of the event; 
the criminal and terrorist action which happened."838 The channel always magnified the outcomes 
of the explosions in order to indicate the seriousness of the gunmen's practices and to completely 
justify any government reaction, especially, the security and martial reactions. "The practices of 
the armed groups are driving the events into a dangerous course."839 
 
Airing the coverage of the explosion, Al-Manar adopted the same discourse as that of the Syrian 
Space Channel: "A bloody strike"840, "Explosions which aimed at imposing a different local, 
regional and international rhythm"841, "The tone of killing and committing massacres is rising in 
Syria every time the international Security Council calls for a meeting."842 This is a denotation that 
there is a conspiracy against the Syrian Government. In order to assure the fact that conspiring 
exists, Al-Manar linked the explosions to local and international political incidents. For example, 
an explosion that takes place before an international conference about the Syrian crisis, or during 
the arrival of Arab and international investigation committees to Syria in order to investigate what 
is happening on the ground. "The explosion takes place in critical political moments which are 
always directed to the interest of the United States of America, especially, in its attempt to 
compensate for the defeat of the withdrawal from Iraq and the unprecedented intelligence failures 
which the Central Intelligence of America (CIA) experienced in Lebanon and Iran. Moreover, the 
most important thing is the failure of the American Administration in turning the Middle East into 
a permanent area of influence of it and its stepchild Israel which has great expectations of the 
downfall of the regime of Bashar Al-Assad."843 
                                                             
 "ينكلون بجثث جنود الجيش" 834
 "يرتكبون جرائم حرب" 835
836 02 November 2012. "ممارسات القتل و التعذيب تتواصل في سوريا و جديدها تصفية عدد من جنود الجيش السوري على أيدي مسلحين في محافظة إدلب شمال البالد" 
837 04 September 2011. "المجرمون أمطروا قافلة المبيت بوابل من الرصاص" 
838 23 December 2011. "طبعا المشاهد تُعبر عن فداحة الحادث، العمل اإلرهابي اإلجرامي، الذي وقع" 
839 12 January 2013. "ممارسات المجموعات المسلحة تضع األحداث في مسار خطير" 
840 24 December 2011. "ضربة دموية"  
841 24 December 2011. "تفجيرات هدفت إلى فرض إيقاع مختلف محلي، إقليمي و دولي " 
842 29 January 2013. "نبرة القتل و إرتكاب المجازر ترتفع في سوريا في كل مرة يتداعى فيها مجلس األمن الدولي لالنعقاد" 





From sources of the opposition, Al-Manar recalled a group of videos where the militants boast 
uploading them on the internet. They show the armed opposition assaulting government soldiers: 
Executing by a firing squad or by hanging, slaughtering, and mutilation of the dead bodies. The 
armed people proudly document the date of the event and mention which battalion or faction 
committed these actions against the Syrian soldiers. The cheers rise high: 'God is the Greatest! 
God is the Greatest!' to denote that these armed people have done things which please Allah and 
support its religion. 
 
Al-Manar also recalled video footages that showed training sessions performed by the militants, 
especially Jabhat Al-Nusra and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The militants raised the 
flag of Al Qaida, cheered the phrase 'God is the Greatest!', and wore headbands on which the 
phrase 'There is no God but Allah!' was written. All the religious – Islamic – icons turned on Al-




The Islamic slogans of the armed opposition seem a symbol of extremism and criminality.844 
 (20) 
 
The Islamic slogans change into symbols of murder and terrifying.845 
 
                                                             
وكالة المخابرات ب من العراق و الخيبات االستخباراتية غير المسبوقة التي ُمنيت بها يأتي التفجير في لحظات سياسية مفصلية لم تنفك تصب في مصلحة الواليات المتحدة األمريكية، خصوصا في محاولة التعويض عن هزيمة االنسحا" 
 ربيبتها إسرائيل التي تعلق آماال على سقوط نظام الرئيس بشار االسد".المركزية سي آي أي في لبنان و إيران.  و قبل ذلك و بعده فشل اإلدارة األمريكية في تحويل الشرق األوسط إلى منطقة نفوذ دائم لها و ل
844  12 January 2013.  




Al-Manar linked the effect of the practices of the armed groups on the regime to that on the 
people. This method suggests that the enemy of the state and that of the people is one. "The armed 
people assaulted the public and private properties"846, "The explosion caused casualties among the 
civilians and the military personnel"847, "The terrorist armed groups which horrified the civilians 
in Daraa and assaulted the public and private properties and plants."848 
 
2.3.Additional Practices of the Armed People  
 
Al-Manar highlighted a group of additional practices which assures the brutality of the armed 
opposition: Setting fires to the forests and the agricultural crops849, booby-trapping the roads and 
the bridges (9 times), assaulting the national hospitals (5 times). 
Turning the mosques, synagogues, churches, schools, cultural centers, hospitals, and homes 
into military sites and field hospitals (10 times). These are significances of deactivating the 
activities through deforming the role of the infrastructures which no longer secured the services 
for the people, but they sent bullets and missiles instead. 
 
"The gunmen have fortified themselves in a number of the residential quarters850", "They are 
making the residential quarters hiding places for themselves"851 (3 times), "They are fortifying 
themselves in the orchards."852 The implied purpose of this coverage is justifying the bombardment 
of the regime's forces of the quarters and orchards. "Setting fire to the forests"853. This is a counter 
propaganda of that of the opposition concerning the burning of the forests by the regime's forces." 
The gunmen are targeting the oil wells"854 (3 times), "They target the power stations"855 (3 times). 
These are indications that the opposition does not care for the situation of the Syrians and deprive 
them of the services necessary to their lives by the pretext of fighting the regime. 
 
"They are attacking the archeological sites"856 (16 times), "Syria's monuments were not safe of 
the firing of the armed groups."857 These are denotations which suggest that the militants are 
wreaking havoc and destroying everything without exception. According to Al-Manar, the Syrian 
legacy is paying the tax of the armed disorder in the country which threatens of erasing the 
historical and religious ruins which date back to thousands of years. The militants are selling the 
                                                             
 "اعتدى المسلحون على األمالك العامة و الخاصة" 846
 "التفجير أوقع خسائر باألرواح، مدنيين و عسكريين" 847
848 01 May 2011. "المجموعات اإلرهابية المسلحة التي روعت المواطنين األمنين في درعا واعتدت على المنشآت والممتلكات العامة والخاصة" 
849 10 November 2011.  
850 01 March 2012, 01 July 2012. "المسلحون يتحّصنون بعدد من األحياء السكنية" 
 "يتخذون األحياء السكنية مخابئ لهم" 851
852 21 August 2012."يتحصنون بالبساتين"  
 "يضرمون النار في الغابات"  853
 "اإلرهابيون يستهدفون آبار النفط" 854
 "يستهدفون محطات الكهرباء" 855
 "يهاجمون المواقع األثرية" 856




history of Syria for a handful of dollars858. "The armed people do not find it embarrassing to sell 
the memory of the Syrian homeland represented in the ruins of Maaloula and others to the brokers 
outside the country, a behavior which leads to deforming the past and confiscating the future."859 
This is a denotation of the opposition's betrayal of the homeland, Syria, and the conspiring of its 
soldiers with external actors aiming at the elimination of the Syrian historical treasures. 
 
"The religious holy places are in the fire range of the armed groups in Syria"860, "The militants 
are escalating their attacks against the religious sites"861, "A group of the holy religious Islamic 
and Christian places were exposed to a destructive campaign during the period of events which 
started two years ago."862 The implied purpose of these statements is assuring the innocence of the 
government forces of the charges against them about their bombing the holy places and knocking 
them down. Al-Manar depicted that the armed opposition assaulting the holy places of the three 
religions: Islamic, Christian and Jewish. The opposition is plundering, destroying, and robbing the 
contents of the synagogues, churches and mosques. "Al-Manar observes the burning of the 
mosques and the holy Quran by the militants."863 This is an implicit message which means that Al-
Manar is pursuing the events on the ground; it does not take its images from unauthenticated 
sources and the fact is that the opposition, not the regime, is the one which destroys the mosques 
and burns the holy Quran. At that time, a group of channels accused the regime of burning the 
Quran and the goal of these charges was the emotional incitement of Arab and non-Arab Moslems. 
 
"The armed people did not respect the specialty of the religious and worshipping places, even 
the graves. This is the new copy of freedom."864 This is a direct mockery of the opposition's slogans 
which show the desire to obtain freedom. 
 
Many times, Al-Manar highlighted the militants' targeting of Shiite shrines and their attempt of 
destroying them such as Sayyidah Zaynab shrine and Sayyidah Ruqayya. This is a denotation of 
the opposition's sectarianism and its old renewed hatred of the Shiite sect. 
According to Al-Manar, the takfiri people's fatwas have no exceptions. All the holy shrines, the 
pious people's tombs, and the Moslem and non-Moslem international ruins are all exposed to 
destruction and bursting under different pretexts one of which is that those who visit these places 
worship idols and Gods other than Allah. 
The channel recalled old video footages the content of which shows the takfiri people bursting 
a number of shrines in different countries of the world like Iraq, Libya, Mali, Pakistan, Afghanistan 
and others. Each time the armed people exploded a grave or a shrine, they cheered the phrase: 'God 
                                                             
858 18 December 2013.  
859 18 December 2013. "ال يجد المسلحون حرجا في بيع ذاكرة الوطن السوري المتمثل بآثار معلوال و غيرها إلى سماسرة الخارج، خطوة من شأنها تشويه الماضي و مصادرة المستقبل" 
860 11 February 2013. "المقدّسات الدينية في مرمى نيران المجموعات المسلحة في سوريا" 
861 11 February 2013. "المسلحون يُصعّدون هجماتهم ضد المواقع الدينية" 
862 02 April 2013."كانت مجموعة من األماكن الدينية المقدسة اإلسالمية و المسيحية عرضة لحملة تدمير خالل فترة األحداث الممتدة منذ سنتين"  
863 15 September 2013. "المنار ترصد إحراق المسلحين للمساجد و القرآن الكريم" 




is the Greatest! God is the Greatest!865'. The takfiri people were proud at each explosion expressing 
that they were doing it so that people would worship Allah, the One, who has no partner, and that 
they, thanks to God, were fighting the disbelievers866. 
(21) 
 
The militants explode the religious shrines.867  
The internet was the main source of most of the images of the opposition militants and their 
activities. These images were mostly misty and shaky (the majority of them were taken by cell 
phones). They suggest instability and create a state of fear and anxiety. This helps to consolidate 
the mental image of the danger of the armed opposition which spread death and horror. 
(22) 
 
Veiled faces and black and grey colors show the opposition militants as horrifying criminal elements.868 
 (23) 
 
The armed opposition seems on Al-Manar’s screen as terrifying murder gangs. The black color and the veiled 
faces contribute to reinforcing this mental image.869 
                                                             
865 01 May 2013.  
866 01 May 2013.  
867  01 May 2013.  
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The low shot helps show the opposition horrible and as a symbol of death.871 
 
3. Features of the Armed People's Weakness 
 
Al-Manar did not employ direct characteristics to indicate the weakness of the militants such 
as a weak, defeated, crushed opposition and so on. It rather implied this notion within the ideas 
and statements: "Syrian army forces inflicted heavy losses on the gunmen"872 (15 times), "The 
armed people try to run away"873 (17 times), "The militants surrendered to the specialized 
authorities"874 (3 times), "The armed people withdraw in front of the advance of the regime's 
forces."875 The method of implying the characteristic of weakness and not stating it explicitly is an 
important one in propaganda and psychological war. Al-Manar tried to keep the mental image 
which presents the opposition as fearful terrorist groups spreading everywhere and extending 
murder wherever it exists (dangerous groups). At the same time, it attempted to sustain the morale 
high on the part of all the regime supporters through introducing the government martial acts as 
                                                             
870  01 December 2013. 
871  01 December 2013.  
 "القوات المسلحة كبدت المسلحين خسائر فادحة" 872
 "المسلحون يحاولون الفرار" 873
 "المسلحون سلموا أنفسهم للجهات المختصة" 874




heroic deeds against an appalling terrorism. To realize the balance between these two images, the 
channel implied the weakness features and did not express them explicitly. 
 
"The militants seemed in a state of exhaustion and suffer from shortage of munitions after days 
of dense bombing of their sites."876 This content was repeated during the two years of 2012 and 
2013. The voice tones of the media personnel denoted the desire to show the strength of the Syrian 
army more than showing the opposition's weakness. That is, hinting to the weakness of the 
opposition reduces the importance of the government martial operations, whereas showing the 
exhaustion of the opposition owing to the strength of the Syrian army would give an impression 
of the Syrian state's confrontation of a serious conspiracy in a courageous and challenging way.  
 
Al-Manar highlighted the following weaknesses: the failure of the armed opposition to control 
border crossings and Syrian regions; the continuity of dissensions and disagreements in the Syrian 
opposition; splitting on basis of dividing power, spoils, and robbed items; splitting because of the 
desire to control the natural resources and underground treasures; and the conflicts of the armed 
factions and the liquidation operations among them. 
 
In 2013, Al-Manar densely covered the battles among the opposition factions, especially among 
the FSA, Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS which Al-Manar called: the Al Qaida-affiliate organizations. 
The implied goal of this label is reminding the recipient that the role of Al-Qaida was not a positive 
one; as it is a terrorist organization which legitimizes killing all those who disagree with its views. 
Al-Manar's journalists made fun of the opposition leaders who exist in Turkey and other Arab 
and western countries: "There is something really weird about the Syrian opposition; it broke the 
standards of all revolutions. A political and field military leadership is altogether abroad. Well, 
this could be politically right due to security reasons. But what kind of reasons prevent the military 
leadership from being there on the field? Or is pursuing the developments of the battles from hotels 
the latest invention of the human mind?"877 This is a significance of the weakness of the faith of 
the opposition leaders in the revolution's goals. They are frightened about their lives. Therefore, 
they hurl the people into a bloody battle while sitting in hotels enjoying peace.  
 
Al-Manar recalled a group of video footages which were uploaded on the internet where some 
of the armed people appear swearing that they were not going to retreat until death and that they 
were not going to get out of the areas in which they were fighting whatever the cost would be: "By 
God the Greatest! We aren't going to leave Al-Qusayr. We aren't going to get out of Al-Qusayr 
even if we all were cut into pieces."878, "By the Lord of Glory! God is with us and we will never 
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877 08 June 2013. 
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kneel but to God."879.  Al-Manar's journalist commented on these video footages in a sarcastic 
way: "But the soul is dear as the saying goes"880, a denotation that the militants preferred their 
personal safety to going on fighting; consequently, it is a signifier of the weakness of their doctrine. 
Then, the journalist explained, sticking to his sarcastic tone, that the militants left behind them 
their dearest and ran away after they had promised to fight until the last breath; the region did not 
even witness any clashes. No sooner did the Syrian army merely approach than the militants ran 
away881.  
 
Mentioning the names of some opposition military leaders who were killed either by the Syrian 
army or by other opposition factions was one of the methods which Al-Manar adopted to show the 
weakness of the opposition indirectly.  
In a video footage, an element of the FSA promises to avenge a leader killed by the elements 
of ISIS while they all were discussing the battles plan: "By God I will avenge you, Abu Bakri. By 
God, you will not be buried beneath the earth till I avenge you. All those, who were involved in 
the story, will be buried."882This is a significance of how fast the revenge is; i.e. he will not burry 
the victim before he takes revenge. 
 
Al-Manar showed ISIS as a monster which swoops down on everything and everybody around 
it. More than 30 leaders of FSA's were beheaded by this organization. Another number was 
slaughtered. More often, Al-Manar only mentioned the leaders of FSA in contexts like this. In 
other words, the channel never recognized in its discourse the existence of an army fighting on the 
Syrian land except the Syrian army. But the opposition's armed people were either criminals or 
terrorists and takfiris (not an organized army). 
"After the field developments between the two opponent factions, the Northern Storm Brigade 
sent an SOS call to Al-Tawhid Brigade, one of the most prominent armed groups in Aleppo, to 
interfere in order to support it."883 This also is an indirect method to show the features of the 
weakness of the opposition. The FSA is shown defeated, but this time not in front of the Syrian 
army yet in front ISIS. The factions of FSA ask each other for help so that they might be able to 
confront ISIS. 
"The Syrian opposition accuses ISIS and Jabhat Al-Nusra, which is also affiliated to Al-Qaida, 
of detaining tens of the opposition fighters on basis of charges pivoting in general around what 
they call violating the Islamic Sharia or around a certain explanation of Islam."884 
"A prominent field event prevails in the Syrian scene. There are fierce battles between the so-
called FSA and ISIS. On the face of it, the motives of these clashes are ideological conflicts. 
                                                             
879 08 June 2013. "و رب العزة أنه هللا معنا و لن نركع إال هلل" 
 "لكن النفس عزيزة كما يقال" 880
881 08 June 2013.  
882 13 July 2013."و هللا آلخد بتارك يا أبو بكري  و هللا ما بتنزل تحت التراب قبل ما آخد بتارك ، كل الي كانوا بالقصة بدن ينزلوا" 
883 19 September 2013. "إثر التطّورات الميدانية بين الفصيلين المعارضين  أطلق لواء عاصفة الشمال نداء استغاثة طالب به لواء التوحيد أحد أبرز المجموعات المسلحة في حلب التدخل لنصرته" 
884 13 July 2013.  




However, they are in fact conflicts between the international supporters and financers of the two 
parties."885 These are the most noticeable comments of Al-Manar's on the reasons of the conflict 
among the different opposition's armed factions. The purpose of these comments is presenting the 
evidence that the Syrian state is exposed to a universal conspiracy. The correspondents of Al-
Manar interviewed some researchers and analysts in order to get more details concerning this 
conspiracy. 
 
In the second half of 2013, Al-Manar concentrated on the disputes among the armed factions 
and densely highlighted intimidating each other and threatening each other of retribution and 
crushing. The main goal of this selectivity is saying: behold this opposition which wants to 
overthrow the regime and replace it! They are murdering each other and everyone who has a 
different opinion of theirs. This selectivity also helps raise the morale of the government supporters 
who feel that the armed oppositions are fighting each other. Eventually, the Syrian armed forces 
can avail of this situation and achieve victory.  
 
4. The Admissions of the Combatants 
 
Al-Manar recalled video footages which were transmitted on the Syrian Space Channel which 
show some of the armed people's admissions of the practices that they performed. In spite of their 
existence on the Syrian land, the correspondents of Al-Manar did not interview these gunmen. 
Rather, they only had enough information from the Syrian Space Channel or other pro-regime 
channels as sources for them concerning the admissions of the detained armed people. 
The content of these admissions was: political Lebanese actors which are opponent of the 
Assad's policy are the ones who finance and guide ruinous armed groups. The combatants assure 
their attack of police centers. They assure their assault of peaceful demonstrators and depicting 
these assaults and transmitting them on the sites of social communication in order to charge the 
Syrian security personnel of committing them. Even the peaceful demonstrators go out to the 
streets for an amount of money886. This is an implied message that there was no true revolution 
against the regime. 
 
A combatant confessed that he and a group of armed people had beheaded elements of a Syrian 
Détachement intégré de sécurité. He assured that he was obliged to obey the orders of his 
commanders: "He said to me: 'Either you kill the Syrian Détachementintégré de sécurité elements 
or we will slaughter you'."887 This is an indication of the fierceness and aggressiveness of the armed 
opposition even among each other. This means that, the leaders murder all those who disobey their 
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سالم في الشام و العراق داعش. الظاهر للعيان أن دوافع اإلشتباكات خالفات إيديوليوجية و في حقيقة األمر  هي خالفات بين الداعمين حدث ميداني بارز يطغى على المشهد السوري، معارك طاحنة بين ما يسمى بالجيش الحر و دولة اإل"
 و الممولين الدوليين لكال الطرفين".
886 13 April 2013. 




commands. "The armed people liquefied a number of people who intended to surrender to the 
authorities along with their arms."888 
 
Another group of the armed people confessed that they slaughtered citizens. One of them 
narrated some of the slaughtering details: "We laid him down on the ground. I held him at his head. 
My cousin held him at his legs. I took out the knife, laid it on his neck, said to him: 'Glory be to 
Allah Who made you halal to be slaughtered', and slaughtered him. I slaughtered him. We 
slaughtered him at his neck. This is the method which Mohammad Kheir Darwish, the head of the 
battalion, taught us; 'Glory be to God Who made you halal to be slaughtered' has a good meaning. 
It means that Allah will forgive your sins. This is good from Islam."889 This is an implicit message 
the purpose of which is highlighting the takfiri characteristic of the opposition which considers all 
those whose views are different from it like animals which God made slaughtering them as halal 
as slaughtering the sheep and cows. Moreover, the one who slaughters is doing something that 
pleases God and makes Him happy. Therefore, the sins of all those who take part in the murder 
operations will be forgiven by Allah. In all the videos transmitted by the opposition combatants 
and recalled by Al-Manar, a large number of the armed people gather in a crowd in order to 
participate in the murder of the hostages, which is an implied indication that assures the brutality 
of the opposition which changed the Islamic rituals into satanic ones where slaughtering people 
becomes as offering a sacrifice to the god so that it might be pleased: "'Glory be to Allah Who 
made you halal to be slaughtered' has a good meaning. It means that Allah will forgive your sins". 
 
5. Declarations of Combatants which were Uploaded on the Internet 
 
Al-Manar recalled a group of the declarations of the armed people's which were transmitted on 
the internet. The contents of these declarations assure the soundness of the mental image which 
the regime and its supporting channels present about the armed opposition. Al-Manar supported 
the regime's propaganda through recalling the enemy's sources. Here are some of the contents of 
these declarations: the armed people talk about their blockade of the regions whose people support 
the Syrian government. "We have put this check point here so as to prevent anyone of them from 
ever leaving the area"890, "We are here monitoring those Shabbiha. We are besieging them."891 
The armed people labeled the title of "Shabbiha" to all the civilian citizens who supported the 
government in order to indicate that they are gangs which support a dictator who is corrupt and 
criminal against the people. In this way the armed groups legalize their blockade and murder of 
the supporters of Al-Assad and his government.  
 
                                                             
888 09 November 2012."المسلحون عمدوا إلى تصفية عدد من األشخاص الذين كانوا ينوون تسليم أنفسهم و أسلحتهم للسلطات"  
889 21 August 2012.  
الطريقة الي علمنا ياها رئيس الكتيبة محمد خير درويش، أنه سبحان من حناه من رقبته.  بطحناه على األرض، مسكته من رأسه، ابن عمي مسكه من اجريه، شلت السكين و حطيته على رقبته و قلتله: سبحان من حللك للذبح و ذبحته، ذب"
 حللّك للذبح يعني أنه هي كلمة كويسة بتغفرلك ذنوبك، كويسة من اإلسالم".
890 11 February 2013."عاملين حاجز هون مشان نمنعن ما حدا يطلع منن أبدا" 




There are other declarations where military commanders of the opposition's assured that a large 
number of the international intelligence apparatus got involved into supporting the combatants. 
The talked about Qatari, Saudi, Jordanian, Israeli, American French, and other western countries' 
involvement through the material, training, and logistic support of the armed opposition and the 
political one outside Syria. This is a significance of the importance of the Syrian state as many 
countries try to eliminate this government which stood in the face of imperialism and Zionism, 
and which said 'No' to the European and American commands.  
 
6. Who Is Fighting in Syria? 
 
"The borders witness a flow of the armed people."892 This is a signifier of the abundance of the 
foreign combatants who enter the Syrian lands to fight the government. 
Al-Manar recalled videos from the Syrian Space Channel (SSC) which show the confessions 
of the gunmen who came from Arab countries like Jordan and Tunisia. These armed people talked 
about the actor who sent them and the way how they were persuaded to come to Syria. A journalist 
from SSC asks a Jordanian gunman: "Who persuaded you of the idea of coming to Syria for 
Jihad?"893 The Jordanian answers: "It was a person called Adnan Nayhi, from the city of Al-
Zarqaa, in Jordan. He persuaded me of Jihad in Syria as the ruler of Syria does not rule in 
accordance to the Quran and he should be fought against."894 The purpose of Al-Manar's recalling 
of these declarations is highlighting the sectarian characteristic of the armed opposition which calls 
for freedom yet wants to impose the religious dictatorship – the hard-line Islamism – on the Syrian 
people. 
The militants talked about the details of their getting the weapons and the nature of the tasks 
which were assigned to them. They also talked about the nationalities of the fighters who were 
living and fighting with them. 
 
"These confessions are an accomplishment of information leaked by western mass media about 
the overflow of Arab and foreign armed people to Syria."895 This is an implicit message which 
means that the confessions of the foreign armed people are not a lie which the regime invented in 
order to justify its martial operations. They are, rather, facts which are assured by western sources. 
In other words, these sources might be opponent of the regime, yet they assure the existence of 






                                                             
892 29 January 2013."المناطق الحدودية تشهد تدفق لمسلحين" 
 "مين أقنعك بفكرة الجهاد في سوريا"  893
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Foreign militants fight with the pretext of defending Islam.896 
 
"'Jihadists' are fighting in Syria."897 Jihad in Islam is an obligation that must be adhered to. 
However, the explanation of the meaning of Jihad differs in accordance with the tendencies of the 
Islamic religious branches and sects and according to the degrees of extremism. Al-Manar's 
highlighting of the term 'Jihadists' implicitly means that the opposition is extremist and kills even 
the Muslims who religiously disagree with it. 
 
Many times, Al-Manar recalled the declarations of Al-Qaida leader, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, who 
called to support the Intifada in Syria898. He also called the Syrians to Jihad and not to depend on 
Arabs, the west and Turkey because all these do not want a free, Muslim, independent, strong, and 
Jihadist Syria. They rather want a Syria which is dependent, weak, and which recognizes Israel or 
goes along with it and which is subjugated to the international oppression. Al-Zawahiri called to 
continue the Intifada until achieving an independent government which rules according to Islam899. 
One of Al-Zawahiri's declarations is: "Our blessed outrage and our gigantic Intifada will not be 




The militants are training, but their appearance on Al-Manar’s screen changes their training sessions into a 
symbol of fear.901 
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Al-Manar availed of the refusal of many Syrian, Arab, and western peoples of Al-Qaida and its 
practices. Al-Manar linked the goals of the Syrian opposition to those of Al Qaida. This made the 
regime seem a civilized, tolerant, secular one which gives way to all worships and doctrines. Hence 
there is no place for comparison between a takfiri, murderous, backward, and underdeveloped 
opposition on the one hand, and a government that respects openness on the world and demands 
development on the other hand. 
A combatant who came from Saudi Arabia to fight in Syria: "I tell my brothers in the Arabian 
Peninsula: 'Fight in the way of God. Syria is in need of fighters who have doctrine and gallantry, 
and you do have them'."902 This is an indication that the extremists who belong to the Sunni sect 
have turned the popular movement which demanded reform into a sectarian war and conflict 
among the Muslims. Id est, they recreated the fitna between the Sunni sect and the other Islamic 
sects. 
 
The channel depicted Jabhat Al-Nusra, which contains hard-line fighters, as a monster which 
spreads death wherever it exists. Foreign fighters direct religious Sharia courts against the Syrian 
people. That is, the occupying strangers rule the country killing all those who have different 
opinions from theirs. Jabhat Al-Nusra wants to enforce the Islamic sharia and to take the people 
back to a period before 1400 years. In plain English, everything on the Syrian land must be as it 
was at the time of the prophet Muhammad.  
ISIS was the biggest face of backwardness and underdevelopment. According to the ISIS 
fighters, all modern technologies are heresies which must be disposed of. Everything which did 
not exist at the time of the prophet Muhammad – technologies, costumes, tools and so on – must 
be crushed and eradicated from the life of the Syrians.  
 
Al-Manar also portrayed that the foreign fighters are trying to establish an Islamic state which 
starts from Syria, and that they do not care whether the Syrian armed opposition – the Syrian 
fighters- is pleased with this or not. This is a signifier that the military matters are out of the control 
of the Syrian combatants. Al-Manar recalled declarations of fighters who consider that Jabhat Al-
Nusra is well-organized and that it can be considered a substitute of FSA which has been corrupted 
and whose elements have committed operations of plunder and robbery of the homes and 
properties of the Syrians903. The implicit goal of this coverage is the absolute blasting of the 
existence of an armed Syrian opposition. This means that the regime's forces are not fighting 
Syrian opponents yet they are targeting an external, occupier, takfiri enemy whom all the world 
has to collaborate with the Syrian people in order to get rid of it. 
 
According to Al-Manar, the foreign fighters came from many Arab and international countries: 
KSA, Kuwait, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, Iraq, many African countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
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Hungary, a group of European countries, America, and so on. To assure the existence of foreign 
fighters, Al-Manar depended on Arab and international sources. In other words, it did not only 
depend on the Syrian sources in order to stress the credibility of the Syrian government concerning 
this matter. As if the channel wanted to say: Behold, world! Since the beginning, the Syrian 
authorities have assured the arrival of takfiri people to Syria. But you did not believe. Now, we 
have evidence from sources, which are not pro-regime ones, assuring to you that those who are 
fighting are not Syrians and that what is going on is not a revolution for attaining freedom; it is 
rather an extremist terrorist attack. 
 
"The numbers of the Arab and foreign armed victims are escalating day by day, especially in 
Eastern Ghouta and Qalamon in indications that the takfiri groups have become the main element 
in the most violent battles on the Syrian land."904 Concerning the foreign victims, Al-Manar did 
not hesitate to present huge numbers that reach thousands of fighters. Mentioning gigantic numbers 
of the foreign armed victims was a pride for the Syrian army which achieves great achievements 
and fights an external malicious enemy. The channel reiterated the notion of western interference 
in the Syrian crisis through the financing and training of the foreigners, and through sending them, 
with the help of bordering countries of Syria like Jordan and Turkey, to fight against the army 
which protects the country. This is a new significance of the universal conspiracy which targets 




The militants are displaying their strength, but their appearance on Al-Manar’s screen changes them into a 
symbol of fear.905 
 
7. Interviews with the Syrian Citizens about the Armed People 
 
The interviews of the Syrians were either with Al-Manar's correspondents or with those of the 
Syrian pro-regime channels (Al-Manar recalled these interviews, especially from SSC). Al-
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Manar's continual adopting of the interviews of the Syrian channels with the citizens again 
suggests that Al-Manar is a real extension of those channels (the official holder of the government's 
propaganda). Al-Manar's sample included different age groups. 
 
7.1.  The Declarations of the Males 
 
The features of the males were characterized by outrage, fear, anxiety, tension and disgust of 
the opposition's combatants. A number of the citizens explained the practices of the combatants 
such as: blocking the roads, cutting electricity off, depriving people of bread, burning the 
government centers and hospitals, and the most important thing is shooting citizens everywhere 
and performing many explosions. "They are terrorists, murderers. They launched two rockets 
which hit my own house. One here, another here. They caused very huge injuries. They shook the 





The people are angry and furious with the armed opposition.908 
 
"These gangs' combatants are criminals. They are criminals against God, the homeland, and 
human beings."909 This is an indication of the people's refusal of the armed opposition out of a 
religious, national, and moral principle. "Religion is morals, principles, and values. They have 
nothing; no morals, no values, and no principles."910 This popular refusal was reiterated in Al-
Manar's sample from 2011 to 2013. It is a significance of the insistence of the people on their 
opinion concerning the opposition. "The Syrian people do not deserve this; killing a believer is 
never justified. Islam encourages love, cooperation, sacrifice, and tolerance. Islam is innocent of 
them."911 This is a signifier whose purpose is countering the opposition's propaganda concerning 
the combatants' obeying the commands of Islam in fighting the enemies of God. The Syrians want 
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to implicitly tell the armed people: 'We are the Muslims, not you! We have the right to talk about 
Islam, not you!'  
 
It was noticed that there was similarity between the descriptions the citizens used and those 
used by the Syrian pro-regime channels: a terrorist act, a criminal act, blood shedding of the Syrian 
people, Syria is stand-still and towering forever in the face of the conspiracy912, and so on. "We 
denounce this criminal act. We denounce this terrorist act"913, "The more they terrorize us, the 
more they cause our love of the homeland"914, "God will! We will remain stand-still in the face of 
terrorism."915 This indicates how strongly people are affected by the media messages.  
One of those who were tortured by the armed people said: "They took me to a house whose 
location I was ignorant of. I only knew that it was in Al Hajar Al Aswad. They led me into a room 
and started treading me with their feet, electricity, rods, and iron."916 Many Syrians talked about 
their being tortured by the armed groups without knowing why they were being tortured. This 
method denotes that the armed opposition assaults people with no reason, no justification. It is also 
a method which suggests that the armed people kill only for the sake of killing and torture in order 




The people are angry and afraid of the armed opposition.917 
 
Many Syrians expressed their sympathy and deep grief towards the Syrian armed forces: "What 
sin have these soldiers committed? All of them are our sons or our brothers! Well! Well! I mean 
what is going on does not please an unbeliever nor a Muslim, nor any other religion. We only 
resort to God, who is the best to be depended upon!"918  
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The content of the citizens' declarations also centers on their refusal of the opposition's slogans. 
Especially those which aim at freedom; as the Syrians considered that the freedom which the armed 
opposition demands is represented by explosions, murder, and bombing people. "What is the 
meaning of the freedom which they want? Please tell us! We want to understand. By God! They 
devastated us. They destroyed all this country."919 
 
"I don't grasp why these people are launching these missiles! Do they care for the revolution, 
or for improvement? Or is it murdering innocent people what they care for? It's high time the state 
put an end to these things. In my opinion, it should strike with an iron arm."920 This is an indication 
that the people do not recognize the existence of a revolution which aims at freedom and at 
improving the living conditions. The main goal of this declaration is assuring that the people 
support the government forces and ask them to intensify their martial operations and bring the 




A wounded man explains about the assaults of the armed groups.921 
 
7.2. The Declarations of Females 
 
The majority of females were wearing hijab, which indicates the attitude of the Sunni sect 
towards the armed opposition. "May God take revenge from them! May God not strengthen them! 
They claim that their leader is our master Muhammad, but no; our master Muhammad is innocent 
from them. Religion is innocent from them. They are making fun of religion; they entered to 
plunder."922  This is a signifier of the refusal of the Sunni sect of the combatants' practices. They 
do not represent Islam. This is what the woman is trying to say; they do not represent the Sunni 
sect as they claim. The woman prays to God to punish these armed people. She did not only 
renounce them but she also wanted God to punish them, which denotes a high level of popular 
outrage against the combatants. 
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A woman wearing the Sunni hijab is talking about the practices of the terrorists.924 
 
A veiled woman comments on an explosion performed by a suicide bomber: "By God, we are 
going to worship Allah. All the people are going to worship Allah. It should not be this way."925 
The implicitly indicates that the armed people have no exceptions; they did not except even the 
Sunni sect. The implied purpose is assuring that the Syrian armed forces and the security personnel 
did not kill the prayers as the opponent channels claim. 
 
Another woman wearing hijab said: "All terrorism is behind them. That's what they send to us, 
and it is clear who is financing them."926This is an indication that the people, especially the Sunni 
sect, are sure that there is a conspiracy. There are countries which export terrorism to Syria. 
Other women expressed their shock of what was taking place in Syria and that they were 
enjoying security and peace before the beginning of the revolutionary events. They also explicitly 
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924 20 June 2011.  
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expressed their refusal of the opposition's slogans concerning freedom. Many of them considered 
that the freedom of the combatants was explosions, slaughtering and considering all those who 
have different opinions of theirs as traitors. The women called the victims from the security 
personnel and the Syrian army soldiers as 'martyrs'. This shows that the Sunni sect recognized 
what the government forces do as a holy act whose result is immortality in God's paradise. 
 
The women expressed their feelings of horror and fear whenever the armed groups controlled 
an area. They always linked the existence of the Syrian army to their feeling of security and safety, 
which is a signifier that the Syrian forces protect the homeland, loyal to the people, and keep 
women away from any assault. 
 
8. The Opposition's Weapons 
 
Al-Manar depicted that the opposition has light weapons, medium and heavy. They had 
automatic guns –Kalashnikov, service revolvers, pump action shotguns, Pulemyot Kalashnikov, 
dynamite, explosive fillings, explosive devices, bombs, mortars, Rocket Propelled Grenades, 
rocket launchers, and surface-to-air missiles. The opposition also owned factories for 
manufacturing explosive devices and rockets. 
 
As for the chemical weapons, Al-Manar positively stated that the opposition is the one which 
targeted the civilians with rockets containing toxic substances and considered this a serious 
escalation. In order to acquit the regime of the opposition's charges of using these weapons, Al-
Manar stated that the Syrian authorities warned the people against the possibility of combatants' 
use of the chemical rockets after the latter seized factories for manufacturing the Chlorine927. It 
also mentioned that a number of reports indicated that the armed groups, especially Jabhat Al-
Nusra were preparing for a massive chemical attack. Al-Manar and the other pro-regime channels 
had a heavy responsibility which makes it an obligation for them to retort continuously and 
instantaneously to all the charges against the government forces on a huge number of Arab and 
international channels. 
 
The most prominent sources of these weapons for the armed people were: the Arab and western 
support and financing, seizing government security and military centers and robbing the weapons 
in them. 
Mostly, mentioning the names of these weapons was in the contexts of talking about: the Syrian 
State's confiscation of weapons owned by the terrorist groups, finding these weapons out after the 
Syrian army was able to control some areas and force the combatants to depart their sites and leave 
their equipment and weapons behind. These contexts combine presenting evidence that the armed 
groups are dangerous and showing the strength of the Syrian state and its control of the situation. 
                                                             





The other context of mentioning the names of the weapons is assaulting the civilians by the 
opposition.  
 
Many times, the channel linked the opposition's ownership of developed weapons and its 
ownership of developed communication stations, developed communication devices, developed 
phones, and developed cameras. This is a denotation of how big and strong the western support of 
this opposition was, and consequently, assuring that Syria was exposed to a big conspiracy. 
 
9. Human Icons 
 
Al-Manar mentioned the names of the armed people and presented them only in two cases: 
when their death had a significant indication such as the death of an FSA leader by Jabhat Al-
Nusra or ISIS, or during committing aggressive and brutal operations against the Syrians. The 
general characteristic of Al-Manar's discourse was generalization, (the armed people, the terrorists, 
and so on). That is to say, without focusing on specific characters. This gives an impression that 
the armed opposition consists of groups of mob with no definite leadership, and that it does not 
have any organizational structure as many channels promote. 
 
10. Regional Icons 
 
The importance of every governorate, city, area, quarter, and street in Syria was the same. The 
news context of Al-Manar's suggests that every hand span of Syria exposed to the assaults of the 
terrorists was worthy of media exposure.  
These regions have different significances on Al-Manar's screen. Some regions have a strategic 
denotation like Homs and Aleppo. Others have implicit significances. For example, the 
combatants´ assault on Maaloula in Damascus Suburb is a denotation of the armed people's 
targeting of the Christians. A massacre in Lattakia countryside is a signifier of the armed people's 
targeting of the Alawites. 
 
The Consequences of the War as Presented by Al-Manar 
 
1. The Dead and the Wounded 
 
"Martyrs" (42 times), "victims" (27 times), "innocent people" (4 times)928. Al-Manar adopted 
these labels to express the civilian casualty and those of the government security and military 
forces. "Martyrs" denotes that the destiny of these murdered people is paradise. 
Labeling the civilians with these terms indirectly shows them as supporters of the regime even 
if they were not actually so. Since the channel's attitude strongly supports the Syrian regime, since 
                                                             




Al-Manar does not cover all the events when civilians die, and since it highlights the deaths only 
in contexts which serve the regime, when the channel talks about the casualty, the recipient 
subconsciously can label the civilians with the characteristic of being loyal to the government. 
 
"The families of the martyrs assure their commitment to the national unity and their rejection 
of fitna"929 this is an indirect denotation that the families of the murdered civilians support the 
Syrian government as these statements suggest that the regime is the symbol of national unity and 
that it confronts a conspiracy which those who adopted it try to create fitna among the sections of 
the people. Al-Manar repeatedly employed this type of statements. In other words, it did not adopt 
the words which have direct indications of the citizens' loyalty to the government.  
 
Al-Manar highlighted the victims of the explosions who were murdered by terrorists – 
according to the labels of the channel. The continual association between the death of the civilians 
and that of the military members was noticed. "The initial toll confirms casualties among the 
civilians and the military personnel"930,  "May mercy be to the souls the civilian and military 
martyrs who fell as a result of this terrorist operation today!"931, "A number of martyrs and around 
30 injured who all were civilians and order-keeping personnel have fallen as a result of the 
explosion resulting from a suicide bombing"932, "A few days after the massacre, the dead bodies 
of the martyrs, with the torture traces clear on them, arrived at the military hospital of Aleppo, 
while it turned out that a number of them were burned. What the members of the Syrian army and 
civilians have been exposed to has resulted in a shock to the Syrians and the humanitarian 
establishments of what may be considered as a war crime."933 
 
This method shows that the enemy of the state and the people is the same one and that the 
opposition does not target the military forces only, but it also murders the civilians. Id est, it is not 
an honorable revolutionary opposition.  
Al-Manar boldly presented images full of blood, cut off corpses, and scattered pieces of dead 
bodies everywhere. The streets seemed like a pond full of blood and cut off human flesh. Al-Manar 
always apologized for the savageness of the presented scenes. This daring presentation of 
frightening images seems as a defensive method through which the government confronts the 
opposition's propaganda, a method of creating a Syrian, and perhaps an Arab and international, 
public opinion which sympathizes with the people and the state who face a horrible terrifying 
enemy.   
 
                                                             
929 02 December 2011."أهالي الشهداء يؤكدون تمّسكهم بالوحدة الوطنية و نبذ الفتنة" 
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A smashed body because of a suicide bombing.934 
 
Al-Manar recalled videos downloaded from the internet of massacres against civilians and 
military personnel. The images show corpses piled above each other on the road, on a lorry, and 
by rivers. They also showed dead bodied lined next to each other in order to be photographed and 
to boast of their number (the opposition is immoral; it delights in watching the murdered people 




Piled dead bodies of Assad supporters.935 
 
The channel restated that the majority of the wounded murdered people are women and kids. 
This is an emotional enticement which implicitly denotes the desire of Al-Manar to defend the 
civilians, and consequently confront the other channels which claim their support of the Syrian 
citizens. On the other hand, we can notice that the channel was not able of completely denying that 
there were civilian casualties, especially due to the modern means of communication. Therefore, 
it had to find a way of acquitting the regime of the charges of murdering these civilians. So, the 
channel resorted to this method of confronting the charges by counter ones: the armed people are 
killing the women and the children. 
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The militants´ murder of children.936 
 
Al-Manar interviewed officials supervising the operations of recovering the dead bodies from 
the debris. Their discourse implied their strong determination to recover the survivals from the 
rubble. This is a significance of the loyalty of the regime to the people and of its determination to 
keep the civilians safe. 
 
Interviews with the citizens about the casualty 
A man with tears in his eyes talks to Al-Manar's correspondent after the death of his daughter 
in a school explosion committed by the armed groups: "My sweetheart has gone away in 
Ramadan". That is, the armed people murdered her in the holy month, the month of tolerance. This 
also means that she is a martyr. "She went to search learning" which means that they murdered her 
without any reason. She did nothing to be killed for it; she was just going to school. "Through your 
channel, I am going to send a message to the councils, to the conferences which are being held 
abroad: 'Fear God for Syria! We are O.K. without your councils and conferences. We are tired'."937 
Here is an indication of the confidence in Al-Manar's channel "Through your channel, I am going 
to send a message." This man condemns all the Arab and international conferences which oppose 
the policy of the regime. This is a significance that the cause of death in Syria is supporting the 
combatants, who murder the kids, by Arab and international actors. 
 
The expressions of many citizens were clear and indicated their political affiliation as 
supporters of the government. On the other hand, the discourse of some others did not clearly show 
their political identity. However, their acceptance to talk to Al-Manar's correspondents and to 
appear on the screen of this station is enough to suggest that these citizens are supporters of the 
government even if they were not. For instance, we see a veiled woman whose school-boy son was 
murdered talking to Al-Manar's correspondent: "May God be unkind to those who were behind 
it."938 This woman is praying to God against those who caused the killing of the school pupils. 
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This statement does not directly show the political identity of this woman. This statement can be 
explained in many ways: the woman can be praying against the regime's forces while she cannot 
explicitly express that she hates them, or she is praying against the combatants of the opposition 
indirectly perhaps because she was afraid of their reaction; or she does not know who committed 
this criminal action against the kids and the young people. Whatever her intention was, her mere 




The woman is praying against those who were the cause of her son’s death.939 
 
While the anti-regime channels were assuring that it had committed a chemical weapon 
massacre, Al-Manar was trying to prove the incredibility of these alleges. The channel recalled 
video footages transmitted on the SSC showing wounded and murdered people who had been hit 
by the chemical weapons. The correspondents of SSC interviewed some of the survivors, among 
whom there were children. A little girl said crying: "Mommy! Mommy! It hit the ground. We don't 
know where daddy and brother are. May Allah be unkind to them! God will, you may die! God 
will, you may die!"940 The voice tone of the little girl is full of grief for losing her family. She prays 
to Allah that those who caused the death of her mother may die. Her appearance on the pro-regime 
SSC and the adoption of Al-Manar of it suggests that the little girl is praying against the armed 
opposition, albeit she might not. This is one of the methods of the media war. The journalists give 
an impression of the loyalty of citizens to the government and of their hatred of the combatants, 
even if this is not true, through showing their declarations on a screen which has a clear political 
affiliation – namely, a pro-regime one.  
 
A doctor who works in a government hospital talks about people who were injured by the 
chemical weapon: "Today a large number of intoxicated people came to us. It is believed that they 
are a kind of phosphoric or intoxicating materials. They cause severe symptoms, nausea, severe 
vomiting and suffocation."941 This is a message that the doctors of the government are the ones 
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who save people. Consequently, the regime is innocent of the charge of bombarding the civilians 
with the chemical weapons.  
 
"Our generation and our kids are flowers. They are our hearts. Those who did this action don't 
want our kids to do their part in learning and education. However, we will send our kids to school 
without being terrified by that."942 This declaration of the father of a child who was killed during 
exploding a school by the combatants. The discourse was not sentimental. It rather was full of 
challenge. The father did not express his grief although the event was still fresh. He rather 
explained the purpose of killing the children and sent a message challenging the armed people. 
This is a denotation of the popular outrage of the practices of the armed opposition; an anger which 
beats grief and boosts the feeling of challenge. The attitude of this man towards the government 
was implicit through insisting to send the children to school to practice their role in learning and 
education; the state is responsible for schools. 
 
"Al-Manar visited the family of two martyrs who were executed by the armed groups in Al-
Raqqa in Syria"943 which is an indication of the mutual relation and confidence between Al-Manar 
channel and the citizens. Al-Manar tried to suggest how careful it was in covering the burial 
ceremonies of the civilian dead people. The morale of the families of the military and civilian 
victims seemed high. In spite of the grief, the features of the citizens denoted the confidence of 
victory. The channel highlighted the people's sympathy and grief for the civilian and military 
victims. 
 
Al-Manar employed emotional enticing phrases in order to show the suffering of the citizens 
due to the crimes of the armed groups. "Gabi, the originally Romanian woman and the wife of the 
victim Iyad, couldn't talk in Arabic or in any other language as the tongue was unable to express 
her feelings owing to the horror which the crime caused944.", "The blood of tens of civilians has 
not dried yet."945 This is a significance of continuing the murder operations; before the blood is 
dry, new blood is shed. "Among the Syrian cities, the murder vehicles move harvesting more 
innocent souls946." This is an indication of the existence of explosions everywhere. The channel 
likened the booby-trapped vehicles to harvesters, and the civilians to the crops which these 
harvesters uproot. Harvest symbolizes fertility and abundance yet the identity of the harvester 
changed the value of harvest; the harvester stands for the criminals and the harvest stands for the 
innocent lives. In this example, we see that the values of nature’s signs are not of mono but of 
multi connotations according to the identities of the subject and the object. 
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Al-Manar interviewed survivals from massacres. They talked about the details of the 
combatants' practices in a way which suggests that the elements of the armed groups resemble wild 
beasts which kill mercilessly. 
 
2- Extraterritorial Asylum and Displacement 
 
The issues of extraterritorial asylum and displacement of the Syrians did not take much room 
in Al-Manar's sample – in comparison with Al-Manar's coverage of the security and military 
events. The channel's method in dealing with these themes shows another tool of propaganda and 
psychological war. In 2011, in order to sustain a high morale, Al-Manar avoided talking about the 
departure of the Syrians from their lands assuring the refugees were coming back to Syria. "The 
return of hundreds of refugees"947, "The number of the Syrian refugees who came back to their 
country has amounted to five thousands948.", "The return of 265 Syrians from the Turkish camps 
to Jisr Al-Shughour"949, "The number of Syrian refugees who returned from the Turkish camps to 
Jisr Al-Shughour has amounted until now to around 12,000 people, while the few remaining there 
are waiting for facilities from the Turkish authorities"950, "The majority of the families in the city 
of Al-Jisr and the villages of Ein Al-Sawda and Al-Mintar have completely returned to their 
homes."951 
However, Al-Manar could not utterly deny the fact that a number of the Syrian refugees are 
outside the Syrian borders as the traditional and modern communication media were on the alert 
against the media blackout which Al-Manar adopted concerning several themes which do harm to 
the image of the ruling regime. Therefore, Al-Manar talked about the refugees in Turkey for 
example, yet it kept the context which shows the desire of the Syrians to return to their country. 
Taking about the refugees in Syria was nearly always accompanied by the return of hundreds or 
thousands to Syria. That is to say, Al-Manar could not fully deny the issue of the extraterritorial 
asylum, but at the same time, it tried to face the channels which make the issue of asylum and 
displacement an important tool of fighting the regime and criticizing its martial policy. Al-Manar 
continually linked the success of the government security and military operations on the one hand, 
and the ability of the people to return to their areas and their homes. 
 
"The Syrian army controlled the city of Jisr Al-Shughour and its suburbs. Nevertheless, it is 
still chasing some armed groups in the neighborhood. Any way, if the residents of Jisr Al-Shughour 
did not return today as the residents of some villages did, they would certainly return tomorrow 
when they have felt that safety and security have been reclaimed."952 The implied purpose of this 
                                                             
947 03 July 2011."عودة مئات الالجئين" 
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949 04 August 2011."عودة 265 سوريا من المخيمات التركية الى جسر الشغور" 
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952 13 June 2011. 
بعض القرى المحيطة فبالتأكيد سيفعلون  لم يعد سكان جسر الشغور اليوم كما فعل سكان الجيش السوري أحكم سيطرته على مدينة جسر الشغور و محيطها إال أنه مازال يالحق بعض المجموعات المسلحة في الجوار.  في كل األحوال إن"




denotation is assuring that the reason of the running away of the citizens is the practices of the 
armed groups, and that the true saviors of the people are the army and the security forces. We can 
notice here that Al-Manar could not deny that there were refugees and displaced people. However, 
it employed the context to serve the regime's propaganda about the fact that the Syrian army was 
not the cause of emigrating the people. "The people have not returned now, but they will do when 
they have felt that safety and security have been reclaimed". This is an indication of the 
inevitability of the victory of the Syrian army. It is also a significance of the connection of the 
return of the people to the victory of the Syrian army. If the armed opposition gained victory, the 
people would not return to their homes. 
 
In 2012, especially in the second half, the numbers of the Syrian refugees and displaced people 
increased because of the high tension of the war. At the same time, the opponent channels 
intensified their coverage of the situation of the refugees. Therefore, Al-Manar had to balance 
between presenting the suffering of the Syrian people and clearing the regime from the charge of 
driving the people away. 
(39) 
 
The suffering of the displaced people because of the assaults of the armed groups.953 
 
"Al-Manar surveys the situation of the displaced people in Lattakia"954 is an implicit message 
which means that Al-Manar's correspondents view what is taking place on the ground. That is to 
say, the channel enjoys a high credibility. 
"The Syrian people have always received their brothers of the neighboring countries during 
wars and crises. Now, things are the other way round and the Syrian exodus whether abroad or 
into the Syrian cities has become the most prominent event."955 This is an emotional enticement; 
the Syrian people received the Lebanese, the Iraqis, the Palestinians and others. However, these 
people now need those who might shelter them. Al-Manar's employment of emotional enticements 
in favor of the people has an implied purpose which is assuring that the Syrian armed forces are 
innocent and that they are not the cause of driving the citizens away (Al-Manar is a channel that 
supports the regime. It supports the refugees. Then, the regime can never be the cause of the agony 
of the displaced people). "The hopes of the displaced people of the close returning to their homes 
and cities fluctuate along with news which raise their hopes about the advancing of the Arab Syrian 
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army's operations in Aleppo alongside with their conviction that they were still under the 
homeland's ceiling even if it were in the name of obligatory displacement."956 This is a direct link 
between the emotional enticement in favor of the people and reminding that the army is the savior. 
 
"It is only a geographic displacement. The body has moved but the soul has not departed the 
borders of the country waiting for the tomorrow of return. It is the tomorrow of return of security 
and stability to the whole map of Syria. Tomorrow is close for those who wait for it."957 This is 
another example of Al-Manar's linking between the emotional enticement in favor of the people 
through talking about their suffering and announcing the good news of the army's victory; that is, 
the probability of the refugees' coming back to their homes. Again, the army is the savior. 
 
"The dream of the Syrians has always been returning to their homeland as soon as possible958", 
"The hope of the residents of those villages has always been the return of security and peace as 
they were before, and the elimination of black clouds which carried blood and destruction to Syria 
with them."959 These are implicit denotations of the loyalty of the people to the government and 
their eagerly anticipating the victory of the Syrian army. 
 
The voice tones of Al-Manar’s journalists were simultaneously balancing between the 
recipients' sympathy with the Syrian people without suggesting strong worry and fear. That is, the 
tone suggested the desire of the correspondents to sustain the high morale. 
"Despite the hard circumstances, the Syrian state has prepared residence places for the displaced 
people. It also provided them with the basic services"960, "Continuous periodical tasks for receiving 
the citizens and round-the-clock answering their calls, even the electronic ones, in order to solve 
their problems."961 The implied intention of these indications is assuring the uprightness of the 
Syrian government and its devotion to serving the citizens. Consequently, it is a significance of 
the regime's innocence of the charges against it. "Tartous receives the displaced people from other 
Syrian governorates, and the state provides all their needs." 962This is a signifier of the 
collaboration between the people and the state. The people host those who were displaced from 
other areas and the state provides the services. All are one hand in the face of the displacement 
crisis. 
 
In 2012 and 2013, the channel did not magnify the issue of the displaced people inside Syria 
because it was always talking about the government's activities and the services it provides to these 
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مع يقينهم بأنهم مازالوا تحت سقف الوطن الواحد، و إن بصفة النزوح ري المتقدمة في حلب، تتأرجح اآلمال لدى النازحين بالعودة القريبة إلى بيوتهم  و مدينتهم مع ورود أخبار تبعث لديهم التفاؤل عن عمليات الجيش العربي السو"
 القسري".
957 24 December 2012."هو نزوح عن الجغرافيا ليس إال، فالجسد قد تنقّل أما الروح لم تفارق حدود الوطن في انتظار غد العودة، غد عودة األمن و األمان و االستقرار إلى كل أرجاء الخارطة السورية، و إن غدا لناظره قريب" 
958 30 March 2013."يبقى حلم السوريين بالعودة إلى وطنهم بأسرع وقت ممكن" 
959 15 April 2013."يبقى أمل سكان تلك القرى بأن يعود األمن و األمان إلى سابق عهده و إزالة غيوم سوداء حملت معها الدم و الدمار إلى سوريا " 
960 24 December 2012."الدولة السورية و بالرغم من الظروف القاسية أعدّت للنازحين أماكن لإلقامة كما وفرت الخدمات األساسية لهم" 
961 27 March 2013."مهام دوريّة متواصلة الستقبال المواطنين و الردود على اتصاالتهم و حتى اإللكترونية على مدار الساعة لحل المشكالت" 




displaced people. The voice tones of journalists did not denote the hardships which these displaced 
people inside the country suffer. The voice tones of the reporters were stable, with medium speed 




The government seeks to secure the needs of the displaced people inside Syria.963 
 
Al-Manar covered the displaced people's situation only in Lattakia and Tartous. These two 
governorates were under the control of the government forces. The channel's correspondents 
mentioned that there was a typical situation of coexistence among the Syrians under a situation of 
aggravated provocative intercommunal tension which Syria is exposed to and which is being 
promoted. The correspondents denied that Syria was changing into sectarian and ethnic blocs964. 
"The Syrians are with the Syrians. This is what the street here says denying all what is being 
rumored about the disappearance of coexistence within the Syrian society, and the pains resulting 




A displaced woman from Aleppo to Tartous talks about the crimes of the armed groups. The journalist chose a 
green garden to talk to her. In the Syrian and Arab culture, the green color is considered a symbol of rest and 
relaxation. Highlighting this color in the image may reduce the severity of the message’s effect about the 
difficulties of displacement.966 
 
                                                             
963  27 March 2013. 
964 27 March 2013. 
965 27 March 2013."السوريون للسوريين، هذا ما يقوله الشارع هنا، نافيا كل ما يشاع عن ضرب للعيش المشترك بين ثنايا المجتمع السوري، ليبقى األلم الناتج عن األحداث محصورا بين أضالع الوحدة الوطنية " 




However, concerning the external refuge, Al-Manar did not find it embarrassing to magnify the 
situation of the refugees; this is not the responsibility of the Syrian authorities outside the borders 
of Syria. "Al-Zaatari Camp for the Syrian refugees in Jordan, a catastrophic situation"967, "In Al-
Zaatari Camp, where the Syrians running away from the homeland had gathered, the remnants of 
dignity were drowned with the fall of rain. The water expelled the population out into the open 
space in such a way that the scene became more miserable. The refugees were left to face their 
destiny without noticing any movement by the international and Arab actors which established the 
camp under the title of relieving the suffering of the refugees." 968 This is an implicit criticism of 
the Arab and international policies which criticize the Syrian government. Id est, Al-Manar wants 
to state: 'How can these Arab and international actors criticize the Syrian government's 
carelessness about the suffering of the people while they do not provide any support to the refugees 
abroad? Simultaneously, Al-Manar tries to retort the opposition's propaganda concerning gaining 




The children in the refugee camps outside Syria.969 
 
The children in the refugee camps outside Syria.970 
 
Interviews with refugees and displaced people 
Al-Manar's correspondents interviewed some of the displaced people in Syria and some of the 
refugees in bordering countries like Jordan and Lebanon. 
                                                             
967  11 January 2013."مخيم الزعتري للسوريين في األردن، حالة كارثية" 
968  11 January 2013. 
ء ليزداد المشهد بؤسا. فالالجئون تُِركوا في مواجهة مصيرهم من دون مالحظة أي تحرك في مخيم الزعتري الذي اجتمع فيه السوريون الهاربون من الوطن غرق ما تبقى من كرامة مع هطول األمطار، فطردت المياه السكان إلى العرا"
 ن تخفيف معاناة الالجئين". من قبل الجهات الدولية و العربية التي أنشأته تحت عنوا
969  11 January 2013.  




The discourse content of the displaced people in Syria is almost completely different from that 
of the refugees outside the country.  The content of the displaced people's discourse in the interior 
of Syria was centered on the assaults of the armed groups and terrorists on the citizens and their 
committing of expulsion operations against the Syrians. All the women were wearing hijab, which 
denotes that the armed groups assault the Sunni sect and that the government is the one which 
provides security to this sect. The implied intention of this is facing the opponent propaganda about 
the regime's sectarianism (a Shiite – Alawite regime) and about its assault of the Sunni sect. 
 
A woman talked about the difference in Syria between the situation before and after the crisis: 
"We used to go out of our homes at any time even at 4 after midnight. When these came, we were 
lost."971 This means that the security and safety prevailed all over the country before the crisis; 
they were not afraid to leave their homes at any time because they were sure that they will not be 
exposed to anything wrong. However, because of the armed groups, the citizens were obliged to 
migrate from their areas and scatter here and there on the Syrian land looking for safety. We notice 
that the woman used the demonstrative expression 'these' to refer to the combatants. This suggests 
her disgust to mention any name or description of the armed opposition. Therefore, she substituted 
the labels by using the demonstrative pronoun. In Syria, the personal and demonstrative pronouns 
are sometimes used instead of names and adjectives to express disparaging or scorning a particular 
person or party. 
 
Other women talked about the torture methods the combatants used against them and their 
families: "They put me in the middle. They undressed me and took out my own head cover"972, "I 
was pregnant. They aborted me"973, "They hit my son because he tried to save me."974 These are 
indications of the brutality and immorality of the armed opposition. A woman said: "We reached 
a stage when Jabhat Al-Nusra threatened to kill my husband. They wanted us to sell the store and 
give it to Jabhat Al-Nusra so that they could kill the soldiers who were protecting us."975 This is a 
significance of the popular objection to the actions of Jabhat Al-Nusra that a group of channels, 
one of which was Al-Jazeera channel, used to promote. The most prominent reason of this 
objection was the assaults of the opposition against the Syrian army that protected the civilians. 
This is an indication that the people respected and loved the army and that they were concerned 
that none of its soldiers might be harmed.  
 
The number of men which Al-Manar interviewed was few in comparison with that of women. 
The discourse of these displaced people was divided into expressing their objection to the practices 
of the armed opposition, which involved non-Syrian combatants who came to assault and plunder 
the Syrians on the one hand, and talking about the difficulties they were facing like the difficulty 
                                                             
971 24 December 2012."كنا نطلع الساعة 4 بالليل، لما أجو هدول شندلونا" 
972 27 March 2013."حطوني بالنص عروني شلحوني إشاربي" 
973 27 March 2013."كنت حامل سقطوني" 
974 27 March 2013."ضربوا ابني ألنه حاول ينقذني" 




of finding a house on the other. However, every time they talked about a problem; they added a 
sentence that indicated that the government was trying to provide the displaced people with their 
needs. This shows the desire of Al-Manar to balance between talking about some difficulties of 
which the displaced suffer from and talking about the determination of the government and its 
responsibility towards the people. 
 
Al-Manar's correspondents also interviewed some of the officials who had been assigned to 
provide the displaced people with their needs such as the governors of Tartous and Lattakia: "We 
opened a round-the-clock medical center for them, and an ambulance, of course. Even the special-
needs children were serviced"976, "We are providing all the services for those who are in need."977 
The officials did not mention the difficulties which the displaced suffered from. Their discourse, 
rather, concentrated on the activities of the state to provide the care the displaced required till the 
situation became tranquil in the hot areas so that the immigrants could be able to go back to their 
homes. 
 
The discourse of the refugees outside the country was totally different. Theirs was full of 
complaints. The tones of their voices were full of fear and anxiety. The features of the children 
were full of the agony of homelessness and deprivation. On the one hand, Al-Manar had to match 
the other channels which specified a large space to talking about the suffering of the refugees. On 
the other hand, if the channel had not covered the situation of the refugees, it would have seemed 
as an inhuman channel that did not care for the suffering and the pain and that only concentrates 
on the military situation. It was easy for the channel to give way to the refugees to express their 
agony as these declarations would be considered as criticism messages to all the countries which 
boasted of sympathizing with the Syrian people while they did not provide any real support. 
A kid complains to Al-Manar's correspondent sobbing: "By God, the Greatest! By God, the 
Greatest! The blankets were all soaked with water. All of the blankets were soaked."978 This kid 
has used the repetition method to assure his credibility and to give evidence of the size of suffering 
in winter. 
"There is no support. There are no aids; nobody is helping us; there is no heating, no water. For 
bread, we make lines and buy it by our own money. We complain, but no Islam listens. The 
presidents are all against us."979 This young man's discourse is similar to that of the opposition's: 
"No Islam hears, all the presidents are against us." Many Syrian opponents used to reiterate that 
the Islamic nation left them behind and did not support them in the face of the unjust and 
disbelieving ruler. However, this young man's appearance on Al-Manar's screen may suggest to 
the recipients that he is a supporter of the regime, or, at least, neutral. Yet his anti-regime tendency 
could be completely eradicated. This is another evidence that the means of conveying a message 
is able of changing the meaning of this message in the mind of the recipient. 
                                                             
976 24 December 2012."فتحنا لهم مركز طبي على مدار الساعة، و هناك سيارة إسعاف طبعا، حتى أنه تم تأميين األطفال ذوي االحتياجات الخاصة" 
977 24 December 2012."عم نقوم بتقديم جميع الخدمات لمحتاجيها" 
978 11 January 2013."و هللا العظيم، و هللا العظيم، أنه كانت البطانيات كلها مي، كل البطانيات مي" 





Al-Manar recalled declarations of Syrian refugees in Jordan which were transmitted on a British 
channel. The women expressed the state of fear which they suffer from because of the assaults and 
the violations they are exposed to: "It is not fear. It is horror. In the tent, I lived a state of terror; 
everybody in the tent was sleeping except for me. I couldn't sleep"980, "They kidnapped a lot of 
girls and exploited them."981 This is an indication of sexual assault against women. 
 
Some Syrian men also expressed their disgust of Saudi and Qatari men, who availed of the 
suffering of the Syrian refugee females so that they could sexually get them, in the pretext of 
marrying them. "So what? Do they look at us as if we were in a sales market? A sheep sales 
market? If we are penniless, does this mean that you want to exploit us?!"982 This is a declaration 
of a father who got angry with the Saudis and Qataris, who proposed to marry his daughters 
although these men were much older than his daughters. He was angry because they proposed to 
pay a lot of money as a price of his agreeing to let his daughters get married to them. He wonders 
if his daughters were like the sheep ready to be bought and sold. Al-Manar's implicit purpose of 
recalling this type of declarations is criticizing KSA and Qatar which support the armed opposition 
with money and weapons. Al-Manar highlights the immorality of these two countries through 
showing the Qatari and Saudi societies which consider the Syrian females as a prey which is easy 
to attack. Al-Manar challenges KSA and Qatar through recalling videos transmitted on foreign 
channels. The implied goal of this is saying: 'Behold! It's not we, who accuse your peoples of 
filthiness and exploiting the suffering of others, they are, rather, channels which are known for 
criticizing the Syrian regime'. 
Some women expressed their grief because these Saudis and Qataris are too bold to disparage 
them and make them feel that they are cheap goods ready to be sold: "There, they dreamed to 
marry Syrian women, but things have reached the worst and the days have turned black, so it 
became easy for them to marry Syrian females."983 That is, before the crisis, Saudis and Qataris 
wished Syrian women had accepted to get married to them. This was like an inaccessible dream 
for them; however, due to the crisis, and because women had to refuge to countries which were 
careless about their services and humanitarian conditions, it became easy for these Saudis and 
Qataris to dare to buy Syrian females. 
 
3. The Humanitarian and Service Results 
 
3.1. Infrastructure and Services 
 
Al-Manar tried to make the recipients feel optimistic. At the same time, it adopted a method 
which was able to polish the government's image more and more. "The government institutions 
                                                             
980 30 March 2013."مش خوف، رعب، حياة رعب عشت بالخيمة، كل الناس نايمة إال أنا ما أقدر نام" 
981 30 March 2013."خطفوا كثير بنات خطفوهن و شغلوهن" 
982 30 March 2013. "!يعني شو شايفينا نحن بسوق بيع؟ سوق غنم؟ شايفين ما معنا فلوس يعني خلص بدكن تستغلونا؟" 




promise to rehabilitate the city and some burnt institutions in a few days in addition to cleansing 
the city and elimination of checkpoints and providing the living needs of people"984, "Units of the 
army are performing cleaning operations of the city"985, "The Syrian army settled the matter. The 
workshops of bringing normal life back to the city has been launched; the streets are being cleaned, 
the services are being gradually brought back, and the oil pipes which were exposed to sabotage 
actions on a large extent are being repaired."986 By this method the recipients understand that there 
is devastation and destruction. However, the impact of the news will not be that big as the essence 
of the piece of information is that the government is soon going to treat all the problems resulting 
from the clashes or from the assaults of the combatants. In other words, Al-Manar does not deny 
that there is destruction yet it does not want to talk directly about it. Therefore, the channel puts it 
in an optimistic context, a context which makes the recipients feel the credibility of Al-Manar – 
i.e. it is covering the devastation – but at the same time, the pro-regime recipient feels that things 
are going to be well as soon as possible. This method is important in the psychological war. Al-
Manar's pro-regime audience may get a great optimistic energy through the contexts and the news 
formulas which the channel selects987. 
 
"These scenes reinforced the feeling of tranquility in the souls of the people of the city of Jisr 
Al-Shughour who started to make their way back to their own villages and homes."988 These 
scenes' refers to cleaning the streets and eliminating the remnants of destruction, which is an 
optimistic context that blasts the mental image of the suffering of the refugees and that of 
devastation. 
 
"The return of normal life"989, a phrase which has an optimistic character, was reiterated 5 times. 
Here is an implicit admission that life was not normal in some governorates and regions, yet Al-
Manar did not explicitly state that there were huge life difficulties. The channel always aimed at 
sustaining a high morale which was confident of victory. "The return of communication"990 has an 
implied admission that the services were not available. Al-Manar did not cover the communication 
or electrical power cut-outs and did not highlight the suffering of the people resulting from the cut-
out of services. However, the channel covered the positive events – the communication return and 
so on – with the aim of conveying optimism and providing an image of the Syrian state's ability to 
treat the crisis on all levels, whether they were military, political, economic or services. 
 
                                                             
984 11 August 2011."بتأهيل المدينة و بعض المؤسسات المحروقة فيها خالل أيام، فضال عن تنظيف المدينة و رفع الحواجز و تأمين حاجيات الناس المعيشية  "المؤسسات الحكومية تَِعدُ 
985 20 June 2011."وحدات من الجيش تقوم بعمليات تنظيف للمدينة" 
986 05 March 2012. 
 مال تخريب على نطاق واسع".قت ورشة إلعادة الحياة الطبيعيّة إلى المدينة، تنظيٌف للشوارع و عودة تدريجية للخدمات، و إصالٌح ألنابيب النفط التي كانت عرضة ألعحسم الجيش السوري األمر، أُبِعدت المجموعات المسلحة، و أُطل"
987 This is what the researcher noticed through close contact with pro-government slices which continually watch Al-Manar and the different pro-regime channels.  
988 20 June 2011. "هذه المشاهد عززت الطمأنينة في نفوس أهالي مدينة جسر الشغور الذين بدأوا بشّق دروب العودة إلى قراهم و منازلهم" 
 "عودة الحياة الطبيعية"  989




"Al-Manar examined the conditions of the citizens who resumed their daily activities."991 This 
is a denotation of the presence of Al-Manar's correspondents among the civilians – the ground. 
The goal of this denotation is challenging the opponent propaganda concerning the hatred of the 
Syrian people of the government; because the citizens’ acceptance of communicating with Al-
Manar's correspondents implicitly means their acceptance of the regime's policy. 
 
Al-Manar only adopted the method of magnifying destruction when the armed groups were the 
only responsible side for it. In plain English, the destruction resulting from the battles between the 
government forces and the combatants was only very accidentally a media theme for Al-Manar. 
Whereas, the images of the explosions of the opponent armed forces or their other military 
practices were a prominent theme. Al-Manar was not at all embarrassed to introduce the images 
which showed huge destruction in the quarters, in Islamic, Christian and Jewish religious centers, 
in markets, and in the archaeological centers because the channel always linked the enormous 
destruction to the practices of the opposition – i.e. the regime was clean-handed. 
(44-45) 
 
An image after battle where Al-Manar avoids showing the scenes of the immense destruction.992 
 
 




                                                             
991 22 June 2013. "تفقّدت كاميرا المنار أحوال المواطنين الذين استأنفوا أعمالهم اليومية" 
992  01 March 2012. 




3.2. The Economic Situation 
 
Talking about the economic suffering of the Syrian citizen was not a priority of Al-Manar's. 
There were many contexts through which the channel tackled this theme: For example, the channel 
talked about an initiative which a group of the Syrian young people performs. The purpose of this 
initiative was securing food supplies and providing them to the people of a Damascene quarter – 
namely, Al-Maidan: "Foodstuffs in addition to cereals, gas cylinders and other daily goods were 
distributed to the homes of Al-Maidan. This caused a feeling of ease mingled with wishes in the 
souls of the citizens of this Damascene quarter."994 This is an optimistic context which does not 
contain sentences that directly indicate the suffering of the people. The people were relieved and 
felt hopeful after they saw that these goods were available. This suggests that Al-Manar could not 
absolutely deny that there was an economic crisis. Therefore, this channel had to create a balance 
between showing its credibility – covering different sides of the crisis – and sticking to providing 
an image of the stability, albeit a partial one, in Syria. Magnifying the economic suffering of the 
citizen would lead to shaking the confidence of the regime supporters in victory. "This youth 
initiative isn't going to stop in Al-Maidan Quarter. The return of life to the streets of the capital 
will go hand in hand with other initiatives in the different Damascene quarters which were fields 
of chasing the armed groups by the Syrian army."995This is a significance which has three goals. 
The first is assuring the Syrian citizens that the food supplies are going to be available. The second 
is introducing an image of the popular cohesion and cooperation – the young citizens secure these 
items to other citizens. The third goal is justifying this economic instability; the army is chasing 
the combatants – defending the homeland. This justification may indirectly suggest to the recipient 
that the Syrian citizen has to be patient. In plain English, securing the foodstuffs and the food 
supplies is important, yet the victory of the army and the elimination of the terrorist groups are 
more important. 
"The Syrians rush to the state's Consumer Establishments running away from the wave of the 
rise in prices which prevails over the markets these days. At every visit, they find what saves them 
more cost and more increase in prices."996 Using the verb "rush" suggests that the Syrians go 
quickly, in a state of confusion, to the state's establishments that are considered their safe economic 
shelter which protects them from the private market that does not take into consideration the 
circumstances which the crisis imposed. Al-Manar has shot two targets with one arrow; it has 
talked about the people's suffering and kept the image of the government shining, clean and 
impartial – the state is like the warmhearted mother. 
"On its side, the government is exerting tremendous efforts to secure the basic items in these 
establishments at reasonable prices which do not have profit as a target despite the high cost which 
results from that."997 
                                                             
994 26 July 2012. "مواد غذائية إضافة إلى الحبوب و قوارير الغاز و غيرها من السلع اليومية كانت تمر على بيوت الميدان ما أرخى ارتياحا ممزوجا باألمنيات لدى أهالي الحي الدمشقي " 
995 26 July 2012. 
 تتالزم مع مبادرات أخرى تجاه األحياء المختلفة في دمشق، و التي كانت ساحة لمالحقة الجيش السوري للمجموعات المسلحة".إن هذه المبادرة الشبابية لن تتوقف في حي الميدان، إذ أن عودة الحياة إلى شوارع العاصمة س"
996 16 July 2013."يهرع السوريون إلى مؤسسات الدولة االستهالكية هربا من موجة الغالء التي تعم األسواق هذه األيام، حيث يجدون في كل زيارة ما يوفر عليهم مزيدا من الكلفة و ارتفاع األسعار " 




"The fluctuations of the exchange price of the dollar allow some manipulative merchants to 
impose the prices they desire, while the state's establishments stick to the prices set by the 
government, which makes the number of their customers outdo that of the markets to a large 
degree. In exceptional circumstances like these which the Syrians go through the legal reference 
might sometimes be absent so that a moral and fideist one may replace it."998 This is an indication 
whose goal is acquitting the government from being the cause of a rise in prices and blaming the 
private sector which does not respect the suffering of the Syrians. 
 
"Crowdedness here has its reasons and standing in a long line to pay for the purchases is easier 
for these people than the burning fire of the rise in the prices outside."999 That is to say, the citizens 
prefer to resort to the state's establishments even if they had to stand in queues and wait for a long 
time due to crowdedness. We notice here that Al-Manar has always linked the economic suffering 
and the ability of the state's establishments to secure the people's needs. The channel only 
mentioned that there was an economic problem in the context of talking about the state's efforts in 
securing the needs of the people. "In spite of the circumstances, the Syrian government continues 
to support and secure bread to all the citizens."1000 This is a message to confront the opponent 
propaganda concerning the regime's bombing of bakeries. 
 
"Despite the blockade and turbulences which Syria has suffered from, the Syrian government 
cares for securing the basic items for the citizen and the most important of these is bread. The 
difficulty of securing this item, which was rumored to have high rise in its price, is almost a result 
of crowdedness and of the fact that some bakeries were out of service in Damascus Suburb because 
of the security situation."1001 This is an explicit and direct defiance of the opponent propaganda. It 
is a new signifier of Al-Manar's linking the existence of an economic crisis to the government's 
serious attempts to secure the living requirements. 
(46) 
 
The government seeks to secure the needs of the displaced people in spite of the difficulties.1002 
                                                             
998 16 July 2013. 
ظروف كهذه الظروف اإلستثنائية من التجار بوضع األسعار التي يرغبون بها، فيما تلتزم مؤسسات الدولة بتعرفة الحكومة ما يجعل زبائنها يفوقون رواد األسواق بكثير في  تقلبات سعر صرف الدوالر في سوريا تسمح لبعض المتالعبين"
 التي يمر بها السوريون قد تغيب المرجعية القانونية أحيانا لتحل محلها مرجعية أخالقية و إيمانية".
999 11 November 2013. "اإلكتظاظ هنا له ما يبرره، و الوقوف في رتل طويل لدفع قيمة المشتريات أهون عند هؤالء من نار الغالء خارجا" 
1000 21 December 2013. "رغم الظروف، الحكومة السورية تستمر في دعم و تأمين مادة الخبز لكافة المواطنين" 
1001 21 December 2013.  
باهظ في سعرها، تكاد معاناة الحصول عليها تتركز على اإلزدحام و خروج سوريا من حصار و اضطرابات، تهتم الحكومة السورية بتوفير المواد األساسية للمواطن و أهمها الخبز، هذه المادة التي أُشيع عن إرتفاع بالرغم مما أصاب "
 بعض األفران عن الخدمة في ريف دمشق بسبب الوضع األمني".





Al-Manar's discourse which deals with the economic crisis was totally different when the armed 
opposition's practices were the direct cause of this crisis. "The inhabitants of the two villages suffer 
from a severe lack of food supplies and a permanent power cut-out because of the blockade which 
has been imposed on them for months under the pretext that the people support the Syrian 
government as the armed people claim"1003, "The people of the quarter did not bear the blockade 
which these groups impose on the west part of the city where the Syrian army exists. So, they went 
out in a demonstration demanding to put an end to it and to allow the foodstuffs and the medical 
items to enter to the civilians who suffer from a severe humanitarian crisis, especially the 
children."1004 Al-Manar magnified the suffering of the Syrians under the blockade of the armed 
groups. This means that the channel magnified the events in the areas which were controlled by 
the opposition and that it made the suffering seem simple in the areas which were controlled by 
the regime's forces. This indicates that the purpose of highlighting the suffering of the citizens was 
not supporting the people and creating a true compassion towards them, but the purpose was 
supporting the government propaganda concerning the criminality of the terrorist groups. 
 
Al-Manar's correspondents interviewed Syrian officials such as heads of consumer 
establishments, heads of bakeries and ministers. The content of their discourse about the economic 
suffering was different in accordance to the regions they talked about. In other words, if the city 
or region was under the control of the government, the officials’ discourse would have an 
optimistic characteristic, a discourse which praises the government's achievements and its attempt 
to secure services. However, if the city was under the control of the armed opposition, the officials’ 
discourse would have a magnifying characteristic that suggests a disastrous suffering which has to 
be faced and immediately treated. 
 
3.3. Life is Normal and Peaceful in Spite of Everything 
 
In order to raise the morale, Al-Manar assured that, despite the difficult security circumstances 
which the Syrian people experience and suffer from, the citizens face and defy these difficulties 
through insisting on their regular activities such as going to parks and recreation places. "The 
Syrians have a great will of living; they insist to live the details of the Holy Month surpassing their 
security circumstances."1005 The Holy Month means the month of Ramadan. In other words, the 
Syrians continue practicing the religious and recreation rituals which they used to practice before 
the crisis such as going out to restaurants, and having the meals of Suhour and Iftar1006 with friends 
                                                             
1003 11 February 2013. "سُكان القريتين يعانون نقصا حادا من المواد التموينية و انقطاعا دائما للتيار الكهربائي بسبب الحصار المفروض عليهم منذ أشهر، تحت ذريعة أن األهالي يؤيدون الحكومة السورية كما يدعي المسلحون" 
1004 10 July 2013.   
ائية و الطبية إلى المدنيين الذين يعانون من أزمة إنسانية ار الذي تفرضه هذه الجماعات على غرب المدينة حيث يتواجد الجيش السوري، فخرجوا في تظاهرة تطالب بإنهاءه و بضرورة إدخال المواد الغذأهالي الحي لم يتحملوا الحص"
 حادة، و باألخص األطفال".
1005 28 July 2013. "إرادة الحياة عند السوريين كبيرة، يصّرون على أن يعيشوا تفاصيل الشهر الفضيل، مُتعالين على ظروفهم األمنية" 





and family. "They eat the most delicious foods"1007 is a statement which denotes that there is not 
any true suffering as the people go out to have their meals in restaurants happily and relaxingly. 
This discourse gives the channel two different characteristics. The first is: Al-Manar is totally 
detached from reality. The second is: Al-Manar is a truthful channel that presents the truth and 
confronts the channels which try to magnify the Syrian crisis. Branding the coverage of Al-Manar 
with characteristics differs according to the political affiliation of the recipients; the pro-regime 
ones may feel that Al-Manar is the channel of truth. However, according to the opponents, it is 
untruthful, disconnected from reality, and serves the regime without any moral restraint1008.  
  
3.4. Interviews with the Citizens about the Services and Humanitarian Suffering 
 
The discourse of some citizens included complaints about the unavailability of the essential 
materials of living such as foodstuffs and the heating materials. However, the context in which 
these declarations were put was a survey of the practices of the terrorist groups. In this way, Al-
Manar, shows that it is not indifferent about the fact that there were living difficulties, yet, 
simultaneously, it acquitted the regime of the charges against it about making the people hungry 
and poor – the armed groups were responsible for the hardships of life. 
A Syrian citizen said: "The bakery in our area is closed due to electrical power cut-out, and we 
do not have bread. When the army came, security and assuredness came back, thank God!"1009 id 
est, the opposition's armed people caused the power cut-out and the entrance of the army brought 
normal life back and secured the services. 
A veiled Syrian woman said: "By God! Bread is easily available and the bread bundle is for 15 
Syrian Pounds. The citizens are welcome to get it. There is nothing wrong. They are all biased 
channels which hate us."1010 This citizen tried to defy the opponent propaganda by stating that the 
price of bread has not changed and that this foodstuff is easily available. The woman mentioned 
the anti-regime channels as if she were telling Al-Manar's correspondent: 'We know why you are 
interviewing us about bread, and here we are answering the way you want us to, and showing the 
reality from another viewpoint.' Many women assured that the bread crisis was fake and that reality 
tells the contrary; everything is abundant and available. 
 
The men's discourse sometimes contained complaints of the inability to get bread easily. 
However, the reason was the Syrians themselves; some people bought a large number of bread 
bundles from the state's bakeries and sold them to people for much higher prices. In this way, Al-
Manar shows that it does not deny the existence of a food crisis. However, it, simultaneously, 
keeps showing the innocence and irresponsibility of the regime for this shortcoming. 
 
                                                             
1007 28 July 2013. "يتناولون ما طاب من الطعام" 
1008 The researcher's observation.  
1009 11 August 2013. "عنا الفرن مسّكر بسبب قَطع الكهربا و ما عنا خبز،  و من إجانا الجيش إجانا األمان واإلطمئان،  والحمد هلل" 




Some women said that they hoped things to return as they were before the crisis: "By God! I 
only hope that our country may be as it was. I mean security and peace and everything. However, 
the most important thing is peace. We want peace."1011This is an implicit denotation that the regime 
used to secure safety and stability to the people and that the opponent popular movement led to 
corrupting everything. The Syrians hope that stability may be back. That is, the State may regain 
its control over everything.  
 
Some citizens expressed their contentedness with the State's establishments which provide the 
people with goods and foodstuffs for the least prices. The voice tone of the citizens and the content 
of their discourse suggest to the recipients that the concerns of the Syrian citizen are very simple. 
They are not as the anti-regime channels show them. Al-Manar implicitly states: 'Look! This is 
how the Syrians think. It is not a news formulation which is controlled by the channel's 
administration; it is the truth, that is how the Syrian people are.' 
 
Many women wearing hijab expressed their desire to enjoy life in spite of all what was going 
on: "We, particularly the Damascene people, love life. God will, we will go on. There is nothing. 
We love entertainment, we love joy. God will, everything will be well. I mean everything will 
come to an end, and, God will, things won't last the way they are."1012 This woman states that there 
is no crisis "There is nothing" as many opponent channels claim. The importance of the declaration 
of this woman lies in the fact that she represents the Sunni sect which the opponent media portrays 
as a rebelling one against the government which depresses it, bombs it, and assaults its women. 
The confidence of this woman that everything will come to an end signifies her confidence in the 
ability of the State to control the crisis and to regain security and stability. This quotation also 
indicates that the citizens were enjoying a life full of joviality before the crisis – the regime is the 
source of stability. 
 
(47-48) 
                              
The veiled women (Sunni hijab) emphasize their happiness despite the difficult circumstances; they talk 
about eating the most delicious foods in restaurants.1013 
 
                                                             
1011 26 July 2012.  "و هللا ما بتمنى غير يرجع بلدنا متل ما كان، يعني أمان وسالم و كل شي، و أهم شي السالم بدنا السالم" 
1012 28 July 2013. "نحن أهل الشام بالتحديد منحب الحياة، و بدنا نكمل بإذن هللا، مافي شي،  منحب البسط و منحب الفرح، و على خير إن شاء هللا، يعني كل شي حينتهي ما حنضل هيك بإذن هللا" 




"We say: 'May God bring things to a state of tranquility!' May God protect the Syrian people 
and the Syrian army! And may God protect the president Bashar Al-Assad for us!"1014 This is a 
veiled woman's answer to a question about the nature of the situation in Syria. The woman did not 
explicitly talk about the difficulties, but prayed to God to make things tranquil – implied admission 
of tiredness because of the situation. Then, she complimented the Syrian people and army. She 
also prayed to Allah to protect the president, which is an indication that the return of stability is 
connected to the operations of the Syrian army under the leadership of the president Al-Assad. Her 
compliment of the Syrian people is a significance of the cohesion of the Syrians in the face of this 
crisis. 
 
Al-Manar portrayed that the people are able to challenge the difficulties and to confront the 
conspiracy, that the Syrians are patient and sure of victory, and that they go on with practicing 
their daily activities as a form of defiance and standing still. 
 
What Are the Ethnicities and the Religious Sects Al-Manar Highlighted? 
 
1. The Sunni Sect 
 
Al-Manar depicted that the Muslims who belong to the Sunni sect support the government. In 
order to portray this image, Al-Manar adopted many methods. Firstly, recalling declarations of 
religious icons such as excerpts from the sermons of Mohamed Said Ramadan Al-Bouti1015in 
mosques: "The scholar Mohamed Said Ramadan Al-Bouti called to unity and refusing the fitna 
which some actors are trying to throw Syria into it."1016 This is a signifier of the certainty of the 
most prominent religious leaders of the Sunni sect that there is a conspiracy against the Syrian 
government. It is also a significance of his absolute refusal that there is an honest peaceful 
revolution. Moreover, Al-Bouti's sermon contained a condemnation of the operations of recruiting 
mercenaries and sending them to Syria so as to explode, destroy, and eliminate security and 
peacefulness. 
 
Al-Manar's correspondent commented on one of Al-Bouti's declarations: "Contrary to moderate 
Islamism which the religious institutes in Syria have always been teaching, there are many groups 
which entered the country including a takfiri current that practices its acts behind the mask of what 
is called the Sharia Board."1017 This signifier which implicitly denotes that the Sunni sect – the 
moderate Islam – in Syria is a supporter of the regime, and that those, who allegedly claim being 
                                                             
1014 28 July 2013.  "منقول هللا يهدّي األمور، هللا يحيي الشعب السوري و الجيش السوري و هللا يخليلنا الرئيس  بشار األسد" 
1015 He is considered one of the most important religious – Sunni – scholars across Syria, the Arab and Islamic world. During the crisis from 2011 to 2013, opinions were divided 
about him because of his attitudes supporting the Syrian government and refusing the popular movement. He was assassinated in March, 2013. The regime and the opposition 
exchanged charges concerning his assassination.  
1016 27 April 2012."العاّلمة محمد سعيد البوطي دعا إلى وحدة الصف و رفض الفتنة التي يحاول البعض زج سوريا بها" 




Muslims and fight the government under extremist, salafi, and takfiri Islamic flags, have come 
from outside the country.  
Secondly, condensing highlighting the opinions of the women wearing the hijab which is 
specific of the Sunni sect1018. These women, who talk positively and express their support of the 
government and the Syrian armed forces, are Sunnis.  
Thirdly, the dialects of the people who are talking with the correspondents. For example, the 
dialect of the Aleppine and Hamwi young men1019 who support the government gives an 
impression of loyalty of the Sunni sect to the government as well. 
Fourthly, the names of the regions. For instance, when Al-Manar's correspondent says that the 
people of Al-Maidan Quarter expressed their happiness on the return of the security and safety 
after the deployment of the Syrian army, the implied denotation is the loyalty of the Sunni sect to 
the regime because the majority of the residents of the Damascene Quarter, Al-Maidan, belong to 
the Sunni sect. 
 
2. The Shiite Sect 
 
Al-Manar did not talk about the situation of the Shiite sect explicitly, yet it used hinting and 
implication through many methods: First, talking about the role of the armed opposition in 
inflaming the sectarian fitna. Indicating that the armed people are killing on a sectarian basis, 
which is a significance that the combatants assault the people who belong to the religious 
minorities, specifically, the Twelver Shiite and Alawite sects. Secondly, the dialect of the Syrians 
who talk in the reportage. For example, the coastal dialect; it is an implied denotation which mainly 
refers to the attitude of the Alawites. The discourse content of the interviewers was often a sad one 
spoken in dialects which indicate that the speakers belong to the Shiite or Alawite sects and 
suggests the role of the victim, the role of those who have been assaulted by the gunmen. This 
shows that the Syrian revolutionary movement is not in favor of the minorities because it is based 
on a sectarian and denominational basis. 
Thirdly, the names of the religious sites and regions like the shrines of Sayyidah Zaynab and 
Sayyidah Ruqayya1020, and the names of the villages of the Syrian coast – a large proportion of the 
residents of these areas belong to the Alawite sect. The context in which these names have been 
mentioned indicates the exposure of the Shiite symbols to assault and devastation by the armed 
opposition, or indicates the exposure of the villagers to murder and emigration by the combatants. 
The reportages did not contain opinions of Alawite or Shiite sheikhs. The only declaration was 
that of one of the Syrian Shiite sheikhs whose uncle was exposed to a kidnapping operation by the 
armed groups: "Until now, we are still reassured that they are in good health. However, what 
concerns us, in addition to his Eminence and the safety of his Eminence, the safety of the rest of 
                                                             
1018 There are some differences in the color and the way of wearing the hijab between the Sunni and the Shia sects. 
1019 The citizens who reside in the governorates of Aleppo and Hama.  





the kidnapped women and kids whose number has exceeded a hundred and a few more."1021 In 
addition to the desire to present the Shiite sect as a victim of the terrorist armed people, there is an 
additional purpose of highlighting this: The sheikh does not only worry about – the Eminence- of 
his kidnapped uncle, but he is also concerned about all the kidnapped people at the same degree. 
This is a signifier that the value of the religious leaders is equal to the rest of the people – the Shiite 
people represent justice and equality. 
 
3. The Christians 
 
Al-Manar portrayed that the Christians suffered from the oppression of the armed groups who 
assaulted them because of the sectarian classification and in order to mobilize the sectarian 
instincts1022. This is an implicit significance of the Christians' refusal of the opposing popular 
movement. 
Al-Manar correspondents interviewed the families of kids and young men who had been killed 
by the terrorist groups. The citizens talked about the combatants’ mechanisms of killing and about 
the kidnapping operations. The tones of their voices were full of extreme grief and assured the part 




The gunmen’s targeting of the Christian people – a woman is crying because of the death of her son who was 
murdered without cause.1023 
Al-Manar also interviewed several archbishops whose discourse contained a pro-regime 
character whether explicitly or implicitly. "It's not only Sari. There are many others like Sari from 
the Al-Abrashiya family, who passed away in the cause of the homeland."1024 This is a denotation 
of the large number of the Christians who were murdered by the combatants. "They passed away 
in the cause of the homeland" is an indication of the patience of the Christians, who are loyal to 
their homeland. It also implicitly denotes that the opposition is the enemy of the Syrian homeland, 
an enemy of the mutual living. 
                                                             
1021 10 August 2013."إلى اآلن نحن ال نزال مطمئنين أنهم بصحة جيدة، و لكن الذي يهمنا باإلضافة لسماحته و سالمة سماحته سالمة بقية المخطوفين و المخطوفات، من حرائر و أطفال صغار ناهز عددهم المئة و قليال " 
1022 02 December 2011. 
1023  02 December 2011.  




"I'm not an archbishop of a single category of the people. I mean I'm not an archbishop of the 
Christians only. I'm the archbishop of all the children of this homeland."1025 This is a signifier of 
the unity of the Syrian people and the strength of co-existence. It also indicates that all the people 
are united in the face of the takfiris.  
"They shoot us with the death missiles, the Mortar missiles, but we, as sons, are rooted in this 
country, deeply rooted sons because we are not extrinsic in the country. We are here on the side of 
our brothers in the rest of the society's slices completing the beautiful mosaic. Whatever they try 
or want, we are here and they won't be able to uproot us from this country. We'll hold tightly and 
keep rooting more and more and we'll defend the areas of our existence whatever the price is."1026 
This is a significance of the nationalism of the Christians and of the national unity in the face of 
terrorism and conspiracy. The discourse of the Christian clergymen many times contained assuring 
that there was no separation among the religions in Syria and that there was no hatred based on the 
difference of religious affiliations. This discourse is a message of confrontation of the opponent 
propaganda which charges the regime of sectarianism and of practicing dictatorship on the Syrian 





The militant’s murder of the Christian kids.1027 
 
The Christian clergymen also expressed their suffering and inability to practice the worship 
rites due to the control of the combatants on churches and Christian worshipping centers. Albeit, 
they showed their confidence in the return of the security and peacefulness and in the elimination 
of the armed groups. 
 
The channel often used the explicit and direct method to express the religious affiliation of the 
Christians: "On the Christian level, some armed people violated the archaeological village of Brad 
                                                             
1025 02 December 2011."أنا ماني مطران فئة وحدة، يعني ماني مطران بس المسيحيين، أنا مطران كل أبناء هالوطن" 
1026 23 November 2013. 
ن إلى جانب أخوتنا هنا في باقي شرائح المجتمع نتمم هذه الفسيفساء الجميلة. نحن مهما حاولوا و هم يقذفوننا بقذائف الموت، قذائف الهاون و لكن نحن كأبناء متجذرين في هذه البالد، أبناء متأصلين ألننا لسا بطارئين على البالد، نح"
 ن سنتمسك و سنتجذر أكثر و أكثر و سندافع عن أماكن تواجدنا مهما كلف الثمن". مهما أرادوا لن يقتلعوننا من هذه البالد نح




north of Aleppo, devastated its church, and stole its contents before they defiled the Christian 
symbols in it as the residents of the village stated. The village contains the grave of Mar Maroon, 
who is considered the Patron Saint of the Maronite sect."1028 The difference between Al-Manar's 
methods of covering the reality of the Christians – direct method – and covering the reality of the 
Islamic minorities like Shias and Alawites - implicit method – reflects the observance of the 
channel of the tension sensitivity among the Islamic sects, particularly the Sunnis and the Shias, 
and the ability of this sensitivity to double the hatred among the slices of the Syrian society. 
  
4. The Palestinians 
 
In 2011, Al-Manar showed the support of the Palestinian refugees to Syria and their standing 
on its side against the external conspiracy1029.  The channel recalled declarations of some 
Palestinian officials who expressed their refusal of any Arab resolution against Syria which stands 
still in the face of the imperialistic and Zionist projects whose target is controlling the treasures 
and the capabilities of the nation1030. "In this procession, all the people of the Camps express their 
support and loyalty to Syria which has always stood with the Arab right and with the Palestinian 
cause and which has been and still is the ever-pulsing heart of Arabism."1031 The Palestinian 
officials have not employed the terms: 'the Syrian government or the regime', they have, rather, 
substituted that by the word 'Syria'. This endows the regime with high prestige and dignity. 
   
However, in 2012 and 2013, the content of Al-Manar's discourse was different. The channel 
tried to confront the opponent propaganda about the enmity of the Palestinian refugees residing in 
Syria to the Syrian government and about their refusal of the practices of the Syrian military and 
security authorities: "Al-Yarmouk Camp1032 is again exposed to the firing of the armed groups' 
bombarding and shooting by snipers whenever the Palestinian refugees get out expressing their 
refusal of the armed groups´ practices."1033 This is a signifier of the armed opposition's continuing 
assaults against the Palestinians. Al-Manar showed that the Palestinians strongly oppose the 
combatants without talking about the loyalty of these Palestinians to the Syrian government.  
The channel pointed out that some actors were trying to incite the Palestinians to get involved 
in the Syrian crisis1034. "The Camp's authorities and residents assure that behind the targeting there 
are actors who try to deviate the Palestinians in Syria away from their main cause which is 
Jerusalem and the right of return. Pushing them into the darkness of the events is a service to Israeli 
                                                             
1028 02 April 2013. 
تها قبل تدنيس الرموز المسيحية فيها بحسب رواية أهالي المنطقة. و تضم القرية مدفن مار على الصعيد المسيحي، كان مسلحون استباحوا في شباط فبراير الماضي قرية براد األثرية شمال حلب حلب، و خربوا كنيستها، و سرقوا محتويا" 
 مارون الذي يعتبر شفيع الطائفة المارونية". 
1029 15 November 2011. 
1030 15 November 2011. 
1031 15 November 2011."وكل أبناء المخيمات يعبرون في مسيرتهم هذه عن دعمهم ووفائهم لسورية التي وقفت دوما إلى جانب الحق العربي والقضية الفلسطينية وكانت وما تزال قلب العروبة النابض" 
1032 One of the residence areas of the Palestinian refugees. It lies near Damascus. 
1033 16 December 2012. "مخيم اليرموك مجددا تحت نار المجموعات المسلحة، قصفا و قنصا، كلما خرج الالجئون الفلسطينيون فيه تعبيرا عن رفضهم لممارسات تلك المجموعات" 




and western projects."1035 Strictly speaking, the real purpose of bombarding the Palestinians by the 
combatants is sidetracking them towards an assumed crisis so that they may forget their principal 
goal which is liberating Jerusalem and returning to their homeland – Palestine. All this is directed 
by foreign Zionist and western actors. This is an indication that the armed opposition is a part of a 
universal conspiracy against the Syrian homeland. 
 
"The Palestinian People's Committees in Al-Yarmouk Camp charged the mass media, which 
are talking about the fall of their area under the control of the armed people of being a part of the 
international terrorism operations room which is directed against Syria and the Palestinian 
people."1036 This is a significance that the Palestinians are aware that there is a conspiracy which 
targets the Arab Homeland and employs the power of the media – especially, the Arab media –to 
destroy the morale of both the Syrian and Palestinian peoples. 
 
Generally speaking, Al-Manar's discourse shows that it wants to portray the Palestinians as a 
neutral party which does not interfere with the details of the Syrian crisis. Yet, at the same time, it 
is a party that is aware of the existence of a conspiracy which aims at the destruction of the Arab 
nation. 
 
5. The Kurds 
 
Al-Manar portrayed that the major target of the opposition combatants' assault on Kurds in 
Syria is practicing pressure on them due to their neutral attitude during the crisis in Syria so that 
they may push the Kurds to adopt a hostile policy against the Syrian government1037. The other 
target of the control of the opposition on the areas where the Kurds resided was securing the 
military and human reinforcements for the combatants as these areas were adjacent to Turkey. 
Strictly speaking, in case the armed opposition controlled these areas, the financing operations 
would become much easier.  
 
Al-Manar confronted the opponent propaganda stating that the regime's airplanes targeted the 
Kurds. The channel portrayed that the main aim of the combatants' attacks against the Kurdish 
areas was drawing the Syrian army to fight battles there, and consequently, showing this army as 
an enemy of the Kurdish national constituent; therefore, this army intended to murder the Kurds 
and evacuate them outside the Syrian land. Many times, the channel highlighted the battles of the 
Kurds against the armed people of the opposition and talked about massacres which the combatants 
committed against the Kurds. However, the channel did not use words that showed the Kurds as 
                                                             
1035 16 December 2012. 
 خدمة لمشاريع إسرائيلية و غربية". يؤكدون أنه وراء اإلستهداف جهات تسعى إلى حرف فلسطينيي سوريا عن قضيتهم األساس و هي القدس و حق العودة، و إدخالهم في ظلمة األحداثفعاليات المخيّم و سُكانه "
1036 16 December 2012. 
 عن سقوط منطقتهم بأيدي المسلحين بأنها جزء من غرفة عمليات اإلرهاب الدولي الموجهة ضد سوريا و الشعب الفلسطيني" اللجان الشعبية الفلسطينية في مخيم اليرموك اتهمت الوسائل اإلعالمية التي تتحدث"





victims; i.e. it did not employ sentimental enticement in favor of these Kurds. The fighter 
characteristic was the general feature of the Kurds. In other words, Al-Manar presented them as 
fighters who were independent from the Syrian government army forces; fighters who faced the 
combatants of the armed opposition in order to protect themselves. 
 
In 2013, the channel highlighted the conflict of the Kurds and their battles against Jabhat Al-
Nusra and ISIS. The prominent feature of these battles was that of continuity and perseverance. 
Al-Manar did not name the dead people of the Kurds 'martyrs'. It rather branded them as 
'murdered people/ casualty'. This is an implied denotation that Al-Manar wanted to be neutral 
concerning everything about the Syrian Kurdish situation. That is, its attitude towards the Kurdish 
pivot during the Syrian crisis was utterly different from its biased one towards both the Syrian 













The Index for Chapter 7 
Al-Manar´s Random Sample 
Report Title in Arabic Report Title in English Report Date Link Internet 
سوريا تشكل لجنة للتحقيق في أحداث 
 درعا "المؤسفة"
Syria forms a committee to 





تظاهرات مليونية مؤيدة للرئيس األسد 
 في كل أنحاء سورية 
Million-man demonstrations 
in support of president Assad 
spread all over Syria. 
29/03/2011 
http://www.almanar.com.lb/adetails.php?eid=26503 
اعترافات الخلية السورية: النائب 
 الجراح متورط و األخير سيصدر بيانا
The confessions of the 
Syrian Cell: The parliament 
member Al-Jarrah is involved 





سانا: استشهاد شرطي سوري و 
في تلبيسة 11إصابة   
SANA: Martyrdom of a 






وزارة الداخلية السورية: تنظيمات 
وريةسلفية تعبث بإستقرار س  
Syrian Ministry of Interior: 
Salafi organizations are 
meddling around the 
independence of Syria. 
19/04/2011 
http://www.almanar.com.lb/adetails.php?eid=35883 
 سورية: تشييع عدد من الضباط و
 عزل رئيس األمن السياسي في بانياس
Syria: Funeral processions 
of a number of officers and 
discharging the head of Political 




من عناصر األمن و  5سانا: استشهاد 
آخرين بهجوم لمسلحين في درعا 5جرح   
SANA: Martyrdom of 5 
security personnel and injuring 
5 others in an attack by 
combatants in Daraa. 
24/04/2011 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=38463 
الجيش السوري يالحق المجموعات 
 اإلرهابية المسلحة في درعا
The Syrian army chases the 




الجيش السوري يطلق عملية عسكرية 
 في منطقة جسر الشغور
The Syrian army launches a 





الجيش السوري يحكم سيطرته على 
 جسر الشغور ويكتشف مقبرة جماعية
 
The Syrian army strongly 
controls Jisr Al-Shughour and 
discovers a mass grave. 
13/06/2011 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=61696 
مئات اآلالف يتظاهرون في دمشق 
م( دعماً 2300رافعين أطول علم سوري )
 للرئيس األسد
 
Hundreds of thousands 
demonstrate in Damascus 
raising the longest Syrian flag – 




مقبرة جماعية وكميات من األسلحة 
 في جسر الشغور
 
A mass grave and amounts 
of weapons in Jisr Al-Shughour. 
20/06/2011 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=65666 
تظاهرات مليونية في سورية دعماً 
 لمسيرة االصالح بقيادة الرئيس األسد
 
Million-man demonstrations 
in Syria supporting the reform 





صنداي تايمز: مسلحون يشنون 
القوات الحكومية السوريةهجمات ضد   
 
Sunday Times: armed 




مسيرات رافضة للتدخل في شأن 
مئات الالجئينسورية.. وعودة   
Marches rejecting 







 and hundreds of refugees come 
back. 
سوريا من المخيمات  265عودة 
 التركية الى جسر الشغور
 
The return of 265 refugees 




وحدات الجيش السوري تغادر مدينة 
 حماه بعد إعادة األمن واإلستقرار إليها
 
The units of the Syrian army 
leave the city of Hama after 




بينهم ضابط في  9إستشهاد سانا : 
كمين نصبته مجموعة إرهابية مسلحة 
 وسط سورية
 
SANA: the martyrdom of 
nine personnel among which 
were officers in an ambush by 
an armed terrorist group in the 




سورية أوقفت شحنة أسلحة مصدرها 
 "اسرائيل" قادمة من لبنان
 
Syria seized an armament 





سانا: ضبط اسلحة اسرائيلية في 
 حمص.. ونفي اخبار قناة الجزيرة
 
SANA: seizing Israeli 
weapons in Homs and 





تظاهرة حاشدة في السويداء تأييداً 
 للرئيس األسد ودعماً لإلصالح
 
A massive demonstration in 
Suwaidaa in solidarity with 





 سورية تلتف حول األسد
 




األمن السوري يلقي القبض على 
 مسلحين ويضبط أسلحتهم
 
Syrian security arrests armed 




سورية.. أهالي الشهداء يؤكدون 
 تمسكهم بالوحدة الوطنية ونبذ الفتنة
 
Syria:  martyrs' families 
assure their strong hold of 




اء والجرحى في عشرات الشهد
 تفجيرين إنتحاريين كبيرين في دمشق
 
Tens of martyrs and 
wounded people in two 




توقيت وأسلوب التفجيرين في قلب 
 دمشق.. دالالت أمنية وسياسية
 
The timing and method of 
the two explosions in the heart 




إصابة ضابطين كويتيين 
 بجروح في سورية
 
Injuring two Kuwaiti 
officers in Syria. 
10/01/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=164076 
المتظاهرون في دمشق : شعبنا 
 أقوى من جيوشهم
 
Demonstrators in Damascus: 




دمشق تتهم إرهابيين بتفجير 
عبوات ناسفة وخطاً لنقل النفط في 
 حمص
 
Damascus charges terrorists 
of bursting explosive devices 
and a pipeline for transporting 
oil in Homs. 
06/02/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=179799 
جهاديون" يقاتلون في "
سورية..واستمرار اإلشتباكات بين 
 األمن والجماعات المسلحة
"Jihadis" fight in Syria, 







 personnel and the armed groups 
carry on." 
سورية: اشتباكات بين الجيش 
والمسلحين والقاء القبض على 
 مطلوبين
 
Syria: Clashes between the 
army and the combatants and 




مقاتلون فرنسيون في حمص، 
 وجوبيه للفيصل: من يعيد لنا جنودنا؟
 
French fighters in Homs, 
and Juppé to Al-Faisal: "Who is 






شهادات عن فظاعة جرائم 
 المجموعات المسلحة في بابا عمرو
 
Testimonies of the ugliness 




السلطات السورية تحتجز ثالثة 
عشر ضابطاً فرنسياً جرى توقيفهم 
 في حمص
 
The Syrian authorities detain 
thirteen French officers who 




حشود كبيرة في دمشق 
والحسكة دعما للرئيس األسد 
إلصالحاتوا  
 
Large crowds in Damascus 
and Hasaka in support of 
president Al-Assad and reforms. 
07/03/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=197029 
عدد كبير من الشهداء والجرحي 
تفجيرين ضربا دمشقفي   
 
A large number of martyrs 
and injured people in two 
explosions which hit Damascus. 
17/03/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=202679 
تحبط سانا: السلطات السورية 
 تسلل ارهابيين من تركيا
 
SANA: The Syrian 
authorities abort the infiltration 
of terrorists from Turkey. 
26/03/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=207769 
ت الجرحى تسعة شهداء وعشرا
في انفجار استهدف حي الميدان في 
 دمشق
 
Nine martyrs and tens of 
injured people in an explosion 
which targeted Al-Maidan 
Quarter in Damascus. 
27/04/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=227259 
تنظيم "القاعدة" يتبنى تفجيرات 
دمشق ومسلحون يهجرون قرية 
 بأكملها في حماه
 
Al-Qaida organization 
adopts the explosions of 
Damascus and armed people 




أهالي القبير يتهمون 
 المجموعات المسلّحة بالمجزرة
 
Al-Qubair people charge the 
armed groups for the massacre. 
08/06/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=250729 
سورية.. مجموعة مسلحة تقتل 
مواطنا وتمثل بجثثهم وتخطف  26
 آخرين في ريف حلب
 
Syria: an armed group 
murders 26 citizens and maims 
their dead bodies, and kidnaps 
others in suburb of Aleppo. 
22/06/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=258929 
إستشهاد راجحة وشوكت 
وتوركماني في تفجير انتحاري في 
 مبنى األمن القومي بدمشق
 
The martyrdom of Rajha, 
Shawkat and Turkmani in a 
suicide bombing in the building 




أ.ف.ب : الجيش الحر يفشل 
السيطرة على معبر نصيب على ب
 الحدود السورية األردنية
 
AFP: the Free Army fails to 
control the border crossing point 




الجيش السوري يالحق فلول 
 المسلحين في دمشق
 
The Syrian army chases the 







سورية.. هدوء في دمشق، 
 ومعارك عنيفة في حلب
 
Syria: calm in Damascus 
and violent battles in Aleppo. 
26/07/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=274459 
الجيش السوري بدأ معركة 
حلب.. وإشتباكات عنيفة مع 
 الجماعات المسلحة
 
The Syrian army has 
launched the battle of Aleppo 




اشتباكات عنيفة في حلب 
والجيش السوري يكبد المسلحين 
 خسائر فادحة
 
Fierce clashes in Aleppo and 
the Syrian army causes gross 
losses to the combatants. 
01/08/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=278281 
الجيش السوري بدأ هجومه 
البري على حلب وسيطر على حي 
 صالح الدين
 
The Syrian army has started 
its land attack on Aleppo and 
controlled Salahuddeen Quarter. 
08/08/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=282281 
الجيش السوري الحر".. "
 إجرام بال حدود
 




تقدم للجيش في حلب ومالحقة 
للمسلحين في دير الزور ودرعا 
 والالذقية
 
An advance of the army in 
Aleppo and a chasing of the 




الجيش السوري دخل داريا.. 
وصور تظهر مجازر ارتكبها 
 المسلحون
 
The Syrian army enters 
Darayya and images that show 




الجيش السوري يواصل عملياته 
في ريف دمشق وحلب ويحبط 
 هجوماً على مطار في ادلب
 
The Syrian army continues 
its operations in Damascus 
Suburb and Aleppo, and 




السورية: تحرير األحداث 
مخطوفين والعثور على سيارات 
 مفخخة وأسلحة اسرائيلية
 
Syrian events: freeing 
kidnapped people and 
discovering a booby-trapped 
vehicle and Israeli weapons. 
04/09/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=299411 
الجيش السوري يطهر الحجر 
االسود بدمشق، وتحطم مروحية في 
 دوما
 
The Syrian army sanitizes 
Al-Hajar Al-Aswad in 
Damascus, and a helicopter 
crashes in Douma. 
20/09/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=310921 
الجيش السوري يكسب المزيد 
من مناطق المسلحين في حلب 
 ويتصدى لمحاوالت تسلل من لبنان
 
The Syrian army gains more 
areas from the combatants in 
Aleppo, and confronts 




عشرات الضحايا في سلسلة 
تفجيرات ضربت ساحة سعد هللا 
 الجابري وسط حلب
 
Tens of victims in a series of 
explosions hitting Saadallah Al-




المسلحون السوريون ينتهكون 
 الهدنة
 




المنار في قرية ربلة السورية 
 بريف القصير
 
Al-Manar in the Syrian 






تفجير في دمشق وشريط فيديو 
سوريا 28يظهر تصفية   
 
An explosion in Damascus, 
and a video footage that shows 
the liquidation of 28 Syrians. 
02/11/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=338921 
مسلحون يقتحمون بلدة كردية 
 في الحسكة ومجزرة في دير الزور
 
Armed people break into 
Kurdish town in Hasaka, and a 
massacre in Deir Ezzor. 
09/11/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=344431 
مذبحة ينفذها المسلحون في 
 راس العين شمال سورية
 
A massacre committed by 
the armed people in Ras Al-Ain 
in the north of Syria. 
14/11/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=348391 
تظاهرات "معارضة" في 




in Syria raise the logo: "The 
Free Army" is a thief!!! 
30/11/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=361316 
سوريا ... عودة االتصاالت إلى 
طبيعتها على وقع تصاعد 
 االشتباكات في ريف دمشق
 
Syria – Communications are 
back to their nature as the 




كاميرا المنار تواكب الجيش 
ا بريف دمشقالسوري في داري  
 
Al Manar's camera 
accompanies the Syrian army in 
Darayya, Damascus Suburb. 
05/12/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=365641 
المقاتلون في سورية: القاعدة ... 
 والمجموعات األخرى
 
The fighters in Syria: Al-
Qaida and other groups. 
09/12/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=368651 
المجموعات المسلحة في سورية 
 تستخدم األطفال لقطع الرؤوس
 
The armed groups in Syria 
employ children for beheading. 
10/12/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=369811 
مسيرة في حلب تطالب بطرد 
المسلحين وارتفاع حدة الحملة 
وريةاإلعالمية على س  
 
A march in Aleppo asking 
for expelling the armed people, 
and the media campaign against 
Syria gets severer. 
16/12/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=374076 
سوري:  مصدر عسكري
مسلحون استعملوا غازا كيماوياً أدى 
جنود سوريين 7إلى استشهاد   
 
A Syrian military source: 
combatants used chemical gas 
which led to the martyrdom of 
seven Syrian soldiers. 
23/12/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=380006 
المنار تعاين النازحين السوريين 
 في الالذقية
 
Al Manar examines the 
situation of the Syrian displaced 
people in Lattakia. 
24/12/2012 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=381366 
 معركة دمشق الثالثة وآمال المسلحين
 
The third battle of 
Damascus, and the expectations 
of the armed people. 
01/01/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=387116 
مخيم الزعتري للسوريين في األردن.. 
 حالة كارثية
Al-zaatari Camp for Syrians 




 Foreigners in Syria … Why األجانب في سوريا .. لماذا يقاتلون ؟
are they fighting? 
12/01/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=395796 
الجماعات المقاتلة في سورية .. 
 فروعها وبنيتها
The fighting groups in Syria 
… Their branches and structure. 
20/01/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=401626 
المنار في عقربا.. وهيومن كاميرا 
رايتس ووتش تتهم المسلحين بانتهاك 
 اماكن العبادة
Al Manar's camera in 
Aqraba and Human Rights 
Watch charges the combatants 
of violating worship places. 
23/01/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=404526 
العثور على عشرات الجثث لموالين 
  للنظام جنوب حلب
Finding tens of corpses of 







المسلحون يصعدون هجماتهم ضد 
المواقع الدينية ، ونقمة شعبية على النصرة 
 في ادلب
The combatants escalate 
their attacks against the 
religious sites, and popular 




ضباط أتراك في  4انباء عن مقتل 
حلب ومسيرات شعبية في المدينة دعما 
 للجيش
News of killing 4 Turkish 
officers in Aleppo, and popular 
processions in the city in 
support of the army. 
15/02/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=422239 
تفجيرات دمشق الدموية: عشرات 
 الضحايا ومئات الجرحى
Damascus bloody 
explosions: tens of victims and 
hundreds of injured people. 
21/02/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=426409 
دفعة جديدةٌ من المقاتلين المدربين 
اميركي الى سورية ودمشق تشتبه في 
 االردن
A new group of combatants 
trained by Americans to Syria, 
and Damascus suspects Jordan. 
15/03/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=443869 
دمشق: استخدام المجموعات المسلحة 
الكيميائي "تصعيد خطيرللسالح  " 
Damascus: using chemical 
weapons by the armed groups is 
a serious escalation. 
19/03/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=446321 
من طرطوس تستقبل النازحين 
المحافظات السورية والدولة توفر لهم 
 جميع احتياجاتهم
Tartous receives the 
displaced people from the other 
Syrian governorates and the 




الجئون سوريون في الزعتري 
 يروون بعضا من االنتهاكات بحق النساء
Syrian refugees in Al-
Zaatari tell some of the 




آثار سورية لم تسلم من نيران 
 المجموعات المسلحة
The Syrian ruins were not 




كاميرا المنار في قلب مدينة داريا 
  بريف دمشق
Al-Manar's camera in the 




معاناة أهالي القرى السورية المتاخمة 
 للحدود مع لبنان
The suffering of the people 
in the villages which lie on 
borderline with Lebanon. 
15/04/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=467939 




لقضاء على مجموعات مسلحة في ا
 "الغوطة الشرقية" االستراتيجية
Eliminating armed groups in 




 The takfiri people and التكفيريون وتفجير المقامات
exploding the shrines. 
01/05/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=480849 
دير مار الياس بريف القصير .. شاهد 
المسلحينعلى ارتكابات   
Mar Elias Monastery, Al-
Qusair suburb, is a witness of 
what the combatants commit. 
08/05/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=486089 
كيف حول المسلحون في سورية 
المواطنين إلى مقار عسكرية؟منازل   
How the armed people 




ة فيديو اعدامات جديد من قبل جبه
 النصرة
A video footage of new 
executions by Jabhat Al-Nusra. 
16/05/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=492089 
المنار" زارت عائلة شهيدين "
الرقة اعدمتهما المجموعات المسلحة في 
 بسورية
Al-Manar visited the 
families of two martyrs 







المسلحين في  المنار تدخل مخابئ
  القصير
Al-Manar enters the hiding 




معركة القصير كشفت التصدع في 
مجموعات المسلحةبنية ال  
Al-Qusair's battle uncovered 




آالف قتيل مسلح أجنبي في  6
   سوريا 
6 thousand foreign 
combatants murdered in Syria. 
10/06/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=509689 
مجزرة يرتكبها المسلحون في بلدة 
 حطلة بدير الزور شرق سورية
A massacre committed by 
the armed people in Hatla town, 
Deir Ezzor, east of Syria. 
12/06/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=510759 
الجيش السوري يستعيد البحدلية 
لذيابيةوحلبون بريف دمشق ويتقدم باتجاه ا  
The Syrian army retrieves 
Al-Bahdaliya and Halboun, 




وقتل جديدة بفتاوى التكفير جرائم ذبح 
 في سوريا
New slaughter and murder 




يمان الحلبي كاميرا المنار بحي سل
وتدحض الشائعات والجيش السوري يحقق 
 نجاحات في برزة
Al Manar's camera in 
Salman Al-Halabi Quarter 
disproving the rumors, and the 




مواد غذائية متفجرة وبيوت مفخخة.. 
 تركة المسلحين في ريف حمص
Explosive foodstuffs and 
booby-trapped homes, the 




أهالي حلب تحت حصار المجموعات 
 المسلحة في شهر رمضان
The people of Aleppo under 
the combatant groups blockade 
in the month of Ramadan. 
10/07/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=533669 
معارضون سوريون: اشتباكات بين 
"الجيش الحر" و"مسلحين جهاديين" في 
 ادلب
Syrian opponents: clashes 
between "the Free Army" and 
"jihadi combatants" in Idleb. 
13/07/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=536006 
المواطنون السوريون في ظل 
 الحصار




مراسل الموقع: عدد ضحايا مجزرة 
جثة نقلت  220خان العسل يفوق المعلن و
 حتى االن لحلب
The site's correspondent: the 
number of the victims of Khan 
Al-Asal is over what has been 
declared and 220 corpses have 
been moved to Aleppo so far. 
28/07/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=549140 
يتحدون السوريون في دمشق 
 األوضاع األمنية
The Syrians in Damascus 
defy the security situation. 
28/07/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=549349 
المسلحون يتراجعون في ريف 
الجيش السوري في الالذقية والمنار تواكب 
 عملياته
In Lattakia suburb, the 
armed people withdraw and Al- 
Manar accompanies the Syrian 
army in its operations. 
06/08/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=558116 
مجازر الجماعات التكفيرية في ريف 
الالذقية.. ناجون يتحدثون عما جرى مع 
  عائالتهم
The massacres of the takfiri 
groups in Lattakia suburb, 
survivors talk about what 
happened to their families. 
10/08/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=561086 
الوضع الميداني بريف الالذقية 
الشمالي باتجاه الحسم الكامل لمصلحة 
 الجيش السوري
The field situation in the 
northern suburb of Lattakia is 
about to be fully decided in 






الجماعات المسلحة في سوريا ... هل 
 !استخدمت الكيماوي ؟
Did the armed groups in 
Syria use the chemical weapon? 
25/08/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=572548 
الشارع السوري مرتاح لجهوزيَّة 
 الجيش تجاه أي تهديد محتمل
The Syrian street is satisfied 
with the army's readiness for 
any possible threat 
01/09/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=578840 
قتيال لـ "جبهة النصرة" في كمين  40
 للجيش السوري بريف دمشق
40 of Jabhat Al-Nusra were 
murdered by an ambush by the 




الجيش السوري على 
ون عن تقدمه...ومقاتلون من القوقاز ينشق
 الجماعات المسلحة
The Syrian army is still 
advancing and combatants from 




يش السوري يسيطر على تلة الج
الراقم بجبال الزبداني وعلى مناطق 
 استراتيجية بادلب
The Syrian army controls 
Al-Raqem Hill in Zabadani 




المنار ترصد احراق المسلحين 
 للمساجد والقرآن الكريم في ريف حمص
Al-Manar monitors the 
burning of mosques and the 
Holy Quran by the armed 
people in Homs suburb. 
15/09/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=591589 
جبهة النصرة" تتبنى المجازر بحق "
 العشرات من اهالي قرى ريف حمص
Jabhat Al-Nusra adopts the 
massacres against tens of the 
people of Homs suburb. 
16/09/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=592601 
قرى في  7الجيش السوري يستعيد 
 حماه والنصرة تواصل اجرامها
The Syrian army retrieves 7 
villages in Hama, and Al-Nusra 
continues its criminality. 
16/09/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=592898 
القاعدة تسيطر على اعزاز السورية.. 
 وتركيا تقفل معابرها
Al-Qaida controls Aazaz, 
Syria, and Turkey closes all its 
border crossing points. 
19/09/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=595769 
إتفاق لوقف النار في أعزاز بين 
القاعدة والجيش الحر واستمرار 
 المواجهات مع األكراد
A cease-fire agreement in 
Aazaz between Al-Qaida and 
the Free Army, confrontations 
with Kurds continue. 
20/09/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=596880 
و"الحر" يمتد االقتتال بين "داعش" 
  الى الالذقية
The conflict between "ISIS" 




مسلحو "داعش والحر" يتبادالن 
اتهامات الخيانة ويهددان باستئصال 
 بعضهما
The combatants of "ISIS" 
and "the Free" exchange the 
treason charges and threaten of 
exterminating each other. 
24/09/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=600147 
داعش" ترفع رايتها على كنائس "
 الرقة وتهاجم االكراد في ريف حلب
“ISIS” raises its flags on the 
churches of Al-Raqqa and 




الحرب بين "داعش" وباقي 
الجماعات المسلحة متواصلة والخسائر 
 كبيرة
The war between "ISIS" and 
the other armed factions 




مجازر ضد االنسانية ارتكبها 
 المسلحون في الالذقية
Anti-human massacres 




إنجازات للجيش السوري في باب هود 
 بحمص وتقدم في وادي الضيف بإدلب
The achievements of the 






Homs, and an advance in Wadi 
Al-Dhaif in Idleb. 
المنار تدخل منطقة البويضة في ريف 
 دمشق بعد سيطرة الجيش عليها
Al-Manar enters Al-
Buwaida area in Damascus 




تفجير انتحاري يودي بالعشرات في 
 حماه
A suicide bombing that kills 
tens in Hama. 
20/10/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=623258 
مفتي "جيش االسالم في سورية" 
 "يهاجم "جبهة النصرة
The "Mufti" of Jaish Al-




تراجع مستمر للمسلحين...السبينه 
  والغزالة في قبضة الجيش السوري
Continual withdrawal of the 
armed people. Al-Sbeina and 




مؤسسات سورية تكافح الغالء تنفيذاً 
 لوعد الحكومة
The Syrian institutions 
control the rise in prices in 




استسالم مسلحين في ريف دمشق.. 
 والجيش يستعيد المعامل في حلب
The surrender of combatants 
in Damascus Suburb  and the 




الجيش السوري يتقدم في جبال 
اء التوحيد تؤكد مقتل القلمون، وجماعة لو
 قائدها قرب حلب
The Syrian army advances 
in Al-Qalamon Mountains, and 
the group of Liwaa Al-Tawheed 




الجيش السوري يستعد العديد من 
 المناطق االستراتيجية في حلب وريفها
The Syrian army retrieves 
many strategic areas in Aleppo 
and its suburb. 
21/11/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=654344 
المسلحون يستهدفون أحياء بدمشق 
 والهدف .. تهجير المسيحيين
The armed people target 
quarters in Damascus with the 




مقتل قائد لواء القعقاع بريف دمشق 
 ضمن سلسلة تصفيات قيادات المسلحين
The murder of the leader of 
Liwaa Al-Qaqaa in Damascus 
Suburb within a series of 




المنار تكشف عن جرائم المسلحين في 
في دير عطية بريف  مستشفى الباسل
 دمشق
Al-Manar uncovers the 
crimes of the armed people in 




عم اسرائيلي وعربي وغربي د
 للمسلحين في سوريا.. باعتراف احد قادتهم
Israeli, Arab and western 
support of the combatants in 




قتلى المسلحين في ريف دمشق 
 معظمهم سعوديون
Most of the combatants’ 
murdered people in Damascus 
Suburb are Saudis. 
01/12/2013 
http://archive.almanar.com.lb/article.php?id=664255 
 Robbing the ruins in سرقة اآلثار في معلوال بريف دمشق

























رغم الظروف.. الحكومة السورية 
تستمر في دعم وتأمين مادة الخبز لكافة 
 المواطنين
In spite of the hard 
circumstances, the Syrian 
government continues to 




مسيرة داعمة للجيش في حي دمر 
البلد بدمشق وأوضاع معضمية الشام إلى 
 التسوية
A procession supporting the 
army in Dommar Al-Balad 
Quarter, Damascus, and the 
situation of Muadamiyyat Al-







This study tackles the coverage of the internal aspect of the Syrian crisis by Al-Jazeera and Al-
Manar channels from 2011 to 2013; that is before the expansion of the crisis on the Arab and 
international levels and before the role of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) got larger as 
an effective actor in the events. The target of the research is knowing the characteristics of the 
news discourse which is subject to several effects of which are the political, economic and 
religious. It also aims at uncovering the propaganda tools through studying the interrelation 
between the verbal and non-verbal signifiers. The research samples are made up of news reports; 
the news report has been chosen as a study subject matter because it is the cornerstone of the news 
coverage. The quantitative analysis of this study shows the general features of the mechanism of 
the coverage by the two channels while the semiotic analysis presents accurate details that deal 
with the interrelation between the verbal and non-verbal signifiers. This eventually helps know the 
mental images that the two channels attempt to introduce to the recipient and know the tools of 
forming these images.  
The importance of the research is linked to the geopolitical importance of Syria especially in 
the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the overlapping of many variables which influence the 
course of events and the mechanism of media. It is also linked to the influential role of Al-Jazeera 
and Al-Manar channels on the public opinion of the Arab peoples. Al-Jazeera channel led to wide 
argumentation as from its start because of its coverage of many “sensitive” issues on the Arab and 
international levels and because of its being linked to or subject to the Qatari policy. Al-Manar is 
considered by Israel Hezbollah’s strongly effective weapon in the psychological war. The relation 
of Hezbollah to the Syrian government and leadership is an important factor which influences the 
channel’s coverage mechanism in Syria. This research is listed in the frame of propaganda. The 
overlapping of the variables makes the studied channels direct and indirect propagandists at the 
same time. It is direct because they cover the crisis in accordance with the interests of their owners 
and indirect because they convey the propagandas of the conflicting parties in Syria. This fact 
boosts the importance of the research which studies the methods and tools employed in portraying 
the Syrian crisis.  
   The outcomes proved the validity of the research hypotheses. Al-Jazeera’s trend is 100% 
against president Assad and the Syrian government while Al-Manar’s is supportive by 100%. Al-
Jazeera supported the opposition while Al-Manar was hostile to it. Al-Jazeera depended on the 
opposition’s sources by 70.4% but at the same time tried to prove its credibility through recalling 
pro-regime sources. The results of the study contradict the studies that affirm the objectivity of Al-
Jazeera only because it recalled a variety of sources. This confirms that the quantitative analysis is 
not enough to know the channels’ trends; the contexts in which the sources were mentioned must 
be studied. Al-Manar mainly depended on the sources of the Syrian opposition by 21.88% but the 
purpose of all the contexts was supporting the Syrian government’s propaganda (emphasizing 
credibility through employing the enemy’s sources). Moreover, the channel recalled anti-regime 




conspiracy against the Syrian president and government. Al-Jazeera, on the other hand, recalled 
the sources which supported the Syrian government in order to disprove the propaganda of this 
government. The correspondents of Al-Jazeera only made up 1.9% of its sources.  Al-Manar’s 
correspondents practiced self-censorship; in spite of their existence on the Syrian ground, they 
depended on the Syrian Space Channel and other Syrian sources as a main source of the news. Al-
Manar seemed as an extension of the Syrian Space Channel and the other Syrian channels which 
support Assad. 
Al-Jazeera introduced itself as an independent and strong entity whose strength parallels that 
of the international news agencies. It did not depend much on news agencies and marginalized the 
role of the Arab media as a news source. The sources of Al-Manar were various but the target of 
recalling them was supporting the Syrian government propaganda. 
The two channels almost used all the propaganda´s technical methods mentioned in chapter 
four: 
Assertion. The two channels mainly employed this tool through condensed highlighting of 
the slogans of the conflicting parties. Al-Jazeera heavily presented the opposition’s slogans 
while Al-Manar asserted those of the Assad’s supporters.  
Repetition. Both channels repeated definite ideas and sentences. The previous studies in 
the field of propaganda affirm that repetition reinforces the idea in recipient’s mind. However, 
this study proved that repetition is enormously controlled by the contexts. Al-Jazeera 
repeatedly reported the propaganda of the Syrian government but repetition led to trivializing 
rather than reinforcing it. This confirms that the influential ability of repetition is connected to 
the affiliation identity of the sender and to the news contexts.  
Exaggeration. Al-Jazeera adopted this tool as an offensive weapon against the government 
and Assad. It covered the demonstrations, the security and military statuses, and the war results 
in a way that suggests that the situation in Syria is disastrous. To attain this purpose, the channel 
employed all the verbal and non-verbal signifiers including the voice tone and speed. The 
research uncovered an important tool which can be considered as a means of magnification; it 
is presenting the sounds which the videos include along with the news story. Al-Jazeera 
presented these sounds by a rate of 84.55%. For example, the audience can see and hear the 
bombing and simultaneously hear the news discourse supported by a voice tone which is able 
to charge them with emotions and irritation. 
Name-calling. Both channels used this tool but in different ways. Al-Manar explicitly and 
directly named the opposition with insulting descriptions such as “terrorists”. This means that 
the channel did not hesitate to show its attitude. However, Al-Jazeera adopted the direct and 
indirect methods. Sometimes, it described the government forces as “Shabbiha” declaring its 




as “the Assad’s gangs” or “the criminal gangs”. Al-Jazeera seemed careful not to be 
professionally accused of vocabulary selectivity.  
Glittering generalities. This technique was used to assert the legality of the conflicting 
parties. Al-Jazeera linked the movements of the opposition to great values like “freedom 
revolution” and “revolution against injustice”. Al-Manar linked the movements of the 
government and its supporters to values such as “national sovereignty” and “confronting 
conspiracy and strife”.  
Reincarnation, similarity, imitation and plain folk. The two channels adopted this 
technique through: Language selectiveness, Familiarity and identification and reincarnation of 
interests.  
Recipient-credible testimonials. Before talking about this technique, the targeted recipient 
by these channels must be known. The results of analyzing the sources may help to know this. 
The two channels highlighted the ally’s and the enemy’s sources altogether. This means that 
the opponents and supporters of the government were targeted by the two channels. The 
government’s supporters may doubt its propaganda when they see the ways of presenting it by 
Al-Jazeera. Similarly, the supporters of the opposition may doubt it when they see its 
declarations and activities presented on Al-Manar. Choosing the recipient-credible 
testimonials is a complex issue. It is not limited to recalling declarations but to the contexts of 
recalling them as well.  
Bandwagon. Al-Jazeera enticed people and called them to join the forerunners to 
demonstrations and armed movements. It portrayed the opposition as representative of all the 
Syrians; therefore, all those who do not join it are losers. Al-Manar attempted to attract the 
recipient to the Assad supportive camp through concentrating on the firmness of the Syrian 
state and its close victory and affirming the legality and patriotism of the government which 
faces a conspiracy due to its stance of resisting the occupation. Both channels concentrated on 
the popularity of the propagandists through employing phrases like “million-man 
demonstrations”, “the Syrians want” and “people want”.  Promoting popularity aims at 
polarizing the recipient to join the forerunners. 
Simplification. Both channels presented simple uncomplicated ideas and sentences. The 
research found out an important tool that serves simplification.  Al-Jazeera’s discourse was 
often in classical Arabic language because it did not contain many interviews with the people 
in Syria. Al-Manar’s news content included interviews with people talking in their own local 
Syrian dialects. Classical Arabic is not in fashion among the people so it may seem somewhat 
difficult, while the simple expressions in the local dialects can influence the Syrian recipient 
more than the classical discourse. However, when the Syrian dialects are unintelligible for 
other Arab peoples Such as Tunisia and Sudan, classical Arabic becomes a means of 




Emotional enticement. The two channels depended mainly on this tool. Some emotional 
enticements are motivating for all societies such as concentrating on the gravity of murdering 
women and children. Some others are suitable for the Syrian or Arab culture in general. For 
instance, Al-Jazeera considered the men’s tears or their having to cook an important indication 
of the enormity of the crisis. 
Euphemism. Al-Manar adopted this technique in order to raise the morale of Assad 
supporters and to prove that the crisis is still under control. For example, instead of saying “the 
return of the refugees” it said “the return of citizens”. 
Diverting Attention. The two channels used this means when it was not possible to deny a 
certain event or opinion. They used to cover other events or the same event but concentrating 
on points that reshape the reality in the recipient’s mind. For instance, when several channels 
were talking about the opposition’s killing of unarmed supporters of Assad, Al-Jazeera could 
not deny it. However, it used to allocate very few seconds about the topic then complete the 
report talking about the regime’s crimes against the people. 
Lesser Than Two Evils. This tool was used to make the people patient and to encourage 
them to persevere in their attitudes. This is done through admitting the difficulty of the situation 
and simultaneously announcing that victory and achieving aims are close.  
Fabricating Crisis. I could not verify the use of this technique by the channels due to the 
lack of accurate neutral information that can be considered a reliable reference which is free 
from the influence of politics.  
Pinpointing the Enemy. Al-Jazeera made Assad an enemy of the opposition and portrayed 
overthrowing him as the solution of the crisis. The opposition’s enmity of the regime seemed 
as an enmity of Assad as an individual and the regime seemed as just a tool in the hand of the 
ruling individual. On Al-Manar’s screen, the enemy was of multi identities and forms, but in 
its multi forms and degrees it seeks to implement a universal conspiracy.  
Inflicting Terror and Chaos. Al-Jazeera intimidated of future and of the probable results. 
Its discourse can be considered frightful especially for the Syrian recipient. 
Lying and Misleading. Lying was not exclusive to changing realities but it was through 
selecting frames and absenting others.  
   The principles of propaganda of the conflicting parties were similar to the most prominent 
ones which Anne Morelli argued. -We do not want war. Al-Jazeera asserted the peacefulness of 
opposition and the reluctance of the opponents to draw the revolution to an armed conflict. When 
the channel covered the activities of the armed opposition, it stressed that the opponents had to 
carry the weapons in order to protect themselves. Al-Manar portrayed the activities of the 
government security and army as reactions against the armed terrorists’ actions and as an 




-The opponent camp is the only one responsible for the war. -We are defending noble aims. On 
Al-Jazeera screen, the opposition seemed as holding right, principles and lofty goals. On Al-
Manar’s screen, the government and the army seemed holders of sublime national and moral 
values. -Our enemy commits crimes and does terrible actions on purpose, but if we made some 
mistakes, they would be unintended. What is going on is a war between civilization and barbarism. 
The enemy commits its crimes without any moral deterrent. -We respect the rules of war and fight 
with honor but the enemy uses prohibited weapons. -Educated people and artists support our cause. 
-Our cause has a sacred character, so it should be defended and sacrificed to death. -All those who 
doubt us and our cause are traitors. 
 -Demonizing the Opponent. Al-Jazeera demonized the regime in most of the details of the 
topics it discussed. Al-Manar demonized the opposition in each piece of news. Anne Morelli sees 
that personifying the opponent is a very important technique. This is what Al-Jazeera did, but Al-
Manar did not do. When it discussed that Syria was exposed to an international universal 
conspiracy in which there are many influential, financing, directing actors, it did not show the 
recipient an identified clearly depicted opponent. The armed opposition seemed a player who was 
implementing the agendas of powers some of which were known and some managed all what was 
going on in Syria from behind the scenes. This method can be considered an important propaganda 
weapon in the psychological war because it magnifies the image of the enemy and absents its 
features at the same time. The Syrian government supporting recipients – especially those who are 
unable to analyze the data accurately – may feel the greatness of their country which resists great 
powers that participate and cooperate to destroy their country.   
-Our losses are few but the enemy’s are much larger. The results of the research were 
compatible to this basis only in some contexts. Al-Manar – reportedly from pro-Syrian government 
sources – heavily highlighted the regime’s losses in 2011 and the first months of 2012 because the 
victim’s image served the propaganda which attempted to polarize the Syrian and international 
public opinion. However, when it needed to raise the morale, the discourse changed to become 
that of heroism and victories. Al-Jazeera concentrated on the losses of the unarmed opposition, but 
it did not talk much about those of the armed one. Hence it preserved the images of the hero and 
the victim at the same time. 
 
The research concluded other methods that can be a contribution to the field of propaganda: 
Denying and trivializing the existence of the other. Al-Manar totally denied the existence 
of a peaceful opposition with legal demands and did not mention any people’s demonstration 
or movement against Assad. Denial seemed as a defensive means in the psychological war. Al-
Jazeera did not deny but it trivialized the importance of the processions and movements which 
supported Assad and the government. Trivialization here seemed as an offensive means. I 
argue that trivialization is stronger than denial in the psychological war. Denial leads to 
doubting the credibility of the channel whereas trivialization gives the recipient the illusion 
that the channel is objective or neutral (it treated the different topics). At the same time, it 




The people say the truth. Next to opposition sources, Al-Manar secondly depended on 
eyewitnesses in Syria by 20.45%. All their declarations were supportive and assertive of the 
government’s propaganda. But Al-Jazeera employed verbal and non-verbal signifiers to prove 
that all the Syrian people are opponents of Assad. Therefore, the opposition sources seemed as 
an official spokesperson in the name of all the people. Al-Manar was interested in reporting 
the viewpoints of males and females and its sample contained different age groups. The 
differences in the women and men’s discourse content can be considered an important means 
of propaganda. The women used emotional words such as love, wedding party and merry 
making, whereas the men used phrases of challenge in the face of the conspiracy against their 
country.  
More concentration on the actions of the enemy. Both channels concentrated on the 
activities of the opponent. Al-Jazeera highlighted the actions of the regime by 72.29% in 
comparison to those of the armed opposition which constituted 27.70%. Al-Manar highlighted 
the actions of the armed opposition by a rate of 65.45% in comparison to those of the regime 
which made up 34.54%. This method is important because it gives the propagandists a 
justification for all their actions. 
Simultaneous absence and presence. Both channels did not talk much about the 
declarations and actions of Assad. They rather made him present in a lot of verbal signifiers. 
For example, Al-Jazeera said: “Assad’s regime” and “Assad’s soldiers” while Al-Manar used 
to highlight Assad’s name in the statements of the people who supported him.  Through this 
method, Al-Jazeera underestimated Assad as a president yet it highlighted his dictatorship 
through personifying the regime and the army.  Al-Manar kept the crisis far from 
personification and made the people defend Assad instead of defending him itself in a dry news 
discourse.  
Hinting. Al-Jazeera employed this method when it presented only a part of information 
which can be only understood by those who know the information in full. Hinting can carry 
different signifiers of which: 1- The channel assumes that the recipient knows the information. 
2- The channel uses ambiguity as one of the methods of agitation propaganda. 3- The sender 
urges the recipient to search for the facts. 
Linking the destiny of the state to that of the people. Al-Manar adopted this method to 
show that the enemy of the State and the people are one; therefore, the people should support 
the State in order to confront this brutal enemy. It always connected between military and 
civilian victims or between the militant’s aggressions on private and public property.  
Alleviation of events´ severity through employing non-verbal signifiers. In order to raise 
the morale and to portray the Syrian State as a strong one despite the crisis, Al-Manar adopted 
this method. It did not show images of immense destruction as Al-Jazeera did. It only presented 
images of murdered people in contexts where the Syrian State appeared as a victim of 




correspondents selected places such as parks which are considered a symbol of rest taking into 
consideration that the green color symbolizes relaxation and tranquility in the Syrian culture. 
At a time when the black and grey colors were predominant on Al-Jazeera screen, Al-Manar 
highlighted the colors which are considered optimistic in the Syrian culture such as the red, the 
white and the green. The shaky unclear images were repeated on Al-Jazeera screen, but Al-
Manar’s images were stable and the movement of the camera was easy in such a way that 
suggests that the situation was still under control. This difference is attributed to the fact that 
Al-Jazeera depended on the activists’ video footages which spread on the internet while Al-
Manar depended on the images of professional journalists. Al-Manar did not present the sounds 
included in the footages by a rate of 70.53% and we only heard the voice of the reporter. This 
technique helped alleviate the severity of the events.  
One signifier is stronger than many combined signifiers. Like when Al-Jazeera presents 
many positive verbal and non-verbal signifiers about Assad yet the voice tone of the journalist 
is sarcastic. The voice tone changes the literal meaning of the other signifiers. This 
demonstrates that the number of signifiers and their repetition may not eventually reinforce the 
idea in the mind of the recipient; the influence is not related to quantity but to quality. This 
stresses the importance of the semiotic analysis and affirms the inability of the quantitative 
analysis to give exact results because it depends on the manifest meaning of the word. 
Direct and indirect adoption. For example, Al-Manar adopted the item “martyr” for all 
the regime and civilians’ murdered people; that is, it took a religious attitude towards the 
identity of the murdered people. However, Al-Jazeera did not consider the opposition’s 
murdered people martyrs in its discourse but it highlighted this term a lot through presenting 
the voices included in the video footages. For instance, we hear people shouting: “the martyr 
is Allah’s beloved person”. 
Direct and indirect bias. The partiality of Al-Manar was direct while that of Al-Jazeera 
was indirect in many contexts.  
Repeating the opponent’s propaganda. This affirms that repetition itself does not fortify 
the idea but the methods of arguing information and the ways of giving the signifiers do. If 
repetition had reinforced the idea, many of Al-Jazeera audience would have believed in the 
regime’s propaganda because the channel presented it repeatedly. 
Exploiting the characteristics of Arabic language especially in the context of emotional 
enticement. It is like when Al-Jazeera says: “the bereaved city of Daraa”. The word city is 
feminine in Arabic. Al-Jazeera compared the city to a bereaved woman in order to influence 
the recipient in favor of the opposition. 
Islamizing events and accusing the enemy of sectarianism. Al-Jazeera and Al-Manar 
Islamized the crisis as from its beginning but in different contexts. Al-Jazeera showed the 




people. Al-Jazeera also Islamized the demonstrations and the armed opposition movements. It 
even presented the soldiers of Jabhat Al Nusra as heroes and saviors of the people. Moreover, 
it considered the militants of ISIS revolutionaries. Al-Manar presented the opposition as 
extremist takfiri elements that assault people even in the holy month of Ramadan and on Holy 
Days (Eids). This mental image undermines the true affiliation of opposition to Islam. The 
opposition is extremist but it does not represent true Islam. The Islamic symbols and the veiled 
faces of the opposition members seemed as emblems of heroism and nobility on Al-Jazeera 
screen. However, the same symbols and faces seemed as signs of intimidation and horror on 
Al-Manar screen.  
Animalizing the opponent and undermining them through exploiting the socially 
prevailing meanings of words. This is like when Al-Manar states that the Syrian army 
attacked the “dens” of the militants or “purified” the places where they exist. The prevailing 
meaning of the word den is “the animal’s habitat” and the word purify is linked to germs.  
Exploiting the signifiers of the mentioned numbers. This applies to the number of 
murdered people, the wounded, the refugees, the detainees and even those of the names of the 
areas mentioned in each report. 
Mentioning the names and types of weapons. Al-Jazeera verbally and non-verbally 
concentrated on the regime’s weapons while Al-Manar concentrated on the opposition’s 
weapons but it presented the images of the tanks of the Syrian army especially in the context 
of talking about the advance of the military forces and their reclaiming of regions. Al-Manar 
absolutely negated the use of chemical weapons by the regime whereas Al-Jazeera asserted it. 
Unleashing the recipient's imagination through verbal and non-verbal signifiers. That 
is like when Al-Manar states that the Syrian army caused the militants heavy loss without 
telling the type of loss, or like when Al-Jazeera presents images dominated by darkness and 
talks about crowded demonstrations. Not giving definite information or the unclear content of 
the image may make each recipient imagine the event according to his/her experience and 
connection to the topic. 
Linking victory or the feelings of hope to religious phrases. For example, the soldiers 
and leaders of the conflicting parties used phrases like “Inshallah”, “God will” and “Thank 
God”. Linking the achievements to the will of God makes the cause of the propagandist sound 
sacred, helped and supported by God.  
Showing the attitudes of children. Al-Manar presented the attitudes of the kids to assert 
their love of Assad and eventually the legality of his rule. However, Al-Jazeera exploited their 
statements which criticized Assad and his actions which caused their homelessness and agony. 
Kids are an important tool in the context of emotional enticement. 
Disproving the other’s propaganda. This was done in different ways of which are: 




voice tone. Presenting the propaganda of the opponent verbally and undermining it by 
presenting contrary images. Ordering the propagandas in the news; Al-Jazeera used to present 
the propaganda of the Syrian government first followed by that of the opposition in order to 
refute it. Al-Manar explicitly refuted Al-Jazeera’s news and considered them lies. The channel 
also disproved the opposition through reminding the audience that its coverage is a field one 
and not reported from unreliable sources.  
The channel gives the interviewed people political trends. For example, the appearance 
of the people on Al-Manar’s channel may make the recipient feel that they were supporters of 
Assad even if they did not declare it. That is because Al-Manar never interviewed opponents 
and all the contents of its news are supportive of Assad. The channel may give a political 
identity to the murdered people as well. The recipient may reckon that the murdered people on 
Al-Manar’s screen are supporters of Assad due to the news contexts.  
Balancing between the discourses of strength and weakness. Both channels attempted to 
create a balance between the discourse of victimization and heroism. They also employed this 
tool to serve the requirements of each stage.  
Images free from a clear meaning and leading the recipient’s perception to the images 
content through the news story. This is like when Al-Jazeera presents shaky foggy images 
whose content in indistinguishable along with a news story about attacking the civilians by the 
regime’s forces.  
Exploiting the position of another enemy in the region. The attitudes of Israel were the 
most prominent. Al-Manar talked about the gladness and relaxation of Israel in case Assad was 
overthrown; this is an evidence of the nationalism and integrity of the president. Al-Jazeera 
did the same when it talked about the fear of Israel of the opposition’s control on the bordering 
areas. This implicitly means that Assad is secretly allied with Israel so it is afraid of his 
overthrow and that the opposition is nationalist and loyal to the nation’s causes.  
Exploiting the interference of allies. Al-Jazeera portrayed the Syrian regime as a weak 
one which needs the interference of Hezbollah, Iraqi factions, Iranian forces and Russian 
soldiers. On the other, hand, Al-Manar exploited the interference of the militants who came 
from several countries to support the opposition and depicted them as mercenaries and 
terrorists.  
Stressing that the enemy is not strong and that it is rather brutal. 
Indirect mentioning of the weakness of the opponent in order to justify the military 
actions. This is like when Al-Manar says “The Syrian army has eliminated a group of 
terrorists” without using phrases such as “weak opposition”. Not declaring the weakness of the 




Affirming the maintaining attitudes and continuation such as the continuation of 
demonstrating, the continuation of military confrontation, maintaining positions by the people.  
The camera’s angles and movement. As when Al-Jazeera employs the low shot to show 
the opposition soldiers as heroes and when Al-Manar uses the same shot to show the same 
soldiers as murderers; the low shot magnifies the meaning of the content.  
Exploiting non-traditional spoils, especially communication technology. Mobile phones 
played an important role in disclosing some of the enemy’s activities. The conflicting parties 
used images and videos which they found during battles so that they could detect the 
opponent’s mistakes. Both parties used to document their torturing the other and boast it. 
Metaphors. Al-Manar used metaphors of a positive optimistic character like “spectrums” 
and “flow” to describe the processions which supported the government. However, it changed 
the positive meaning of some signifiers such as “harvest” and turned them into a negative 
symbol when it used them in the context of talking about the actions of the terrorists. In most 
contexts, Al-Jazeera borrowed from nature negative signifiers like “strong wind” and 
“infection” to talk positively about the activities of the opposition. This may help magnify 
events and serve agitation propaganda. 
Linking all the catastrophic results to the opponent. The two channels did not mention 
any actions of actors who exploited the chaos and committed crimes in Syria. These actors 
may not belong to any camp. All the catastrophes seemed as a result of the actions of the 
opponent.  
A signifier on behalf of another. For instance, on Al-Jazeera’s screen we see heavy smoke 
and we immediately know that it indicates bombarding the civilians by the government forces. 
Exploiting the characteristics of the female. This is related to the culture of the targeted 
audience. For example, the Arab audience may be influenced when they see a female journalist 
accompanying the armed opposition’s activities more than getting influenced by seeing a male 
journalist. The confidence of the journalist as a female in the fighters may increase the 
significance of the message concerning the positivity of the opposition. The female’s voice 
talking about the results of the war can be more influential than the male’s. Quantitative studies 
are important to be more certain of the validity of this idea.   
Integrating the statistical presentation with the emotional enticement. This technique 
helps to create balance between the logical the emotional signifiers as they address the mind 
and feelings of the recipient.  
Addressing the topic of ethnicities and sects indirectly. For example, the two channels 
concentrated on presenting the images of the women who wear the Sunni hijab to assert the 




contrary seemed on Al-Jazeera screen. The names of the areas and the dialects of the people 
were also methods of addressing the different sects indirectly. 
The journalists’ engagement in the events. The positions of the media personnel were 
clear through many signifiers: pronouns, verbs, their relation to people during the coverage, 
their relation to the fighters, and their voice tones. The relation of Al-Jazeera’s journalists with 
the armed and civilian opposition seemed strong while the work of Al-Manar’s journalists 
seemed as an extension of the activities and goals of the government. 
Human icons. Each icon was used to emphasize the validity of the conflicting parties 
propaganda. Some of the mentioned personalities were historical, some became heroes as a 
result of media effect, and others represented ethnicities and sects. 
The propagandists spread their propaganda through mentioning or adopting that of 
another party. Al-Manar is the main conveyer of the ideology of Hezbollah. Al-Jazeera is the 
most important media tool in the hand of the Qatari government. Both exploited the 
propagandas of the Syrian government and the opposition for the service of the ideologies they 
represented. 
Each signifier mentioned in the sample can be considered a weapon that serves the 
propaganda whether the journalist chose it intentionally or unintentionally, consciously or 
unconsciously. The cognitive semiotics confirms that the human being often practices 
communication unconsciously. Distinguishing between the intentionality or unintentionality 
of the sender is not possible but the signifiers can be studied on the basis of many sciences and 
approaches. Each part of the news messages shows a weapon that can be used in propaganda. 
Integrating the analysis Methodologies helps discover these weapons. In this research I noticed 
that the physical direction of the content in the image can be a war tool but I could not reach a 
scientific result because I needed to quantify the directionality of the content. However, this 
requires time and allocating a large space of the research. The same thing applies to quantifying 
the characteristics and tones of voice, the duration of the shots and the scenes allocated for 
each topic.  
I argue that the physical direction of the content can provide indicators of an important 
mechanism of forming the content. These indicators may lead the researchers into discovering 
new relationships between the sender and the signifiers, the receiver and the signifiers, and the 
relation of the signifiers to each other. For example, I noticed that when Al-Manar talked about 
the advance of the Syrian army forces with tanks included in the images, it often directed the 
tanks to the right side of the recipient. And many times, when the channel talked about 
evacuating the army from areas after regaining safety, it directed the tanks and armored 
personnel carriers to the left side of the recipient. Many hypotheses can be formulated about 
this issue but they can only be proved by using several research methods and approaches. Al-




with multi directions in such a way that the regime’s forces seemed like the monster which 
exists everywhere, in all the directions of the Syrian ground, sky and water.  
Studying the signifiers of repetition and its influence on the recipient requires using more 
than one research methodology. Studies of propaganda consider repetition a means of 
reinforcing the ideas yet it may lead to banality. 
The practice of propaganda is very complicated and analyzing this practice is more 
complicated due to the interlacing of many variables which sometimes make things look simple 
and sometimes complex and inconsistent. The previous recipient of media messages has 
become a sender and a receiver at the same time owing to the characteristic of interactivity 
which modern communication media provides. The propagandist needs more efforts to 
influence the audience. Emotional enticement which previously was basic to propaganda is no 
more able to influence the recipient. The propagandist needs to use logic and employ firmly 
connected overlapping of the verbal and non-verbal signifiers in order to persuade the audience 
emotionally or mentally.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
